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GOGO WHO LIVES ON WILD VEGGIES
Gogo M.M.from the Mbuluzi area
outside Mbabane, lives on wild
vegetables... not because she is
primitive, but because she has got
no alternative - a victim of old age
with no-one to look after her. Her
son, who is also her only child and
would be looking after her,
became paralysed after being
stabbed by muggers. Gogo M.,
who says she is in her eighties,
walks several kilomètres to
Mbabane to beg. When com-
passionate people give her a few
coins, she buys mealie-meal to
feed herself and her daughter-in-
law who has remained close to her
despite the tragedy that befell her
husband. (...) She appealed to
people to come to her rescue and
blamed the government for not
caring for old people. (...)
Gogo M. is not the only old
woman who is desperate in the
area. "(...)other old women of the
area are suffering too, however
their case is not too bad because
they have their able bodied
children with whom they stay. I
suffer the most because I have one
child who can't work because hè is
paralysed". she said. "Some people
make fim of me when I beg for
money. They tell me to ask for
money from my children, but I
don't blame them... they don't
know my situation", she added.
(...)
(The Times of Swaziland, October
14,1990)
With many thanks to the editorsofthe Times of Swaziland for givingme a copy
of the photograph and giving me permission îo use it for this thesis.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Social security research and development thinking
In récent years both researchers and policy makers have shown a growing
interest in social security in developing countries (see, for example,
Ahmad et al. 1991, Von Benda-Beckmann et al 1988 and 1994, McGree-
vey 1990, Meereboer 1994, Midgley 1984, World Bank 1990). This grow-
ing interest is not just a matter of fasbion. The évolution of research on
social security in developing countries is closely related to thé post-war
évolution of our ideas on what development is, and our expériences with
development policies. Singer (1989) gives an excellent overview of forty
years development thinking and expériences. Hère I draw heavily on his
paper, in order to describe thé development of research on social security
in developing countries.
In thé 1950s and 1960s, development was understood as économie
growth and, influenced by thé ideas of Keynes and of Harrod and Domar,
économie growth was understood as capital accumulation, This capital
accumulation should be attained by macro-économie planning and effec-
tive government action. Singer (1989:65) indicates that "thé wartime
expérience of thé industrial countries had indeed demonstrated the poten-
tial for macro-economie planning and effective government action to
maximize output, mobilize latent resources, achieve füll employment, and
at the same tune control inflation and achieve a more equal income
distribution." There was a strong feeling that the same principles of
planning, macroeconomic management of the economy by governments
and mobilisation of latent sources were also applicable to the économies
of developing countries. But the emphasis on physical capital accumula-
tion as the 'crux' of development led, in due course, to a tolérance for
income inequalities and the persistence of poverty. This took the form
either of a belief that growth was sooner or later bound to 'trickle down'
and spread to the poor, or even more strongly that increased income
inequalities were a necessary priée to pay for the time being until the
luxury of genera! welfare could be afforded from an enlarged cake of
production (Singer 1989:78-9). These beliefs were based on the ideas and
théories of Kuznets, Rostow and Lewis on stages of development and
income distribution. However, expériences showed little sign of trickle
down, and growth did not lead to redistribution.
With the heavy emphasis on physical capital accumulation, exclud-
ing the rôle of human capital in the development process, and the belief
that growth would ultimately lead to redistribution, social security in
developing countries was not a major issue of concern in the 1950s and
1960s. A few (rare) examples of attention to social security issues can be
found in Lewis (1955) and Kassalow (1968), but in genera! sustained
growth came before social security. However, when trickle-down effects
did not occur and growth did not lead to redistribution, the ideas on
development (policy), and consequently social security, began to change.
In the 1970s, growth of the Gross National Product (GNP) became less
synonymous with development, although it was still considered as a
necessary condition for development (Singer 1989:87). Singer (1989:88)
describes that the shift in objectives from simple growth of the GNP took
two forms: "one was the establishment of employment as a major and
over-riding objective; the other was a shift to redistribution. With employ-
ment création moving to the centre as the crux of development, such
'human capital' aspects as training, skills, health and other factors in
productivity were now given increased weight, compared with physical
capital accumulation." The employment-oriented development policy, in
which thé International Labour Office (ILO) played a major rôle, pro-
vided an essential bridge between thé growth-oriented strategy emphasiz-
ing 'productive' investment, and a subséquent poverty orientation which
could be accused of shifting to 'unproductive' activities such as redistribu-
tion, provision of social services and direct income support (Singer
1989:89-90). The greater emphasis on human capital led also to the
second major shift in development objectives: a greater concern with
income distribution. The strategy of 'Redistribution from Growth' became
a strategy of 'Redistribution with Growth', promoted by thé World Bank,
and of thé 'Basic Needs Approach', promoted by ILO.
Both shifts in development objectives also led to an increasing
interest in social security in developing countries. Social insurance
schemes and thé provision of social services became part of the 'Employ-
ment Strategy'. As a resuit of thé 'Basic Needs Strategy', community-based
projects and programmes were set up to provide poor people directly with
food, clothing, housing, and so on. It is, therefore, not surprising that in
thé 1970s the first studies on social security in developing countries also
appeared (see Mouton 1975, Mesa-Lago 1978). A main characteristic of
these studies is their focus on social security initiatives in thé 'formai
sector', including state-initiated social welfare schemes, and social insur-
ance programmes set up by companies and the state. This focus on
'formai social security' is not surprising. Firstly, it is in line with a develop-
ment strategy directed at creating jobs in thé formai sector. Secondly, the
ways in which social security programmes were organised and carried out
were adopted from thé industrialized countries. In thèse countries thé
state had and still bas a major rôle in redistributing income and welfare
and hence in carrying out social security programmes. It was thought that
developing states should hâve thé same major rôle in organizing social
security and welfare (re)distribution.
In sum, in thé 1970s expectations were fairly high and it was generally
thought that developing countries had now embarked on the proper road
to development. The two oil booms in thé 1970s, followed by recession in
thé industrialized countries, could not, in thé first instance, disturb this
optimism. However, thé effects of thé recession on thé developing coun-
tries came later: the 1980s were characterized by the debt crisis and deep
économie recession in most parts of the developing world. South East
Asia was the only exception. In thé case of thé other régions, thé 1980s
might be described as a decade 'lost' for development: "thé attention
shifted to debt settlement, stabilisation, adjustment, structural change,
libéralisation, etc. - often at the expense of everything that previously had
been understood as development, whether growth, employment, redis-
tribution, basic needs or réduction of poverty " (Singer 1989:96). Singer
(1989:96) also concludes that "(...)this shift can be associated with thé
ascent of neoliberal idéologies and a shift in décision making on develop-
ment strategy to creditors, donors and international financial institutions.
Structural adjustment was considered a pré-condition for new develop-
ment. "
The conséquences of the adjustment programmes for social security
and social welfare of poorer people were devastating. UNICEF studies on
l'Adjustment with a Human Face' (Cornia et al. 1987) and 'The Impact of
the World Recession on Children' (Jolly and Cornia 1984) documented
that the new adjustment policy contributed to less welfare of women and
children and led to greater inequalities of income distribution. Because of
the emphasis on structural adjustment, social security as a major compo-
nent of development vanished trom sight and received relatively little
attention compared with the 1970s.
However, at the end of the 1980s the tide turned. As the decade of the
1980s drew to a close and a broad décline of investment, physical and
human, and widespread reversai of development became apparent,
résistance to the neoliberal counter-revolution increased (Singer 1989:
105). It became accepted that adjustment should have a more 'human
face'; that more external resources were needed to smooth the process of
adjustment; that adjustment must be made less harsh and stretched out
over a longer period, Moreover, in 1987 the Brundtland Report on 'Our
Common Future' introduced new ideas in development thinking by
emphasizing the need for 'sustainable development'. In this report, not
only does the state of the natural environment become part of the devel-
opment concept, but also the balance between growth and redistribution
ui the development concept is restored and income redistribution and
social security become intégral parts of it again (WCED 1987-.50,106). The
same process of restoring the balance can be found in the 1990 World
Development Report on 'Poverty' (World Bank 1990:90-102), and also in
the form of the increasing attention being paid by the United Nations to
social security issues and poverty (see, for instance, Meereboer 1994).
The renewed attention being paid to social security and social
welfare policy in developing countries is reflected in scientific research on
the subject. Two recent major contributions are Von Benda-Beckmann et
al. (1988) and Ahmad et al (1991). The former study includes mainly
contributions from (legal) anthropologists and sociologists, while in the
latter study (development) economists dominate. What these two studies
have ui common is that attention is paid not only to so-called 'formal
social security', but also to 'informal social security', which can be gen-
erally understood as non-state initiated social security (for a detailed
discussion on thé concept of social security, see Chapter 2 of this study).
An important reason for this increasing attention being paid to
informai social security might have been that the transplantation of social
security models of industrialized countries onto developing countries led
to many problems. As Hirtz (1989:22) states, "serious doubts émerge as to
whether, with the transfer of thé goals of social security of the industrial-
ized nations, one can also transfer the undeniable success of this part of
thé world". A main problem was that thèse models did not fit into thé
actual social and économie conditions in developing countries, in which
not only is a modest percentage of the working population involved in the
'formal' sector, but also "a diverse constellation of risks vis-à-vis the
compensation conditions have to be assumed" (Hirtz 1989:22). Gradually
policy makers have become aware that large sections of the population in
developing countries do not depend on the 'formal' sector for their social
security and that, notwithstanding the existence of widespread poverty,
people in developing countries have and maintain their own mechanisms
for providing themselves with social security, independently of what is
initiated by the state or development agencies. Social security research
has been more directed, then, at questions as to how these 'informai' or
'traditional' social security mechanisms operate, and how 'formal' or
'modern' social security mechanisms can be linked and adapted to these
'informai' social security mechanisms. This study addresses primarily the
fïrst of these two questions, and focuses on Swaziland as a case study.
1.2. The plan of this study
This study starts with three theoretical chapters on social security in
developing countries. In Chapter 2 the concept of 'social security' is
discussed, the research problem and research questions are presented, and
also the methodology used to answer these questions is explained. In
Chapter 3 we elaborate on the fonction and place of social security
mechanisms in society and the several factors that can influence this
function. In Chapter 4 the most important social security mechanisms to
be found in the rural areas in developing countries are presented.
The content of the theoretical chapters is illustrated with an exten-
sive case study on social security mechanisms in the rural areas of Swazi-
land (Chapters 5 to 9). In Chapter 5 a brief profile is given of the King-
dom of Swaziland. In Chapter 6 there is an analysis of the rural home-
stead, which can be considered as one of the most important social
security mechanisms in Swazi society. In Chapters 7 and 8 other important
'informai' social security mechanisms in the rural areas of Swaziland are
discussed, such as kinship relations, neighbourliness, associations, and
chiefdom. In Chapter 9 the actual opération of the discussed social
security mechanisms is further illustrated by analyzing their rôle for the
Swazi individual and in the event of three major contingencies.
The final chapter summarizes and présents the main conclusions,
as well as pointing out the present study's limitations. It is here that also
the possible directions for future research will be explored.
2. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter this study's research problem and methodology are
explained. This présentation is preceded by a brief discussion on the
définition of the main concept of this study, namely social security. The
development of the term 'social security' has been analyzed thoroughly by
many authors (see Atkinson 1989, Berghman 1986, ILO 1984a, Kaufmann
1973, Midgley 1984, Partsch 1983, Veldkamp 1984). This study is not
going to repeat their analysis and discussion. In this chapter the concept
of social security is discussed by placing it in the context of developing
countries, namely in a social-cultural, economie and political context
which differs considerably frorn the original context in which the concept
of social security developed, the industrialized market economy. In
Section 2.2 a brief introduction is given to the 'conventional' view of
social security prevailing in developed market économies. In Section 2.3
the limitations of this view of social security are discussed in relation to
developing countries. In Section 2.4 a broader view of the concept of
social security is presented, which is strongly advocated by legal anthro-
pologists and rural sociologists concerned with social security in develop-
ing countries (see, for example, F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1988, F.
and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1994, Bossert 1985, Fuchs 1985, Hirtz 1989).
Based on this broader view on social security, the research problem and
research questions are presented in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6 thé metho-
dology used for this study is explained, with an outline of the choice of
the theoretical setting (Section 2.6.1) as well as the ways in which data
were collected (Section 2.6.2).
2.2. Conventional understanding of social securîty
The term 'social security' has its origin in the welfare policy of US
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In 1934 Roosevelt announced a program
for "security against the hazards and vicissitudes of life" (quoted by
Partsch 1983:14). This announcement was followed in 1935 by the Social
Security Act. The subtitle of this Social Security Act gives an indication of
what was understood, then, under social security: "An Act to provide for
the général welfare by establishing a system of fédéral old âge benefits,
and by enabling the several states to make more adequate provision for
aged persons, blind persons, depended and crippled children, maternai
and child welfare, public health, and the administration of their unem-
ployment compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise
revenue; and for other purposes" (quotation from Partsch 1983:15, foot-
note 10).
Since then, it has been the International Labour Office (ILO)
which has provided the main standards for what should be understood by
social security and what not. In 1942 the ILO defined social security as
"the security that society turnishes through appropriate organization
against certain risks to which its members are exposed" (ILO 1942:80). It
suggested that only those schemes should be regarded as social security
which "provide the citizen with benefits designed to prevent or cure
disease, to support hun when hè is unable to earn and to restore him to
gainful activity".Moreover, to be labelled as social security these schemes
had to be provided by the state and made available to those who require
assistance subject to defined conditions of eligibility.
In the ILO's Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention No.
102 of 1952, social security schemes are further divided into nine
branches: they include the statutory provision of (1) médical care, (2)
sickness benefit, (3) unemployment benefit, (4) old age benefit, (5)
employment injury benefit, (6) family benefit, (7) maternity benefit, (8)
invalidity benefit, and (9) survivors benefit. The description in this con-
vention is still widely used as a conventional or formal définition of social
security (Midgley 1984:82). In many industrialized countries, therefore,
social security includes one or more of four types of social security
schemes: (1) social insurance, (2) social assistance, (3) employer liability,
and (4) social allowances. The basic features of these schemes are sum-
marized m Table 2.1.
Table 2.1. Basic features of major social security schemes in industrial-
ized countries
Type of scheme
Social insurance
Social assistance
Employer liability
Social allowances
Primary source of
runding
Contributions
from employee,
employer, and
usually from pub-
lic revenues
Public revenues
Employer
Public revenues
Coverage
Members of
social insur-
ance schemes
Persons in
designated
catégories who
have low
incomes
Employees in
designated
catégories
Persons in
designated
catégories
Particular
entitlement
qualifica-
tions
Contribu-
tion record
Means test
Domicile
Employ-
ment cri-
teria
Domicile
Source: Midgley 1984:85
Departing from the conventional understanding of social security, several
authors have analyzed social security in developing countries by investi-
gating the major schemes as mentioned in Table 2.1 (see Fuchs 1985,
Mackenzie 1988, McGreevey 1990, Mesa-Lago 1978 and 1991, Morgan
1991, Mouton 1975). Their conclusion is that social security is not found
on a large scale in these countries: on average 10 per cent or less of the
population in so-called LDCs or LLDCs are covered by social security
(Fuchs 1985:35-37). This coverage differs between the major continents.
Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest coverage numbers, while coverage
numbers in Latin American countries rise up to 35 per cent. These studies
would lead to the conclusion that social security hardly exists in develop-
ing countries. Is this really the case? In the next section the conventional .?
understanding of social security is critically reviewed. f^ ^
fe
2.3.Critics on the conventional définitions f
In recent years many authors have argued that for a good understanding K
^of social security in developing countries a broader view of the concept is .|
necessary. Their main argument is that conventional définitions are based ^
on assumptions that do not tally with the social and economie reality to
be found in most developing countries. The définition of social security as
a particular set of (statutory) arrangements to cover a particular set of ir
social risks reflects tacit assumptions about one type of society only: the
industrialized market society. The critics concentrate on three major
items: (1) conventional définitions stress the important rôle of statutory ,
law, (2) formai définitions stress the rôle of the State in the provision of !
social security resources, and (3) conventional définitions make explicit
statements on what situation is considered to be normal and what situ-
ations are considered as exceptions (the social risks).
With respect to the first point of criticism, we start with an observation by
Hirtz (1989:12-3) that most définitions of social security contain state-
ments about two important éléments, which form the basis of the concept
of social security: (1) the définition of an exception as a déficient state of
affairs, and (2) the définition of the remedy to eradicate a deficiency.
Both éléments give rise to such questions as the following: Who defmes
what deficiency versus normalcy is all about? Where are the boundaries of
inclusion/exclusion of people in need? What is it that makes a deficit
become an issue calling for a remedy? Will the remedy be effective? Who
pays the bill for the remedies? Whose responsibility is it to have the
necessary instruments applied?
Hirtz (1989:12) continues that to answer the above questions value
judgements have to made then, and law enters the discussion. In devel-
oped countries an important rôle is assigned to (statutory) law, and the
parts of law that deal with social security are known as 'social law', 'social
législation', or 'law of social welfare'. It is this part of statutory law which
defines the exceptions from the raie as déficits, as well as the modes of
proper compensation. Furthermore, the law both sets and guards the
adequate procedures to implement the appropriate instruments for the
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identified cases (Hirtz 1989:14). This is all in accordance with the ILO
prescriptions that a scheme is a social security scheme when, among other
things, it is a statutory provision. Moreover, the conventional définitions
seem to restrict the term social security to those statutory provisions
which cover the nine branches indicated in the previous section.
Hirtz (1989:17) argues, then, that any such formal définition "is
bound to exclude some provisions which are known as social security or
social législation in some countries". In many developing countries, areas
such as éducation, labour législation, or agrarian reform are included in
their social législation areas. Moreover, as Hirtz (1989:17) also argues, "if
one is to understand thé formai définition of social security as 'provisions
in thé social security field' then fiscal measures, benefits provided by
voluntary organizations as well as occupationally linked benefits of
employers have to be included". When we concentrate on thé majority of
thé population in developing countries, namely thé rural population, laws
of a more général nature, granting security of land, regulating leasehold,
subsidizing spécifie insurances, or providing assistance exclusively for a
rural environment under prescribed circumstances also affect the social
security of the rural population.
There are, therefore, many more 'grey' areas: laws and régulations
pertaining to production, post-harvest management, and marketing and its
taxation affect the général well-being of thé population. Thèse cases hâve
a dual nature: thèse laws and régulations are originally concerned with
général économie development and distributional aspects of national
wealth. The social welfare effects are then dépendent on thé expected
économie effects. However, one can agrée with Hirtz (1989:18) that "a
comprehensive study on the welfare of thé rural population ought to take
statutory provisions which also regulate thé (rural) economy into considér-
ation". In sum, investigating only social législation or social law in devel-
oping countries would give an incomplete picture of the entire social
security field.
An additional remark, closely related to thé previous remarks, is
that in developing countries thé actual Implementation of social security
législation extends only to a minority of thé population. It covers only that
part of thé population that finds itself in thé same économie conditions as
thé population in industrialized countries, in which industrial wage-labour
relations prevail. This is thé case because thé législation is 'imported'
from industrialized countries. In this sensé, as Hirtz argues (1989:18-9),
social security législation in developing countries is restricted to "exclusive
il
economie zones" where modern industrialization occurs and the same
labour conditions prevail as in industrialized nations. However, only a
minority of the population in developing countries is involved in wage
labour in modern industries. It is not surprising, then, to find that 10 per
cent or less of the population is covered by social security.
The second point of criticism is related to the rôle of the State in devel-
oped and developing countries. In the literature on social security in
developing countries it is argued (Woodman 1988, Hirtz 1989) that the
conventional or formai définitions draw attention to state institutions of
social security only. Woodman (1988:70) argues that this attention results
from the tendency for political discussion in developed societies to exalt
the state. Hirtz (1989:22-27), going into more detail, argues that conven-
tional understanding about the remedy against déficits places the responsi-
bility in the hands of State-run institutions, the responsibility being based
on some provisions in the constitution, Statutes, or court décisions. Even if
compensation for contingencies is provided for by private institutions
(employée insurance plans, workmen's compensation, or private insur-
ance), it is assumed to be the State's almost exclusive responsibility to
regulate thèse areas and to regulate thé procédural aspects of conflict
resolutions. Are thé states we are talking about capable of meeting thé
responsibility they hâve included in their constitutions? Hirtz (1989:24)
argues that "this question does not aim at the periphery - though import-
ant - of bureaucratie performance and control but at the center of state-
society relations and state capabilities in the developing countries. The
development of societies and thé institutionalized Nation-state bas been
researched for thé European continent, but the model of évolution thèse
théories gave rise to can not be directly transferred to developing coun-
tries." In contrast with thé European societies, in most developing coun-
tries thé formai superstructure of State agencies is imposed on society and
is not an original social évolution, and hence thé depth of State pénétra-
tion is of a différent quality (see also Geschiere 1985, Migdal 1988). The
important rôle that is ascribed to the State in the conventional under-
standing of social security should be reconsidered when looking at devel-
oping countries.
A third point of criticism of the conventional définitions is related to what
Hirtz (1989:20) calls "the different raie-exception clause in the Third
World". Conventional définitions of social security départ from a generally
prevailing quality, a state of affairs, a communality which is apt to be
generalized. The tacit assumption under the formai définitions is that
normally "every adult earns a living for himself and his family (at any rate
for the children and largely also the spouse) by working. The basic
assumptions are that work provides an income and that the income is
adequate to meet the needs of both the income earner and his family"
(Zacher 1988:21). In conventional définitions, these assumptions are taken
as a point of référence and considered as the 'social normality' and cases
are defined to which the generalized state (normality) does not apply.
Social security implies the restoration of this normality.
But what is normal in a developing country? That every adult is
able to realize an income is an exception rather than the rule (Hirtz
1989:20). For most people the normal state is 'poverty', and hardly being
able to realize any income. In this case social security is charged with
preventing further détonation of this 'normal state' or with providing
means to overcome this situation or both. Several authors have indicated
this call for including poverty alleviation in the définition of social security
(Drèze and Sen 1991, Hirtz 1989, Woodman 1988). '
The assumption on 'what is to be regarded as normal', which
underlies formai définitions, becomes even clearer when the major 'ab-
normality' is indicated: the loss of monetary earnings. The majority of the
'earners' in developed countries receive their monetary income by doing
wage-labour. Having access to work in developing countries is, again, the
exception rather than the rule (Hirtz 1989:22). Moreover, in developing
countries far more people are dependent on non-monetary earnings and
gains from what is generally called 'self-employment' (Woodman 1988:71-
2). All forms of income-producing activity are therefore in issue.
The référence to employment reoccurs when as the main cause of
loss of earnings formai définitions mention 'loss of employment' as result
of a core group of social risks. For people in developing countries other
risks might be a persistent danger for their (non-monetary) earnings,
especially to those who are self-employed. Because of technological
innovation and progress, developed countries have been able to eliminate
weather-induced and environmental risks, such as drought, insect plagues,
etc.. However, it can be argued that risks of this kind should be included
1
 Even the ILO acknowledges that poverty might become a major item m the social
secunty field, and "we are well aware that, in bnngmg anti-poverty pohcy m the main-
stream of social security pohcy, we are argumg for a major widemng of the field" (ILO
1984b 29).
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in the définition of social security when considering developing countries,
especially since most people obtain their earnings through self-employ-
ment in agriculture.
In sum, conventional définitions of social security include major tacit as-
sumptions about a particular type of society. The définitions implicitly
refer to a society in which statutory law prevails, économie conditions are
such that thé majority of people earn money for themselves and their
family by being employed in wage labour, and thé State has an important
rôle in social and économie life. Thèse conditions hardly exist in develop-
ing countries. But, nevertheless, also in thèse countries efforts are under-
taken to cope with adversities, misfortunes, calamities, and so on. Thèse
efforts only partly resemble thé efforts of industrialized nations, are often
non-statutory, and thé State is much less involved. The application of the
formai or conventional définitions of social security would resuit in a
major part of thé social security efforts in developing countries being
overlooked. Based on thé arguments above, a call for a broader view of
thé concept of social security seems to be necessary when considering
developing countries. In thé next section we go into more détail.
2.4. A different view of the concept of social security
The main common characteristic of those who advocate a different view
of thé concept of social security is their rejection of any formai définition.
Their point of departure is a conception of social security as a functionally
defined field of problems (F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1988:10): "ail
over the world, social and économie conditions are such that a multitude
of people suffer from insecurity: from uncertainty whether they will have
to eat or to be fed, whether they have a roof over their head, be cared for
when they are ill, be helped when they are young and old, hâve money to
support themselves when they hâve no means to earn it, and so forth. In
the most général sensé social security thus refers to thé efforts of individ-
uals, groups of individuals or organisations to overcome thèse insecur-
ities." In this view, then, social security is not connected to any particular
set of contingencies and schemes. Von Benda-Beckmann étal. (1988:10)
state that "the term can thus be taken to refer to social phenomena on a
variety of levels". In their view, the words 'social security' become multire-
ferential and should be used as an adjective rather than a noun. They
distinguish between four different kinds of social phenomena which 'social
security' can refer to: (1) ideology, philosophy, values and policy pro-
grammes, (2) thé économie and social position of people, (3) human
interaction in which goods and services are transferred for social security,
and (4) social relationships and institutions.
With respect to values, ideals, idéologies and, in their more
concrète form, policy objectives, we observe mat, within any single society,
there is hardly any agreement on one notion of social security. Différent
agents, distinguished by gender, âge and social class, may define social
security differently. According to Von Benda-Beckmann et al. (1988:10),
"there is no need to choose only one définition; instead we have to note
thé différences, inquire into their underlying causes, and establish their
varying significance. "
When social security refers to thé économie and social position of
people, a relative state of security or insecurity is indicated. This state of
(in)security is one dimension of the économie and social position of
people. Therefore, social security is not the same as poverty or wealth,
terms that usually indicate a relative level of income and/or standard of
living. Social security is relevant at whatever level of poverty and wealth,
which is one of the reasons why social security analysis should not be
confused with studies of poverty and welfare (see Atkinson 1989, Drèze
and Sen 1991, and also Chapter 3 of this study).
Social security may also indicate actual practice as observed in
collective and individual action. In this sensé social security can colour thé
most varied sorts of social processes. Building a house, for instance, as a
category of behaviour, is not as such a form of social security provision.
But building houses for thé poor, or for one's poor relatives whom one is
obliged to help, is a form of social security provision.
When social security refers to social relationships and institutions,
again gréât variety can be observed. In some societies institutions hâve
been established with thé spécifie purpose of providing assistance to needy
persons under given circumstances. In other societies no such institutions
exist; no spécifie social security institutions have been differentiated from
social organisations in général. Again we may notice thèse différences, try
to explain them, and analyze their significance.
Von Benda-Beckmann et al. (1988:11) acknowledge that thé above con-
ceptual approach "may, of course, still be too wide and too vague", but we
agrée with them that "a wide définition would allow us to distinguish more
sharply the unknown areas and conceptualizations needed." In a more
recent contribution, F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann (1994) argue that
rather than selecting one spécifie set of contingencies, relationships or
institutions, they prefer an approach that tries to identify which policies,
institutions, relationships and interactions form the social organisation and
the field of social security problems. It should also be acknowledged that
when social security refers to this variety of social phenomena any attempt
to squeeze policy, institution, practices and economie conditions into one
définition of social security nearly inevitably leads to paradoxical and
contradictory statements. Given the problems with the conventional
définitions as outlined in the previous section, the above approach to the
concept of social security is more suitable when analyzing social security
in developing countries. In point of fact, the same conceptual approach
should also be welcomed in the analysis of social security in developed
countries, as it is far better suited to the analysis of 'social security
pluralism' (Zacher 1988:26). Some recent contributions in the field of the
study of 'welfare pluralism' in Western developed countries have provided
the first steps towards such an analysis (see, among others, Johnson 1987,
Kaufmann et al. 1989, Rose 1989, and Wheelock 1989).
Given the above conceptual approach, the task for the researcher is to
make clear what kind of phenomena at what level of social organisation
he is discussing. By doing so, the multireferentiality of the words social
security becomes an asset rather than a bürden. Instead of presenting
another définition of social security in the next section, we will try to
make clear what 'social security phenomena' are studied in this thesis.
2.5. What this study is about
2.5.1.Object of the study
The approach to the concept of social security outlined in the previous
section is a useful basis for delimiting any research on social security. Of
course, the various social phenomena described are closely linked and
ultimately can and have to be related to the problem of social security.
This study concentrâtes on the phenomenon of social relationships and
institutions in which goods and services are transferred or appropriated
for social security purposes. These social relationships and institutions can
be referred to in as 'social security mechanisms' (F. and K. von Benda-
Beckmann 1994:22). This study thereby focuses on those social security
meehanisms which are non-state and non-market organised. Less attention
Will be paid to the State as social security mechanism, because for the
majority of the population in developing countries the State has no rôle in
providing for their social security. The characteristics of the non-state and
non-market social security mechanisms are generally that they operate in
rather small-scale networks of relationships and using resources internai
to~such networks, and that they are not or hardly differentiated out as
'social security' from ordinary forms of social and economie organization;
ordinary in the sense that no rtmctionally and/or institutionally differenti-
ated sets of relationships and institutions, and procedures for resource
transfers in specified situations or periods of distress are available or have
emerged in local social organisation (see also F. and K. von Benda-
Beckmann 1994). In literature these types of social security mechanisms
are usually collectively labelled 'informai', 'traditional' or 'community-
based'. Although this terminology is widely used to distinguish social
security mechanisms from so-called 'formal' or 'modern' social security
mechanisms, the use of dichotomies like 'modern-traditional' and 'formal-
informal' can lead to sévère misunderstanding.
The modern-traditional dichotomy mostly indicates the différence
between state organised institutions for social security, which are relatively
new in developing countries, and forms of social security which func-
tion(ed) in the traditional or precolonial society. In developing countries
we find many raies and principles relating to social security which are of
ancient origin and which have been maintained through tradition within
local communities. But the use of the term 'traditional' might imply the
notion of an 'unchanging tradition' in those societies. Also traditions 'dis-
covered' during the colonial period were influenced or even created by
economie and administrative measures of colonial governments. It makes
sense to describe as 'traditional', as von Benda-Beckmann et al. (1988:12)
suggest, "those forms of social security which are rationalized by référence
to tradition, and to distinguish them from historically more recent and
innovative legal raies and institutions, as for instance thé emerging local
institutions of self and mutual help. But it must be kept in mind that thèse
institutions are not necessarily informai, traditional, archaic or customary.
They may be modem phenomena, thé highly rational responses of people
united by a common interest in overcoming problems of need and risk
through a coopérative effort. " Besides this, large parts of state law can be
considered to be traditional, too. This is especially thé case with those old
raies which have been handed down through the générations within the
community of legal scholars, judges and state bureaucrats. Von Benda-
Beckmann et al. (1988:13) suggest that we might do better to speak, with
respect to any society, of old raies and recent innovations, of historical
and contemporary legal forms, if we want to give a temporal aspect to our
conceptual usage. They conclude, that "if we use the conventional pairs of
terms to identify in a genera! way state law on the one hand, and tradi-
tional law on the other, we are certainly embarking on a mistaken voyage
filled with false comparisons and false contradictions" (Von Benda-
Beckmann et al. 1988:13).
The second dichotomy to be found in literature is formal versus
informai social security mechanisms. As in other sphères of life, such as
labour relations and credit arrangements, 'formai' tends to be equated
with Western-style, state-initiated 'légal' social security mechanisms based
on starutory law, and 'informai' with social security mechanisms within
family, kinship and village groups, of which it is often said that their exist-
ence and opération are based on voluntary, spontaneous actions. By this
équation, however, we are almost certain to miss the informai éléments in
the Western, and the formal éléments in the indigenous Systems. The
actual working of Western social security mechanisms often resembles
very little a model of formai applications of raies. Local, indigenous social
security mechanisms, on the other hand, can be very formal. In the local
village and tribal sphères, we are dealing with sets of quite well defined
légal obligations and rights, on any reasonable view of what is 'legal'.
Obviously, we also find informal mutual help arrangements which tran-
scend légal obligations. These, however, should be distinguished from the
arrangements of both state and local laws. So we can distinguish formal
and informai aspects of social security mechanisms in different societies,
but cannot classify sets of social security arrangements (state and indigen-
ous respectively) along the same lines (Von Benda-Beckmann et al.
1988:12).
For reasons outlined above, this study will avoid as much as
possible the use of the terms 'informai' or 'traditional'. When the term
'social security mechanisms' is used in this study the reader should keep in
mind that we talk about those mechanisms which have the characteristics
as outlined in the first paragraph of this section: rather small-scale net-
works of relationships which in most cases use resources internai to such
networks, and which are hardly or not differentiated out from ordinary
forms of social and economie organisation.
A further délimitation of the research object is obtained by concentrating
on social security mechanisms operating in the rural areas of developing
countries. The urban context is considered to be quite different from the
rural context and it is assumed that social security mechanisms in urban
areas are subject to different conditions and socio-économie changes from
those in the rural areas. It is, however, acknowledged that urban and rural
areas cannot be considered as different entities. Strong links exist between
them in the form of people and means constantly being transferred back
and forth. The urban areas are, therefore, not completely excluded from
the analysis, but the focus in this study is 'rural'.
Furthermore, the study is applied to Swaziland in Southern Africa.
It is mainly practical reasons which have determined the choice of Swazi-
land as a case study. However, Swaziland exhibits socio-economic charac-
teristics that are typical for the région of Southern Africa as a whole. lts
culture and history is characteristic of the Bantu people that came from
Central to Southern Africa centuries ago. As in the entire région, there
has been long-standing contact with the monetary economy; this has taken
the form of modern-sector development in agriculture and industry within
the country, as well as participation in the industrial development of
South Africa through international migration. The rural areas are charac-
terized by land tenure Systems that can also be found elsewhere in the
région. Moreover, the social organisation and settlement pattern in the
rural areas, in which homesteads instead of villages dominate, is also
typical of the région as a whole. In short, Swaziland represents typical
characteristics of countries in the southern African région in terms of land
tenure, culture, history, and the economy, without suffering from some of
the extremes experienced elsewhere in the région. For these reasons, the
findings in Swaziland may also have relevance for other nations in the
région.
2.5.2.Research problem and research questions
i JWhich problem with respect to the research object does this study want to
sjdnvestigate? As also described elsewhere (Tieleman and Leliveld 1989),
the main issue in this study is the opération of social security mechanisms
in the rural areas of developing countries in genera! and in Swaziland in
particular. Due to a long history of contacts with what Marxists would
describe as 'the capitalist mode of production', radical social and econ-
omie changes have been taken place in the rural areas of developing
countries. The question is to what extent these changes have influenced
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and still affect rural social security mechanisms. In literature on Swazi-
land, for instance, opposite opinions can be found.
On the one hand it is argued that social and économie changes
hâve destroyed thé rural social security mechanisms from earlier times,
thereby threatening thé social security position of the rural population as
other mechanisms hâve not replaced the older ones. The main cause of
this destruction is thé incorporation of the Swazi rural population in
'capitalist relations of production' (see Neocosmos 1987). On thé other
hand it is argued that rural social security mechanisms hâve survived,
notwithstanding thé intrusion of capitalist relations of production, and still
provide people with social security (see several publications by Russell).
The truth will be somewhere in between. It cannot be that social
and économie changes (which also took place before thé intrusion of
capitalism) do not affect social security mechanisms at ail, but it is also
very difficult to believe that ail social security mechanisms from earlier
times were destroyed without new social security mechanisms arising. In
many rural societies a tendency to 'reconstruction' can be observed (see
Coquery-Vidrovitch 1985, Raatgever 1988). People will try to cope with
new social and economie realities and the insecurities thèse bring with
them. Whether they are able to cope or not dépends on many factors, and
thé situation will not be the same for ail rural people. This study wants to
contribute to thé above discussion by analyzing thé opération and
dynamics of social security mechanisms in rural areas of developing
countries by means of a case-study in temporary rural Swaziland.
In order to study thé above research problem three research questions are
essential. The first research question has to deal with thé problem how
thé opération and dynamics of social security mechanisms can be ana-
lyzed. In other words, we need an analytical framework that can be used
for analyzing thé data collected in our case study.
The second research question in this study is: What social security
mechanisms can be identified in rural Swaziland nowadays and how do
they operate? So the following questions can be posed. What are thé main
characteristics of each of thèse social security mechanisms? To what
extent is the mechanism an intégral part of social and économie relation-
ships and institutions, which also have other fonctions besides providing
social security? How is the distribution of resources for social security
purposes organised? Who contributes and who receives? How 'traditional'
or 'modem' is thé mechanism? What is ils degree of 'formality'? What
contingencies are covered by thé mechanism? A very important subques-
tion with regard to thé opération of social security mechanisms is also:
How do people who need resources for social security purposes hâve
access to thé mechanisms that provide these resources? In short, thé
second question and thé subséquent subquestions aim at an investigation
and description of social security mechanisms to be found in rural Swazi-
land nowadays.
The third research question is much more ambitious and more
difficult to answer. How hâve social and économie changes in rural Swazi-
land affected thé opération of thé social security mechanisms to be found
there and how will they affect this opération in future? The main purpose
of this question is to put thé currently operating social security mechan-
isms in a dynamic context in order to show that their existence and
development dépends not only on what happens in the présent, but also
on long term social and economie developments that have taken place in
the past and are still taking place.
As thé second and third research question are closely related to
each other, they will not be separately answered for each social security
mechanism analyzed in this study. In the analysis of the social security
mechanisms in this thesis their static and dynamic aspects are combined,
precisely because of thé strong existing relationships. It is considered that
in this way a more comprehensive picture can be given.
2.6. Methodological considérations
2.6.1.Theoretical background
Research on social security in developing countries is donc by various
disciplines, including development économies, (légal) anthropology, and
sociology. Each discipline acknowledges that sometimes insights from thé
other disciplines are needed in dealing with social security issues in
developing countries. But, given thé spécifie research problems addressed
by each discipline, and given their mutual différences in research method-
ology, no unequivocal 'theory of social security' exists. The researcher is
confronted, then, with bits and pièces of several théories and analytical
frameworks with which he or she can analyze his or her social security
phenomenon. Several such theoretical settings have been presented to
analyze social security phenomena (see, for instance, publications of F
von Benda-Beckmann, F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1994, Bossert
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1985, Freiburg-Strauss and Jung 1988, Hirtz 1989, Kaufmann 1973,
Leliveld 1991, Partsch 1983, Platteau 1991, Zacher 1983), but 'the theory
of social security' is still lacking.
Of course, thé question still remains as to whether it is désirable to
hâve such a comprehensive theory on social security or not. Given thé fact
that social security as a concept can indicate many différent phenomena,
it seems almost impossible to relate ail thèse phenomena to one another
and explain all the interrelationships within one comprehensive theory.
This is not to say that thé lack of a clear-cut theory on social security in
developing countries does not leave the researcher with problems. He has
to make a choice between different théories and build bis own analytical
framework, so äs to provide himself with the necessary tools to analyze
thé social security phenomena he is interested in. For an individual
researcher it may, therefore, be better to start from bis own spécifie
research questions, and try to identify a theoretical setting which hè
believes may help him to find the answers to his spécifie research prob-
lem. Given the above research questions, this section briefly explains the
choices we made with regard to the theoretical setting that will be used in
this study.
Generally the study of social security issues, including the issue of social
security mechanisms, has three entrances. One entrance is to look at a
spécifie contingent situation (old âge, sickness, unemployment, food
shortage, etc.) and analyze which social security mechanisms can and
actually are mobilized in order to cope with the contingent situation, what
values and idéologies play a rôle in this, and so on. Another entrance is to
look at the resources (land, labour, money, relationships, etc.) that are
necessary to overcome contingent situations. Are these resources avail-
able? Under what conditions do they become available? How is their
'ownership' regulated? Which social security mechanisms do provide a
particular resource? A third entrance is to look at the social relationships
and institutions that may 'help' to overcome the contingent situations by
transferring resources for social security purposes. Of course there is
considérable overlapping between the three entrances. For instance, in
Chapter 8 on associations and chiefdoms in Swaziland it will become clear
that some social relationships and institutions are exclusively directed at
covering one contingent situation and/or providing for a spécifie resource
that is needed, while in Chapters 6 and 7 is shown that thé Swazi home-
stead and kinship system are much more 'multi-purpose'. Nevertheless, in
this study thé social relationships and institutions are thé main entrance,
while the resources and contingent situations are 'side-entrances'. In
Chapter 3 some theoretical observations are made with respect to thé
fonction and place of social security mechanisms in society. In Chapter 4
thé social security 'contents' of spécifie social and économie mechanisms
are theoretically analyzed. In Chapters 6 through 8 thèse social relation-
ships and institutions are analyzed with respect to their social security rôle
in rural Swazi society. Chapter 9 is, however, thé proverbial exception to
thé rule. In this chapter thé emphasis is on the significance of the ana-
lyzed social security mechanisms for thé individual Swazi and for three
selected major contingent situations (old âge, sickness, death of a family
member). The more général analysis of social security mechanisms in
Chapters 6 through 8 is more explicitly linked to thé two other entrances
of social security analysis in Chapter 9.
As already mentioned, this study concentrâtes on thé opération and
dynamics of non-state and non-market social security mechanisms. Since,
generally, one of the most important functions of social security mechan-
isms is to redistribute resources, we are essentially looking for a theoreti-
cal tool which can help us to explain non-market distribution. As was indi-
cated, in industrialized countries the state has a major rôle in (re)distrib-
uting means in society, including those for social security purposes.
Studies within the field of public finance touching on this subject are
numerous and might well be used for thé analysis of the social security
rôle of the state in developing countries. But, again, thé présent study
concentrâtes on non-state social security institutions. It is remarkable to
see, then, how little (development) economists hâve donc on (re)distribu-
tion of economie resources within thé mechanisms we want to study, such
as families, kinship Systems, associations, and so on. The main représenta-
tives of what is usually called 'household' or 'family économies' (see,
among others, Barnum and Squire 1979, Becker 1981, Low 1986) make up
just a small part of the économie discipline. Moreover, thé main emphasis
is thereby on thé allocation of economie resources for productive pur-
poses, and not on (redistribution issues.
It is, therefore, almost inévitable for the economist not to have to
cross his own disciplinary boundaries. Within so-called économie anthrop-
ology, for instance, a gréât deal of attention has been paid to 'non-market
ways of exchange and distribution'. Inspired by thé works of Karl Polanyi
and thé successive debates between formalists and substantivists in
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economie anthropology, many studies appeared on how means are
exchanged and distributed in 'primitive societies', with a great deal of
attention being paid to non-market mechanisms.2 Especially Polanyi's
ideas on the existence of several 'modes of exchange' (reciprocity, redis-
tribution, and (market) exchange) in any society may prove helpful for our
analysis. In Chapter 3 this will be further explored.
It was mentioned in the previous section that also an important aspect of
the opération of social security mechanisms is the access people in need
have to the social security mechanisms and the resources that are redis-
tributed. Whether or not people have access can only be estimated after-
wards, and is a question of évaluation. Amartya Sen has shown convinc-
ingly in many studies that access of people to resources (in Sen's cases
mostly food) has much to do with people's entitlements. Individuals have
to be entitled to means in order to obtain and/or to keep them. As the
term entitlement already suggests, there is a strong legal basis underlying
the appropriation of resources by individuals in society. This légal base is
also very important in the case of means used for social security purposes.
What can be estimated in advance are the 'social security entitlements'
people have when they are in need and the factors that influence these
individual 'social security entitlements'. Whether or not these entitlements
are actually 'honoured' or 'respected' is a matter of évaluation when the
need has arisen, which, in turn, will say something about the effectiveness
of the opération of social security mechanisms.
How should we look upon the dynamic aspects of the discussed social
security mechanisms and how can we grasp their change and develop-
ment? Again, (development) economists have said little about this subject.
Attention has been paid to the question of how 'modern' economie
development and market intégration influences 'traditional' economie
structures, but often these 'traditional' structures were considered as
The advocates of formalist economie anthropology départ from the premise that if
models of (neoclassical) economie theory are rendered sufficiently broad and abstract,
these models can be applied to all human societies. Substantivists take the position that the
models of (neoclassical) economie theory properly apply only to capitalist économies where
the market principle is pervasive. Societies, therefore, where other modes of production
and redistribution predominate, different models must be applied. In substantivist theory,
économies is properly concerned not with maximizing behaviour but with the ways in which
humans produce and distnbute the material goods that sustain their existence. For an
overview of this discussion is referred to: Halperin 1988, Leclair and Schneider 1968,
Tieleman 1985.
obstacles to development rather than having an essential rôle in it. The
dynamics of these 'traditional' institutions were, therefore, not a major
concern for most development economists. Again, the economie
researcher has to turn to other social sciences for insights in this matter.
In this context, useful ideas have been put forward by représentatives of
what can be called the 'articulation approach' within neomarxist anthro-
pology.
This articulation approach argues that the intrusion of the capitalist
mode of production in precapitalist societies will lead to an articulation of
modes of production. The central idea of the articulation paradigm is that
in the development of a society various modes of production do not
replace one another, but that new modes of production can develop on
the basis of the continuing functioning of older, subordinate modes of
production. Processes of change ('development') can be seen as the
conjunction of different modes of production. During these processes of
change the new (capitalist) mode of production will gradually change the
older relations of production to make them functional to the new domi-
nant mode.3
A point of contention among the advocates of the articulation
theory discussion is to what extent older relations of production can
withstand the intrusion of capitalist relations of production. Some of them
emphasize the strength of older relations of production (see Geschiere
1985, Hyden 1980), while others conclude that older relations of produc-
tion are radically transformed or even destroyed (see Dupré 1982, Meil-
lassoux 1975). In Southern Africa, Wolpe (1980) applied the articulation
theory to the situation of apartheid in South Africa. He concluded that
the apartheid System, an ultimate form of capitalist repression, destroyed
older relations of production, which led to an impoverishment of a large
section of the population in the Homelands. Mahmood Mamdani (1987)
gives an account of the negative effects of the intrusion of capitalism on
coopérative redistributive forms prevailing in rural areas in Uganda.
Although the 'articulation approach' has been widely criticized and
more or less came to a dead end, as it failed to adequately clarify and
define ils concepts, the case-studies of ils représentatives provide insights
into how processes of socio-économie change influence 'traditional'
institutions, including (re)distributive ones. These insights, too, may prove
See for a good review of the discussion on the articulation of modes of production,
Binsbergen and Geschiere 1985, and Raatgever 1988.
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helpfui in this study.
To the reader the above choice of théories that together make up the
theoretical background of this study may look opportunistic or at least
eclectic, and doubts may rise whether these théories are compatible. But
there are some clear similarities between the théories mentioned which
make them quite compatible for this study. First, the théories are rooted
in what can be called the 'Institutional Paradigm'. By Institutional Para-
digm we mean those theoretical models that take institutions as the
primary mechanisms for analyzing production, distribution and consump-
tion processes (Halperin 1988:18)." In the analyses of Polanyi and Marx,
institutions play a major rôle in their analyses, but also Sen's entitlement
approach is strongly related to the analysis of (légal) institutions in
society. Secondly, the combination of théories introduces the
multidisciplinary element needed for this study. In the théories of Polanyi
and the Marxist anthropologists, the economie and social structures are
linked, while Sen's approach links économies with law. Thirdly, the
théories supplement each other as regards their level of analysis. Polanyi
and the Marxists analyze at the level of institutions and society as a
whole, while Sen does the same but also brings in the individual level. For
these three reasons, it is believed that these théories together might form
an eclectic but suitable basis for dealing with the questions addressed in
this study. With the aid of the theoretical background outlined above we
will present in Chapters 3 and 4 some theoretical observations on the
opération and dynamics of rural social security mechanisms in developing
countries.
2.6.2. Data collection
In addition to theoretical tools for interpreting and explaining social
security phenomena, data on the phenomena are needed before any
analysis can start. The data for this study were collected in Swaziland and
three data sources were used: existmg literature, in-depth study and a
sample survey.
The concept of institution is an analytical construct that refers to an organisational
principle, mechanism or device (Halperin 1988:18).
Literature study
Literature study did not only include the study of scholarly publications on
Swaziland, but also the study of government statistics, census data, and so
on. The focus was mainly on literature dealing with the social and econ-
omie life of Swazi people in the rural areas. Many sources are therefore
available.
Anthropological studies (Kuper 1947, 1950 and 1963, Marwick
1966) give an insight into the social and economie organisation of Swazi
people and frequently also mention mechanisms for social protection. The
danger of relying on these anthropological sources lies in thé emphasis in
these studies on normative descriptions rather than on empirical observa-
tions. Kuper tends to have a functional and idealised view of Swazi society
and présents a picture in which historical developments are neglected.
Swazi society is analyzed as if no changes have taken place and are still
taking place. Moreover, a more common criticism of the works of Kuper
is that she did her fieldwork among the higher levels of society, namely
among the chiefs and the royal Dlamini clan. As traditions are better
preserved within thèse groups than at other levels, the anthropological
studies give less insight into what is going on at 'grass-root' level. Never-
theless these studies have their value in giving a broad overview of Swazi
économie and social life.
At the level of the rural household (homestead) literature abounds.
Being the major social and économie unit of rural Swazi society, the Swazi
homestead has been analyzed by economists, sociologists, and anthropol-
ogists. Extensive research on Swazi homesteads was donc by Allen (1973),
Holleman (1964), Hughes (1972), Low (1986), Neocosmos (1987), Russell
(1983, 1984, 1989, 1993), and De Vletter (1983). All these studies are
more or less focused on the social and economie affairs of rural home-
steads and are good sources for understanding the social and economie
organisation of homesteads and the changes such organisation undergoes.
Social security is seldom mentioned as such, but these broader studies
implicitly touch upon social security issues when discussing the socio-
economic position of homesteads, the situation of women and children,
labour migration in all its aspects and effects, and so on.
Historical and political studies (see, for example, Bonner 1982,
Kowet 1978, Levin 1985) offer insights into structural processes of change
that took place in Swaziland during this Century. These historical studies
generally focus on structural processes of change at the level of society
and do not discuss the implications of thèse processes for rural home-
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steads and individuals. Studies such as those of De Vletter (1983), Low
(1986) and Neocosmos (1987), on the other hand, discuss how structural
social and economie changes affect rural homesteads.
In sum, literature on Swaziland offers abundant information on the
social, economie, historical and political dimensions of Swazi society.
Some of these studies implicitly deal with or refer to the questions dealt
with in this study. More explicit data, however, had to be collected by
both an in-depth study and a sample survey.
In-depth study
An in-depth study of four months (February 1990 to June 1990) was made
of a small Community in Southern Swaziland called Elulakeni (see Appen-
dix A for location site). The main objective of this in-depth study was to
get more detailed information on thé questions addressed in this study.
Ten homesteads were selected for this in-depth study. At the start of the
in-depth study all the homesteads in the community were included in a
base-line survey, in which data were collected on homestead composition
and main bases of subsistence. The ten homesteads were selected on the
basis of this study. The sélection was made in such a manner that the
total set would, by and large, be représentative for the several types of
homesteads to be found in Swaziland with respect to size, composition,
and combination of subsistence activities.
Information was gathered by doing unstructured interviews with
several members of the respective homesteads. Questions were asked
which were closely related to the existence and opération of social
security mechanisms, their dynamics, and their effectiveness. The informa-
tion collected in this way was satisfactory, but also often contradictory. As
not too many respondents were involved in the study, it was difficult to
check whether or not their answers would be représentative for rural
Swaziland as a whole. Sometimes a comparison with what could be found
in thé literature was helpful to détermine thé reliability of data, some-
times confronting respondents with different views led to revealing
insights. Interviews with people who did not belong to thé selected
homesteads, such as community elders and the indvuna ('messenger' of
the chief), sometimes generaled additional and complementary informa-
tion on what at first sight seemed to be contradictory information. The
information from the in-depth study formed the basis for the question-
naire used in the sample survey.
Sample survey
The sample survey was done on Swazi Nation Land (SNL) by interviewing
304 respondents on 203 homesteads. 5 Respondents were interviewed with
regard to their own social and economie position as well as that of the
homesteads and, of course, on social security issues (see Appendix H for
the questionnaire).
The sample survey was done in three communities during four and
a half months. The three communities are located in different ecological
zones, so that the different combinations of subsistence activities that
occur on Swazi homesteads are represented (see Appendix A for location
of research sites, and Appendix B for explanation of the ecological zones).
In point of fact, the communities also belong to the three different types
of Rural Development Areas. The Rural Development Area Programme
(RDAP) was initiated in 1970, whereby selected areas of Swazi Nation
Land were provided with extra investments in rural infrastructure in order
to raise agricultural productivity (see also Chapter 5). Although this pro-
gramme officially still continues, investments stopped in 1981 and a report
on its performance (Hunting 1983) made clear that the objectives of the
programme had not been reached. As result of the programme, large
infrastructural différences between SNL areas can be observed. The three
communities appeared to be spread over a non-RDA, a minimum-input
RDA and a maximum-input RDA.6 The différence is that in maximum-
input RDAs slightly better conditions for agriculture are present, and the
overall infrastructural provisions such as schools, clinics, and so on are at
a higher level than in non-RDA régions.
The sample of respondents was stratified. As gender and age were
thought to be important factors in determining someone's access to
particular social security mechanisms, the number of respondents was
spread equally over male and female and over older and younger génér-
ations. The objective was to interview 150 men and 150 women of differ-
ent age groups. However, a high absentée rate among men shifted the
5
 Swazi Nation Land (SNL) is communal land and covers two-thirds of the total land
surface in Swaziland. A majority of the Swazi rural population lives on SNL. A part of
SNL is divided into 172 chiefdoms, each headed by a chief. The chief takes charge of the
distribution of this communal land among homesteads in his chiefdom in the name of the
King. Another part of Swazi Nation Land falls under the direct jurisdiction of the King and
belongs to him and the royal family (see also Chapter 5 for further explanation).
6
 The différence between a minimum input RDA and a maximum input RDA are
the amounts invested in economie and social infrastructure.
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ultimate sample towards 225 women and 79 men.7 The distribution of age
is more equally spread among the respondents, varying from 18 to 70
years of age. Children were excluded from interviews.
The interviews with respondents were made with the aid of an
interpréter. This créâtes its own difficulties, but there is no reason to
doubt that the collected data are fairly reliable and représentative for
people living on Swazi Nation Land. Of the 304 interviews, 295 interviews
on 195 homesteads were thought to be reliable enough to be included in
this analysis. The collected data from the literature study, the in-depth
study, and the sample survey will be used and presented in Chapters 5 to
9.
3. THE FUNCTION AND PLACE OF SOCIAL SECURITY
MECHANISMS IN SOCIETY
3.1. Introduction
7
 Labour migration was one of the causes for male absenteeism. The other one was
the 'shebeen' (local bar). At the start of the survey attempts were made to interview men
in these shebeens, but the information could not be considered reliable for obvious
reasons. It was decided, then, to do only on-homestead interviews. In this way also other
homestead members besides the respondent could be consulted on issues such as the
homestead income, the âge and éducation of homestead members, and so on.
For an analysis of the opération and dynamics of social security mechan-
isms, it is necessary to have an insight into the function and place of
social security mechanisms in society. In this chapter an attempt is made
to point out some genera! theoretical considérations regarding the func-
tion and place of social security mechanisms in society which can also be
useful for the analysis of social security mechanisms in Swaziland. It is
acknowledged that large différences in social and economie conditions
exist between (developing) societies. These différences are reflected in the
function and place social security mechanisms have in society. For analyti-
cal purposes, however, it would be désirable to have some général con-
cepts which can be used in the analysis of social security mechanisms, not-
withstanding the différences to be found among societies. These concepts
and their usefulness for the analysis of social security mechanisms are
explained in this chapter. No attempt has been made to present a 'genera!
theory of social security mechanisms' in the sense of a comprehensive
causal model (i.e., equally good for all cases) or in the sense of a sharply
defined, interlinking family of concepts. The analysis in this chapter must
be seen rather as an 'approach' or a 'frame'; as a procedure of question-
ing and Investigation.
The function of social security mechanisms can be made clear by
pointing out what social security mechanisms do for the individual, known
ui populär language as 'the man in the street'. This is donc in Sections 3.2
and 3.3. The place that social security mechanisms have in society can be
explained by placing social security mechanisms in a wider context and by
showing the relationships that exist with other institutions in society. In
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 we elaborate on this. In Section 3.6 the main obser-
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valions in this chapter are summarized.
3.2. The standard of living of the individual
To explain thé fonction of social security mechanisms we start from the
simple observation that each and every individual in society has a certain
'standard of living'. For our discussion it is important to know, then, how
this standard of living is defined, and how the individual reaches a certain
Standard of living. These two questions can be answered by using Amartya
Sen's définition of standard of living in terras of 'capabilities' and by ap-
plying nis 'entitlement approach'. Therefore, in Section 3.2.l the concept
of standard of living is briefly discussed and in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3
Sen's entitlement approach is explained. In Section 3.2.4 we continue with
the observation that a person's standard of living is constantly 'under at-
tack', because in daily life individuals live in an uncertain environment in
which circumstances constantly change and new developments may take
place. In Section 3.2.4, therefore, the patterns of uncertainties that may
threaten a person's standard of living are analyzed.
3.2.1. The définition of the standard of living
The concept of standard of living is a controversial one. The question of
how the concept should be operationalized is still a major point of
discussion among (development) economists. In development économies
the définition of the 'minimum standard of living' is of special importance,
as this minimum standard is used for measuring and estimating poverty or
deprivation. What counts as the minimum standard of living, and there-
fore also as deprivation, is a matter of valuation. According to Drèze and
Sen (1991:5-10) the values involved can be characterized in three different
ways.
The first approach is the utilitarian notion of value, derived from
mainstream welfare économies. This approach "(...)sees value only in
individual utility, itself defined in terms of some mental condition, such as
pleasure, happiness, desire-fulfïlment" (Drèze and Sen 1991:5). This
subjectivist perspective is however very misleading as it may fail to reflect
a person's real deprivation. For example, in times of long-standing
deprivation a person is not going to sigh all day and complain about nis
or her miserable situation. He or she will try to find pleasure in some
small mercies and to eut down personal desires to modest 'realistic'
proportions. So when a measure such as pleasure or désire folfilment is
used, someone's real deprivation may be concealed because hè or she may
not even have the ability to be adequately nourished, comfortably clothed,
minimally educated, and so on.
The second approach concentrâtes on a person's 'real income', or
command over essential commodities. An example within this approach is
the 'basic needs approach', which concentrâtes on the requirement to
provide some specified minimal amounts of necessary goods (such as
food, clothing, shelter, etc) to all. The disadvantage of this approach is
that "commodities - and therefore income and wealth - are means to well-
being, rather than constituent éléments of it" (Drèze and Sen 1991:6, italics
by them). The ability to convert commodities into personal achievements
may vary greatly between one person and another, and also between
communities. For example, the calorie requirement for being well-nour-
ished varies greatly with body size, âge, sex, climatic conditions, and so on,
and an interpersonal comparison of deprivation or of poverty cannot be
adequately performed just in terms of comparing commodity commands.
Only focusing on incomes for analyzing poverty and deprivation comes up
against the same problem of variability, because the value of income lies
in its use for commanding commodities (Drèze and Sen 1991:6). More-
over, there is the additional problem of the conversion of incomes into
commodities. Market limitations, such as imperfect compétition, présence
of externalities, and thé unavailability of certain goods in particular mar-
kets, can cause variations in the power of income to establish command
over goods and services (Drèze and Sen 1991:6). Therefore, thé problem
of conversion of commodities into living standards is compounded by the
problem of conversion of income into commodities.
The third approach to value deprivation, or more generally, living
standards has been developed by Sen (see Sen 1985 and Sen 1987). He
proposes that the focus variable for analyzing quality of life in général or
deprivation and poverty in particular is thé capability to perform certain
basic fonctions. Drèze and Sen (1991:7) argue that "if life is seen as a set
of doings and beings that are valuable, thé exercise of assessing the
quality of life takes thé form of evaluating thèse fonctions and thé capa-
bility to fonction. This valuation exercise need not be performed by simply
counting pleasures or desires (as in thé utility-based accounting), or by
focusing on commodities or incomes instead of doing and beings (as in
the commodity-based accounting). The task is that of évaluation of the
importance of the various functionings in human life, (...). The functio-
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nings themselves have to be examined, and the capability of the person to
achieve them has to be appropriately valued." In thé early 1990s some
ambitious attempts have been undertaken to operationalize thé capabil-
ities approach, by measuring thé inadequacy of each nation's level of
'human development' (see thé UNDP's Human Development Reports).
In short, in thé 'capability approach' the focus is on what goods
allow people to do - their capabilities to fonction - rather than goods per
se. The strength of this view is its emphasis on activities rather than
commodities, built on thé récognition of thé contingent nature of claims
over goods: what goods do for well-being dépends on a host of factors,
including thé circumstances - personal and environmental - of an individ-
ual (Lipton and Ravallion 1993:15, see also Sen 1985). In spite of the
strength of this approach, Lipton and Ravallion (1993:15-8) also indicate
that "unfortunately this route is beset with its own problems". They state
that capabilities can rarely be observed directly, rather certain 'achieveme-
nts' are observed. The mapping from the latter to thé former will also
depend on other factors, such as préférences; for example, to conclude
that a person was not capable of living a long life we must know more
than just how long he lived. There is also the unresolved issue of how one
should aggregate over different capabilities. Indexes of qualiry of life have
been very arbitrary in what they include or exclude. Furthermore, as
Lipton and Ravallion (1993:16) argue, "thé rôle that is ascribed to préfér-
ences in (...)the capabilities approach is not entirely convincing; it is one
thing to reject thé strict welfarist view that only utilities matter, and quite
another that utilities are not at least a part of thé objective. For a gréât
many of choices that people make, one would be loth to say that they do
not know what is best for themselves. And then one should be cautious in
forming judgements about poverty which are inconsistent with those
choices." (...) "The capabilities approach has not established why consump-
tion should not still remain an argument of the social évaluation of
individual well-being, even if it does nothing for capabilities" (Lipton and
Ravallion 1993:16). Notwithstanding thèse unresolved problems, the most
important message of thé capabilities approach is that it recognizes thé
real limitations of an incomes-centred conceptualization of well-being. It
is agreed that command over goods matters to well-being.
3.2.2. Sen's entitlement approach
In this study we adopt Sen's view on thé concept of standard of living.
The standard of living is thus defined in terms of capabilities. The next
question that can be asked is how an individual attains capabilities. Also
on this point Sen has something to say. Sen's argument is that capabilities
are generaled by entitlements. Sen introduced thé concept of entitlement
in his essay on 'Poverty and Famines' (Sen 1981). Since then, an 'enti-
tlement approach' has been forther developed and applied, not only by
Sen but also by other scholars. Gasper (1993) gives a useful overview of
this development, and thé contexts in which thé entitlement approach has
been applied.
Generally, an 'entitlement' can be defined as a person's effective
legitimate command over goods or other resources. Each person in a
given society, in a given situation, has an entitlement set which consists of
a set of alternative commodity bundles, any of which thé person can
décide to hâve (Sen 1981:45). In an economy with private ownership and
exchange in thé form of trade (exchange with others), this entitlement set
dépends on two parameters: the 'endowment' of the person (the owner-
ship bundie, including his own labour power) and the 'exchange entitle-
ment mapping' (the fonction that spécifies the set of alternative commod-
ity bundles that the person can command respectively for each endow-
ment bundie). Sen (1981:46) gives the following example to illustrate his
points: "(...),a peasant has his land, labour power, and a few other
resources, which together make up his endowment. Starting from that
endowment hè can produce a bundie of food that will be his. Or, by
selling his labour power, he can get a wage and with that buy commod-
ities including food. Or hè can grow some cash crops and seil them to buy
food and other commodities. There are many other possibilities. The set
of all such available commodity bundles in a given economie situation is
the exchange entitlement of his endowment. The exchange entitlement
mapping spécifies the exchange entitlement set of alternative commodity
bundles respectively for each endowment bundie." In other words, Sen's
'exchange entitlement' refers to the possible titles into which one could
change one's present titles ('endowments'), via production, trade, etc. The
'exchange entitlement mapping' (E-mapping) reflects the rules, conditions
and processes which affect how one's entitlements are derived from one's
endowments.
The E-mapping will depend on -the legal, political, economie and
social characteristics of the society in question and the person's position in
it. In the above example, the E-mapping will depend on production
opportunities, as well as trade opportunities of resources and products. It
will depend, for instance, on whether the peasant can find employment,
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and if so for how long and at what wage rate; on what he can earn by
selling his non-labour assets, and how much it costs him to buy whatever
he may wish to buy; on what he can produce with his own labour power
and resources (also resource services he can buy and manage); on thé cost
of purchasing resources (or resource services) and thé value of the
products he can seil. It will also involve legal rights to apportioning the ^
product, for example thé capitalist raie of the 'entrepreneur' owning the *
produce. The social conventions governing thèse rights can sometimes be ^
very complex, for example those governing thé rights of migrant members *
of peasant families to a share of the peasant output (Sen 1981:46).
According to Sen (1981:46), social security provisions are also
reflected in thé E-mapping, such as thé right to unemployment benefit if
one fails to find a job, or thé right to income supplementation if one's
income would otherwise fall below a certain specified level. Employment ï
guarantees, when they exist, are also reflected in thé E-mapping, giving v
one thé option to seil one's labour power to thé government at a mini-
 s^
mum priée (as has been the case in some (former) socialist économies).
E-mapping will depend also on the taxes that have to be paid. In thé
context of studying rural societies in developing countries, Agarwal
(1991:173) proposes that thé E-mapping should also reflect a person's
rights to communal resources (such as village commons, forests, grazing-
land, etc.) and his rights to support from social networks (such as those of |
patronage, kinship, friendship) embodying relationships between social
groups or persons in which considérations other than thé mère économie
take precedence.
\\
The entitlement approach is an important contribution to thé analysis of
poverty and deprivation, and living standards in général. According to
Gasper (1993:683), "mis conceptual apparatus - namely endowments; a
mapping via production, trade, etc.; and a set of possible acquisitions,
whose use is radier unproblematic - is a generalization of models in
micro-économies, including 'consumer theory'. 'Entitlement' is an exten-
sion of thé concept of purchasing power, to cover acquisition potential as
a whole, not only via exchange." The approach involves "(...)analysis of
effective/sanctioned command, and its various channels and déterminants, ^
including attention to thé rules and institutions that control access, and
thé distinctive vulnerabilities of différent groups" (Gasper 1993:709). In
Section 3.3 we will indicate thé importance of Sen's approach for thé
analysis of thé fonction of social security mechanisms. First, we continue
with a brief discussion on thé relationship between entitlements and
capabilities, and factors influencing this relationship.
3.2.3. Entitlements, capabilities and uncertainties
The général statement that "entitlements générale capabilities" sounds
simple and straightforward, but in daily practice this relationship is not so
simple. To go from entitlements to actual capabilities may need many
steps for an individual, and he may meet many problems on his way. It is
important to understand in this respect that thé conversion of entitlements
into capabilities is in fact an ongoing process of acquiring and using. For
example, assume again a private ownership market economy in which a
peasant works and lives, having his labour power, some land, and some
other resources. Let us assume that his main objective is to be adequately
fed. By combining his endowments (production) he may be able to
produce, let us say, cotton. In a private ownership market economy thé
peasant is entitled to keep his produce. Sen (1981:2) calls this a 'produc-
tion-based entitlement': "one is entitled to own what one gets by arranging
production using one's owned resources, or resources hired from willing
parties meeting thé agreed conditions of trade." Why is this accepted?
Because in a private ownership market economy one is entitled to one's
own labour power, and thus to thé production-based entitlements related
to one's labour power (Sen calls this 'own-labour entitlement'). After
having produced thé cotton, which he owns, thé peasant may décide to
seil it for money. The ownership of thé money is accepted by society,
because in a private market economy the peasant has what Sen (1981:2)
calls a 'trade-based entitlement': "one is entitled to own what one obtains
by trading something one owns with a willing party". With thé money thé
peasant now owns he may buy ingrédients to prépare his food. The
ownership of thé ingrédients is accepted, because he got it by exchange
through thé money he owns (again a trade-based entitlement). Having thé
ingrédients, then, an activity is needed (cooking) to prépare food that can
be eaten. When thé peasant is able to perform this activity, he will own
thé prepared food, and this is accepted because he made it with his own
ingrédients and his own labour power (a production-based entitlement).
Ultimately, then, it can be concluded (in retrospect) that for thé peasant
the capability to be fed has been reached. By using thé several (exchange)
entitlements he had he was able to couvert his initial endowments into
food.
The above example shows that thé road from entitlements to
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capabilities consists of a 'chain' of conversions. Whether or not such
conversions are indeed possible can only be said in retrospect. From one
day to another thé entitlement of money to food may be disputed, ils
validity denied, or thé cotton plants may be destroyed by storms, or thé
food supply may be destroyed or disturbed. Also influencing thé conver-
sions are factors such as matters of economie dependence, power differen-
tials, bureaucratie corruption, individual personality traits and émotions,
and individuals' or families' histories (Drèze and Sen 1991). Another
important 'conversion factor' is whether or not societal institutions can be
mobilized which can enforce conversion claims, if necessary against the
will of people concerned.
It has become clear, then, that in no way do entitlements automatically
générale capabilities. It will often be the case that an individual is not
able to reach a certain minimum standard of living which is thought
reasonable by all members of society. Moreover, the individual's actual
standard of living may be constantly 'under attack'. The inability for the
individual to reach a socially accepted minimum standard of living or the
negative disruption of the actual standard of living can be labelled as a
'contingent situation'. A main factor causing the occurrence of such a
situation is that the individual lives in an uncertain environment. As far as
developing countries are concerned, it is widely recognised that a high
level of uncertainty typifies the lives of individuals and families. ' Looming
above all these kinds of uncertainty is the sheer poverty of so many
people, meaning that the outcome of uncertain events can often make the
différence between survival and starvation (Ellis 1988:80). In the literatu-
re, types of uncertainty are classified in different ways.
Ellis (1988:81), for example, summarizes types of uncertainty under
four main headings: natural hazards, market fluctuations, social uncer-
tainties, and state actions and wars. Natural hazards refer to the unpre-
dictable nature of weather, pests and diseases, and other natural calam-
ities. Market fluctuations refer to situations by which future market priées
are not known at the time décisions are made. This problem is enhanced
1
 The term 'uncertainty' is preferred hère to the term 'risk'.Uncertainty refers in a
descriptive sensé to the character of the environment confronting décision makers, an
environment which will contain a wide variety of uncertain events to which décision makers
will attach various degrees of risk, according to their subjective beliefs of the occurrence of
such events (see for detailed discussion on thé concepts of uncertainty and risk, among
others, Ellis 1988,Newbery and Stiglitz 1981, and Roumasset 1976).
when information is lacking and markets are imperfect, as is often thé
case in developing countries. By social uncertainty Ellis means insecurity
caused by différences of control over resources within the family economy
and the dependence for survival of some (members of) family units on
others. Finally, (members of) family units may face uncertainties concern-
ing décisions by agencies of the state, which may chop and change from
one moment to the next, one coup to the next, one visit by the IMF to the
next. Moreover, uncertainties of this type may resuit from restricted social
or legal rights which (members of) family units have in some countries.
Another classification is made by Zacher (1988), who distinguishes
three areas in which contingent situations for the individual and nis
dépendants can arise as result of the outcome of uncertainties: the area of
work and income, the area of the satisfaction of needs, and the area of
the support unit. In industrialized countries, as result of what is often
referred to as 'structural differentiation', these three areas are functionally
divided over different social and economie institutions. The area of work
and income, which covers the organisation of work and earning an income
by work, can be found in the enterprise. The area of satisfaction of needs,
which involves the organisation and distribution of goods which people
need to meet their needs, such as food, housing, éducation, training and
care, is covered by companies and (para)statal institutions. The area of
the support unit, indicating the group of persons who are interdependent
or all dependent upon one of their number for the satisfaction of their
individual needs, is covered by the famiiy. What can be observed especial-
ly in the rural areas of developing countries is that structural different-
iation has taken place to a far less extent than in the industrialized
countries. We will find many family units that 'cover' at the same tune the
area of work and income, the area of satisfaction of needs and also the
area of the support unit. Nevertheless, we agrée with Zacher that also in
these family units the functional areas can be distinguished theoretically.
So contingent situations may arise in each of the areas.
In the area of work and income, a person may be unable to work
completely or partly, permanently or temporarily, through sickness, old
age, invalidity, and so on. Alternatively, a person may be unable to utilise
his capability of working, as in the case of unemployment. During the
absence of the capability or while the capability cannot be utilised, there
will be no income. Moreover, because the enterprise is 'internalized' in
the family unit, the Standard of living of the family is directly influenced
by contingencies that arise because of the outcome of uncertainties as
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mentioned by Ellis, such as natural hazards, market fluctuations or state
actions or those which resuit from thé social organisation. In industrial-
ized societies, these kinds of risks also influence employees of enterprises,
but some of the conséquences are passed to insurance companies, govern-
ment, and so on. In other societies thé family unit as enterprise mostly has
to bear ail thé conséquences itself. In the area of the satisfaction of needs,
problems may arise when a range of goods is so expensive that is inaccess-
ible to poorer families, or its purchase entails a disproportionately high
bürden for them. Other situations might hâve thé same repercussions,
such as a low level of development, a war or a catastrophe. Then, certain
goods or services may not be available at a given place or time. In
developing countries, contingencies will arise in the area of the satisfac-
tion of needs mostly not because of unavailability of goods, but because of
the deprivation of the family unit itself. Within the area of the support
unit, problems may arise when one of thé 'useful adults' is missing
(because of death) or répudiâtes his or her obligations (e.g. refuses to
provide support), or if social relations dissolve between générations. The
constitution of a support unit can also resuit in insufficiency of income in
relation to needs, if there is a disproportion between thé numbers of
actual productive adults and non-productive children in thé unit, as in thé
case of families with numerous children.
We hâve gone into some détail on thé causes of contingent situat-
ions, because in developing countries thèse situations will often hâve
sévère conséquences for thé standard of living of individuals and their
dépendants. Of course, degrees of severity exist. If a productive member
of thé family unit has a light fever for a few days, it is not very likely that
thé standard of living of this individual and bis or her dépendants will be
much affected. A chronic illness, on thé contrary, will have far-reaching
conséquences. Another important considération concerns the moment the
contingent situation arises in relation to thé 'cycle of the family unit' (see
Chapter 4). To use an example of Freiburg-Strauss and Jung (1988:236):
losses due to a bad harvest cause greater damage to a 'young' family with
small children than to a well established family, because in the field of the
enterprise of thé former case thé availability of labour is small and in thé
field of thé support unit thé ratio of producers versus non-producers is
low.
In short, in this section it has been argued that the uncertain environment
that surrounds people may cause contingent situations. What thèse
contingent situations hâve in common is thé occurrence of a conversion
problem for individuals since they may lead, for example, to a lack or
destruction of resources, a déniai of previous existing entitlements, affect
negatively thé physical abilities of an individual, or influence negatively
thé opération of societal institutions that sometimes are needed for
conversion (such as markets, government, légal institutions, and so on).
The rise of contingent situations may make it impossible for thé individual
to convert his entitlements into capabilities. Often, this not only has
conséquences for thé standard of living of the individual himself but also
for his dépendants. Are there any remedies to solve the conversion
problems that may arise because of the existence of contingent situations?
Yes, there are and in thé next section we go into more détail.
3.3. The fonction of social security mechanisms
The existence of contingent situations and thé resulting loss of capabilities
will, ui many cases, be experienced by people as something négative, and
attempts will be made to remedy thé situation. To restore thé initial
standard of living, or to reach a certain minimum standard of living,
resources will be needed. In many cases, thé main problem is that the
contingent situation caused, amongst other things, a loss of resources. So,
how can we deal with thé need for extra resources to overcome thé
contingent situation?
A first solution might be that individuals or families have foreseen
or expected certain contingent situations, and hâve already coped with
their occurrence: for example, by storing food from last year's harvest to
cope with possible bad harvests this year, or by saving money from last
year's income-generating activities to cope with possible market distor-
tions this year, or by investing in cattle that can be sold or eaten in tunes
of food shortage, and so on. Moreover, one may be able to switch
resources from one allocation to another. For example, instead of using
savings originally meant for buying new clothes or paying school fées,
thèse savings might be used for buying medicines in case of sickness or
food in case of bad harvests. 'Coping' or 'switching' stratégies by individ-
uals (or families) can be found in all societies, and also in rural areas in
developing countries many examples can be found. But individuals and
families may also be confronted with unforeseen contingent situations
with which they cannot cope, because no resources are available to meet
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the extra need which has arisen. Other measures might then be necessary.
One such measure couid be that people who are not in need
provide people in need directly with the resources they need. When
someone cannot obtain food because hè or she is too old to earn money
to buy food, food can be given to him or her. When someone has lost bis
house because of a typhoon and hè has no means of restoring the dama-
ge, shelter can be given to him. When someone becomes unemployed and
no income is earned which entitles a person and possibly his family to
commodities and services, the money, goods or services might be directly
given to him, and so on. It is clear, however, that those people who are
not in need will not and cannot provide resources in all contingent
situations which arise and which may lead to a décline of someone's
Standard of living. Three important considérations may play a rôle.
In the first place, a 'social Standard' for living conditions may have
developed in society. When contingencies cause a décline of the standard
of living below this social standard, resources from society may be trans-
ferred to the individuals or families concerned to bring them back up to
the social standard. This social standard can be a minimum standard of
living necessary for survival, often defined in such terms as 'poverty line'
or 'subsistence level'. But the social standard of living may also be higher
than the subsistence level.
Secondly, not all contingent situations that give rise to a décline of
the standard of living are considered by society to require compensation.
It may be thought that the conséquences of certain contingent situations
should be borne by the individual himself. In général, society will prima-
rily provide resources for contingent situations that result from so-called
social uncertainties: uncertainties whose outcome leads to such negative
conséquences for the individual's standard of living that they cannot be
borne by the individual alone. What risks are considered as social risks
which should be provided for by society is often a matter of opinion,
culture and politics. We have already discussed the choice of ILO, but
other risks might be selected and also different socio-economic settings.
A third considération is that, in case of need, only so-called 'social
goods' can be provided by society.2 A 'social good' is one that is at the
disposition of society, whose distribution can be a matter of social policy.
According to Rawls (1971:62), important primary social goods are "rights
and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth". This observa-
tion by Rawls is interesting, because it may lead to the conclusion that not
only resources such as money, labour (time) and commodities are in-
volved, but contingent situations can also be solved by society by giving
people rights, powers and opportunities. One who becomes unemployed,
might be given the opportunity to work again, one who has lost or does
not own land, might be given rights to land, and so on.
Because of the individual's limited capacity to deal with the negative
conséquences of contingent situations, the measure to provide people in
need with social goods in certain contingent situations has been applied in
many societies. If people in a particular society agrée upon this measure,
this will lead to organisation in society to implement the measure: social
goods have to be made available and distributed, individuals in need have
to be entitled to these goods in defined circumstances, and when goods
are available for the individual in need they also have to be converted
into capabilities when this individual is unable to carry out this conversion
himself. In other words, social security mechanisms are established and
developed which have the fonction of entitling people in contingent situat-
ions to these goods, of organising the collection and distribution of social
goods and of converting these social goods into capabilities when people are
not able to do so themselves. The purpose of this function is twofold:
'protection' and 'promotion' of the standard of living (Drèze and Sen
1991:3). By protection is meant that social security mechanisms are
concerned with preventing a décline of living standards in genera! and of
the basic conditions of living in particular. Partsch (1983:47) mentions that
in this respect social security mechanisms have essentially an 'insurance'
function. This contrasts with the function of enhancing normal living
conditions and dealing with regulär and often persistent deprivation. This
'promotional' aspect of social security mechanisms is more ambitieus in
Rawls (1971) makes a distinction between 'pnmary natural goods' and 'pnmary
Social goods' Pnmary social goods are goods which any rational person can be presumed
to want, irrespective of his préférences, talents and other personal charactenstics It is only
social goods that can at the disposition of society Pnmary natural goods, such as intelli-
gence and athletic abihty, are also resources a person would want, but are not at the
disposition of society.
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wanting to counter problems that have survived for very long periods of
time. In the literature (Atkinson 1989, Burgess and Stern 1991, Drèze and
Sen 1991,Partsch 1983) this doublé fimction of social security mechanisms
with regard to the standard of living is emphasized. In practice, many
social security mechanisms have both protective and promotional
éléments. This will also become clear in this study when spécifie social
security mechanisms are analyzed.
3.4. Social security mechanisms and society
In the previous sections the fonction of social security mechanisms in
society have been made clear by showing what they can do for the
individual. The question of how this function is operationalized (that is,
which institutions in society operate as social security mechanisms and
how these institutions as such are organised) can only be answered by
pointing out the relationships that exist between social security mechan-
isms and the society in which they operate. It will be argued in this
section that the organisation of society in général (Section 3.4.2), and that
of the economy in particular (Section 3.4.1), bas a large impact on the
way in which social security mechanisms are organized and operate.
3.4.1. Social security mechanisms as part of the economy
It has become clear that, among other things, a major function of social
security mechanisms is to redistribute resources from those who are not in
a contingent situation to those who are. So, because of this distributional
function, social security mechanisms have economie aspects and can be
looked upon as being part of the economy. How this distribution within
social security mechanisms is organised will very much depend on the way
in which production and distribution in the economy are generally
organised. The latter may differ between societies. Karl Polanyi cum suis
have developed some général concepts which can be used to analyze
cross-cultural différences between économies. His view on 'the economy'
will also be userai for our analysis.
Polanyi cum suis consider thé economy in ail sorts of societies as a
process of material provisioning of livelihood, which involves production,
distribution and consumption. An essential question they hâve asked
themselves is how ail thèse économie activities by many actors are 'tuned'
to each other; in other words, what makes an economy an economy?
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According to Polanyi (in Polanyi and Pearson 1977:31), thé economy is
"an instituted process of interaction serving thé satisfaction of materiai
wants". For Polanyi, 'instituted' means organised in thé sensé ofsomething
which is not random (Halperin 1988:33). Polanyi (in Polanyi. Arensberg
and Pearson 1957:251) argues in this respect that, for example, "acts of
exchange on thé personal level produce priées only if they occur under a
System of price-making markets, an institutional set up which is nowhere
created by mère random acts of exchange". Polanyi's use of the word
!random' refers to Adam Smith's notion of thé 'invisible hand' as thé
organising principle for thé market economy: a séries of randomised
exchanges on thé part of individuals créâtes thé forces of supply and
demand that set thé priées that produce a market System. Polanyi implies
that there are institutional perquisites, such as a system of private prop-
erty, which must be met before individual acts of exchange will become
part of a market system.
According to Polanyi thé principles of organisation and thé rel-
evant units may vary across cultures. As Halperin (1988:33) explains: "for
Polanyi, économies must be analyzed as parts of cultural Systems. Econ-
omie processes hâve cultural components. Only certain kinds of social
units with certain kinds of social structures can organise particular kinds
of economie processes". And Polanyi (in Polanyi, Arensberg and Pearson
1957:250) states, elaborating on thé concept: "thé human economy, then,
is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, économie and noneconomic.
The inclusion of thé noneconomic is vital. For religion or government may
be as important for thé structure and functioning of the economy as
monetary institutions or thé availability of tools and machines themselves
that lighten thé toil of labour. " With this élaboration, Polanyi makes clear
that his notion of what is 'économie' is broader than conventional notions.
The market as coordinating and exchange system is not the only kind of
economie institution. Polanyi's notion of economie implies that an institu-
tion need not appear 'economie' by conventional Standards in order to
fonction as organiser of production, distribution and consumption (Hal-
perin 1988:34). Polanyi also states that thé economy is an instituted
process. Process implies movement through time - activities that often
occur in complex combinations but that are ongoing and changing, as well
as continuous, whether cyclical or linear.
On the basis of thé above considérations, Polanyi (1968) argues that there
are three major modes of exchange in human societies: exchange, redis-
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tribution and reciprocity.3 'Exchange' is a mode of exchange by which
each prestation is compensated with another clear-cut prestation (for
example, wage for labour, products for amounts of money, one product
for another). Exchange is the transfer of goods at priées based on supply
and demand. Exchange as a mode of exchange, therefore, requires thé
existence of price-setting institutions where supply and demand can meet,
such as commodity markets, labour markets, and fïnancial markets. In
many societies separate exchange circuits may exist, because some goods
can only be exchanged among people with a certain social position, or
only against certain other goods (see Bohannan 1955).
The second mode of exchange is redistribution, in which a central
authority has the power to collect commodities or money and to redistrib-
ute thèse means. The institutional condition for redistribution to be a
mode of exchange is the existence of a centralized structure. The central
authority serves as an allocative point where goods, services and money
are collected and from which they are disbursed. The centre must be well-
established and ongoing and must exist independently of any particular
movement of goods, money or services. Examples of such central authori-
ties are heads of villages, chiefs, churches, modem governments, kings,
and so on. The ratio behind such a system can be very différent (Tiele-
man 1991:14). For example, it enables all kinds of labour division and
income distribution: between the young and old, between men and
women, between ralers and commoners, and so on. Another ratio can be
thé continuing existence ('reproduction') of society, which implies some
form of redistribution between producing and non-producing members of
society (children, elderly, sick people, people performing caring tasks).
Reciprocity is thé third mode of exchange. This is the exchange of
goods which takes place neither through markets nor through (administra-
tive) hiérarchies. Reciprocity refers to those économie activities of people
which comprise thé fulfilment of obligations, which are culturally deter-
mined. There is no immédiate compensation, but people act because 'they
ought to do so', with thé expectation that others will also act accordingly.
Examples are the care of parents for their children, domestic activities
3
 Polanyi himself refers to thèse modes of exchange as 'modes of économie
intégration'. Although thé latter term indicates better that the concepts reciprocity,
redistribution and exchange were formulated for thé analytical purpose of identifying
patterns of économie activity that can be associated with particular kinds of institutional
arrangements, we think thé use of the term 'modes of exchange' is more clear and refers
more directly to thé économie activity of distribution on which we concentrate in this
study.
^ done by various members of thé household, and so on. In order for
reciprocity to function as modes of exchange, an economie process must
;>. occur between symmetrically organised structures (Halperin 1988:37), for
s
. example, between kinsHip groups. Sahlins (1972) indicates that various
'^ forms of reciprocity may exist. There is 'balanced reciprocity', indicating a
mutual exchange among individuals or family units with thé amounts
exchanged being approximately equal in thé long run. 'Unbalanced
j'ëciprocity' exists when there is a constant move of means from those who
» hâve to those who hâve not. 'Negative reciprocity' can also be found, and
stealing is hère one of the examples.
above modes of exchange must be understood as models, that is, as
specifying idéal requirements that do not necessarily exist empirically
(Halperin 1988:37). The three modes of exchange can operate simulta-
âeously in a given society, but usually one of them will dominate. In
industrialized market économies, it is often taken for granted that (mar-
ket) exchange prevails, but considérable redistribution also takes place in
s%me important non-market segments, primarily those of non-profit
organisations and government agencies (Halperin 1988:50). Moreover,
ïeciprocity, rather than exchange or redistribution, mostly dominâtes
îwithin and between families. In precolonial developing countries and thé
îsO-called antique societies, thé principles of redistribution and reciprocity
Hominated, while in contemporary developing countries exchange is
becoming increasingly dominant. But in thé latter, too, large parts of the
economy are dominated by redistribution and/or reciprocity.
« The question of which mode of exchange will dominate is largely
aliswered outside the field of économies. The mixture of the three modes
pf exchange in a given society is not random, but strongly reflects cultural
ideas and opinions, political relations, other power relations like those
jfetween young and old, men and women, employed and unemployed,
ifich'and 'poor'classes, castes, and so on (see also Tieleman 1991:16-20).
Moreover, many économie activities are regulated by a mixture of two or
three modes of exchange. For example, in industrialized societies many
tfgricultural products marketed (exchange) are in fact highly subsidized
.(redistribution). Many socially important activities (associations, cultural
institutions) are based on a mixture of reciprocity (working with volun-
teers, monetary gifts), redistribution (subsidies) and exchange (contribu-
tion or admissions).
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Given thé above observations, and given thé fact that social security *
mechanisms, amongst other things, can be considered as économie
mechanisms that redistribute resources, this redistribution process, too,
will be 'regulated' by one or more of thé three modes of exchange
 s
prevailing in society. The idea behind Polanyi's thought is that a particular s
mode of exchange is closely related to a spécifie institutional setting. This
implies that thé mode of exchange coordinating distribution within social
security mechanisms tells us something about both thé form social security -
mechanisms hâve and also the way in which social security mechanisms
manifest themselves in society. Although the fonction of social security
mechanisms is more or less thé same in each society, social security -
mechanisms as institutions will take on a différent appearance in différent
societies when their underlying modes of exchange differ. For example, in * '
so called mixed économies, where both market exchange and redistri-
bution are main modes of exchange, thé exchange activities of social ,
security mechanisms are also mostly coordinated by one of thèse modes.
This is, for instance, reflected in thé finding that many social security °
mechanisms are organised by the state or other redistributive centres, and •
some social security provisions, such as pensions or life insurances, are ,
also provided by insurance markets. In developing countries, and espec-
ially in thé rural areas, reciprocity and redistribution are still often
dominant modes of exchange. In thèse rural societies, social security .
mechanisms can be found to a large extent operating within family and
kinship Systems, and within rural redistributive centres such as chief s
places, heads of villages, or patrons.
However, it should also be said that social security mechanisms do
not always follow thé dominant mode of économie exchange. In private
ownership market économies where exchange and price-setting markets
coordinate économie life, thé outcome of thé market in terms of distribu- ^ *
tion may be considered négative for some groups in society. This may lead ,
to a deliberate choice for another mode of exchange and its respective *
institutions to correct this outcome. In many market économies, it has
long been thought that redistribution would thé best mode of exchange to |
coordinate social security programs. In more récent years, a discussion has ^
been taking place as to whether or not social security mechanisms should
not be organised more in conformity with exchange, which will require a
quite différent set of institutional building and organisation. Whether or
not social security mechanisms follow thé prevailing mode of exchange in
a given society is rather a political and ethical issue. It dépends to a large
extent on thé subjective views of people in society on whether or not the
prevailing mode of exchange and its respective institutions is able to
serve, among others, also social security purposes, and whether or not the
outcome is considered as 'just'.This may also explain to some extent why
in some societies separate social security mechanisms exist alongside other
social and économie institutions, while in other societies thèse mechan-
isms do not appear separately from social and économie organisation in
général. In thé latter case, thé dominant mode of exchange already has
outcomes with respect to thé distribution of goods, wealth, rights and
opportunities for social security purposes which are considered just by thé
mèmbers of society. In practice, économies coordinated by reciprocity
agpear to hâve a larger 'social security component', in the sensé that
resources, rights and opportunities are already relatively more directed to
people in contingent situations than in économies coordinated by only
éxchange. In thé latter case, more 'artificial' correction is needed than in
thé former case.
There are two other ways in which thé economy influences social security
mechanisms. In thé first place, thé economy détermines to a large extent
the amount of resources that can be made available for social security
purposes. If there are just enough resources produced in society to give,
on average, everyone a minimum standard of living, problems could arise
for those individuals in contingent situations. Resources may still be made
available, but it is obvious that there is a relationship between thé level of
economie development and resources made available for social security
purposes (Drèze and Sen 1991:23-4). In thé second place, a higher level
of économie development will increase thé individual standard of living.
In turn this higher standard of living might lead to a new définition of
\vhat should be thé minimum social standard of living conditions in
society. In turn, more resources have to be made available then for social
security purposes, to bring someone back up to thé initial standard of
living before a contingency occurs.
3.4.2. Social security mechanisms and society
Iplanyi's theoretical observations on thé economy can prove helpful in
obtaining an insight into thé relationship between thé economy and thé
opération of social security mechanisms within thé economy. The econ-
omy as such, however, forms part of a wider context of social, political
and cultural relationships, namely a society. As thèse other 'sphères of
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life' are strongly interrelated with the economy, they also influence the
opération and dynamics of social security mechanisms. In this section we
pay attention to the relationships between social security mechanisms and
these other sphères of life.
Distinguishing 'sphères of life '
The fûrst question is, then, which sphères of life can further be distin-
guished in addition to the economie one? Sociologists have struggled with
this question for decades and going into great detail here would not serve
the purpose of this study. A userai initial basis for distinguishing sphères
of life is given by Parsons (Parsons 1951, Parsons and Smelser 1957), who
made an important contribution to the theory of social Systems. Examples
of applications of this theory are numerous. Practical applications can be
found, for instance, in Goudzwaard et al. (1994) and Tieleman (1991).
Laeyendekker (1994) gives a handsome introduction to the theory of
Parsons. What can be learnt from Parsons and his followers is that society
can be divided into four Subsystems: an economie, a political, a socio-
cultural, and a communal Subsystem. These Subsystems are analytical
constructs, and cannot be observed as separate phenomena. Moreover,
whether or not particular Subsystems will explicitly exist or develop in a
given society will largely depend on the extent to which a process of struc-
tural differentiation has taken place or is still taking place, whereby
spécifie functions are more and more differentiated over spécifie institu-
tions. Nevertheless, the functions the Subsystems fulfil are clearly distin-
guished. In the previous section we have already seen the functions of the
economie subsystem. We continue with the other three Subsystems.
In the political subsystem many décisions are taken that influence
the economie subsystem: décisions with respect to the distribution of
income, whether or not resources have to be provided by the local or
central authorities, or by the market (enterprises), and so on. At the same
time the political subsystem needs the economie subsystem, because the
economie subsystem provides the material means that are necessary to
allow the political subsystem to function. Circulating around the political
subsystem there may be a network of social movements, political parties,
media, trade unions, and so on, which influence the political system and
decision-making by observing and expressing the opinions in society. This,
in turn, intégrâtes the political and economie decision-making with the
ideas and values that exist in society. The bundie of the above institutions
can be called the Community subsystem. However, the sources of the
opinions that are advocated by institutions in the community subsystem
«ome from people, individuals, who live in their own environment where
they develop their own ideas and ideals. A fourth subsystem can, there-
fore, be distinguished: the socio-cultural subsystem. In this subsystem
attitudes and norms are developed and are maintained and transmitted by
a process of éducation, reflection and interaction. Families and also
schools play a major rôle here, as may churches.
As already stated, it will depend on the extent to which structural
differentiation has taken place in society whether or not the above
functions are also operationalized in different Subsystems. Large différ-
ences can be found among societies in the extent to which a subsystem is
relatively independent of the other Subsystems. For example, many pre-
industrialized societies have been described in which, for example, no
spécifie économie institutions can be found. The économie functions are
performed by thé kinship System, in addition to thé other functions this
System has. In relation to this point, Godelier uses the term 'relative
autonomy' to indicate thé extent to which Subsystems are mutually
(in)dependent in thé performance of their functions.
Societies also differ with respect to which subsystem is dominant in
society. It is often argued that in Western industrialized societies thé
économie subsystem is dominant and that norms and values are adapted
to the requirements of the économie subsystem with its emphasis on écon-
omie growth and efficiency. In other societies, however, other Subsystems
may be dominant and thé économie subsystem is made subservient, for
example, to thé maintenance of a particular kinship system, or may be
adapted to thé requirements of a théocratie society, in which religious
tasks rather than économie motives are thé principal 'guideposts in life'.
The question arises, of course, why in one society the economie subsystem
dominâtes, while in another this might be thé political or socio-cultural
subsystem? Godelier (1978) has formulated an answer by stating that the
subsystem that also régulâtes thé relations of production in society will
become the dominant subsystem. For example, when kinship relations
détermine someone's place in thé production process, as well as thé rights
to land and resources and their obligations in terms of labour and gifts,
thé kinship system will be considered by people in society as thé dominant
subsystem. When, for example, religious relations also function as rela-
tions of production, as is still the case in those parts of Indian society in
which thé caste system régulâtes daily life, thé religious subsystem will be
eonsidered thé dominant one.
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Subsystems and social security mechanisms
The second question is: Which éléments do thé Subsystems contain which
also influence thé opération of social security mechanisms in society? In
this respect, thé Community Subsystem, for instance, tells us something
about thé social relationships in society which, in turn, shape the size and
quality of social relationships that are important for thé opération of
social security mechanisms. One thinks hère of institutions and bureau-
cracy, social strata and class formation, catégories of population according
to âge, éducation or income, etc. But éléments such as family structure,
production and employment structure, seulement patterns, and so on may
also influence thé shape of social security mechanisms.
The social-cultural Subsystems include values and norms that regulate thé
social behaviour of members of society and, therefore, also influence thé
opération of social security mechanisms. Values symbolize thé common
view of a stratum or a group in society or thé common view of a society
as a whole concerning what is désirable; values influence and limit the
choices between possible acts, means and objectives. Values détermine
thé opération of social security mechanisms, to thé extent that it is not
very likely that thé way in which social security mechanisms operate will
be based on values that contradict général and widely acknowledged
values. Moreover, values are often used to défend a choice of a particular
social security mechanism. For example, in Western societies thé choice of
thé insurance principle is justified by referring to its correspondence with
more generally accepted values such as self-responsibility and what
Partsch (1983:74) calls 'Leistungsgerechtigkeit'.4 Values, however, are
valid irrespective of thé situation we are talking about. When we want
values to be of use for regulating social action they hâve to be operation-
alized. In sociology the term 'social norms' is used for thèse operationali-
zations (Partsch 1983:74). Norms are mandatory and relatively constant
raies of conduct; norms indicate exactly in a particular situation how to
conduct oneself and what acts are prescribed or prohibited. If norms are
respected in daily life, they not only direct social acting but also bring
about a certain regularity, uniformity and répétition in thé outcomes of
particular social acts. This latter characteristic of norms is important for
social security mechanisms, because thé opération of thèse mechanisms
With 'Leistungsgerechtigkeit' is meant thé général idea prevailing in western
societies that a person can only benefit if ne or she also contributed in the past. Distribu-
tion takes place 'according to work or prestation' and not 'according to need'.
dépends on régulation and regularity. Besides, it cannot be expected that
thé necessary processes of (re)distribution will take place and will take
place suffïciently, when no norms are présent to force members of a
group or society to participate in social security mechanisms. Values and
norms may be translated into social law, and there may be sanctions
against violation of thèse norms and social law.
Norms and values (whether or not made explicit in law) not only
direct people's actions, but are also the basis of people's entitlements. In
this respect one can argue that norms and values, amongst other things,
also détermine the entitlements people have to social security resources
eirculating within social security mechanisms. These entitlements can be
referred to, then, as 'social security entitlements'. In line with the obser-
vation that social security mechanisms do not necessarily appear as
separate institutions in society, is the fact that social security entitlements,
also, may not appear as separate institutions in society. They may be
hidden in more genera! entitlements, such as entitlements to communal
resources, to genera! support from kin members, and so on. Social
security entitlements are part of someone's exchange entitlements, as also
argued by Sen. When a person does not have sufficient production-based
or trade-based entitlements, social security entitlements may enable hun
to générale capabilities anyway.
With regard to the use of the term 'social security entitlements', one
major qualification must be made. The term 'entitlement' has as its
central sense, as we saw, 'what one has title to'. It must be emphasized
that there are very many types of possible or proposed title - moral, legal,
de facto. Gasper (1993:707) distinguishes therefore äs follows: (...) "(a) a
Claim of moral entitlement, lacking prédominant social acceptance;
perhaps one would label this äs a claimed right (...);(b) a claim of moral
entitlement, with prédominant social acceptance; one could call this an
acknowledged right; (c) a legally stated entitlement; (d) potential com-
mand over resources, consistent with law; this is one reading of Sen's
définition of exchange entitlement, and might be re-labelled 'legitimate
potential command' (...); (e) de facto command/effective command
consistent with law, reflecting how far the law is actually known, enforced
Of enforceable; i.e. what a person can in practice obtain title to. This last
is thé main interprétation in the development literature on food security
and income distribution; it might be better labelled 'legitimate effective
command'." Gasper's main argument is that scholars use the term 'entitle-
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of changes in those éléments from the Subsystems which also influence the
place and functioning of social security mechanisms. The analysis of these
éléments and their changes will explain to a great extent the dynamics of
social security mechanisms in society. The question which factors, in turn,
cause the changes of these éléments might lead to the ultimate identifi-
cation of changes in social security mechanisms, but this would require a
comprehensive study of the dynamics of societies, which is not the pur-
pose of this study. Nevertheless, in the context of this study some useful
observations can be made with respect to change and social security
mechanisms.
It was already argued that the discussed Subsystems can theoretical-
ly be distinguished, but cannot be observed empirically as such; the
Subsystems are not separate entities in a given society. A change in one of
the éléments of one Subsystem will in many cases induce changes in
éléments in the other Subsystems. Because of this interdependency,
Partsch (1983:76) suggests combining the changes of these éléments (and
thus of the Subsystems) in one term when they are used to explain the
change in social security mechanisms. The term Partsch uses is 'social
differentiation', a long lasting process of development whereby small,
homogeneous social formations develop into larger, heterogeneous and
complex societies because of increasing division of labour, social stratifica-
tion and other structural changes. In a process of social differentiation,
not only are thé (éléments of) Subsystems changing, but also the individ-
ual standards of living will gradually be differentiated. This process also
bas conséquences for thé existence and opération of social security
mechanisms.
A characteristic feature of most developing countries is that thé
process of social differentiation, translating itself into structural changes in
society, bas been induced by external forces during the colonial and post-
colonial period. This is not to say that thé precolonial society was a static
one, but its own dynamics have been significantly influenced and dis-
torted. When contacts with foreign societies intensified and in many cases
ultimately led to conquest and colonialism, social differentiation in
developing countries was shaped by external forces. What happened bas
been described by predominantly economie anthropologists of Marxist
orientation (see Binsbergen and Geschiere 1985, Dupré and Rey 1969,
Meillassoux 1975, Raatgever 1988, Rey 1983) as a process of 'articulation
of modes of production'. What do they mean by this?
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The articulation of modes of production has induced structural changes in
each of thé subSystems that make up society. At least six fundamental
processes of change taking place this Century in contemporary developing
countries hâve to be referred to in the context of the present study: a shift
towards monetization and thé market economy, thé introduction of private
ownership of land and of commercial monocultures, migrations of workers
and the flight from the land, urbanization, industrialization and national
intégration.
The introduction of money or thé intensification of its use was an
important change. The development of a money economy was bound up
with die conversion of traditional taxes from kind into money, with thé
growth of trade and thé replacement of barter by money exchange, and
with thé organisation and expansion of wage-earning labour m accordance
with the requirements of the government and thé colonial economy.
Commodity, fînancial and labour markets developed accordingly. The
development of capitalism also gave rise to thé individual appropriation of
land. The indigenous population was often expropriated and the land was
allocated to a privileged group of people or (foreign) companies. This
process started earlier in Latin America than in Africa or Asia.
The development of new économie activities (such as mining and
other industries) and new organisation forms of agriculture (such as
plantations) increased thé need for wage-labourers, entailing significant
flows of migrant workers. Thèse migrations may be of a temporary or a
more permanent character. The latter induces a one-way traffic from thé
countryside to thé towns. Urbanization, therefore, has become a very
important phenomenon in récent years. Towns and cities have been
created to fulfil a number of fonctions of an administrative, military,
commercial or other nature. Industrialization has taken a spécifie form
bound up with Western development. It is often confined to industries
exploiting natural resources or providing raw materials for export. Finally,
there is thé émergence of nationhood, which has its roots in European
expansion. But this national intégration process is far from complète:
there are still marked ethnie and régional différences within countries in
Latin America, Asia and Africa, which in many cases hâve lead to politi-
cal instability.
The six structural processes specified above hâve transformed
precapitalist societies with regard to their activities (industries and planta-
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lions, new agricultural technologies), their way of life (urbanization,
population movements, money and market economy), their social struc-
ture (development of private ownership, appearance of new production
relations) and, lastly, their socio-political organisation (process of colo-
nization followed by national intégration), social psychology and culture
(Malassis 1975:60-1). For thé people in developing countries thèse
changes mean other possibilities for hicome génération (commercial
agricultural production, wage-labour, etc.). in addition to agricultural
subsistence production; better techniques of cultivation hâve become
available; family members might migrate from thé rural family unit to
towns; individuals and family units are confronted with new state and non-
state institutions (through thé levying of taxes, expropriation of land,
introduction of new laws, etc.); more goods and services hâve become
potentially available for members of the family unit. Moreover, new social
norms and values are developing and new religions hâve appeared. Many
people in developing countries, in particular thé younger générations, live
in two worlds. They are confronted with both thé older and newer values
and norms and migrate between a still more conservative rural society
and a more progressive urban life; they are part of both older political
and social relations determined by âge, gender and social position, and
new social and political relations based on économie position, éducation,
and so on.
It needs no further explanation that thé structural changes in thé various
Subsystems have their repercussions on social security mechanisms in
society. These repercussions can be manifold. First, besides creating new
opportunities for people to reach a certain minimum standard of living,
articulation also leads to thé création of new patterns of uncertainties
surrounding people - for example, those related to market fluctuations.
People will try to find ways to cope with thèse uncertainties, and one such
way may be thé change in social security mechanisms or thé émergence of
new ones.
Secondly, individuals may lose entitlements or receive new and
more entitlements. An example of thé former-case is people losing
entitlements to communal resources when private ownership of land is
introduced. This, in turn, might threaten someone's standard of living
when he is dépendent for his survival on thèse communal resources. An
example of thé latter case is that the exchange entitlements of labour
increase as more opportunities for work may becotne^ available. In both
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cases, the shift in an individual's E-mapping will affect an individual's
standard of living and possibly that of his dépendants. This, in turn, also
influences actions taken by society to cover negative possible consé-
quences.
Thirdly, when articulation leads to économie development, more
resources become available in society, and possibly also for social security
purposes. In addition to more resources becoming available, thé nature of
those available resources will also change. As Partsch (1983:73) states, thé
introduction of money widened thé possibilities for social security mech-
anisms to distribute resources. For example, in contrast with food items,
money is not perishable, which enables social security mechanisms to
redistribute resources over time, and individuals to contribute to a
common fimd from which they can receive benefits in tunes of need.
Fourthly, articulation has in many cases led to 'exchange' becoming
the principal mode of exchange in society. Reciprocity and redistribution
were in many cases replaced. On the one hand, this may lead to a disap-
pearance of social security mechanisms which were institutionally tied to
these modes of exchange and, on the other hand, new mechanisms may
arise based on the new dominant mode. This means that the opération of
social security mechanisms changes.
Fifthly, as already argued, when articulation leads to economie
development the social standard of living conditions may rise, and this has
its conséquences for resources that have to be made available for social
security purposes.
The above list of possible changes is not exhaustive, but it shows
that social security mechanisms in society are not static, but are part of
the dynamics of society. Older social security mechanisms may change or
disappear, new mechanisms may arise. The conséquences of this are not
the same for ail people. Some groups of people may be worse off, others
may be better off. For example, the rising conflicts between older and
younger générations can be seen as a conflict between those who are
seriously threatened in their social security position as a resuit of articula-
tion, and those who are able to take advantage of the new opportunities
offered to them, and therefore do not participate anymore in thé older
mode of production, including its social security mechanisms. The case of
Swaziland in this study will present more concrete examples of these.
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3.6. A brief overview
Two main questions were analyzed in this chapter: thé function of social
security mechanisms for thé individual, and thé relationships existing
between social security mechanisms and (Subsystems of) society. The
analysis in this chapter is summarized and visualized in Figures 3.1 and
3.2.
Figure 3.1 can be considered as a flow diagram. Starting at the top-
left side of the figure we see that after an individual has been born in a
particular society, his membership of this society gives him certain entit-
lements. As was indicated, the type and amount of entitlements a given
person will have depend on his or her social and economie characteristics
and the society we are talking about. The entitlements give one the
command over resources. These resources may be income and commod-
ities, but also one's own labour power, someone else's labour power, land,
and so on. Resources may be converted by production or exchange or
both into income and commodities that ultimately can be used to fulfil
needs. In retrospect, then, one can say whether or not someone has
attained certain capabilities. These capabilities constitute someone's
standard of living. This standard of living can be compared with the social
standard. When the individual standard exceeds the social standard, no
action by society is required. When the individual standard is lower than
thé social standard, society may décide to take action. Taking into con-
sidération spécifie causes or contingent situations that gave rise to thé
situation will influence thé décision to take action. The action may be
threefold and is channelled through 'social security mechanisms': people
may be entitled to spécifie resources when they hâve no entitlements to
these resources; people can be directly given thé income or commodities
they need to fulfil certain needs; or people can be supported by convert-
ing income or commodities into needs fulfilment. In one case, one of
thèse measures might be sufficient: for example, giving a landless farmer
an entitlement to fertile land and 'honouring' this entitlement might be
sufficient for the farmer to overcome his contingent situation. In another
case, ail measures might hâve to be taken: for example, it is not sufficient
for disabled people to be entitled to a monetary benefit; the income also
has to be converted into prepared food for which thé disabled might need
support in thé realm of activities such as shopping, cooking, and so on.
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In Figure 3.2 tiiere is a summary of which éléments from each Subsystem
in society influence thé opération and dynamics of social security mechan-
isms in society. We consider social security mechanisms to be part of the
economie subsystem. The whole picture (both Figure 3.1 and 3.2) may
appear to be rather static, but, as already explained, shifts will continuons-
ly occur: in thé entitlements people have, in the dominant mode of
exchange and thé respective institutions that coordinate production and
distribution of resources, in thé amount and form of resources available in
society and in those resources that are made available for social security
purposes, in thé contingent situations for which society will give compen-
sation, and so on. The driving force of thèse shifts is due to changes in thé
various Subsystems making up society. These changes may resuit from
-internai dynamic factors or may be induced by external forces.
In this chapter, a gréât deal of attention has been paid to the rôle and
place of social security mechanisms in society. Thus far, we have dealt
with social security mechanisms as a homogeneous group of mechanisms
with a particular place and fonction in society. We have not further
specified those mechanisms. Many forms of such mechanisms can be
found, however. The next chapter, therefore, explicitly focuses on those
different forms of social security mechanisms.
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4. TYPES OF SOCIAL SECURITYMECHANISMS
4.1. Introduction
In previous chapters we used the term 'social security mechanisms' to
indicate a particular group of institutions and social relationships with a
common fonction and particular place in society. In many cases, societies
hâve différent types of social security mechanisms and are characterized
by thé existence of 'social security pluralism' (see Zacher 1988). In accor-
dance with thé purpose of this study, in this chapter the most important
types of thèse mechanisms to be found in thé rural areas of developing
countries are analyzed. In Section 4.2, an explanation is given of the
différent types distinguished in this study. In Sections 4.3 to 4.5, thé différ-
ent social security mechanisms are analyzed in more détail. In Section 4.3
social security mechanisms are dealt with for which reciprocity is the
dominant mode of exchange, including thé family unit and thé social
network - consisting of kinship relations, social relationships with neigh-
bours and friends, and social relationships resulting from membership of
associations. Because of the important rôle of thèse social security mech-
anisms for thé social security of the rural population in developing
countries, we pay a gréât deal of attention to thèse mechanisms. In
Section 4.4, social security mechanisms for which redistribution is the
dominant mode of exchange are analyzed. Thèse mechanisms can be
found at thé community, village or chiefdom level, but also at state level.
Section 4.5 contains brief comments on social security mechanisms for
which market exchange is the dominant mode of exchange.
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4.2. Classification of social security mechanisms
Two attempts in literature to distinguish différent types of social security
mechanisms have already been discussed in Chapter 2. The conclusion
was that it would be better to avoid a classification according to dichot-
omies such äs modern-traditional and formal-informal. Can we think of an
alternative classification? Yes, if we can argue why we want such a
classification in the first place. One argument is that a useful classification
can make an investigation of different forms of social security mechanisms
casier. By classifying thèse différent forms according to certain criteria, we
can group them and analyze their characteristics, their mutual différences
and their dynamics. Moreover, a classification can help us to set bounds
to our field of study, when we want to analyze a subsection of existing
social security mechanisms in society.
The classification used in this study is derived from the arguments
that were brought forward in the previous chapter. When we look at the
function of social security mechanisms, we see that it implies, amongst
other things, human interaction in which resources and/or opportunities
are transferred. These transfers for social security purposes, like any other
transfer in society, are coordinated by what we have called a mode of
exchange. When the human interaction we are dealing with is institu-
tionalized, particular social relationships and institutions are linked with
the prevailing mode of exchange. As was outlined 'm Chapter 3, the modes
of exchange can be associated with particular kinds of institutional
arrangements. There is no reason to assume that this will be different for
social security mechanisms. Consequently, three major groups of social
security mechanisms can be distinguished: a group
 sfor which reciprocity is
,-f- % f' Jk&
the dominant mode of exchange, another for ]vhich redistribution is the
prevailing mode, and a third group for which exchange is the dominant
one. Our thesis is that particular institutional arrangements can be found
for each group. When reciprocity is the dominant mode of exchange,
social security mechanisms will have the forRi of symmetrical social
relationships, such as can be found within famïly units, kinship groups and
other small-scale social relationships. In the case* oî* redistribution, social
läliiSI^ * t*
security mechanisms will have the form of hjeïarcnical redistributive
centres such as chiefdoms, government agencies,™ patrons, and so on.
When exchange is the dominant mode of exchange, social security mech-
anisms will be institutionalized in markets and, in particular, in insurance
markets.
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In the next sections of this chapter, the different forms of social
security mechanisms will be analyzed in terms of the way in which the
collection and distribution of social security resources is organized, the
type of social security resources it can provide, the type of contingencies it
is able to cover, and how people in need are entitled to the social security
resources circulating within a spécifie form.
4.3. Social security mechanisms and reciprocity
As briefly explained in Chapter 3, reciprocity is obligatory gift and
counter-gift giving between persons who stand in some socially defmed
relationship to one another. For the people involved, gifts of produced
items and factors are regarded simply as one form - material or economie
- of expressing such social relationships (Dalton 1967:72).' In many Sub-
Saharan African rural societies, reciprocity still plays a much more
important rôle than in Western societies. The frequency and amounts of
such gifts are greater, the number of different people with whom one
person may engage in gift exchange is larger, the social obligations (and
sanctions) to do so are strenger and, above all, such gift reciprocity may
play an important part in production (especially in labour allocation),
which is rarely the case in Western industrialized market économies
outside the family farm. In an article with Goodwin, Schapera (1937:166)
explains the importance of reciprocal flows in Bantu societies (to which
the Swazi also belong): "the main incentive to conformity with these
obligations is reciprocity. In the relative absence of industrial specializ-
ation and consequent economie interdependence, kinship serves to
establish greater social cohésion within the community, and to integrate
its activities into a wider coopération than obtains within the restricted
limits of the household. The so-called 'communal System' of the Bantu is
largely a manifestation of this close bond of solidarity and reciprocity
arising out of kinship and affecting well-nigh every aspect of daily life".
Dalton (1967:72), when discussing production in primitive African
économies, states that "the great variety of items and services transacted
reciprocally helps to explain why 'production' is invisible, so to speak, in
primitive économies: from the viewpoint of the participants, the move-
1
 For example and comparison, m Western society a birthday gift to someone is just
one among many ways of expressmg a social relationship with that person.
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ment of resources and products is not regarded as an activity distinct from
other social activities. A gift of labour to help a kinsman clear his land
(part of production) may not be distinguished from a gift of cattle to help
him acquire a bride; or, indeed, a gift of a song or a name". According to
Dalton (1967:72) "the pivotai matter is the social relationship between the
persons which induces gifte of labour, cattle, songs and names. When the
source of the gift obligation is the same, there is no reason for the
participants to mark off the labour gift as part of production, h is only
when production activities become divorced from activities expressing social
obligation that production becomes marked off as a peculiarly economie
activity, apart from other activities (as, of course, occurs in market
economy)" (italics by Dalton, A.L.).
The above observation by Dalton is very important for this study.
The same sort of reasoning can be applied to those activities that lead to
transfers of means for social security purposes. When reciprocity is the
main mode of exchange, the transfer of resources for social security
purposes is, again from the viewpoint of the participants, not regarded as
an activity distinct from other social activities. It is the social relationship
between people which also induces the transfers of social security
resources. Only when the activities related to the transfer of social
security resources are not connected with activities expressing social
relationship do social security transfers become marked off as peculiarly
social security activities. The latter situation bas largely been the case in
Western market économies. As social security activities in rural areas of
developing countries are to a far lesser extent marked off as social
security activities than in Western market économies, it is much casier to
widerstand why many social and économie researchers from thé European
and North American continent conclude that social security mechanisms
hardly exist in developing countries. Their search for and présentation of
institutional arrangements that solely organize activities for social security
purposes is thé conséquence of being too ethnocentric on this issue. The
social relationships in which reciprocity dominâtes may, besides being
social relationships, at the same time be social security mechanisms. In
this sensé, then, social security mechanisms cannot be distinguished from
social organization in général.
Although from thé viewpoint of the participants a transfer of
resources for social security purposes may not differ from giving someone
a name or a song, this différence does exist for us in this study, and thé
task of the 'social security researcher' is to investigate those transfers
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resulting from social relationships which also 'serve' social security
purposes. In other words, the researcher must be looking for those social
relationships in which resources are transferred which, besides being an
expression of thé social relationship, also protect or promote an indivi-
dual's standard of living in thé sensé described in thé previous chapter.
For his own analytical purposes, therefore, ne may label thèse relation-
ships as social security mechanisms, while keeping in mind that thèse
mechanisms cannot be observed in isolation and that thé social relation-
ship also serves other purposes. We go into more détail on two main
forms of social relationships, which frequently also operate and are used
as social security mechanisms: thé relations within thé family group
(Sections 4.3.land 4.3.2.)and social relationships which constitute social
networks (Section 4.3.3), of which kinship relations (Section 4.3.4),
relations with neighbours, friends and acquaintances (Section 4.3.5), and
social relationships within associations (Section 4.3.6) will be analyzed
separately.
4.3.1.The rural family
In this study we use the term 'family' or 'family unit' to indicate thé basic
unit in which people live together. In social science analysis thé family is a
social unit defined by kinship relations between people (Elus 1988:13).
Since thé major Unes of kinship which constitute a family unit differ
markedly in différent societies, it is not possible to state a général rule
concerning the boundaries of the term 'family'.However, it can be safely
stated that in rural areas in developing countries thé family unit is seldom
a nuclear family unit consisting of two adults with their children. A rural
family is often 'extended', comprising three or more générations, often
enlarged with other congenial relatives or friends.
The sociological term 'family' is preferred to the more économie
concept of 'household'. Generally the concept of the household is used to
indicate either a unit of consumption (group of people who eat from thé
same pot) or a unit of production (group of people who pool their
resources for production purposes). This makes thé concept less appropri-
ate in this study to indicate the overall social unit in which a group of
people live. The term 'family' or 'family unit' is considered to be much
broader than 'household', serving not only an économie fonction, but also
social, educational and religious fonctions. Further, as will be argued,
family units also serve social security purposes and can therefore be
labelled as one type of social security mechanism.
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Freiburg-Strauss and Jung (1988) present a model of a rural family
unit that is useful for this study. The model is presented in Figure 4.1.
One of the major éléments of this model is that family units are not
considered as static entities, but as dynamic units whose structure, compo-
sition and intra-family relations constantly change due to changes in the
lives of the individuals constituting the family unit. This idea of distin-
guishing phases in the development of the family unit was first put
forward by Fortes (1970), and attempts to apply nis ideas can be found in
Goody (1971). For Southern Africa, Low (1986) and Murray (1981) can
be mentioned as représentatives of what was later called the 'development
cycle theory' (see also Chapter 6).
Fortes (1970:4) distinguishes three phases in the developmental
cycle of the family unit.2 First, there is a phase of expansion that lasts
from marriage of two people until the completion of procréation of their
family. The biological limiting factor is the duration of the wife's (or
wives'!)fertility. More important isthat "in structural terms it corresponds
to the period during which all the offspring of the parents are economical-
ly, affectively and jurally dependent on them" (Fortes 1970:4). The second
phase is the phase of dispersion or fission. This begins with the marriage
of the oldest child and continues until all the children are married. The
third phase, the phase of replacement, starts when one of the children
(often the youngest child remaining on the estate, or the eldest) takes
over the family estate. The phase of replacement ends with the death of
the parents.
Figure 4.1 shows how a person's life cycle (first row in the figure)
is related to the different phases of the family unit. During his or her life-
time in the family unit a person will expérience deficit and surplus phases.
A deficit phase is "a situation where the normally satisfied subsistence
needs of a family member exceed his or her contributions to the family
income in its different forais (agricultural production, wages, etc.)" (Freib-
urg-Strauss and Jung 1988:231). In a surplus phase, of course, the contri-
butions of a family member exceed his or her needs.
In his childhood, the individual is completely dependent on his
parents. His parents produce in their enterprise and their production is
distributed among the family members. In his time of courtship, the in-
dividual still lives in the parent's unit, but participâtes in the productive
Fortes uses the term 'phase' instead of 'stage',because one phase may partly overlap
the other one in time.
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activities and hence contributes to the production of the family by working
as a family labourer in bis parents' enterprise or as share-cropper, - or
starts working outside the family enterprise as a wage-labourer. At the
time of marriage and birth of the first children, a new nuclear family is
created, which lives from the means that are generaled by its own produc-
tive activities. The individual may still be a family labourer or sharecrop-
per, but may also continue with wage-labour or start his own production
as simple commodity producer. When the children grow up, they will
contribute their labour to the productive activities of the nuclear family
unit, and the production will increase. The generaled means are used to
maintain the nuclear family and to support the elderly in the family whose
productive activities have declined or finished. When becoming older, a
person's productive activities will 'run-down' and be partly or wholly trans-
mitted to his children, who may already have starled their own nuclear
family by marriage. In this phase of the individual life cycle, a person
becomes largely dependent on the production of his children, although hè
may still be engaged in the family production as family labourer or may
have accumulated sufficient wealth to live as a rentier. Upon Ihe death' of
a person, Ihe whole estate will be Iransferred lo (one of) his children and
the cycle starts again.
Having explained the model of a rural family unit adopted in this
study, we can turn to the more spécifie question of Öie family unil operal-
ing as a social security mechanism.
4.3.2. The rural family as solidarity group
It can be concluded from the above model that an ideal course of the
family life cycle will guarantee an interlocking of the different surplus
phases. In such an ideal picture, in all phases of a person's life a surplus
product is generaled wilhin Ihe family unit which is sufficient to compen-
sale for Ihe deficils of olher family members. In Iwo phases of his life
(youlh and old âge), a person will suffer deficils and will receive part of
Ihe surplus producl produced by olher family members. In one phase of
his life (marriage), Ihe individual is producer of Ihe surplus producl him-
or herself and has lo conlribute to sustain children and Ihe elderly. In Ihis
way, then, a certain slandard of living is guaranleed for all family mem-
bers at any given poinl in time.
However, Ihis ever repeating cycle of interlocking surplus phases is
neilher a self-suslaining process nor does il happen in each and every
family. The occurrence of Ihe cycle of inlerlocking surplus phases is highly
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influenced by spécifie social and economie factors lhat make a social
group ullimately a solidarity group. A solidarity group can be understood
as a group in which resources are transferred lo Ihose members who are
unable lo raise these resources themselves (see Zacher 1981, Partsch
1983). Five importanl factors play a rôle in the opération of a solidarity
group: Üie continuing existence of a rund of resources for social security
purposes, Ihe size of the group, its composition, ils suslainability, and the
existence of a 'normative insurance' wilhin the group (Partsch 1983).
Existence of a fund of resources
Freiburg-Strauss and Jung (1988:230) slale ihal "the economie conditions
of surplus-production and its appropriation and redistribution within Ihe
family unil conslilule the internai social security System".3 A possible
surplus-product can only be realized when members of Ihe family are able
lo continue production. A critical poinl in Ihe family cycle, Iherefore, is
when a new enterprise is starled in Ihe family unil, as Ihe new enterprise
has lo realize the production needed lo lake care of Ihe children and
elderly. For Ihe slart of a new enterprise, aulonomous righls over property
and conlrol over (re)productive resources for the surplus-producing family
members are very important: "the essenlial stake is the right lo use and
dispose of the productive and reproductive resources which every génér-
ation must gain possession of when il reaches malurity. In général, the
allocation by gift, prestation, inheritance and succession of righls over
property, persons and office on the one hand, and of rights over the
fertility of women on Ihe olher, is a major, if nol the most significant,
factor in the developmental cycle of the domeslic group" (Fortes 1970:5-
6). Freiburg-Strauss and Jung (1988:230) corne more or less to the same
conclusion when stating that "access to resources or means of production,
(...), is an importanl precondition for the continuing of Ihe Iransfers of
contributions and returns within the family unil. " This access lo resources
is in turn highly dependenl on Ihe prevailing syslem of property righls and
succession and on the options lo engage in economie activities in a given
society. This détermines lo a large exlenl Ihe fund of resources Ihal will
be available for Ihe eslablishmenl of a new enterprise.
In the above family unit model, overlapping cycles of surplus-
production (of the parents and Üie newly eslablished family) are assumed.
3
 The reader is reminded that 'surplus-production' is understood as the amount of
production that exceeds the normal subsistence needs of the productive family members.
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This helps to overcome the transition period from childhood to the
establishment of a new reproduction and production unit. The young
man's initial surplus phase coïncides with the establishment phase of his
enterprise because of his parents' contributions, which can be understood
as a further investment in their old-age insurance. But, as said, migration
disrupts the possibility of interlocking surplus phases, and in the event of
a migrant returning home without a rund of savings, the establishment or
redevelopment phase of the family enterprise coïncides with the obliga-
tion to take care of both the children and the parents (Freiburg-Strauss
and Jung 1988:235).
The extent to which a person will gain control over and access to
resources coïncides largely with his life-cycle. It has been observed in
many societies that a change in a person's control over and access to
(reproductive resources is closely linked to the different phases in
someone's life-cycle. As Fortes (1970:9) states, it is "the changing struc-
tural relationships that make up the framework of a persons's life-cycle.
The stages of physiological maturation that accompany this development
are of secondary significance. They are chiefly important as signs of
readiness for a shift from one phase to another." Moreover, we can add
the observation that women and men face different possibilities and
options in the fund raising process.
In the courtship period, a woman generally cannot contribute to
the resource rund, because she continues to participate in the domestic
activities of her parents' enterprise until the formation of a new house-
hold. The young man in his courtship has, however, several options. One
option might be sharecropping with his parents (or others), who advance
him the necessary capital during the erop season. The parents appropriais
part of his surplus-product in exchange for providing him with access to
land or capital. When parents are not able to support the young man,
agricultural wage-labourer may be another option, but the seasonal and
unstable wage-relations make only a modest capital accumulation poss-
ible. Migration might be another option, then. But migration may distort
thé circulation of subsistance within thé family unit. In his absence thé
parents continue the farm enterprise, but they cannot exploit thé young
man's labour and are likely to enter thé 'holding' and 'running-down'
phase. When thé migrant returns, he will have to redevelop the enterprise
from a diminished economie and social base.
With Freiburg-Strauss and Jung (1988:236), we can corne to a main
conclusion: "the combination of individual surplus- and déficit-phases that
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constitutes the household- and enterprise-cycles should be considered the
principal management problem of a peasant economy." Social security will
be strained if these cycles happens to 'clash'. What is of special interest in
this context is the interdependence between (long-term) biological/demo-
graphic and (short-term) economically determined deficit- and surplus-
phases within the family economy. Economically, deficit- and surplus-
phases originale from social and economie events of a temporary charac-
ter, such as a bad harvest, a décline in product priées, temporary loss of
employment opportunities, and so on. The arising short-term déficits
require short-term décisions to secure a minimum level of family subsis-
tence - by, for example, liquidating real assets, incurring debt, reordering
production arrangements, or giving up Investments. However, all these
short-term déficit-phases will cause greater damage to a 'young' family
with small children than to a well-established family because of the
tension in thé former case between the restricted availability of land and
labour and the subsistence needs of the unproductive members of the
family economy. During this phase, thé young family runs a greater risk of
losing control of part of its enterprise and therefore of its reproduction
base, if a structural deficit, namely the foundation of an autonomous unit
of production and consumption, coincides with a temporary déficit
situation.
The size of the group
A second factor that is important for thé opération of a solidarity group is
thé size of thé group. The size of thé group détermines thé bürden that
will fall on each single member when one or more group member(s)
fall(s) short of particular needs. The more members thé group has, thé
less will be thé bürden for each single member when one of them falls
short. A minimum size for a solidarity or risk group would be difficult to
estimate, but it can be suggested that the size must exceed that of a
nuclear family (husband, wife and children) (Partsch 1983:65-66). On thé
other hand, the group cannot be too large. Platteau (1991:136) refers hère
to thé incentive problem: "any kind of collective action - including social
security arrangements - is always under serious threat from incentive
Problems". These problems actually arise when information is costly and
asymmetrically distributed, and they usually take thé form of moral hazard
and adverse sélection (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981:165-166, Binswanger and
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Rosenzweig 1983:507, Newbery 1989: 278-79)." These problems can only
be avoided when elaborate record-keeping is possible and thé transaction
costs of providing insurance, including social security (administrative and
information costs), are relatively low (Platteau 1991:136). When the term
'transaction costs' is given a more sociological meaning, thèse costs also
include thé efforts of an individual to gain another person's confidence. In
this sensé, it also refers to someone's 'bargaining power' towards other
persons: how strong someone's solvability is in the eyes of the other
person, and whether someone is able to acquire what he or she wants
from thé other (see also section on intra-family relations, page 85 and
beyond). Platteau (1991:137) states that thé problem of asymmetrical
information and the high transaction costs this would give rise to is one of
the reasons why social security schemes in developing countries can be
found mainly at thé level of small communities and social groups. Within
thé family unit, for instance, thé cost of information collection and
contract enforcement is reduced to manageable levels because of the
historical ties and highly personalized relationships within thé family unit.
Moreover, given thé interlinked nature of many transactions and thé lack
of alternative possibilities (other communities or social groups being
themselves tightly-knit social entities with entry barriers), thé cost of free-
riding or rale-breaking tends to be so high that even implicit or tacit
commitments can be considered as more or less self-enforcing.
A model of thé family unit as presented above will usually contain
sufficient productive members to make thé bürden on each of them nót
too heavy when one of thé members falls short. Furthermore, thé size of
thé group is limited and, because of the highly personalized relationships,
transaction costs are low and problems of moral hazard and adverse
sélection are minimized. The absence of other support-giving institutions
might enhance thé absence of rule breaking or free-riding behaviour.
In thé économie theory of insurance, moral hazard arises 'when an agent who
obtains insurance has an incentive to take less care to avoid thé contingencies which give
rise to claims'. As for adverse sélection, it occurs 'when thé insurance Company cannot
distinguish between agents who hâve différent probabilities of claims, and hence must offer
all the same contract', with the result that the contract only appeals to (and adversely
sélects) those belonging to a comparatively high-risk category (Newbery 1989:278). Both
problems arise from 'asymmetrie information' regarding the relevant personal character-
istics of the agent seeking insurance.
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The composition of the group
For the opération of a solidarity group, the composition of the group is a
third factor that needs to be considered. The composition must be such
that at all tunes there are enough members who can give sufficiently of
their own means to members in need. This implies a composition of the
group in which not all members are affected by the same risk at the same
time (so called collective risks). To give an example: it does not make
much sensé for farmers living in an ecologically uniform area and carrying
out activities which are similar from a risk point of view to pool or share
their risks. If they are all maize growers, for example, a drought or maize
disease will affect them all to the same extent. No one is able then to
help each other. A fundamental theorem of the economie theory of risk
and insurance deals with this so called covariance of risks. The theorem is
that the cost of an additional risk dépends on its covariance with existing
risks: the cost will be higher the strenger the degree of positive corréla-
tion, while negatively correlated risks will have the effect of reducing the
total cost of risk hearing. Consequently, there are potential gains from
trade in risk when incomes and contingencies are uncorrelated, while, if
all agents face similar risks, risk cannot be reduced much by trading
between the participants (Platteau 1991:139, Newbery and Stiglitz 1981:
165, Newbery 1989:270-2). To continue with the example of the farmers:
the high covariance of yields accounts hère for the difficulty of providing
insurance against collective risks, that is, risks which affect all the partici-
pants simultaneously. The opposite applies when farmers, carrying out
different activities from a risk point of view, pool their risks; a contin-
gency would not affect all farmers to the same extent and enough farmers
will be left to supply means of subsistence to help the needy. In sum,
when covariant risks exist interpersonal redistribution is impossible (or it
is possible, but no one will enter the scheme).
In thé family unit, thé problem of covariant risks is reduced by
having people of différent générations and âges. Moreover, also due to
thé gender division of labour, thé économie activities of family members
are not of the same kind, but diversified over several activities, which
reduces thé chance of ail members being affected by the same risk. And
not only among family members are there différent économie activities,
but frequently each productive member is engaged in différent économie
activities. Thèse activities form a System of interlocking factor and product
markets (see Bardhan 1980, Braverman and Srivinasan 1983). Freiburg-
Strauss and Jung (1988:235) state that this System forms "a complementary
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part of informal social security. The network of multistranded relation-
ships permits thé adjustment of family resources to actual requirements of
production and reproduction."
The sustainability of the group
The sustainability of a solidarity group is a fourth factor. It must be
certain for ail members that thé group will continue to exist when thé
contingencies occur and during thé whole period in which conséquences
are felt as resuit of the contingency. Interpersonal redistribution takes
place when it is certain that thé size and composition of a group or
Community will exist in thé future. Solidarity groups that are able to
replace departing members over tune are especially suitable for interper-
sonal redistribution. Extended families or clans, for example, are perfect
solidarity groups from this point of view, because they are able to repro-
duce thé group over long time periods (Partsch 1983:66).
'Normative Insurance'
Last, but certainly not least, if we want a group to be a solidarity or risk
group a principle must be présent that obliges members to support other
members when necessary. This is the fifth factor. There must be norms or
values that force members to redistribute means from those who hâve to
those who hâve not. The existence of such a "normative insurance"
(Partsch 1983:67) is a perquisite because it cannot be expected from thé
individual members that they will contribute and contribute sufficiently at
times when this is needed. Customary rules, moral principles and com-
munity norms constitute, therefore, a powerful means of assuring each
participant that co-operation will ensue and that thé obligations created
will be enforced (Platteau 1991:139). It is obvious that a normative
insurance in this way does not only direct the transfers of resources from
those who hâve to those who hâve not, but also, at the same time, entitles
people in need to these resources. Normative insurance bas two sides of
thé same coin. Thèse rules, moral principles and norms might take thé
form of well-defined laws and sanctions, but might also take the form of
unwritten norms and values based on and sanctioned by religious belief s.
Both forms hâve to be considered as 'légal', in the broadest view of what
is légal.
It might be argued that the necessary redistribution of means will
take place if a group lasts long enough, because the individual contribu-
tions and receipts will balance in the long run. But such a balance can
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only be expected with certainty when a far-reaching équivalence between
prestation and contra-prestation is secured, such as with private insurance
(Partsch 1983:67).5 The realization of this équivalence principle is not
possible in developing countries, because some important technical
insurance assumptions are not given (homogeneous and estimable risks;
application of the law of big numbers). Moreover, the use of the équival-
ence principle is limited when it leads to situations that are in conflict
with other (often more important) values and norms of a group or society.
The équivalence principle would, for example, lead to lack of protection
for those who cannot contribute sufficiently. When the objective-is also to
create a social balance, the équivalence principle should be replaced or at
least be strengthened by another principle, for example, the principle of
solidarity.
The importance of the fifth factor is reflected in research and literature. It
is one of the thèmes within légal anthropology, and other social sciences
also pay attention to this factor. A famous discussion on the importance
of the fifth factor is what Platteau (1991) calls the Scott-Popkin contro-
versy. Scott (1976) is the main advocate of the 'moral economy approach'.
In this approach, precapitalist rural societies are viewed as societies in
which social rights of minimum subsistence are secured to ail members.
The premise is that thèse societies are essentially geared to providing
social and économie security to ail members. Social arrangements and
économie institutions in traditional village communities have been espe-
cially designed to cope with the threat of hunger and other kinds of
contingencies. It is in the light of this central objective that the high
incidence of redistribution and reciprocity must be accounted for (Plat-
teau 1991:113). Scott (1976:32,40) states that there is a strong "subsistence
ethic" to guarantee subsistence as a "moral claim" or as a "social right" to
which every member is entitled. It finds its social expression "in the
patterns of social control and reciprocity that structure daily conduct". A
particular person may lose his membership and, thereby, his traditional
claims to guaranteed subsistence if he breaks the customary rules of the
5
 With private or individual insurance the insurant pays an insurance premium that
corresponds with expected values of insurance benefits. If the calculated contribution is
correct and the group of insured people is large enough, the collected contributions must
be sufficient to balance the losses or damages of an insured who suffered from a contin-
gency. Also in this case interpersonal redistribution takes place, but the only objective is to
restore the status quo before the risk occurred (Partsch 1983:67,note
 (61).
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society to which hè belongs. These violations are assumed to be rare,
since villagers are keen to avoid subsistence crises and it is difficult to get
accepted in other comrmmities.
Scott's view is opposed by the 'political economy approach', ad-
vocated by Popkin (1979). Popkin states that there is no such thing as a
'subsistence ethic'. He argues, on the basis of his own fieldwork, that the
peasant is self-interested and his focus will be directed on himself and bis
family. Collective action will only be undertaken from the standpohit of
self-interest and based on rational cost-benefit accounting (Popkin 1979:
31). Norms and values do not influence human behaviour in this respect.
Platteau's main argument is that both views do not exclude each
other, and presenting the above views as each other's opposite obscures
the discussion. As Platteau (1991:155) concludes "in sofar as these
methods or mechanisms (social security mechanisms, A.L.) have proven to
be workable, their success ought to be ascribed both to self-interested
behaviour on the part of individuals and to ruling customs and norms that
are designed to ensure their continuity and to control major incentive
Problems." This can also be made clear by referring to the prisoner's
dilemma. Take a group of people of which the members do not know
each other, but all the members have a chance of falling into a contingent
situation, although they do not know if this will ever happen to them and
when. For the group and for each individual member, the best way to
maximize the standard of living in the long run is to cooperate with the
others by giving some of his means to other members when they are in
need in order to receive means when hè himself is in need. But, as each
individual member does not know if he will ever be in a contingent
situation, the absence of an obliging norm will probably prevent him from
cooperating and will also make hun less sure that hè can expect help from
others when hè is in need. Each individual member, then, will choose for
himself, although this will create a suboptimal situation in the long run in
which the standard of living of the group and of the individual members
will be lower than in the case of coopération (except for those lucky few
who never fall into a contingent situation). However, when all group
members agrée on a norm to help each other in times of need, coopér-
ation is ensured and support can be relied on in times of need. A situ-
ation is created then in which all members will reach a higher standard of
living than in a situation without coopération. In this case, it is in each
member's interest to cooperate. The collective action is still donc from
the standpoint of self-interest, but the existence of an enforcing norm to
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support each other in tunes of need forms the bridge between 'micro' and
'macro' rationality.
The above will also apply to the family as solidarity group. For example,
when a parent is not sure that his child will take care of him, it might be
rational for a parent not to transfer resources to his children and to form
his or her own pension rund. But he will never know if the fund will be
sufficient to cover all his needs because, for instance, the parent does not
know how long he will live in old age. To transfer economie resources to
his children in order to enhance his own old-age insurance is a better
option, then, but this will only happen when there are norms, values, or
laws which oblige that children have to take care of their elderly parents.
The parent will be even more prepared to support his children if it is
certain that they will have sanctions applied against them if they break the
law. Of course, personal feelings such as love and affection will also play
a rôle in this matter. Insights into family law (including maintenance
laws), property law (including land tenure) and inheritance law, äs well äs
hi thé society's religion, will provide the researcher with a greater under-
standing of thé présence or absence of a 'normative insurance' within thé
family. It should, however, be acknowledged with Popkin (1979:22) that
social norms cannot always be expected to mitigate thé free-rider problem
by instilling altruistic préoccupations into thé people's internalized values
Systems, or by holding their most dangerous opportunistic tendencies in
check. Norms can be malléable, continuously renegotiable, and shifting "in
accordance with considérations of power and stratégie interaction among
individuals". As a resuit, norms are often found to be inconsistent or
conflictual so that they "cannot directly and simply détermine actions".
In sum, applying thé above factors to thé rural family suggests that thé
family unit theoretically can act as a solidarity group. But some other
considérations should also be taken into account to qualify this statement.
In thé first place, a family is unable to cover all the contingencies of its
members. In thé second place, intra-family relations are such that not all
members have equal positions in thé family group. This is also reflected in
their 'social security position'. Thirdly, families are not isolated units that
continue to exist independently of the external world. The family develop-
ment cycle represents solely thé internai dynamics of the family, but thé
dynamics of thé family is also partly determined by social, économie,
political and cultural changes in society. So changes in society will also
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affect the rôle of the family as solidarity group. We go briefly into more
detail on each of these considérations.
Family and contingenties
It was shown above that an interlocking of surplus phases in the develop-
ment cycle of the family enables the family as a whole to cope with long-
term déficits (childhood and old age) originating from the life-cycle of its
individual members. In Chapter 3 it was indicated that rural families live
in a highly uncertain environment. These uncertainties were rubricated as
natural hazards, market fluctuations, social uncertainties, and state
actions. It was also indicated that rural family units in developing coun-
tries are often units where income is realized, needs are satisfied and also
support is given. Therefore, the outcome of uncertainties will, in most
cases, directly affect the family unit. Is the rural family also able to cope
with these uncertainties?
Freiburg-Strauss and Jung (1988:238) add a time dimension to
these uncertainties. They distinguish between short-term and long-term
production risks and short-term and long-term reproduction risks. The
conséquences of short-term production risks (for example, bad harvest,
seasonal fall of priées, shortage of labour force or capital, disease,
increase in costs) will normally be mastered within thé family by curtail-
ment of consumption, sale of cattle, reordering production arrangements,
informai crédit, and so on. In thé event of thé family itself being unable
to master thé distress, interfamily arrangements may prove helpful (see
next section). Long-term production risks include, for example, thé
dissolution of informai production arrangements, risks involved in thé
purchase of land, sale of land due to debts, and loss of family labour
force. It will be extremely difficult for a single family unit to cope with
thèse risks, as their occurrence usually means a loss of means of produc-
tion which cannot easily be replaced. In this case, thé family will depend
on external social networks for support.
Short-term reproduction risks include seasonal shortage of income
to meet consumption needs, illness, accidents, maternity, and so on. Long-
term reproduction risks include émigration of family members, dissolution
of social relations, chronic illness and invalidity, death of family members.
Freiburg-Strauss and Jung (1988:238) conclude that "reproduction risks,
both short-term and long-term, are exclusively covered within thé family
and its wider social network which centres around kin and affinai rela-
tions." The coverage is realized by kin relations imposing a moral obliga-
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tion on thé individual to protect relatives from need according to thé
individual's possibilities. The principle of reciprocity underlies the trans-
fers of resources. The protection offered reflects thé particular économie
situation of the family involved. A family which normally lives in a
precarious situation cannot offer more than thé redistribution of poverty.
Moreover, since thé obligation is often moral, there are no enforceable
sanctions for kinpersons who refuse assistance. This can lead to thé
statement that support is given only in cases where continuous relations of
production and/or reproduction are established (Freiburg-Strauss and
Jung 1988:238).
It is noted that, of course, thé expenditures to cover eventualities
doe not leave the family unit unaffected. The costs of meeting expendi-
tures may strain thé long-term performance of the family enterprise,
especially in cases of long-term reproduction risks. The effects are two-
fold. First, thé production capacity of the family enterprise is affected
which, in turn, may disturb thé cycle of interlocking surplus-phases.
Secondly, thé capacity to participate in 'relational contracting' (Williamson
(1985:71) with other family enterprises will be affected, in turn intensify-
ing thé incidence of short-term production risks. As already argued, thé
development phase in which thé rural family finds itself will largely déter-
mine to what extent thèse effects will occur.
The nature of intra-family relations
Another constraint for thé family operating as solidarity group has to do
with intra-family relations. Reciprocal relations among family members do
not necessarily exclude inequalities among family members. 'Sharing' does
not mean, at the same time, equality, nor does it have to lead to equality.
Many studies have revealed that, in général, the redistribution of
resources within a family unit is highly unequal, not only in developing
but also in developed countries. One can assume that this conclusion also
applies to resources circulating within social security mechanisms.
In her study on social security and the family, Agarwal (1991)
élaborâtes on this issue. Agarwal refers to the entitlement approach of
Sen, and to another publication of Sen (1983) which focuses on the
conceptualization of family relations. Sen conceptualizes family relations
as embodying both coopérative and conflicting éléments. The family is a
unit in which various household arrangements (who does what and gets
what goods and services) are fixed on the basis of the implicit bargaining
strength of its members. He argues that many coopérative outcomes are
83
possible, which, compared with non-coopération, are bénéficiai to ail
parties, but thé différent parties hâve strictly conflicting interests in thé
choice among the set of efficient coopérative arrangements. Which
coopérative solution émerges dépends on thé relative bargaining power of
the different family members. A family member's bargaining power, in
turn, may depend on various parameters, especially on the strength of the
individual's 'fall-back position' if coopération should fail, and on feelings
of love, affection, concern, etc. In other words, it dépends on both econ-
omie and non-economie (including moral) factors (Agarwal 1991:172-3).
A person's fall-back position would depend, in turn, on a family
member's ownership endowments, exchange entitlements and external
support Systems, that is, on support received from outside the family unit
(for example, patronage, kinship, friendship, and rights to communal
resources, Agarwal 1991:173). Agarwal's point, among others, is that
among family members inequalities exist in their ownership endowments,
exchange entitlements and access to external support Systems. Gender
could be one such basis of inequality, age another (Agarwal 1991:173).
These inequalities place some family unit members in a weaker bargain-
ing position relative to other family members. To the extent that contin-
gencies affect ownership endowments and exchange entitlements, as well
as the strength of external support Systems, a total collapse or large
décime in a family members's fall-back position could weaken thé bar-
gaining power of a family member to such an extent that non-coopération
is found to be more bénéficiai by thé other family members than coopér-
ation, creating a tendency towards disintegration of family units. Whether
or not an actual breakdown occurs would be subject, of course, to other
considérations as well, such as the already mentioned lies of love and
affection which hold the family together (Agarwal 1991:174). In her case
study in India, Agarwal convincingly shows that in thé event of contin-
gencies female family members are in a weaker bargaining position than
mâle members, because their initial fall-back positions are weaker than
those of men. This would mean that female family members run a greater
risk of being 'abandoned' instead of helped by other family members in
thé event of contingencies. Non-coopération might be more bénéficiai for
thé other (mâle) family members than coopération.
In short, for social security analysis, Agarwal's study suggests that
individual family members are differently entitled to social security
resources and that this is closely related to a family member's fall-back
position. Gender and age are important factors in determining someone's
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entitlements to social security resources circulating within thé family.
Family and changes in society
A third observation is that families form part of society and
operate within thé différent subSystems distinguished in thé previous
chapter. In Chapter 3 we also distinguished six fundamental processes of
change taking place in developing countries resulting from thé articulation
of différent modes of production. Of course, not all families in rural
society will be affected by processes of change to the same degree. The
way in which processes of change influence the family as solidarity group
can be estimated by looking at what they do to the conditions as
described above. It is almost impossible to make any genera! statements
on this influence; more man an indication cannot be given.
First, the conditions under which (surplus) production takes place
change constantly. With respect to their economie activities, rural families
are increasingly being integrated into national markets, including financial,
labour and commodity markets. This makes the production of rural
families dependent on market developments, including priée fluctuations
and changes in supply and demand. On the one hand, the intrusion of the
market economy offers new opportunities, but, on the other hand, the
family's economie position becomes more vulnérable to external economie
shocks. The family is confronted with new uncertainties, and it might be
open to question whether the family is able to cope with its conséquences.
Other economie institutions, in addition to markets, are entering the rural
family's world: credit banks, marketing boards, and coopératives. Also,
compétition is increased by the introduction of new production tech-
niques, new erop varieties, new seeds, pesticides and fertilizers, and so on.
To ensure the long-term production capacity of the family, expensive
investments often have to be made, which are by no means without risk.
Secondly, family size and composition are also affected by new
developments. Rural-urban migration of the younger family members
means a loss of productive members at home. When no remittances take
place, the continuity of the family is threatened, as well as the social
security of the improductive members. It does not need intensive research
to find many rural families consisting of only elderly and children now-
adays. The size of the family might be affected by government policies
such as family planning programmes and land reform. Intensive land
reform programmes might include a change in seulement patterns of rural
family units. Restricted access to land by privatization of land tenure sets
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limits to the production of the family, and thereby implicitly to its size. It
is clear that also the sustainability of the family unit is at stake owing to
the changes that may take place in the size and composition of the unit.
Thirdly, the 'normative insurance' may be changed by the introduc-
tion of 'Western' values and norms, with their great emphasis on individ-
ual responsibility, individual profit-oriented approach and maximization of
individual goals. The colonial governments also brought new law practices
with them, which were imposed on the rural family. Statutory law was
introduced, which was mainly based on Western law. In the field of social
security, the insurance principle was introduced, with its greater emphasis
on equivalency.
The above changes are only capita selecta, and within each society
more can be distinguished. In each society new developments have
worked out differently, and it is only with case studies that the effects of
new developments can really be made clear.
4.3.3.Social networks as social security mechanisms
In the previous section it has become clear that the family unit bas an
important rôle in providing social security to its members. At the same
time, this rôle should not be overestimated. Families cannot cope with the
conséquences of all contingencies and adversities. The capacity of the
family to operate as solidarity group will vary through time and with
changes in the outlined conditions. The implication for each individual
family member is that hè cannot expect that the family will always be able
to help him in tunes of need. Other social security mechanisms are
necessary, then, for the provision of social security. These mechanisms
may fully replace the family or may supplement the social security pro-
vided by the family. In rural areas of developing countries, with the
absence of state-organized social security, in many cases social security
resources are obtained by mobilizing one's own social network. In the
literature this social network is sometimes referred to as 'social capital'.
The latter term refers to the amount of social relationships someone has
as well as to their contents (what is the value of these relationships for
the individual in terms of support that can be really expected).
The social network is highly personalized: it can hardly be stated
that families maintain social relationships. In point of fact, the family is
just too abstract a concept in this respect. Social and economie relation-
ships of families are essentially realized through the social and economie
relationships of its individual members. Resources obtained from these
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personal networks of relationships may or may be not redistributed within
the family. In many industrialized societies it has been one of the import-
ant assumptions underlying social security mechanisms that social security
benefits accruing to individuals will ultimately benefit the whole family
because of intra-family redistribution. However, the validity of this
assumption is increasingly being challenged by contemporary develop-
ments in Western societies and, as a result, intra-family redistribution is
becoming less evident.
Social networks are an important thème in sociological literature and
network analysis in général also has a major place in économies and orner
social sciences. The extent to which social networks are also supportive
networks, that is, networks which deliver resources in times of need is less
well analyzed (Kaufmann 1989). This thème is of great importance for
this study.
The most général définition of the concept of the social network is
ascribed to thé godfather of social network analysis, Barnes (1954), who
defined a social network as a System of social relationships between
individuals. Three types of social relationships constitute thé social
network: personal, categorical and structural relationships. Personal
relationships indicate contacts with kin, neighbours, friends and acquaint-
ances. Categorial relationships are relationships between individuals or
groups that are classified according to certain social stereotypes, for
example, racial or ethnie features. Structural relationships are relation-
ships between people according to social positions and rôles they hâve
(for example, in thé family, in thé enterprise, in associations, in parties,
and so on). In most cases, social networks are defined in terms of per-
sonal relationships (Kaufmann 1989:12), and in this study, too, we concen-
trate on thèse relationships. This approach takes thé individual as unit of
analysis and it uses thé egocentric network analysis in its most simple
form as point of departure. 6 The approach is relational, that is, the
network is seen as a system of transactions in which resources are
exchanged, information is given, influence and authority are exercised,
support is mobilised, coalitions are developed, activities are coordinated
and confidence is built up. Thèse transactions are the foundations of the
In a egocentric network analysis all social relationships of one central person are
analyzed. The network look hke a star, then, with a centre from which all the radiants flow
outwards. This is the most simple form of network analysis.
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network.7 Other aspects of social networks important for thé social
security discussion are, of course, thé network's contents with respect to
material support in times of need, and such related dimensions as fre-
quency, stability, degree of reciprocity, and diversity of linkages of actors.
Actors may hâve contacts by having one rôle; for example, being neigh-
bours. They can, however, also have more rôles at the same tune; for
example, they can meet as both neighbour and colleague or employer.
The social relationship is single-stranded when it is based on one rôle and
multistranded when based on more rôles.
When we consider those relationships out of the entire social network
which in many societies also operate as social security mechanisms, thé
following social relationships need closer attention: kinship relations,
relations among neighbours and friends, and social relationships resulting
from membership of associations. The basis of thèse varions social
relationships is différent, as well as their contents. Kinship relations are
based on consanguinity and congeniality, which détermine at the same
time the contents of the relationship. Social relationships with neighbours
and friends are based on résidence and mutual affection, and thé contents
of thèse relationships is to some extent 'canalized' by général values and
norms in society on how to deal with neighbours and friends. Social rela-
tionships within associations evolve from membership, and thé contents of
thèse relationships is in many cases 'formalized' by Statutes and raies of
conduct. The ways in which ail thèse forms of relationships take shape in
society are numerous. It is impracticable to analyze ail aspects of the
relationships just listed. We restrict ourselves to général comments on thé
social security aspects of thèse relationships. This will be donc in thé
following sections.
4.3.4.Kinship relations and social security
Kinship or familial relations (Hirtz 1989:295) are thé first form of social
relationships people almost automatically hâve. Birth into a family group
defines a set of khi relations. Birth itself is far from a natural event; thé
social and cultural ties surrounding birth give newborns a social identity
An alternative analysis of social networks is thé positional analysis. This form of
analysis is not so much interested in thé contents and internai affairs of a social network
and ils cohésion, but rather in thé relationships of its actors towards another individual or
group outside their own network. The question to what extent thé actors are directly or
indirectly related among each other is not considered.
within a set of allied kin and conter spécifie rights, obligations and
resources (Mardi and Taqqu 1986:20). Three kinship Systems can be
found: matrilineal, patrilineal and bilatéral kinship. Matrilineality refers to
a principle of descent from an ancestress through her daughter, her
daughter's daughter, and so on (in the female line). Matrilineal kinship
often goes together with matrilocality: résidence of a married couple with
the wife's kin. Patrilineality refers to descent traced through a line of
ancestors in the male line. Patrilineality in most cases is combined with
patrilocality: a married couple lives with the husband's kin. Under bilat-
éral kinship relationships are traced to relatives through both father and
mother. Résidence patterns may differ from case to case with bilatéral
kinship.
The three kinship Systems generally work out differently for thé
rights of men and women in thèse Systems, and thé extent to which kin
relations can be incorporated into one's social network. In matrilineal
descent, it is clear that women hâve considérable power and authority.
Mothers and daughters control important resources and have decision-
making rights, usually sharing thèse rights with brothers, sons and
maternai uncles. This makes thé fall-back position of women strong and
therefore also their bargaining power within families. Moreover,
matrilocality gives women thé opportunity to retain strong relationships
with their relatives. In patrilineal Systems, it is just thé opposite. In most
cases, men have absolute power over resources and decision-making.
Moreover, the claims women can press upon their natal patrilineages are
rarely identical to men's, and not explicitly recognized. Nevertheless,
women in nearly all such Systems continue to have clearly definable
relations with their natal kin (March and Taqqu 1986:20). In bilateral
Systems, inheritance and résidence patterns give both men and women
rights and resources, although these may differ substantially between
them. With bilateral kinship relations, one's kingroup and sense of family
extends to individuals on both the mother's and the father's side. Such
Systems offer, therefore, considérable scope for maintaining kinship
relations. Kinship ties in bilateral kindreds are activated by personal
effort. Although kin are defïned by birth, spécifie relatives become
important as constituent allies only if relations with them are cultivated
and maintained.
Through marriage, an individual becomes connected with the wife's
or husband's kin, and this can lead to additional strong bonds of solidar-
ity. In many cases, the rights, duties and obligations versus in-laws are well
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described and have clear sanctions. It is, furthermore, well-known that
marriage does not just link two people, but two families or lineages. This
link might be further intensified and lead to stronger relationships,
including those of mutual help and support.
With regard to social security, the kin relations are essentially an exten-
sion of the family relations. As regards the requirements of solidarity, kin
groups, lineages or clans are theoretically very good solidarity groups. The
larger size of the kin group means more people are available to share
resources. As far as composition is concerned, the kin group not only
contains people of different age and sex and with different income-
generating activities, but also people who in many cases are geographical-
ly separated, thereby spreading the risk of natural hazards with which the
family itself is seldom able to cope. This geographical variety is realized
by living in different régions with perhaps different ecological and clima-
tological conditions, or by having kin relations living in towns or cities. On
the other hand, distance might create problems when social security
resources have to be transferred. Logistic problems, such as bad infra-
structure, might prevent transfers of resources between kin members in
geographically different locations.
Kinship is also favourable from the point of view of durability, as it
is the best long-term relationship established and is able to reproduce its
members over tune. Moreover, kin groups are usually characterized by the
existence of a strong 'normative insurance'. In many rural societies in
developing countries, measures of support between relatives and of help
in times of crises are well defmed and obligatory. Kin members who
refuse to fulfil their duties can be excluded from coopération and support,
and in extreme cases are expelled from the family network. In practice,
these sanctions prove to be effective, since it would be impossible for
most families to survive without support and help from relatives (Bessert
1985:40). The availability of resources for social security purposes within
kin groups dépends, of course, on the surplus-producing capacity, and
thereby on the economie position, of the families involved.
In sum, kin relations constitute a major part of an individual's social
network (or social capital) and will be a major source of social security
resources. As with intra-family relations, the access of individuals to
support or help from relatives will depend on age, sex, marital status,
économie position and whether someone is of one's own family or an in-
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law. Just as in thé case of thé family, thé life-cycle of the individual plays
an important rôle in determining someone's position in kinship relations
and thé accompanying rights and obligations (Kaufmann 1989:84-86).
4.3.5. Social relationships with neighbours and friends
Neighbourliness and friendship are other social relationships in which
transfers for social security purposes may take place. Information about
thé rôle of neighbourhood and friendship in rural areas in developing
countries is difficult to find. One of the reasons might be that, in many
cases, neighbours and friends are at the same tune kin. Nevertheless, it is
well known that help and support between non-kin neighbours and friends
is common and ail types of coopération exist between them. This coopér-
ation can be both économie (work groups) and social: taking care of each
other's house when one is absent, help in times of food shortage, taking
care of each other's children, and so on. For reasons of proximity, thé
contacts with neighbours and friends are often more intensive than with
kin living at a greater distance. In mis sensé, good neighbourliness and
friendship hâve big advantages. What is 'good', of course, differs among
communities, villages, clans, societies. As with kinship, thé opération of
neighbourliness and friendship as a source of social security resources will
depend to a large extent on thé 'normative insurance'. In many societies,
mutual help and support between neighbours and friends is commonly
accepted and prescribed. Violation of this unwritten rôle may resuit in
such sanctions as gossip, social isolation and, in extrême cases, expulsion
from thé community. Moreover, relations with neighbours and friends will
have to be based on trust - more than is thé case with family or kin
relations. While social and économie relations with family and kin are
almost automatically defmed with birth and marriage, relationships with
neighbours and friends hâve to be cultivated and maintained. It is only by
actual action that one can show his or her 'trustfulness'. Only by répétition
of actions in cases of need do relationships between neighbours and
friends become more intensified. Somehow there will be a corrélation
between thé degree of trust and thé extent to which mutual assistance can
be expected. As a further contrast with family and kin relations, neighbour
and friendship relations are more loose and offer more opportunity for
negotiation and detachment. Social relationships with neighbours and
friends may, therefore, be valuable supplementary sources for help and
support.
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4.3.6.Associations as social security mechanisms
Social relationships originating from membership of associations (whether
social, économie or religious) are a third possible form of social security
resource transfer mechanisms. What March and Taqqu (1986:19) state for
women's associations holds for associations in général: "in their fully
elaborated détail, thé bases for women's legitimate solidarity throughout
thé world are bewilderingly diverse. Providing a comparative framework
to embrace ail that détail, and still preserving the integrity of all indepen-
dent collectivities involved, is an audacious task". Given this variety, it is
hardly possible to estimate also the potential of associations to provide
social security to their members. This can only be done by applying the
conditions for a solidarity group to actual cases. Given the large plurality
among associations, we prefer not to make too many genera! statements
on this issue, and restrict ourselves to attaining more insight into different
types of associations. March and Taqqu (1986) provide a basis for analyz-
ing associations and give us some clues on what to look for.
The first question one can ask is on what bases associations are built.
These bases can be kinship, marriage, résidence, wealth or work. It has
already been shown that kinship in itself may lead to bonds of solidarity.
At the same time, kinship is a layer upon which other associations can be
built. The same holds true for neighbourhood. Living in close proximity
and sharing a lifestyle may foster mutual identification and friendship
among men and women. Sharing the same workplace may be another
basis for associations (March and Taqqu 1986:22). Men or women who
share spécifie tasks, whether as domestic responsibilities or occupational
opportunities, may themselves develop into a legitimate constituency of
mutual support. Wealth may be another basis. This might take the form of
relationships between those who have and have not (for example, patron-
age), between those who have (for example, the Lion's Club), or between
those who have not (for example, trade unions, 'communidades de base' or
émancipation movements).
A second question that can be asked is whether associations are défensive
or active. Associations can be characterized as défensive when they
mobilize in response to adversity or crises. Thèse are basically reactive
social relationships which do not aim to create separate resources,
alternative conditions, or autonomous influence. According to March and
Taqqu (1986:34), thèse défensive associations "represent the efforts of
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politically disenfranchised groups of people with insufficient resources to
meet even their most minimal needs; ...they structure leadership, respon-
sibility, and participation to redistribute insufficient resources and meet
the emergency needs of members, if only temporarily or serially." In
général, défensive associations are directed at providing protective social
security. Another main characteristic of these défensive associations is
that the support is not on a contractual base. Hirtz (1989), when describ-
ing village networks in the Philippines, makes a distinction between quasi-
contractual and contractual relationships. In a quasi-contractual relation-
ship, a balanced exchange is regulated where thé terms of pay-
ment/repayment are left open. The reciprocal situation cornes without the
party involved calling for it; the repayment is made in accordance with
socially set norms, in accordance with what is possible at this given
moment. A further characteristic of défensive associations, therefore, is
that only strong interpersonal ties of mutual obligation can motivate thé
assistance. The support within défensive networks mainly involves small
things like incidental help with activities (cutting a tree, cattle being
looked after, taking care of children, a bill paid, water or firewood hauled,
clothes washed, food cooked, etc.), help with général domestic needs of
households by which local scarcity and disasters can be overcome, and
help in thé case of family catastrophes such as long illness, unemploy-
ment, or death of a family member. In thé latter case, we may cite as a
good example thé 'funeral associations' existing in many societies, through
which, at a stage of thé funeral process, community members corne to
deliver goods and services.
At thé opposite end of the spectrum of associations, we find the active
associations, which generally may also be oriented towards thé provision
of promotional social security. It should be added at once that associations
are seldom purely défensive or active. An association can be labelled
'active' when, besides protecting members against crises and adversity, thé
social and/or économie position of its members is strengthened. One of
thé main characteristics of thèse active associations is that its members
share an identity and create an independent référence group that is often
extra-domestic (for example, particular women's associations, occupational
trade unions, rotating working associations, crédit associations). March
and Taqqu (1986:46) distinguish two types of active associations: diffuse
and focused. Diffuse associations are multipurpose groups: for example,
dance associations or visiting groups. Focused associations can be divided
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into religieus and ritual associations, and économie associations. The
latter can be further divided into inéquitable associations (for example,
patronage) and équitable économie associations (for example, rotating
labour or crédit associations). Figure 4.2 gives an overview of the différent
types of associations.
From a social security point of view, the diffuse associations and focused
religious and ritual associations are less important than thé économie as-
sociations. This statement does not imply that the former associations play
no rôle at ail. But it is évident that thèse groups primarily hâve other
objectives than thé provision of social security to their members. Provid-
ing social security resources will rather be a by-product than thé first
objective. For example, local churches primarily serve a religious purpose,
organize people to celebrate masses together and pay attention to thé
religious aspects of life. However, if thé religion to which thé church
belongs also proclaims solidarity among its members, this might lead to
help and support among members in times of crises and adversity and
create bonds of solidarity. In many cases, this 'side-effect' of this type of
association is clearly présent.
In contrast, economie associations are groups with thé spécifie
purpose of acquiring and/or organising economie resources. These
resources may be land, labour, cattle, money, produce, etc. The first
objective is to create an économie situation for each of its members that
is better than it would be without the association. In this sensé, then, its
objective is to strengthen an individual's économie position, which in turn
may also 'promote' his standard of living. A strenger économie position
leads to economically less vulnérable persons who will be better able to
cope with adversities and crises. Besides this promotional aspect, écon-
omie associations are frequently meant to share risks, and in doing this
they operate as a solidarity group providing protection to it members. The
opportunity to get involved in économie associations and thé shape thèse
associations take is determined to a large extent by thé property and
labour rights individual members of society have. In developing countries,
especially in rural areas, thé différences in property and labour rights of
thé two sexes is an important factor which set limits to économie oppor-
tunity and consequently also to économie associations.
With regard to property, men and women inherit and control
different economie resources. The kind of property that individuals
control not only affects thé économie resource base with which they must
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work but also patterns their économie associations with others (March
and Taqqu 1986:49). In developing countries, men generally possess and
inherit real property, while women more typically inherit movable prop-
erty such äs jewelry, produce, money and other goods. Mintz (1971)
suggests that it is precisely because women's traditional property can be
bought, sold, loaned or invested more flexibly than real estate, that so
many women enter trade and subsequently establish market alliances with
other similarly enterprising woman traders. March and Taqqu (1986:49)
conclude "thus, when men and women inherit different types of property,
they must capitalize upon the varying potentialities of those properties,
acquire different skills, and enter different economie alliances. "
Not only does the kind of property an individual receives have an
important influence on the character of economie associations, but the
way in which it is obtained also affects the patterns of economie relation-
ships in any given Community. "The channels through which property is
transmitted shape culture-specific forms of economie solidarity by encour-
aging people to maintain some relationships and abandon others" (March
and Taqqu 1986:49). In cases where siblings inherit from both parents,
they must maintain coopérative and exchange relations with each other
throughout their lives in order to retain their productive base. In other
societies, where women inherit from mothers and men from fathers, a
system of parallel but separate inheritance créâtes two sex-distinct paths
of material obligation and intra-sex alliance is strong. Another major
différence throughout the developing world is that men usually inherit at
parental death or retirement, while women tend to receive their entitle-
ment at marriage. It has already been already argued that marriage links
kingroups, which might be a further basis for economie alliances, includ-
ing transfers for social security purposes. Whether or not women them-
selves obtain control of any property at marriage, either through dowry,
bride-wealth or inheritance, remains, however, the question. In some
societies women may obtain domestic animais; in which case women must
organize water and pasture rights and organize labour to provide the
animais with water and fodder. And many more examples can be given of
how property and property rights influence the establishment and opér-
ation of economie associations.
In addition to property rights, the division of labour is another
element influencing the shape of economie associations. In rural areas of
developing countries, the sexual division of labour is generally strong,
although it should be said that 'what should be' is not always 'what is'.
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Women and men do perform tasks that should be done by the other sex.
Almost universally, however, one of the most common constraints upon
the sexual division of labour is child care, which in most societies almost
exclusively falls upon women. This prevents women from being engaged in
permanent migration, long-distance marketing or regulär wage-employ-
ment. It also prevents them from benig engaged in the accompanying
economie associations. Engagement in petty employment, piecework, or
other such limited forms of part-time employment will only be possible
when child-care arrangements are established among women. It is around
these petty commodity activities that women might be able to organize
themselves economically into associations. It is not surprising, then, to find
that development agencies frequently tend to promote these kinds of
associations.
As the above survey and analysis of reciprocal social security mechanisms
has shown, they might be described as an interlinked system of personal
relations between a person and his or her family members, relatives,
neighbours, friends and other 'important' persons inside the Community.
Reciprocity structures the exchange of resources within these social
relationships. Factors such as sex, âge, marital status, wealth and éduca-
tion détermine to a large extent someone's position in these relationships,
and thereby largely his or her social security position, both as a contri-
butor and recipiënt. Looking at the level of social groups (families,
kinship groups, associations), their potential to operate as a solidarity
group will depend on conditions such as size, composition, durability,
normative insurance, and thé capacity to raise resources for social security
purposes. Both thé individual's personal features and the characteristics of
the group will have to be analyzed in order to assess the extent to which
someone can expect protective or promotional social security from his or
her social relationships.
4.4. Redistribution and social security mechanisms
As already explained, redistribution entails obligatory transfers of material
items, money, or labour services to some socially recognized centre, which
reallocates portions of what it receives to provide Community services and
to reward spécifie persons (Dalton 1967:73). Such centres with a realloca-
tive authority can be found in many developing countries. It is useful to
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distinguish between older centres already existing and operating before
colonial times, and those centres which have been established in the
colonial and post-colonial era.
4.4.1. Older centres of redistribution
When we talk about older centres of redistribution, we have to think of
centres which are vested in one person. One might think of heads of
villages, chiefs, lineage heads, kings, warlords, and so on. In many cases,
this central figure is endowed with the right to distribute land or hunting
sites; these allocation rights are vested in him in the name of the com-
munity by virtue of his high political, juridical, military, or religious
authority. As with reciprocity, the obligation to contribute factor services,
such as labour for the chiefs fields, may not be distinguished from paying
in the form of products such as food. As Dalton (1967:73) concludes,
"indeed, what appear to us as economie transactions of resources and
products need not be distinguished indigenously from such as express the
obligation to perform military service".8
Usually the material receipts of the central authority cannot be
regarded apart from his material obligation to his subjects. Payments and
fines are used for his own maintenance, and also to provide community
services and to reward special service of his subjects. And just as an
individual receives land from his chief and labour from his wives, kin, and
friends as a matter of right, so he also receives material aid in time of
need as a matter of social right. Dalton (1967:74), still discussing produc-
tion in Bantu societies, argues that "subsistence is guaranteed among the
Bantu - as is the case widely in primitive Africa - in two ways: through
socially structured rights to receive factors of production, and through
emergency allotments of food from the chief and gifts from kin."Bossert
(1985) describes in Tanzania even a form of protection by which needy
people were integrated into the domestic group of the chief as slaves.
Heads who were not able to take care of their people were liable to be
deposed and sometimes they were killed.
The older redistributive centres have both éléments of protective
and promotional social security. Protective social security is expressed by
material aid in times of emergency, while the redistribution of productive
In literature on this topic these payments to central authorities are often referred
to as 'tribute'.The word 'tribute' is important in both its economie and social meaning: the
goods and labour paid are a tribute in economie sense, and the social récognition of
authority is a tribute as well.
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resources, mainly land, can be considered as a form of promotional social
security. Having the authority over the distribution of land, the centre
détermines to a large extent the conditions of agricultural production for
the community members. Moreover, access to land in many cases also
means access to other resources, such as water, fuel wood, trees, and so
on. It is not surprising to find that the authority over land distribution
gives these centres considérable power, especially in cases of land scarcity.
It will be almost impossible, therefore, for the individual com-
munity member to escape his obligations towards the centre, as a large
part of his livelihood will depend on his access to land. The type and
mode of delivery of means may, however, differ among individuals. For
instance, children and the elderly are often exempted from obligations,
mâles and females frequently perform different duties in accordance with
the gender division of labour, and sometimes also différences are made
between poorer and richer persons. Performing labour tasks is more
common among poorer strata of the community, while richer families or
individuals have to pay cash or deliver goods. At the same tune, of course,
the 'tribute' paid entitles a person to access to community resources and
to receive help in times of need. In order to prevent social unrest in its
community, it will be difficult for the centre not to honour these entitle-
ments, at least not without considérable military power and repression.
4.4.2.Statal and parastatal social security mechanisms
Besides the older centres of redistribution, which may still exist, the
colonial and post-colonial period brought new centres of redistribution,
one of the most important being the 'state' or 'government'. This organiz-
ation, with large legislative and administrative power, was placed by the
colonial powers on top of the precolonial society and was in most cases a
copy of the governmental structure of the colonial power. One of the
important fonctions of the colonial government was to collect taxes and
other forms of income from the local population. The acquired funds
were sent to the home country or invested in infrastructure. The rôle of
the colonial apparatus in the redistribution of resources for social security
purposes was kept to a minimum. The relationship between the individual
and the government was largely one-way.
In the post-colonial period, the independent states began to play a
rôle in the organization of social security schemes. These schemes were
copied from those existing in the former colonial powers. In the literature,
as indicated in Chapter 2, these social security schemes are referred to as
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'modem' or 'formal' social security. It was also stated that these schemes
play a minor rôle in providing social security resources to thé rural
population. Moreover, by operating under différent social and economie
conditions than those prevailing in industrialized countries, governments
in developing countries are confronted with problems, such as greater
insecurity related to unstable economie conditions, limited administrative
resources and sévère budget constraints. These problems prevent the
création of 'modern' social security schemes which are operationally
tenable and financially viable (Burgess and Stern 1991:44). We have
already indicated that these social security mechanisms will not receive
our attention in this study, because of their minor importance in the social
security provision of the rural population.
It will be very difficult for the individual living in the rural areas to
join these schemes. Statal social assistance schemes are almost non-
existent and social insurance schemes are only accessible to those
employed by the government or parastatal organizations. If a person
wants to be entitled to state social security benefits, he needs to have
access to and join thé labour market for government jobs.
It is more likely that rural people will profit from government
programmes which might be labelled as promotional social security. The
establishment of health care centres, the starting of social development
projects, the provision of rural infrastructure, and so on, might all contrib-
ute to better opportunities for (segments of) the rural population to raise
their standard of living. A positive economie policy of the government
towards agriculture might also contribute to this. However, here we enter
a field that was already described as the 'grey area' of the discussion on
the définition of social security. It is debatable whether or not economie
policy directed at economie development should be labelled also as social
security policy. Providing the poor with new economie opportunities to
raise their standard of living can be seen as an alternative form of promo-
tional social security provision, instead of providing them directly with
money, goods and services. Economie policy in this sense may contribute
equally to one of the main objectives of social security, namely improve-
ment of low standards of living, to the same extent as policies which are
explicitly denoted as a 'social security policy'.
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4.5. Market exchange and social security mechanisms
Market exchange differs sharply from the two other modes of exchange,
reciprocity and redistribution. Purchase and sale seem to be peculiarly
economie - permeated by utility considérations and material gain -
precisely because market transactions are jieither induced by nor express
social obligations or relationships. Unlike thé partners in reciprocal and
redistributive transactions, buyers and sellers in thé market share no
social tie which obliges them to engage in market transactions. Therefore,
terms of trade may be haggled out without social disruption, both parties
to thé exchange being socially free to seek their own material advantage.
Also in relation to market exchange, thé question arises whether or
not the market is a mechanism by which social security resources can be
transferred. Again we are in a grey area. Looking at one market segment,
that of insurance, private insurance companies offer their services. Pen-
sion savings schemes and life insurances can be bought, which will ulti-
mately provide an individual or his family with financial resources in times
of old age or death. One may argue that the amount obtained will be
equivalent to the contributions the individual made. These contributions
are in accordance with someone's health and capacity to raise the
required funds monthly or annually. One might consider this as a form of
self-insurance, by which an individual is not dependent on other persons
ia society. On the other hand, these forms of self-insurance also have one
of the mam characteristics of social security mechanisms: providing people
with resources when they are not capable of doing so themselves because
of contingent situations.
Another important rôle of the market in providing social security
comes to the fore when access to markets is necessary in order to obtain
entitlements to social security mechanisms and régulations. As the previ-
ous section indicated, in many countries entitlements to social security
schemes of the state can only be acquired if one is employed by the state.
This assumes access to the labour market. The same holds true for private
companies offering schemes and privileges in the social security field to
their employees. One can only 'reach' such schemes by joining the labour
market.
For rural families, who are self-employed, ail thèse schemes are
useless, therefore. At best, members of rural families may be able to
insure themselves through thé market against crop failures or other
enterprise-related contingencies. It is, however, well known that thèse
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types of arrangements are scarcely available in developing countries. Like
the state, thé market plays a minor rôle as a social security mechanism for
people in rural areas. One of thé usual ways to profit to some extent from
state- or market-provided social security resources is by having personal
relationships with someone in thé 'formai' sector. It is, therefore, a
common strategy of rural families to hâve one or more members working
in companies and/or government in order to have access to social security
resources. Rural families might even invest in thé good éducation of one
of their members at thé cost of thé éducation of other members, in order
to increase his chances in thé labour market (see Von Benda-Beckmann
1989). Not only thé wages, then, but also the social security resources that
are obtained by this selected family member may be further redistributed
in thé rural family, in accordance with thé social security mechanisms
based on kinship, marital relations, friendship, and so on. In this way,
social security resources provided by 'formai' social security mechanisms
may ultimately circulate also within 'informai' social security mechanisms.
In an analysis of the social security position of rural families, this should
be taken into considération, because thèse links might prove to be vital
for the survival of impoverished rural families.
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5. PROFILE OF SWAZILAND
5.1. Introduction
As thé fieldwork for this study took place in thé Kingdom of Swaziland, a
country not widely known outside thé African continent, a brief introduc-
tion to Swazi society is given in this chapter. This is done by giving a short
history of social, économie and political developments in Swaziland. In
order to understand contemporary Swazi society, références to thé (pre)-
colonial history of Swaziland are thereby necessary. Therefore, a chrono-
logical schedule is used for introducing Swaziland and its development.
Section 5.2 deals with thé precolonial Swazi society; Section 5.3 describes
thé main éléments which characterized thé development of Swaziland in
colonial times; Section 5.4 deals with post-independent Swaziland. In
order to avoid an overkill of facts and figures, an overview of Swaziland
with key indicators on geography and climate, demography, économie
performance and social performance can be found in Appendix B.
5.2. The precolonial period
The Swazi hâve a long and rieh precolonial history of which, unfortunate-
ly, little bas been written down. History has been orally transferred to
subséquent générations through songs, rituals, ceremonies and taies.
Bonner (1980,1982), Booth (1983), Kuper (1963) and Matsebula (1988)
are the few sources describing at some length thé precolonial history of
Swaziland. Most information in this section is derived from thèse sources.
The Swazi people are descendants of the southern Bantu, who
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migrated southwards from the lakes of Central Africa many centuries ago.
In the sixteenth Century, these people lived near Maputo, the capital of
present-day Mozambique. From there, a small group of kinsmen and
retainers belonging to the Nkosi Diamini clan left their home on the east
coast and moved inland across the mountains. They settled in what is now
south-eastern Swaziland. Their ruler was Ngwane. There were no large-
scale state Systems at that tune and agnatic kin groups provided the basis,
or framework, of the political structure (Hughes 1972:34). On occasion,
and for some time, one of these groups came to dominate the others.
Also, from time to time, sections of an agnatic group might hive off and
establish their partial or complete independence from the parent group.
The way of life at that time is described by Hughes (1972:36) as
'semi-migratory': "this is not meant to imply that these people undertook
the regulär seasonal migration of the true nomad, rigidly controlled as
these are by the cycle of the seasons; but rather that they accepted the
relatively frequent movement of dwelling sites and cultivated lands as part
of the normal pattern of living". Sometimes the movement was only over
a few miles, in search of unused land for new fields; sometimes a longer
distance was covered.
A major migration took place at the start of the nineteenth cen-
tury, when Sobhuza I (grandson of Ngwane) came into conflict over
garden lands with a powerful neighbour, Zidze, of the Ndwandwe clan,
who was also building up a following (Kuper 1963:7). To avoid a fight,
Sobhuza moved northward with his group and established himself in what
is now Middle Swaziland. The people that went with him are still referred
to as the 'pure Swazi' (Kuper 1963:8), and they formed the nucleus of the
future Swazi state. The areas Sobhuza entered were already inhabited by
Nguni and Sotho clans. From all these people, referred to as 'the found
ahead', Sobhuza demanded allegiance. When loyalty was assured, they
were allowed to continue to live under their own recognized clan heads
subordinate only to the Diamini ruler. Sobhuza farmer strengthened his
position by diplomatic marriages with other clans and by extending his
military power. When Sobhuza died, a strong kingdom was left, with a
centralized political system controlling several thousands of people
scattered over areas reaching far beyond the boundaries of modern
Swaziland.
Throughout the whole of southern Africa, small tribes linked by
kinship were organised into strong military states under ambitious rulers
(one of these famous rulers was Shaka, King of the Zulu). This important
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change in the structure of political units can primarily be ascribed to
greater economie pressure on the land. Most groups being agro-pastora-
lists, their existence depended on fertile soils and grazing lands. But
population was increasing, and the road further south was locked by
invading whites. Conflicts among tribes, and with whites, were inévitable
at the beginning of the nineteenth Century.
Sobhuza's heir was Mswati, and hè was the greatest of the Swazi
fighting Kings, reigning from 1830 to 1868 (Matsebula 1988). Probably
influenced by the successful Zulu, hè reorganised his army and established
royal homesteads as mobilizing centres for men in outlying districts. These
royal homesteads also served as military posts to launch attacks on
independent tribes. Eventually, his armies even reached what is nowadays
Southern Zimbabwe, and the name of Mswati became as feared as that of
his famous example Shaka. It is at this point in time that the name Swazi
is said to have corne into use, to indicate those people falling under the
reign of Mswati. Like Sobhuza, Mswati incorporated defeated tribes into
his state and emphasized the sanctity and power of hereditary leadership
(Kuper 1963:9). Moreover, because of idisraption in rival kingdoms,
survivors fled to Mswati for protection. This third group constituting the
Swazi is referred to as 'those who arrived after'. Loyal groups were
established in sparsely populated areas under their own chiefs; other
groups which hè trusted less were ruled by members of the royal Diamini
clan.
The main features of the Swazi economy and society at this tune can be
summarized as follows (see also Maasdorp 1991:213). The basic éléments
were the homestead and the extended family system; each homestead was
self-supporting. The main erop was maize, and cattle was a measure of
wealth and status. Trade was minimal. The King held the land in trust for
the nation, but in practice chiefs and subchiefs allocated land for cultiva-
tion and building. In spite of the land system being communal, arable land
was worked on an individual basis and the usufract enjoyed by the
homestead. Wealth was unevenly distributed, birth being the basis of
power and prestige. Swazi society was already characterized by gross
disparities in wealth and différences of political and economie status
(Bonner 1980:95). It was the society described above which European
settlers and, later on, colonial rulers met when they entered Swaziland.
Mswati's death brought a ten-year period of turmoil centring on a dispute
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over the succession (Booth 1983:11), as result of which Swazi power in the
région declined. Ultimately, the compromise candidate Mbandzeni was
chosen King in 1875. His reign started a new period in Swazi history, the
conséquences of which are still feit in contemporary Swaziland. The first
contacts between Europeans and Swazi had already been established in
the mid-nineteenth Century. These Europeans were mainly hunters,
traders, and missionaries. In 1879, modest discoveries of gold were made
in Swaziland, and a larger influx of people commenced. In exchange for
arms, cattle, drinks, cash and other wealth, King Mbandzeni issued
numerous land concessions to the Europeans for prospecting, mining,
farming and trading. Mbandzeni believed that he was not permanently
alienating the land from the Swazi but merely allowing thé concession-
aires to use it according to Swazi law and custom. ' However, thé inter-
prétation in European law was different and major land disputes were
created. The granting of concessions by Mbandzeni is even said to have
exceeded the territory of the Swazi nation.
In 1889 Mbandzeni died, but there was still no solution in sight for
the land problem. Swaziland became a tooi in the rivalry between the
British and the Boers in the South African région. In 1894 the two powers
decided that Swaziland would become a 'protected dependency' of the
South African Boer Republic. The authority of the new king Bunu and
other traditional leaders was recognized in so far as this was consistent
with 'civilized' law and customs. The Republic had the powers of protec-
tion and administration over Swaziland and also had the power to impose
taxes on Swazi huts, a well-known principle to drive people into the cash
economy.
After the Second Boer War of 1899-1902, Swaziland became
British territory. The British ruler decided to solve the concession prob-
lem once and for all, and in 1904 a commission was appointed to delin-
eate the network of land concessions. In 1907 a final proposai was agreed
on: 37 per cent of the total area was appointed to Swazi as Swazi Nation
Land to be held in trust by the King for the nation (as hè always had
done in the past). The remainder was designated as Crown Land or Title
Deed Land, that is, land held in freehold title mainly by large estâtes and
individual European farmers, Moreover, all minéral concessions were
transferred to the British without compensating the Swazi. In sum, two
1
 According to Swazi law and custom the concessionaires were only granted the nght
to live on and make reasonable use of that land for as long as the Swazi commumty as a
whole was agreeable to this, but not any absolute, exclusive nght to the land as such.
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thirds of the Swazi land surface had been expropriated from the Swazi.
This moment in Swazi history would have a large impact on the further
economie and social development in Swaziland.
5.3. The colonial period
Maasdorp (1991:213) argues that "the economie history of colonial
Swaziland may be divided into two periods, namely, pre- and post-1945,
and is closely connected with economie conditions and political percep-
tions in Britain itself." We adopt this division in this section.
5.3.1-The pre-1945 period
After the land problem was 'solved', the British showed little interest in
Swaziland. The First World War, the dépression in the 1930s and the
Second World War followed in quick succession, and British funds for
Investment abroad were limited. The main development in the pre-1945
period was the growing numbers of Swazis migrating to the South African
mines. Several reasons can be mentioned for this migration (see also
Booth 1982): first, to earn money to replace cattle herds that were
decimated by disease in the 1890s; secondly, by government inducement
and coercion in the form of taxes; thirdly, the Swazi monarchy encouraged
men to go to the mines in order to earn money for the repurchase of
expropriated land; and fourthly, those Swazi who did not settle on Swazi
Nation Land were forced to seek employment on European farms or in
the mines. With few investments from abroad in the Swazi economy, the
number of migrants in 1936 (9,561) was almost three times that of local
wage employees (3,354). Also, by 1937, 41 per cent of the territory's rev-
enue (GDP) still came from the earnings of the Swazi themselves (Maas-
dorp 1991:215). The standard of living among the Swazi was very low, and
in the 1930s the Swazi produced only 20 per cent of their food require-
ments (Kuper 1978).
Social progress was as misérable as economie development. Social
services, such as schools and health services, were mainly provided by
missionaries. This led to a High School for Swazi and two hospitals and
some scattered clinics. However, in 1931, 70 per cent of the Swazi
children aged 6-16 years received no éducation (see also Kuper 1978).
The only serious British Investment in the local economy was the esta-
blishment of a network of roads. The isolation of the territory was over-
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corne when the railway administrations of South Africa and Mozambique
opened road motor services into Swaziland.
In sum, British policy did not favour thé local economy and social
conditions. Moreover, Britain was ambivalent about retaining Swaziland,
and incorporation into thé Union of South Africa remained an ever-
present danger against which thé Swazi King Sobhuza II (whose reign
started in 1921) had to campaign (Maasdorp 1991:215).
5.3.2.The post-1945 period
After World War II, British attitudes towards thé colonies changed. There
was a greater interest in development, which was understood as thé
exploitation of agricultural and minéral resources, and in thé improve-
ment of social services for thé indigenous population, who numbered
184,000 in thé 1946 census. As a resuit of this change of policy, foreign
investments came into the country and ils natural resources were
exploited for export purposes: asbestos, kon ore, softwood timber, and
sugar cane and tropical products (both under irrigation). The resulting
économie growth was accompanied by extensive investments in infrastruc-
ture: tarred roads and a railway were constructed, hydro-electric plants
installed, and télécommunication networks were improved and extended.
Between 1955 and 1966, 78.4 per cent of public Investment went into
these items (Maasdorp 1991:216), 12.5 per cent went into social services
and 9.1 per cent into thé improvement of Swazi agriculture. After 1966,
more funds were invested in social services, especially éducation, in a
desperate effort to produce qualified Swazi personnel. The civil service,
for instance, consisted mainly of Europeans, Xhosa and Zulu, the latter
two groups coming from South Africa. The number of primary and
secondary school pupils rosé, and teacher training colleges, an industrial
training institute and an agricultural collège were established.
How did Swazi themselves further profit from thèse developments?
The number of Swazi in wage employment had risen to 40,500 by 1968
(the population totalled 375,000 in 1966), some 48 per cent of whom
worked in the agricultural, forestry and mining sectors in Swaziland. But,
as Maasdorp concludes (1991:217), "the extent to which the benefits of the
new commercial investment had filtered down to the Swazi population
was limited, and two-thirds of the population was still concerned with
non-wage subsistence activities. The structure of the economy at indepen-
dence in 1968 was typically colonial in character. It was heavily dependent
upon commercial exports and mainly in hands of Europeans, and wealth
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and skills were unevenly distributed between expatriâtes and indigenous
Swazi. " In the agricultural sector, a positive development was the expan-
sion of Swazi Nation Land up to 56 per cent of the total area, but, in
1966, the Swazi farmers still held only 1.2 per cent of freehold land
(Maasdorp 1991:217). Also, the majority of production on SNL was still
for own consumption. Cotton and tobacco had become major cash crops.
But the overall participation of Swazi farmers in commercial agriculture
was low.
On the social front, trade unions for wage workers were formed
and, under the influence of Pan-Africanism, political parties were formed
which found their power bases among the urban workers. With their plans
for a centrally planned economy, these parties were a threat to the tradi-
tional monarchy. The traditional monarchy counteracted this threat by
establishing its 'own' party which emphasized the values of Swazi tradi-
tion, and by organising successful élections in which the traditional elite
succeeded in mobilizing their peasant constituency and obtaining the
support of Europeans and the private sector. It was in these circumstances
that Swaziland entered independence in 1968.
5.4. The post-independence period
5.4.1.Political context
Since independence, Swaziland has developed a political and adminis-
trative system which combines European and Swazi forms of government.
At the central level, a modern system of government, with cabinet minis-
ters at the summit, has governed jointly with a traditional government, the
Swazi National Council. Traditional government enjoys substantial power,
especially on all matters affecting Swazi Nation Land development. The
King is de facto head of both forms of government.
The same system can also be found at lower levels. Administrative-
ly, Swaziland is divided into four districts with district governors. These
governors have their représentatives in different parts of their districts.
Swazi Nation Land is divided into 170 chiefdoms, headed by a chief. The
chief's title is heritable. Apart from allocating land, his task is to maintain
Swazi law and custom in his chiefdom.
Besides the modern 'district-system' and the more traditional
'chiefs-system', King Sobhuza II has also developed the so-called 'Tin-
khundla'. Through this system, Swaziland is divided into 40 Tinkhundla ,
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regional councils whose members are chosen by thé population and whose
heads are appointed by the King. These heads are called 'tindvuna'. The
major rôle of the Thinkundla is to be an intermediary between district
governors and chiefs on the one hand and the central government on the
other. The competencies of the 'tindvuna' are in the field of jurisdiction
with respect to Swazi statutory law, and also the coordination of the
development processes in accordance with the traditional values and
norms of Swazi society.
It should be clear that this complex political and administrative
system does not work smoothly. Disputes over competencies are daily
business for chiefs, district governors and tindvuna. Under King Mswati
III, Sobhuza's successor who has been reigning the country since 1986, the
Tinkhundla system has corne under sévère attack from the population. In
1990, the King announced a national discussion on how to improve the
system. This discussion will dominate political Swaziland in coming years.
This debate will become part of the more genera! struggle between
population and government for more democracy, initiated by political
developments in South Africa in the 1990s and the economie recession in
Swaziland.
5.4.2.Economie development
Political and administrative problems have not held back economie
development in Swaziland. Since independence, Swaziland has produced
six development plans (for the latest version, see Economie Planning
Office 1993), in which both economie growth, and social and political
issues are emphasized. The exécution of these plans led to a macroecon-
omic performance which is relatively good compared with other countries
in the région. With a slowdown of economie activity in the first two years
after independence, the mean real growth rate of the Gross Domestic
Product was approximately 6 per cent per annum in the first half of the
seventies. This rate feil to 2-3 per cent in the second half of the seventies.
There was a major upswing in the early 1980s and the growth rate was 5
per cent per annum. Between 1982 and 1986, real growth of the GDP was
3.2per cent per annum, benig equal to the population growth. From 1986
onwards, annual growth rose again to 5 per cent per annum. In the early
nineties, a décline in growth can be observed, with figures approaching
population growth again.
The fluctuations of economie growth can largely be explained by
fluctuations in the world market priées of Swaziland's export commodities.
Swaziland faces the problems of a small, open economy. Although Swazi-
land is relatively well endowed with natural resources and there has been
some diversification since independence, the economy is largely depend-
ent on just a few commodities. Since 1972, sugar and wood pulp have
accounted for at least half of the total value of exports. Agriculture and
agro-industry are still the backbones of the Swazi economy, but in recent
years manufacturing exports have begun to take a larger share of the total
value of exports, and tourism is a growing domestic industry. The manu-
facturing sector has grown because South African and other foreign
companies have opened plants, Swaziland offers a five-year tax holiday to
new industries and has a relatively low corporate tax rate compared with
South Africa. Swaziland has been rated as the most attractive location for
industry in the subcontinent (see Whiteside 1987).
The economie growth has had positive effects on domestic employment.
Until 1984, growth in employment was more rapid in the public sector
than in the private sector. Since then, the situation has reversed. In 1990,
paid employment was estimated at 93,935 (Economie Planning Office
1993). Unemployment figures are not available, but it is safe to state that
a growing gap between job seekers and the number of available jobs can
be observed. The South African mines are still a safety valve for the
unemployed (Maasdorp 1991:222). 16,000 Swazi were estimated to be
working in the South African mines in 1990. An interesting observation is
that surveys have shown that Swazi opted generally for higher wage
employment in South Africa, in préférence to manual work on local
estâtes and plantations. Labour shortage in the latter enterprises was
filled by mechanisation on sugar estâtes as well as by importing Mozambi-
cans (De Vletter 1982). Swaziland is thus both an exporter and an
importer of unskilled labour, while simultaneously having an open unem-
ployment problem in the urban areas (Maasdorp 1991:222).
Whether or not South Africa can continue to fonction as a safety
valve is highly uncertain in view of the new developments in South Africa
(see Whiteside 1992). A South African stop on foreign migrants would
cause sévère problems in Swaziland, which would be exacerbated by the
fact that the population will double in only 22 years at current growth
rates. The 3.2 per cent population growth per annum between 1976 and
1986 has posed immense problems for économie development. The
youthful âge structure (some 47 per cent are under 15 years of âge,
Central Statistical Office 1986), quite apart from implying continued rapid
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population growth, places sévère pressures on social services and thé
capaciîy of thé econorny to provide productive employment.
Apart from the high population growth, another problem for thé economy
has been the éducation System. It should be remembered that at indepen-
dence Swaziland had a weak educational system. Since then, thé numbers
of pupils enrolling in primary and secondary schools have increased
rapidly. The number of teachers has risen, but so has the pupil-teacher
ratio. In 1971 a university was opened. The 'success' of the educational
system confronts the labour market each year with an outflow that far
exceeds the number of corresponding jobs available. Moreover, much of
the éducation is of the wrong type (Maasdorp 1991:223). The Second
Development Plan already identified the highly academie school curricu-
lum as a problem, but changes have not been fast enough to supply
Swaziland with the managerial, skilied and technical personnel required.
It is not surprising to find, then, that in the skilled jobs the number of
expatriâtes is still overwhelming, while they only account for 3.7 per cent
of the manufacturing labour force (Maasdorp 1991:223).
Swaziland's economy is not only confronted with the domestic problems of
unemployment, population growth, and a wrong educational system. The
Swazi economy is also highly dependent on its giant neighbour South
Africa. We have already seen the importance of the South African
economy for Swazi job seekers. Besides this, Swaziland is a member of
the Southern African Custom Union (SACU), together with South Africa,
Lesotho and Botswana. This has caused a strong export bias to South
Africa, and Swaziland's imports are also largely from South Africa.
Besides giving a certain stability to the Swazi economy, this also makes
the growth of the economy highly dependent on economie developments
and fluctuations in South Africa. It is also argued by some authors (Levin
1985, Neocosmos 1987) that the membership of SACU has had devastat-
ing effects on the performance and development of Swaziland's subsis-
tence agricultural sector because of competing cheap food imports. More-
over, most foreign investors in commercial agriculture and industry in
Swaziland are from South Africa. By also being a member of the Rand
Monetary Area (RMA), with South Africa and Lesotho, Swaziland's
economie development is even more geared to developments in South
Africa. The main régulation within RMA is that the currencies of Lesotho
and Swaziland are 'at par' with the South African Rand. Moreover, the
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Rand is legal tender in Swaziland. The large dépréciations of the Swazi
Lilangeni in the 1980s were the result of the depreciating Rand, which
had several effects on the Swazi economy.2 The dépréciations made
Swaziland's experts to countries outside the RMA more compétitive,
alleviating to some extent and for some of the country's main export
commodities the difficulties stemming from depressed world markets. On
the other hand, there are also negative effects: foreign debt is becoming
more expensive, and the country's high propensity to import has led to
significant increases in the cost of living (Coppens, Pommée and Vreman
1988:19). Both SACU and RMA make it almost impossible for Swaziland
to establish its own trade and currency policy, and seriously hamper
policies directed at a more independent economie development of Swazi-
land.
Because of the dependence on South Africa, it has been a deliber-
ate policy to try and diversify external economie relations. Japan has
become a trading partner, as well as Taiwan. Swaziland's membership of
the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC),
United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World
Bank and Organisation of African Unity (OAU) have ensured access to
multilateral aid. Britain is a major source of bilateral development funds.
Swaziland's membership of the Lomé Convention has provided preferen-
tial access for some of its products to the European Union. It also partici-
pâtes in the generalised system of préférences of the United States and is
a member of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern
Africa (PTA). The above diversification must ensure that Swaziland's
economy becomes less dependent on South Africa in future.
5.4.3. Distribution and social development
At independence, the government had, besides economie growth, the
objectives of improving the living conditions of the people, increasing the
participation of Swazi people in the modern economy, and increasing
local control of the economy. To start with the local control, Swazi
participation in the private sector was very limited at independence.
Moreover, as we saw, Swazi 'owned' just a part (58 per cent) of their land
area in 1968. Since then, the government has taken measures to increase
local control. A Kings' Mineral Royalty Fund (Tibiyo Taka Ngwane) was
2
 In December 1981 one Lilangeni was 1.03 US Dollar. In December 1986, this
value had fallen to 0.51 US Dollar (Economie Planning Office 1988:22).
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established, and the accumulated funds were used to acquire additional
Swazi Nation Land and major interests in the share capital of most larger
enterprises. In 1986, the Swazi directly controlled 70 per cent of the land
through Swazi Nation Land, and exercised indirect control over large
areas of estate land (Maasdorp 1991:229). In 1976, the King declared that
the minéral royalties should benefit a new fund, Tisuku Taka Ngwane,
which was to provide housing and acquire other Investments in Swaziland.
Tibiyo would be financed, then, by profits and benefits from its own
activities. There has been criticism on the opération of both funds. As
Maasdorp (1991:229) concludes: "it is difficult to gauge whether Tibiyo
has enriched the aristocracy or whether it is in fact an instrument for
ensuring participation by the Swazi Nation in economie activities hitherto
the exclusive preserve of foreigners, the accrual of benefits therefrom, and
a greater national self-sufficiency in capital génération and food output"
(see also Levin 1985 for a discussion on this issue). In spite of major
criticisms, it can be concluded that Tibiyo has been a major vehicle for
'domestic capital accumulation', and has made Swaziland less dependent
on foreign capital.
Besides the distribution between Swazi and non-Swazi, income distribu-
tion among Swazi is equally important to consider, since traditionally it
was, and to date in fact still is, highly skewed. Not only on Swazi Nation
Land (see Neocosmos 1987, De Vletter 1983, Chapter 6 of mis study), but
also in urban areas différences among households are very considérable.
In 1989, the Gini coefficient for households was 0.51 and for resident
persons 0.73 (Social Science Research Unit 1992). The poorest 40 per
cent (persons) in Swaziland obtained only 5 per cent of the Gross Nation-
al Product. 74 per cent of the Swazi population had an income below the
'average'. Nevertheless, the Fourth Development Plan (Economie
Planning Office 1985) concluded that living standards in the rural areas
had slightly improved. This was, however, not the case for the low-income,
peri-urban, informal settlements. Water, sanitation, and access to other
essential services are poorly provided or non-existent, and the inhabitants
of such settlements are among the most neglected people in the country.
Although large income différences have also been observed
between urban and rural areas (Central Statistical Office 1985), the rural-
urban differentials are less than primary data suggest. The extended
family system ensures that close rural-urban links are maintained: remit-
tances from wage employment account for approximately 50 per cent of
rural homestead income (Economie Planing Office 1985). Russell (1993)
even argues that rural and urban incomes cannot be measured separately
and, because of the failure to grasp the complexity of transfers, rural
incomes have been underestimated and maldistribution of income has
been exaggerated. Russell does not deny income inequalities in Swaziland,
but these inequalities do not exist systematically between rural and urban
as such.
In order to raise the standard of living, it was also thought that the subsis-
tence agricultural sector should be transformed. In the 1970s, therefore,
the Rural Development Area programme was initiated, funded by aid and
covering 51 per cent of Swazi Nation Land. The assumption was that the
provision of physical infrastructure, credit, marketing and extension
services would stimulate output and income. The results have been
disappointing (Hunting 1983). Although it has been estimated that
Investment in the livestock sector yielded a 24 per cent rate of return,
cotton was actually the only erop in which output increased. The major
constraint for an increase in agricultural output was that generally a lower
financial return could be obtained than by doing wage labour and other
off-farm activities, also because the unit size of holdings was uneconomic.
Moreover, arguments are put forward that the traditional commu-
nal land tenure is a major block to higher agricultural productivity.3 Sibisi
(1981) indicates two disadvantages of the communal land system. First,
time is spent in tribute labour on ploughing, weeding and harvesting the
crops of the chief; secondly, pasturage is held in common and cannot be
fenced, which leads to investment of time in tending cattle. Another
weakness is that chiefs often allocate land on the basis of political rather
than agricultural (productive) considérations. It is hard to change this
system, since homesteads owe allegiance to a chief. In sum, there is some
agreement among scholars and others that the government has failed to
design a rural policy generating adequate long-term employment and
incomes (Fair 1985).
Another issue of distribution and concern in literature on (social) devel-
opment in Swaziland is the position of women in society. Women's rôles
3
 On the other hand it is argued that communal land tenure prevents to some extent
large social and economie inequalities among rural homesteads. The 'free' access to land
implied by the communal land tenure system can also be seen as a form of social security
(see Chapter 6 and 7 for further discussion).
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in Swaziland are contradictory. Traditionally, the Queen Mother is a
powerful political figure. In thé public sector, women are underrepre-
sented in administrative posts and overrepresented in thé clérical jobs
(Armstrong and Russell 1985). In thé private sector, they occupy a dispro-
portionate share of the more skilled white-collar jobs, especially pro-
fessional and clérical. Although législation prohibits discrimination in
employment on grounds of sex and establishes the principle of equal pay
for equal work, women are more easily fired during an économie
recession and are lower paid at all levels in both sectors. The représenta-
tion of women in highly-skilled jobs can be explained by both sexes being
equally represented in schools at all levels (also at the university). After
leaving school, however, male are expected to find wage-employment,
whereas females are supposed to be engaged in full-time work on the
homestead. Women in employment, therefore, are a more select group
(Russell 1986). The women in the 'homestead sector' are not "as hard-
pressed as is often assumed" (Russell 1986:304). Many are engaged in
informal entrepreneurial activities (see also Chapters 6 and 8). It cannot
be denied, however, that their economie rôles have changed. In addition
to their traditional tasks on the homestead, they have taken over some of
the traditional male tasks and have entered wage employment (Armstrong
and Russell 1985). Their responsibilities and burdens have increased but
traditional attitudes regarding their rôles have not changed (see also
Chapter 6).
The last issue addressed in this chapter is the labour issue, including
social protection. By and large, the labour force is not strongly organised
in Swaziland. State policy towards trade unions has been conservative, and
labour unrest in 1973 lead to the suspension of the constitution and active
discouragement and weakening of trade unions. In 1983 only one trade
union remained out of nine in 1970 (Maasdorp 1991:234). At the same
tune, however, minimum wage schedules were established. From 1983
onwards, on the basis of ILO législation, trade unions have starled to re-
emerge, although they have relatively weak bargaining power because of
employers pay ing higher than minimum wages to their employees. The
latter can be explained by the désire to have a stable labour force or to
be seen as a 'good'employer (Maasdorp 1991:234).
Labour conditions in Swaziland hâve also improved through thé
establishment of 'formai' social security arrangements. We mention thé
most important among them (see Van der Duin 1990 for an elaborate
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overview). In 1983, thé Workmen's Compensation Act was introduced,
based on thé classical principles of employer liability under which each
employer is individually liable for thé compensation payable to bis
employees. The Act applies to all persons working under a contract of
service. Ail employers, except for thé Government, are required to insure
their liabilities with thé Swaziland Royal Insurance Corporation. The Act
provides compensation in thé event of death, permanent disablement, and
temporary total or partial incapacity.
Another important social security scheme is the Swaziland National
Provident Fund, established in 1974 as a savings scheme. The main
purpose is to provide benefits for employed persons when they retire from
regulär employment as a resuit of old âge or in thé event of becoming
incapacitated. Ail employers in thé private agricultural and industrial
sector are obligea by law to contribute to thé Fund. The employées
contribute one half of thé stipulated amount. Persons employed La thé
public service are covered for their pension by thé Pensioner's Act 1968, if
they have completed more than ten years of pensionable service. About
1500 officers in government service are members (Van der Duin 1990:18).
The approximately 5000 teachers are covered by thé Unified Teaching
Service Pension Plan, which, obviously, provides former teachers with a
pension. Besides thé large social security schemes mentioned above, small
schemes can also be found as Private Pension Plans, in which a dozen
organisations are involved (Van der Duin 1990:19). The Swaziland Royal
Insurance Company also provides life insurance schemes and pension
schemes on a purely commercial basis.
In the field of social welfare, the government has a Department of
Social Welfare, which provides monetary benefits to destitute persons or
families. Public Assistance, as the benefit is called, was given to 305
persons in 1975, a figure which rosé to 895 in 1987 (Van der Duin
1990:15). In 1990/1991, there were 1599 applications. The scheme is non-
contributional, and people are not allowed to 'claim' support. People hâve
to apply for Public Assistance, on thé recommendation of community
leaders at grassroots level and thé Régional Social Worker who assesses
the need (Van der Duin 1990:15). Another social welfare programme is
run by thé Swaziland National Society for thé Handicapped, established in
1970. This Society is a volunteers' organisation and dépends on external
sponsors for its finance. Similar organisations to be found in Swaziland
are: thé Red Cross, operating mobile clinics in remote areas; thé Cheshire
Home Matsapha, part of the Worldwide Cheshire Foundation which
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provides rehabilitation and treatment for disabled people; thé Salvation
Army, for health treatment; thé Save The Children Fund, with activities
ranging from thé exécution of vaccination programmes to providing help
with a social welfare programme to destitute cases in the field of nutri-
tion, éducation and housing.
The provisions with regard to public health are improving slightly.
The health status of Swaziland is low by Southern African standards
(Maasdorp 1991:233). Government expenditures on health hâve long been
directed towards curative health services, with a strong urban bias in
médical infrastructure and personnel. In récent years, increasing attention
has been paid to, and money been spent on, préventive health program-
mes. The rôle of traditional healers has also received attention and
entered thé discussion. Many people still consult the traditional healers
and the strengthening of their rôle in health care programmes is being
seriously considered.
It is clear that most of the social security schemes mentioned above are
only open to people who are employed in the formal sector. Moreover,
the social welfare schemes are still in an embryonic stage, and the num-
bers of beneficiaries have been low. Most people in Swaziland, therefore,
are still dependent on other mechanisms than those provided by the
government or the private sector. Such people can mainly be found in the
rural areas. Following chapters will go into detail on the social security
mechanisms the majority of rural people have to depend on.
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6. THE SWAZI RURAL HOMESTEAD AS SOLIDARITY
GROUP
6.1. Introduction
In Chapter 4, it was argued that thé family unit is the first important
social security mechanism in rural areas in developing countries. In
Swaziland this basic family unit is thé so called 'homestead'. The term
'homestead' usually has two meanings. Hughes (1972:69) concludes that
some social scientists use 'homestead' to mean thé physical units of
settlement, while others use the term to indicate a particular social group.
Hughes (1972:69) distinguishes, therefore, between thé homestead and thé
homestead group. He uses homestead to refer to thé physical entity (buts
and cattle byre) and arable lands, and homestead group to refer to thé
social unit inhabiting thé homestead. This distinction, however, is not very
common nowadays among social scientists in Swaziland. To avoid any
confusion, we adhère to thé common practice of most social scientists in
Swaziland and use homestead to refer to thé social group, unless indicated
otherwise.
The objective of this chapter is to analyze thé several dimensions of
thé homestead as solidarity group in contemporary rural Swaziland. In
Section 6.2., thé homestead is further introduced by a brief review of
research on what the homestead actually is. A good understanding of this
discussion is a prerequisite for further discussion on thé homestead as
solidarity group. Both older works of anthropologists of the 1930s and
1940s, and also more récent publications are discussed. In Sections 6.3 to
6.7, thé Swazi homesteads in our survey are discussed as regards their
possible rôle as solidarity group by analyzing thé différent aspects of a
solidarity group. In Section 6.3.,attention is paid to the économie position
of thé homestead; in Section 6.4, thé homesteads' size is discussed; in
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Section 6.5, the composition of the homestead is analyzed; in Section 6.6
we go into detail on its durability; and the concluding Section 6.7 exam-
ines the existence of forms of normative insurance.
6.2. Views on the Swazi rural homestead
As the homestead is the basic economie and social unit in Swaziland, the
interest of social scientists in the homestead is overwhelming and its
fonctions, characteristics and development have been analyzed thoroughly
from different perspectives. ' What exactly is a homestead? The answer is
not easy to give, if we are to believe the literature. The term 'homestead'
is a translation of the SiSwati word 'umuti' (pi. imiti), which means a
family group living in a small family seulement. Although 'homestead' is
not entirely satisfactory as a translation of umuti, it is closer than any
readily available alternative and is convenient for most ordinary purposes
(Ngubane 1983:95). It serves to highlight that the umuti is neither a
village nor simply a household; it may well contain several households
(Ngubane 1983:95).
These genera! statements cannot disguise that there seem to be as
many homestead models as there are social scientists studying Swaziland.
The homestead has been analyzed by different disciplines and from
different theoretical perspectives. In this section, a brief summary is given
of the different positions social scientists take. The starting point is the
model described by ethnographers in the 1930s and 1940s. We will discuss
other perspectives by analyzing the criticism on this model.
6.2.1. The ethnographie or classic homestead model
The earliest descriptions of the Swazi homestead are derived from anthro-
pological studies made in the 1930s and 1940s (published in Kuper 1947
and 1963, Marwick 1966). The homestead model that émerges from these
studies can be referred to as the ethnographie model (Allen 1973) or the
classic model (Standing 1987). The focus of this anthropological model is
on indicating genera! characteristics, which are in turn ascribed to all
Swazi rural homesteads, as if the Swazi rural homestead can be described
1
 This extensive research resulted in many publications, among others: Allen 1973,
Black-Michaud 1981, Helleman 1964, Hughes 1972, Kappers 1989, Kuper 1947 and 1963,
Low 1986, Marwick 1966, Neocosmos 1987, Ngubane 1983, Rosen-Prinz and Prinz 1978,
Russell 1983,1984,1989,and 1993, Sibisi 1979, Tieleman 1988, and De Vletter 1983.
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and analyzed. In addition, the homestead is analyzed almost indepen-
dently from its wider socio-economic context.
The homestead is seen as a family group whose size and composition
fluctuate with births and marriages, deaths and migrations. In control of
the homestead is the patriarchal headman (umnumzana ) (Kuper 1963:18).
The basic family group constituting the homestead is the headman, his
wife or wives and their unmarried children. However, as the family
develops, a typical homestead may include the headman, his wife or wives,
his unmarried brothers and sisters, married sons with their wives and
children, and unmarried sons and daughters, as well as more distant
relatives (Kuper 1963:18). The ethnographie model, therefore, character-
izes the homestead as having large membership, male household heads,
agnatic relationships (plus affinai relationships of wives marrying into the
homesteads), multiple marital links through polygyny and married sons
remaining in the homestead, and a depth of three or four générations
(Allen 1973:45).
According to the ethnographie model, the homestead is subdivided
into households, which are called tindlu (sing, indlu). These households
may have different compositions. A household may centre around the
headman's wife or wives and their (unmarried) children, and/or around
married brothers or sons with their wives and children. Kuper (1963:20)
describes households as semi-independent social and economie units,
although they continue to be an integral part of the homestead. Whether
these tindlu are units of consumption or units of production (enterprises)
or both is not easy to détermine from the ethnographie works, and much
confusion exists hère.
Reading Marwick (1966), one gets the idea that the indlu is both
unit of consumption and unit of production. In the case of a polygynous
headman, the indlu centres round the wife, who has her own cooking and
sleeping huts, her own fields, and cattle allotted for the use of her indlu.
By dint of her own industry and some assistance from her husband, she
produces crops from the fields to provide food for the unit. The crops she
reaps are kept distinct from those of other wives of her husband and are
stored and used separately. She uses the crops to feed herself and her
children and to contribute her quota to her husband's gastronomie needs
(Marwick 1966:44). At the same tune, however, some of the land allo-
cated to the headman is not distributed to the tindlu, but worked upon
together by all wives of the homestead (including those of married
brothers and sons in so far as they live on the homestead). This land is
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called 'grandmother's field' and ils fruits accrue to the headman. He may
keep the produce for himself, but more likely he will keep the produce in
store and redistribute it among those tindlu whose supplies are inadequate
to meet the needs of that particular household.
In addition to land, certain cattle are also allotted to the wife's unit,
some inalienably, others temporarily. The produce of that cattle also
accrues to the particular indlu. But, as in the case of agricultural produce,
at the same time some cattle is held by the headman and this is to be
considered the common property of all members of the homestead. Each
wife inhabiting her own indlu also makes her own Utensils. Some of these
are bartered or sold for cash. Whatever a wife receives in this way accrues
to her own unit (Marwick 1966:44). If her supplies are inadequate, the
head of the homestead has to provide her with additional resources, which
may be his own or borrowed from other households within the homestead.
What has been said so far regarding tindlu that centre around the
wives of the head also applies to tindlu that are centred around a married
son or brother and his wife and children. Each household has its own
fields, cattle and Utensils, and also monetary benefits from economie
activities may accrue to the household. As tindlu which centre around a
married son and his wife are often 'younger', the married son will often
be a migrant labourer. Strong links with the migrant exist and regulär
remittances accrue to his indlu or also to the homestead as a whole when
remittances are brought in the form of food, agricultural inputs or agricul-
tural Utensils.
The conclusion might be that, according to the ethnographie model,
the indlu is a unit of consumption, but is only partly a unit of production.
Especially with regard to agricultural activities, part of the enterprise is at
homestead level, and also income generaled by doing wage labour does
not rally accrue to the indlu (see also Black-Michaud 1981 and Russell
1984).
The ethnographie homestead is further characterized by the observation
that the relationships among individual homestead members are con-
sidered harmonious and equal. Standing (1987:128) summarizes the view
of the ethnographers on this point as follows: "In the classic model
relations within the homestead are articulated through kinship, and
kinship relations are founded in reciprocity, whether immédiate, delayed
or generalised. Inequalities between homestead members are temporary
and of a short-term nature in that they dérive from âge and (temporary)
status and are subject to future compensation. The homestead is a self-
contained unit within which its members' interests are equivalent and
identical." The ethnographie homestead model pays attention to the
different positions that are taken by homestead members (such as the
male and the female, the younger and the elderly). Attention is paid to
the social division of work, forcing women to be engaged in 'home-bound'
activities such as agriculture, childcare and housekeeping (see Kuper
1947: 137-158, 1963:41-50, Marwick 1966:158-182), as well as to the
distribution of wealth. But, as Standing concludes, all this is analyzed
within the perspective of reciprocal relationships, which are considered
equalising over time.
Another feature of the ethnographie or classic homestead model is its
ahistorical approach to the homestead. The homestead is analyzed
relatively independent from its wider social and economie environment
and changes that take place in Swazi rural society. Labour migration, for
example, was already a major feature of Swazi society in the 1930s and
1940s and the anthropologists incorporated this into their analysis. How-
ever, it is suggested that labour migration, and thereby the introduction of
the market economy, only affected homesteads at the margin and the
opportunities that the market gave were either adopted smoothly or
simply neglected by homesteads. External factors were not used as
explanations for différences to be found among homesteads. Therefore,
différences that might exist among homesteads had to be ascribed to the
internai dynamics of the homestead itself, and according to Standing
(1987:129) this is indeed what the ethnographers did.
In the classic model, the starting point for the homestead's dynamics
is the access to Swazi Nation Land, and the customary right of all Swazi
adult men to claim parcels of land from a chief or chiefs on which to set
up independent homesteads. These claims arise from the homestead
development cycle and from Swazi inheritance practices. The practice of
patrilineality and primogeniture extrade women and younger men from
the homestead. Married women leave the parental homestead and live on
the husbands' homestead; younger men eventually set up replica home-
steads elsewhere. Homesteads may send out male migrants to satisfy
spécifie cash needs. Such migrants retain their rural links and orientation
and are eventually absorbed back into the rural subsistence base (Stand-
ing 1987:129). This process is cyclical and répétitive, generaled endoge-
nously by intra-homestead growth and fission. It is also self-contained and
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self-producing, being carried on in relative isolation from wider processes.
Different levels of accumulation, where recognised, are a direct result of
these cycles of expansion and dispersion. Men accumulate livestock to set
against future marriage payments, and the redistributive pressures of
kinship obligations militate against long-term stratégies of accumulation,
whether in livestock or in cash (Standing 1987:129).
In sum, the picture of the homestead described by the ethnographers is
that of a rather homogeneous, harmonious homestead, which is self-suffi-
cient in agricultural production and sends out migrants. Relations within
thé homestead hâve a reciprocal and redistributive character, which is
vested in kinship relations. Inequalities are, therefore, offset in time and
hâve a temporary nature. The dynamics of the homestead is explained by
thé repeating division of thé homestead, which is possible because every
mâle adult has access to Swazi Nation Land.
Is this an adequate picture of contemporary homesteads on Swazi
Nation Land? Certainly, the model at least represents one type of home-
stead, but other surveys (Holleman 1964, Low 1986, Neocosmos 1987, De
Vletter 1983), including our own, reveal many différences among home-
steads. The classic model of the Swazi homestead has been highly
criticised in recent years. For example, Standing (1987:129) is provocative
when stating that "this kind of framework is a familiär one from British
structural functionalist anthropology but it raises both empirical and
conceptual diffïculties. It is arguable, in the light of Swaziland's history of
continuai social transformation, whether this has ever been an adequate
représentation of rural social relations". Also Russell (1989) has her
doubts when arguing that the classic model tends to stress thé norm
rather than reality. Kuper and Marwick hâve mainly visited homesteads of
chiefs and members of thé royal family. It is widely acknowledged that
thèse homesteads tend to be more 'traditional', in terms of being in
accordance with what a homestead should be according to Swazi law and
custom, than homesteads of commoners.
Generally, the main problem with the classic model is that it can rarely be
found on Swazi Nation Land nowadays. Older and more récent surveys
(Holleman 1964, De Vletter 1983, Low 1986, Neocosmos 1987a, own
survey) hâve shown that a large socio-économie differentiation exists
among homesteads. Thèse surveys found only a minority of homesteads
resembling the classic homestead model. The large socio-économie differ-
entiation among homesteads gave food for thought and several explana-
tions have been brought forward for thé existence of socio-économie
differentiation, resulting in new views on thé Swazi rural homestead.
Neocosmos (1987a) states that the views on socio-économie differentiation
among homesteads and thé explanations given for this are strongly related
to thé way in which social scientists conceptualize thé homestead and thé
Swazi social formation in général. Two mainstreams can be found, accord-
ing to Neocosmos: the 'orthodox' view and the 'radical' view. In the next
sections we will deal with these views.
6.2.2.The orthodox view: the homestead development cycle
In the orthodox view, it is assumed that Swazi society consists of two
sectors: a modern and a traditional one. The latter sector is considered as
basically unchanged and is self-sufficient (Neocosmos 1987a:23). Develop-
ments m the modern sector hardly influence the traditional sector struc-
turally. Rural homesteads are considered to be in the traditional sector. In
this two-sector model it is, as in the classic model, diffïcult to explain why
social and economie différences among homesteads exist. Explanations,
again, have to be found within the homestead itself. Différences are
attributed, then, to ecological factors (homesteads are confronted with
different land qualities in the ecological zones, see Low 1986), psychologi-
cal factors (one farmer is keener than the other, see Sibisi 1981), or
démographie factors (see also Low 1986).
The best known approach within the orthodox view on socio-econ-
omic differentiation is Low's homestead development cycle theory (see
Low 1983 and 1986). The mam idea of Low's homestead development
cycle theory is that, through the domestic development cycle of the family
unit, démographie factors have an influence on farm-household produc-
tion levels, intensity of work, access to resources and the propensity to
adopt innovations (Low 1986:86). Homestead size and âge composition
are linked to five stages of homestead development: establishment,
expansion, consolidation, fission and décline. These stages are based on
Fortes' ideas on developmental cycles in domestic groups, already men-
tioned in Chapter 4. Low uses the size of the homestead and the age of
its members as criteria to classify homesteads.
Following Chayanov (1966), Low states that the size and composition
(expressed in terms of a consumers/workers ratio) of the homestead
influence both the préférence function and the production fonction of the
homestead. When the size of the homestead increases, the level of income
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(both subsistence and cash) of thé homestead has to rise as well, to
provide each member with a reasonable standard of living. The need to
increase income rises, which leads to a reallocation of labour time
between subsistence farming, commercial farming, wage labour and
leisure time. The way in which the homestead labour force is allocated
between subsistence farming and wage labour dépends on thé compara-
tive advantages homestead members hâve in wage labour. Individuals in
thé homestead hâve thé same productivity in farm subsistence production,
but they command différent wage rates in thé labour market. The amount
of labour that is committed to subsistence production dépends on thé
ratio of thé wages to thé retail priée of purchased food in thé case of
food-deficit homesteads and on thé ratio of thé wages to thé gâte priée of
food or cash crops in thé case of food-surplus producers. As soon as thé
real opportunity costs of time of an individual are higher than thé indivi-
dual's marginal physical product of labour, thé homestead should engage
in off-farm wage work in order to maximise income. In this way, Low
explains why mâle members of the homestead are engaged in wage
labour activities and female members are often engaged in subsistence
production. The opportunity costs of time of mâle members is higher than
their marginal physical product of labour, while with female members it is
thé other way round.
Low conceptualizes thé homestead as a 'farm-household', which is
established with thé marriage of two people, and in which children are
born and grow up and ultimately leave thé homestead and which, upon
thé death of thé parents, ceases to exist. This household is directed at
maximizing income in ail stages of its development. During the develop-
ment cycle, then, thé homestead members face différent opportunity costs
of time, by which différences between homesteads in levels of production,
standard of living, and in other économie variables can be explained. The
criticism of Low has been substantial, both from authors belonging to thé
orthodox view themselves and also from thé opposing radical view (see
thé next section).
One of thé major criticisms of Low's theory is put forward by Russell
(1993). Russell argues that thé existence of a homestead development
cycle is highly questionable. According to her, Low's assumption that thé
homestead is a household is not sustainable, and therefore his theory is
insufficient to analyze (différences among) Swazi homesteads. Russell
(1993:771) states that "thé Swazi homestead is not a household but a
flexible patrilineal land-holding group of kin who compose and recompose
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themselves into a number of constantly shifting residential patterns
according to their changing and continuously negotiated interests. It is this
construction which must be emphasized". Moreover, says Russell (1993:
770), "the homestead is an enduring unit. Because thé homestead is the
collective property of a patrilineage it does not corne into, and go out of,
existence with thé death, marriage, or birth of particular individuals; it
précèdes and succeeds thé particular members extant at any time. There
is seldom any dramatic change of homestead membership." The consé-
quence is that size of thé homestead and âge of its members cannot be
used as sole criteria for distinguishing stages. At least additional informa-
tion on générations, kinship relations, and history of the homestead is
required in order to distinguish a homestead development cycle, when it is
possible at all.
A second major criticism cornes from (neo)Marxist scholars. They do
not attack Low's conceptualisation of the homestead. The Marxist dislike
of thé domestic cycle is its challenge to thé primacy of class position. As
ail homesteads are supposed to pass through thé same development cycle,
différences are only temporary and cross-section différences are thé resuit
of being in one phase or another. No attention is paid to différences
among homesteads that are in thé same development phase. In short, thé
focus on thé development cycle keeps attention away from structural
différences among homesteads that exist, notwithstanding thé stages
homesteads find themselves in.
Given thèse comments, Low's analysis should be looked upon
critically and its conclusions considered with care. The conséquences for
our analysis will be discussed in Section 6.2.4.
6.2.3.The radical view: semi-proletarians and homestead classes
Opposed to the orthodox view stands the radical view, which considers ail
homesteads as units which become gradually proletarianized in a linear
way, under thé destructive influence of the dominant capitalist mode of
production.2 The radical view has the same dualistic approach as thé
orthodox one, but hère in terms of modes of production. A precapitalist
(lineage or tribute) and a capitalist mode of production are distinguished.
The precapitalist mode is linked to thé dominant capitalist mode, which
exploits thé former in term of surplus extraction. The state plays an
2
 Main représentatives of this view are Bonner (1982), Booth (1988), Daniel (1982),
Davies et al. (1985), and Fransman (1982).
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important rôle in this extraction. The driving force behind thé linkage
between modes of production is the increasing land shortage, which
undermines the agricultural self-sufficiency of the rural homesteads.
Labour migration is necessary to supplement the subsistence base. In
contrast with the orthodox view, wage-labour is not considered an option
chosen by homesteads but a structural feature of homesteads, forced upon
them due to land shortage and thé exploiting link between thé capitalist
and traditional mode of production. Due to thé wider socio-économie
changes caused by thé intrusion of capitalism, socio-économie differen-
tiation among homesteads can only partly be accounted for by 'natural
factors'. To be rieh or poor does not solely depend on living in the barren
Lowveld or fertile Middleveld, or on which stage of the development cycle
the homestead is in, but dépends on the extent to which homesteads are
exposed to the imperatives of the capitalist mode of production, which
differentiates and proletarianizes people. In this respect, as Neocosmos
(1987:43) argues, the radical view is more realistic than the orthodox view,
because it does not consider the homesteads' development in isolation
from historical developments in Swaziland and does not consider the
precapitalist mode of production as basically unchanged. But, at the same
time, the radical view puts the differentiation concept in a proletarianiza-
tion thesis, which is difficult to sustain when analyzing data of Swazi
homesteads. In addition, the radical view lays too much emphasis on the
external relations of the homestead, and pays little or no attention to its
internai structure and dynamics.
A different position within the radical view is taken by Neocosmos (1987).
Neocosmos blâmes both the orthodox and the radical view (as outlined
above) for the idea that it is implicitly assumed that there must be some-
thing like the Swazi rural homestead. By conceptualizing all homesteads as
either self-sufficient subsistence households (orthodox view) or becoming
(semi)-proletarians (radical view), no insight is given into the structural
différences that exist among homesteads. Such an insight cannot be
obtained by contributing différences to only 'natural' factors (orthodox
view) or to a dominant state-led capitalist sector (radical view). Both
views adhère fundamentally to a homogeneous view on homesteads, as if
différences did not exist before migration or the state appeared. Accord-
ing to Neocosmos, both views fail to conceptualize socio-economic differ-
entiation among homesteads as a structural and lasting feature of Swazi
rural social relations.
r
R
What is Neocosmos' own position in this debate, then? Neocosmos starts
with the suggestion that we should visualize agricultural production on
Swazi Nation Land as petty commodity production, a particular form of
capitalist production (Neocosmos 1987b:81).3 Swazi farmers, and hence
homesteads as well, are petty commodity producers. One of the main
features of generalised commodity production is the private and
individualised nature of such production. What this means is that produc-
tion takes place not so much in a collective manner as under precapitalist
modes of production, but in "independent ... individualised entities
(enterprises, economie sectors, countries, and so on) which look only to
their private interests (bourgeois right) and which appear isolated from
each other" (Gibbon and Neocosmos 1985:171). Marx argues that this
individualised and privatised form of production develops principally
through the undermining of collective relations by the exchange mechan-
ism. Thus it is the process of intégration into market relations - commodi-
tisation - which lies at the root of the privatisation process. Petty com-
modity producers are privatised and individualised in their social form
(Neocosmos 1987b:83). Neocosmos argues that this process of commoditi-
sation has been taking place for more than a Century and that the devel-
opment of capitalism in Swaziland took a form whereby the development
of petty commodity production increased simultaneously with the proletar-
ianisation of large sections of the rural population. The state has an
important rôle in the oppression of the peasantry. However, the effects of
the oppression are not the same for all peasants (Neocosmos 1987b:118)
and petty commodity producers (peasants) become differentiated.
Neocosmos (1987b:46) distinguishes four catégories of homesteads:
1. the poor: those homesteads which do not produce enough from all
their agricultural activities to ensure subsistence and which, in addition,
do not engage in non-agricultural petty commodity production. Subsis-
tence needs are secured partly through agricultural production, partly
through the sale of their labour power. So this category is a category of
clear-cut semi-proletarians;
2. The lower-middle are defined as those homesteads which, like the
poor, do not achieve subsistence in their agricultural production, but
which, unlike the poor, have engaged in non-agricultural petty com-
modity production. In this category, as also in the upper-middle cat-
3
 See for an elaborate discussion on thé notion of 'petty commodity production',
Gibbon and Neocosmos 1985.
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egory, the subsistence production will take place on the basis of family
labour alone.
3. The upper-middle are those homesteads which produce enough from
all their agricultural activities to achieve subsistence, also primarily on
the basis of household labour.
4. The rieh are defïned as those not only achieving subsistence levels but
also employing wage labour from outside the homestead (or else
employing resident wage-labour in conjunction with the ownership of
expensive items of equipment such as tractors and irrigation). In this
category, the production factor capital dominâtes the production factor
labour, which means that peasants in this category are potential capital-
ists.
The most important comment that should accompany this classification is
that the terras 'poor', 'middle' and 'rieh' do not refer to levels of wealth
but to structural catégories, distinguished by their position in a System of
production relations in agriculture. The catégories represent social classes,
or more accurately, perhaps, "incipient social class groupings" amongst
peasants in thé Swazi countryside (Neocosmos 1987a:47). By using this
classification when analyzing a sample survey of 1984-1985, Neocosmos
found significant différences between thé catégories with respect to access
to resources like land, cattle, expensive agricultural equipments, use of
seeds and fertilizers, and so on.
We think a major problem of Neocosmos' analysis is his extensive
use of Marxist terminology, which makes it difficult to follow his line of
thinking. We think his classification can also be 'translated' into neoclassi-
cal terms. What Neocosmos, according to us, essentially says is that
différences in opportunity costs among homesteads are not so rauch deter-
mined by the different phases of a development cycle which homesteads
are in, but more by their resource mix. This resource mix, in turn, is
determined by the (structural) position homesteads have 'm the political
and social relations prevailing on Swazi Nation Land. On the basis of the
different resource mixes (land, capital and labour), homesteads face
different opportunity costs of income-generating activities. In this way,
different structural class groupings can therefore be distinguished.
The major advantage, then, of Neocosmos' analysis is that it pays
more attention to structural changes in Swazi society and emphasizes that
the conséquences of these changes are not the same for all homesteads.
Given their place in the rural relations of production, homesteads react
differently and some homesteads have more 'degrees of freedom' than
others. As homesteads differ structurally among different class groupings,
a homogeneous view on the homestead cannot be sustained.
6.2.4.Using the homestead models
In the previous sections, three views were presented on the Swazi rural
homestead. How do these views relate to one another? In the discussion
on Swazi homesteads, the views are often presented (in particular by the
représentatives themselves) as alternatives to one another or even as each
others' complete opposite. Kuper and Marwick describe the homestead
i from a theoretical background which lies in functional and structural
anthropology. Low's homestead development cycle theory has its roots in
family économies and has a strong neoclassical background, while the
radical view and Neocosmos' theory of petty commoditisation have their
roots in Marxist théories. Three analytical frameworks that are structurally
different from each other. But, in essence, it should be asked whether
what they have to say is really so mutually exclusive.
Take, for instance, thé level of analysis. The ethnographers' analysis
and Low's theory both focus on a micro-analysis of homesteads and try to
explain thé social and economie opération of the homestead and its
dynamics from characteristics of the homestead itself. The radical authors
and Neocosmos have primarily a macro-level orientation, observing struc-
tural transformation processes at the level of society (commoditisation)
that have direct impacts on the opération and dynamics of homesteads.
Low and the anthropologists might be criticized for analyzing homesteads
in isolation from their wider environment and structural processes of
change, but at the same time the radical scholars and Neocosmos can be
criticized for paying less attention to the internai dynamics of the home-
stead and how this also influences the economie decision-making process
of its members. What all these scholars have to say seems rather to be
complementary than mutually exclusive.
In this study, the basic idea is to investigate the rôle of the home-
stead as a solidarity group. It was shown in Chapter 4 that a solidarity
group has certain characteristics, related to both its internai structure and
dynamics and also to its social and economie position in society. The
purpose of the present chapter is to tracé these characteristics of the rural
Swazi homestead. In doing this, différences among homesteads will
become clear with respect to their rôle as solidarity group. What can be
said beforehand, however, is that it is very realistic to assume the exist-
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ence of structural economie differentiation among homesteads. On this
point we agrée with the arguments Neocosmos has put forward. As will be
shown in Section 6.3, the different resource mixes of the class groupings
also have conséquences for the social security resources available within
homesteads. We do not thereby deny that other factors also influence the
rôle of the homestead as solidarity group. These other factors are, how-
ever, not considered as the major causes of structural differentiation
among homesteads. What can be assumed is that some of these factors
may have different effects within different class groupings. Whenever this
is likely to be the case, we will take account of this in the following sec-
tions.
6.3. The economie position of the rural homestead
6.3.1. Analysis at homestead level
An analysis of the economie position of the rural homestead is needed in
order to judge the ability of the homestead to generate sufficient means
for subsistence (including social security) purposes. While the other four
aspects of the homestead as solidarity group (size, composition, etc.) are
mainly concerned with the internai organisation and dynamics of the
homesteads, the economie position leads to an analysis of the place of the
homesteads in the wider rural economy.
Earlier analyses have already shown that there is considérable
economie differentiation among homesteads. In Section 6.2 we saw that
several explanations for this f act have been put forward. Our own analysis
largely follows Neocosmos' approach. The alternative, Low's homestead
development cycle theory, is not used for two reasons. First, as already
argued, the assumptions of Low's theory on what a homestead is are
highly questionable and may lead to misleading conclusions. Secondly,
only Neocosmos' theory pays adequate attention to the relationship
between the homestead and the rural economy, including the transform-
ations taking place in the latter.
The fïrst step in our analysis was to classify the homesteads in our
sample according to the criteria Neocosmos used (see Appendix C and
Neocosmos 1987a). Table 6. l présents the results of this classification.
As can be seen from this table, there are notable différences between our
data and those of Neocosmos. We found fewer homesteads in the cat-
egory 'poor' and a majority of homesteads in the 'lower-middle' range. It
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Table 6.1. Classification of homesteads according to their place in the
rural relations of production
Frequency
Percentage
Neocosmos
Homestead Catégories
Poor
28
15.5
21.0
Lower-Middle
103
56.9
36.0
Upper-Middle
33
18.2
36.0
Rieh
17
9.4
7.0
Source: Survey 1990, and Neocosmos 1987a:48
is not difficult, however, to explain these différences. With regard to the
'poor' category, Neocosmos used data from a survey which was explicitly
directed at identifying the rural poor. Neocosmos (1987a:46) refers to this
point when saying that "by and large, the areas surveyed seem overall to
be slightly poorer on average that the rural areas of Swaziland as a
whole".The second source of différences is the method of data collection.
While the survey of Neocosmos took the (often male) heads of home-
steads as respondents, in our survey women were also interviewed. Our
procedure may have generaled better information on what Neocosmos
calls 'non-agricultural petty comtnodity production' (rural industry),
because these activities are mainly performed by women and are often
easily overlooked by male members of the homestead. The result is that
most of the homesteads can be categorized as petty commodity producers
and belong, therefore, to the catégories lower- and upper-middle. The
high number of homesteads in the lower-middle category can be further
explained by the census year. Due to major storms and hail storms at the
end of 1989, 1990 was a bad harvest year for all agricultural products.
This led to a situation in which many more homesteads could not survive
on their agricultural production alone. This explains the différence
between the lower-middle and upper-middle category. The latter category
includes homesteads that are able to cover subsistence from agricultural
production alone.
Another interesting observation is the low frequencies found at both
ends of the differentiation scale. This can be explained by the homesteads'
overall access to land on Swazi Nation Land. Neocosmos (1987a:48) also
acknowledges the importance of land being relatively easily available in
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Swaziland. Access to land on Swazi Nation Land does not only include
access to land that can be used for agricultural purposes, but also entails
access to other communal resources such as water, firewood, grass,
timber, wild fruits and vegetables, and so on. Many of these resources are
also used as inputs for non-agricultural production. Although in many
cases not sufficient to fully ensure subsistence, thé availability of land is a
brake on socio-économie differentiation in thé rural areas and prevents a
process in which Swazi peasants would become füll proletarians - as pre-
dicted by thé more radical view.
The économie positions the homesteads have in the différent catégories
can be further explained and illustrated by analyzing their économie
resources and économie activities. A first marked différence between thé
groups of homesteads is that the poor and lower-middle are not able to
reach subsistence by agricultural production alone, while thé upper-middle
and rieh can. Table 6.2 gives an indication of thé magnitude of shortages
and surpluses of maize, which is the main subsistence crop.
We found that rieh homesteads produce almost ten times more
maize than poor homesteads. As explained in Appendix C, food suffi-
ciency was calculated by converting ail agricultural production into maize
équivalents and comparing this with thé kilograms of maize required
annually by all resident homestead members. The poor and lower-middle
hâve considérable shortages, of 715 and 1,079 kg respectively. Ail home-
steads with shortages were asked whether they could indicate the mam
cause of shortages. As can be seen from Table 6.2, naturel causes (storms
and drought) were given as thé main reason. But more structural reasons,
such as land shortage, lack of inputs, and not being able to plough in time
because a tractor could not be hired, were frequently mentioned.
Surprisingly, shortage of labour was seldom mentioned. Calculations
showed that, in each category, 2 to 3 members were available for agricul-
tural activities, on average. On this point there were no significant différ-
ences between thé catégories, which may lead to thé conclusion that
labour availability in itself is not a major factor in determining surpluses
or shortages.
However, with an almost equal agricultural labour force available,
there must be large différences in labour productivity (agricultural produc-
tion / agricultural labour force on homestead) to explain thé différences
in production between thé catégories. Labour productivity in agriculture
can be raised by mechanization, thé use of fertilizers, pesticides and
Table 6.2. Maize production, food shortages/surpluses, and reasons for
shortages by homestead category
Variables
Average Maize Pro-
duction (kg)
Maize per Resident
Member (kg)
Food Shortage or
Surplus m maize
équivalents (kg)
Main Reason for
Shortage
Second Reason for
Shortage
Third Reason for
Shortage
Homestead Catégories
Poor
325
53
-715
natural
(25.0 %)
land
shortage
(21.4 %)
tractor
too late
(13.4 %)
Lower-
Middle
418
43
-1,079
natural
(30.1 96)
land
shortage
(10.7%)
lack of
inputs
(10.7 %)
Upper-
Middle
1,276
238
1,007
—
—
—
Rieh
3,068
411
2,661
—
—
—
Source: Survey 1990
improved seeds, and so on. Table 6.3 gives an indication of the extent to
which homesteads hâve means available to raise agricultural production.
It shows clearly that rieh homesteads are far better equipped and ail make
use of modem inputs, such as fertilizers, etc. Furthermore, thé other
catégories are more dépendent on hiring tractors and/or oxen with oxen
plough. Being dépendent on thé rieh homesteads to deliver their services,
one is never certain of getting a tractor or oxen plough at thé critical time
for ploughing (when thé first rains hâve fallen). Ploughing and planting
too late can have disastrous effects on agricultural production.
In literature on agriculture in Swaziland, différences in agricultural
productivity among homesteads are also ascribed to thé ecological région
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Table 6.3. Homestead catégories and agricultural resources (in percen-
tage of homesteads in each category)
Variables
Tractor Ownership
Tractor Plough
Oxen Plough
Cattle (number)
Tractor Hire
Oxen Hire
Use of Bought Seeds
Fertilizer Use
Pesticide Use
Homestead Catégories
Poor
0.0
0.0
53.6
10.5
75.0
39.2
82.1
89.3
67.9
Lower
4.9
4.9
51.5
7.4
67.0
38.9
85.4
76.7
57.3
Upper
6.1
6.1
78.1
12.6
75.7
18.2
84.8
90.9
69.7
Rieh
35.3
35.3
82.4
17.3
64.7
23.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Source: Survey 1990
thé homesteads live in, their size and composition, and whether or not
they are 'female-headed'. Table 6.4 gives thé distribution of homesteads
by category over the three different survey areas.4 Exactly 50 per cent of
thé poor homesteads are situated in Elulakeni, a barren and dry area with
infertile soils. Moreover, Elulakeni is a non-RDA area, which means that
there are no agricultural services and a poor infrastructure. For thèse
homesteads, therefore, it will be difficult to raise sufficient agricultural
produce, because inputs are difficult to obtain, marketing channels are
difficult and thé soil is not fertile. In contrast, many rieh homesteads are
located in Ezokoteni, which is near a province town (Nhlangano), has thé
fertile soils of thé Middleveld, and is an RDA-area. The same holds true
for thé Ngwempisi area, in which many upper-middle homesteads are
found. Although one cannot ascribe everything to régional factors, it
seems that such factors can at least give some explanation for différences
The reader is reminded that in ail survey areas almost thé same number of
homesteads were interviewed. This justifies the making of Table 6.4.
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Table 6.4. Distribution of homesteads by category over survey areas, in
percentage of homesteads in each category
Area
Elulakeni
Ezokoteni
Ngwempisi
Homestead Catégories
Poor
50.0
21.4
28.6
Lower-Middle
28.2
32.0
39.8
Upper-Middle
27.3
24.3
48.5
Rieh
23.5
47.1
29.4
Source: Survey 1990
in agricultural productivity among homesteads and, therefore, thé catégo-
ries they belong to.
Table 6.5 gives thé incidence of female-headed homesteads in each
category. A distinction is made between homesteads with a female head
Table 6.5. Incidence of female-headed homesteads by category of home-
steads, in percentage of homesteads in category
Male-headed
Female-headed because
of migrant labour
Female-headed because
of widowhood
Homestead catégories
Poor
32.1
39.3
28.6
Lower-
Middle
57.3
16.5
26.2
Upper-
Middle
57.6
21.2
21.2
Rieh
76.5
17.6
5.9
Source: Survey 1990
because thé mâle head is a migrant labourer, and homesteads with a
female head because thé mâle head has died and no new mâle head has
yet been installed. We see that, among thé poor homesteads, a considér-
able proportion are female-headed homesteads. As will also be explained
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in Section 6.5, women have generally less access to resources, including
agricultural resources. Their appeals for help with ploughing will be
listened to less, and lack of finance will further prevent the purchase of
agricultural inputs. Moreover, by doing also male tasks, time for agricul-
tural activities will be restricted, which might lead to bad harvests because
of lack of maintenance and weeding. On the other side of the spectrum,
we see that rieh homesteads mostly have male resident heads, which at
least will make the access to resources easier. It might be argued that
having a female head or not will have some influence on the homestead's
agricultural production.
No significant relation could be found between the homestead
catégories and the size of homesteads. Size has apparently little to do with
agricultural productivity. We have already found that all homesteads have
more or less the same size of agricultural labour force available. The rieh
category is the only category which has employed labour to raise agricul-
tural production. This is done in order to achieve higher production and
more profits, not to secure food sufficiency on the homestead. We also
found that there was no significant relationship between the number of
mouths to feed and food available to each resident member.
In sum, we can conclude that the agricultural productivity of the
homesteads is highly determined by factors such as availability of, and
access to, land and agricultural resources, the natural environment, the
availability of infrastructure, and the social position of the homestead's
head. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the picture presented here is a
cross-section analysis and therefore has a rather static nature. It is not
denied that mobility of individual homesteads between catégories is
certainly possible. Homesteads which, as a result of temporary natural
factors such as drought or storms, have had their agricultural production
destroyed in one year, might well be able to achieve subsistence in the
following year. Better weather conditions in 1989/1990 might well have
resulted in more homesteads being in the upper-middle category and
fewer in the lower-middle and poor category. However, considering the
causes of food shortages, most homesteads mentioned structural reasons,
which is an indication that most homesteads structurally belong to a
spécifie category and that mobility can only be expected in the long run.
Besides agricultural (subsistence) production, income génération is
another important issue to look at. Cash is indispensable m Swaziland
nowadays. Cash can be raised by doing wage-labour, or being self-
employed in non-agricultural income-generating activities. Neocosmos'
statement is that homesteads less able to raise sufficient agricultural
production for subsistence will be more engaged in other income-generat-
ing activities, because they need cash to provide for their subsistence. In
bis study, for instance, he shows that the so-called proletarianisation ratio
(wage labourers versus other workers in the homestead) is relatively high
among poor homesteads and relatively low among rieh homesteads. Our
data do not allow such calculations, but an indication can be given by
determining in each category how many homesteads are involved in each
separate activity. Table 6.6 présents the figures.
Table 6.6. Percentage of homesteads involved in distinct income-generat-
ing activities, by percentage of homesteads in each category
Income-generating
activities
Agriculture
Wage Labour
Self-employed
Homestead Catégories
Poor
35.7
89.3
0.0
Lower-
Middle
52.4
74.8
100.0
Upper-
Middle
78.8
57.6
63.6
Rieh
100.0
88.2
82.4
Source: Survey 1990
The figures seem to confirm Neocosmos' observations. A higher percen-
tage of the poor homesteads are involved in wage-labour than in other
catégories. According to Neocosmos, in this respect a major différence
between the catégories poor and rieh is that the poor homesteads do not
have a choice about whether to be engaged in wage-labour or not: they
have to be, in order to guarantee subsistence. Their relatively bad position
in the rural production relations forces these homesteads to send out
migrants. This makes the poor homesteads a category of real semi-prolet-
arians. The upper-middle and rieh homesteads, on the contrary, can
choose to send out migrants in order to raise more cash income. The
lower-middle are essentially in the same position as the poor category, but
are also able to raise an income with 'petty commodity production'.
The fact that there is a category of homesteads in Swazi rural society
that dépends for ils survival on wage-labour is important from a social
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security point of view. Wage-labour is highly insecure, with rising rates of
unemployment and mostly short-time labour contracts. As the continuance
of the homestead as solidarity group dépends, amongst other things, on
the continuance of the homestead as enterprise, wage-labour is not a very
secure basis for ensuring this continuance. Nevertheless, it is often the
only possibility young men of poor and lower-middle homesteads have of
exploiting their own income-generating capacity. In so far as their parents
are uivolved in agriculture or petty commodity production, this is not a
very profitablebusiness and taking over this enterprise is not very attract-
ive. It is often argued that young men return home and invest their
earnings m agriculture. But when homesteads hâve a structurally disad-
vantaged position in thé rural economy, thèse investments are very risky.
It will be much more difficult for homesteads in thé poor and lower-
middle category to ensure long-term agricultural production than for
homesteads in thé upper-middle and rieh catégories. When a new génér-
ation bas to take over the economie activities of the homestead, the start
of this new enterprise is highly problematic and insecure for poor and
lower-middle homesteads.
The degree of dependence of homesteads on one or more income-
generating activities can be further illustrated by calculating the contribu-
tion of each income source to the total homestead income (cash only).
Table 6.7 présents the results. The results confirm the above conclusions.
In the poor and also the lower-middle catégories, more than 50 per cent
of the homesteads earn more than 80 per cent of their cash income by
doing wage labour. In the upper-middle and rieh catégories this depend-
ence is far less. Table 6.7 suggests, again, that the poor and lower-middle
homesteads have enterprises which are relatively vulnérable to external
(economie) shocks; the continuity of these homesteads is relatively easily
jeopardised in times of economie crises.
For this section, it is also interesting to know how much income is gener-
ated by the different types of activities. Neocosmos states that the labels
of the homestead catégories do not correspond necessarily with income
and wealth. Homesteads in the poor category do not have to be poor in
terms of cash income. This is clearly shown in Table 6.8. Except for the
rieh category, the poor category has the highest average cash income per
resident homestead member. However, not all wages earned in town or in
the South African mines are sent home. The disposable cash income for
the rural homesteads is a better indicator of the homestead's income posi-
141
Table 6.8. Average homestead income (in Emalangeni and on annual
base) and homestead catégories
Variables
Agricultural Income
Non-Agricultural
Income
Wage Income
Total Income
Total Income per Ho-
mestead Member
Disposable Homestead
Income
Disposable Income per
Resident Member
Homestead Catégories
Poor
243
0
8,795
9,071
1,091
3,296
532
Lower
313
1,372
8,254
9,981
839
3,923
438
Upper
1,234
919
5,403
7,745
972
3,646
606
Rieh
2,403
2,746
9,088
14,250
1,368
8,282
1,131
Source: Survey 1990
tion. In this case, the poor are again the poor, and might be labelled as
'double' poor: both in rural relations of production and in incomegener-
ated. The disposable income per resident member is 50 per cent of that in
the rieh category. The rieh and the upper-middle catégories have rela-
tively more means available per resident member and are, therefore,
relatively better able to operate as solidarity group in this respect.
In short, homesteads are in different class catégories which are deter-
mined by their place in the 'rural relations of production'. The latter
détermine to a large extent the resource mix and the opportunities that
are available to the homestead for engaging in particular produce and
income-generating activities. In this section, it has been shown that
homesteads in the upper-middle and rieh catégories are relatively better
off, both in terms of resource mix and opportunities. This translates itself
into a relatively better economie position. This better economie position
makes the homestead less vulnérable to external shocks and, in the event
of contingent situations, the homestead will be better able to deal with
such situations, because more means will be available on the homestead.
At the same time, the economie differentiation existing among home-
steads reflects, to a large degree, differentiation in their 'social security
positions'.
6.3.2. Socio-économie differentiation within homesteads
As outlined in Chapter 4 and elsewhere in this study, it is seldom found
that production and income is equally spread among family members. In
spite of (re)distribution rules (see Section 6.7), large différences still exist
between the members of the homestead with respect to production and
income which they can raise themselves. This issue is important because it
détermines the extent and the method of the provision by homestead
members of social security resources to other homestead members (see
Agarwal 1991), and the 'bargaining power' homestead members have
towards each other.
Sex and age are important differentiating factors in Swazi society
(see also following sections). With respect to the individual's economie
position within the homestead, it is considered that gender is more
important than âge. Age mainly détermines whether a homestead member
joins the production process of the homestead or not and whether hè or
she is a net contributor or a net receiver of means. Gender détermines
the entitlements to resources, and therewith access to production and
income, of those members who are involved in the production process of
the homestead. This section concentrâtes on production and income
différences within thé homestead according to sex. The classification of
homesteads used in thé previous section is maintained, in order to show
that différences between sexes are prevalent in all catégories. Table 6.9
présents some data on mâle and female income. We will briefly analyze
thé observed différences by income-generating activity, paying spécial
attention to resource endowments and thé entitlements of male and
female homestead members.
A number of observations can be made analyzing Table 6.9. The
overall inequality between women and men with regard to monetary
income is clear. In ail classes, thé cash income of mâle members is twice
thé female's income. Women have the best economie position in ternis of
monetary income in thé rieh category. In thé rieh category, thé participa-
tion of mâle members in agriculture is much higher in terms of labour
time than among poor homesteads. This also saves tune for women to
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Table 6.9. Average annual income (in E') of homesteads by gender and
homestead category
Income by Source
and Gender
Mâle Total Income
Female Total Income
Mâle Agr. Income
Female Agr. Income
Mâle Income O.I.G.A.*
Female Income O.I.G.A.
Male Wage Income
Female Wage Income
Homestead Catégories
Poor
6,360
2,400
169
733
0
0
6,214
2,580
Lower-
Middle
5,743
2,187
143
124
499
718
5,100
1,305
Upper-
Middle
5,371
2,201
840
298
396
417
3,887
1,516
Rieh
9,811
4,427
2,148
256
1,399
1,374
6,264
2,823
Total
6,116
2,326
442
174
457
588
5,157
1,586
*) Other Income-Generating Activities
Source: Survey 1990
concentrate on other non-agricultural activities. Moreover, Neocosmos'
data show that thé level of éducation of women is much higher in thé rieh
category, which offers women better perspectives in thé labour market.
Let us rurther review the différences by activity. To start with agriculture,
it can be seen from thé above table that both mâle and women raise an
income with agricultural activities, but that, on average, it is not the major
source of income for either of them. Taking into account subsistence
production, however, agricultural production forms a substantial part of
thé total 'income' of thé homestead. It is in subsistence production, as
mentioned earlier, that women are engaged. However, women do not own
their field, since land cannot be acquired by either a married or a single
woman (see Ginindza 1989). Nor are women entitled to other expensive
items and equipment on thé homestead. Indeed, few women could be
found in our sample who owned cattle themselves or to whom land was
allocated by thé chief. Asmellash's (1991) study of a group of women in
Elulakeni confirms this picture. It merely dépends on thé chief's generos-
ity whether he allocates, for example, land to unmarried or single-living
women. Only thé head of thé homestead 'owns' the land and for this
reason he is also entitled to its fruits. Women keep the production from
their own fields in store for their own household needs, but women very
rarely gain entitlement to seil any homestead surpluses, unless they are
themselves thé homestead heads (Social Science Research Unit 1990:102).
Surplus maize goes to thé head, who may seil it or distribute it to other
households to supplément depletions. As soon as expensive agricultural
inputs and equipment are used in agriculture, the men will be engaged in
it and take thé income from it. Commercial maize farmers, who are
mainly to be found in thé rieh category, and also cotton farmers are good
examples. It seldom happens that thé fruits of this production fall to
women. When women acquire income from agricultural activities, it is
either by selling green maize or by selling vegetables. Green maize is sold
by women directly from the field and yields a high return (6 times dry
maize). Prudence frequently imposes constraints on this érosion of family
food stocks and otherwise thé head will forbid this practice, as he is
responsible for paying eventual shortfalls. With regard to vegetable
production, thé woman is entitled to thé income it might raise. Women
development projects hâve latched onto this practice, by establishing
Community gardens where women cultivate vegetables together and share
inputs and irrigation (see Chapter 8 for a further description). But often a
lack of marketing channels in thé rural areas prevents a high income
being raised from selling agricultural products.
'Informai activities', 'rural-industry', or 'self-employment' are a main
source of income for women. Ginindza (1989:31) states that "tornbetween
domestic responsibilities, différent phases of agricultural activities primar-
ily for subsistence and thé need for cash income, rural women carry out
income-generating activities which are flexible and fit into their work
activities." The female activities under this heading are very diverse:
brewing beer, making mats, making baskets, preparing food, making
knitwear, making clothes, making grass curtains and necklaces for thé
tourist industry, and so on. Some of them buy hawker licenses and go to
South Africa to buy suitcases with lotions, soaps, and so on. Thèse
products are sold at home at high margins and provide women with
considérable income. Domestic and agricultural responsibilities, however,
force most of thé women to stay at home and increase their income in
other ways. As women's initial resource are low and women are excluded
from receiving bank crédits, women look for activities for which low
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Investments and cheap inputs are required. What can be observed, then, is
that women are often engagea in income-generating activities where thé
inputs can be obtained from the natural environment. Being a member of
a homestead and consequently of a chiefdom, entitles women to ail
natural resources found on thé communal lands, although she is not
entitled to the land itself. Wood, water, grass and other resources are
'free of charge' and are excellent inputs for nature-based products such as
mats, baskets, necklaces, beer, and so on. It should be noted that environ-
mental dégradation of thé communal lands endangers sufficient availabil-
ity of these resources and consequently women's income-generating
activities (see Agarwal 1991).
Women are entitled to keep the revenues obtained by their own
industry. Ginindza (1989) found that thé cash earned gives thé women
control and power over their lives. They décide on what and how to spend
thé money and thereby assert their independence and self-dignity. The
women interviewed by Ginindza all stated that the husband had no say or
control over their money and that thé women refused to give any money
to thé husband when asked. Several studies (Ginindza 1989, Social
Science Research Unit 1990, UNICEF 1979) found that a large part of
thèse women's revenues will be spent on children (clothes, school fées,
food and groceries) and thé elderly. Women need cash to cover indispens-
able needs ("soap and sait", as they put it), to pay school fées, to cover
fares and health costs, clothing for their children, and so on. As thé daily
care within thé homestead remains thé responsibility of women and large
parts of this care cannot be provided without having money, women are
forced into thé activities as described and forced to spend their money on
thé homestead's daily welfare. Many women claimed that their income
suppléments thé meagre allowance they receive from their husbands, or
that they cannot ask their husbands for money for every need that arises.
For some widows and unmarried mothers, thèse types of income-generat-
ing activity are their sole source of income. If thèse activities fall away, for
example because of environmental dégradation, part of the général
homestead's welfare will also be endangered and thereby the care for
children and thé elderly (Agarwal 1991).
Mâle participation in rural industry is much more limited, as is the
range of activities. Brick-making, herbal doctors, shopkeeping, house
building and mechanical repairs are activities done by men. For men,
however, wage labour is a much more attractive alternative than other
low-paid, income-generating activities.
iJ
Hill
I
It is the income from wage-labour which causes the main différence
between male and female income. Women, too, are engaged in wage-
labour activities (see also Armstrong and Nhlapo 1985), although oppor-
tunities for women to do wage-labour are limited. Low educational levels
and the gender division of labour prevent women from doing labour
outside the homestead. Women who are engaged in wage-labour have
either a high éducation level or are unmarried with children (Social
Science Research Unit 1990:122). As soon as they are married, their
wage-labour activities are not allowed by Swazi custom, and they are
forced to stay on the homestead. Several motives for men to do wage-
labour are mentioned in the literature. We saw with Freiburg-Strauss and
Jung (1988:230) that the extent to which a homestead will have means
available for social security purposes dépends on the continuing of its
income-generating activities over tune. This, in turn, requires that the
younger générations on the homestead ultimately have access to resour-
ces, which is realized by the prevailing system of property rights and
succession, and the options to engage in economie activities. Although
every young male adult in Swaziland has the customary right to a parcel
of Swazi Nation Land, and the eldest sons of a family will inherit most of
the parent's wealth, this is insufficient nowadays to start one's own
enterprise and homestead. Land is becoming scarce and the parents'
wealth should not be overestimated in rural areas where poverty is the
rule. It is, therefore, necessary for the younger sons to raise funds them-
selves in order to establish their own homestead. Labour migration is one
of the options left for young man to accumulate funds. This motive for
labour migration will quite often prevail among migrants from 'poor'
homesteads (see also Rosen-Prinz and Rosen 1978). Generally, these
homesteads are characterized by the receipt of few or no remittances.
Young men want to accumulate funds and keep these funds for them-
selves. They are not so much concerned with thé économie position of the
parents' homestead, but more with thé establishment and économie
position of their own future homestead. In this way, their labour migration
does not contribute much to an increase in thé économie position of the
parents' homestead (see also Leliveld 1994).
The young homestead head's reasons for labour migration after he
has established his own homestead might be various. One reason might be
that he does not have access yet to sufficient land and other agricultural
resources to start a profitable farm. Additional income is necessary to buy
food and to fulfil other cash needs. In this case, labour migration is for
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the purpose of supplementing low agricultural income. In addition, it is
now the young man's own homestead hè is migrating for; he is the head
and, as such, responsible for the economie welfare of the homestead
members. It is not surprising to find, then, that the amount of remittance
is considérable and forms a large part of the homestead's disposable
income. This argument often holds true for homesteads in the poor and
lower-middle catégories. Labour migration might also be a choice when
labour migration turns out to be more profitable than agricultural or
other income-generating activities. In the latter case, it is rather the taking
advantage of different economie opportunities which are open to male
and female homestead members than reasons of sneer necessity that
détermine labour migration. This is often an important considération for
homesteads in the upper-middle and rieh catégories.
It can be concluded from the arguments above that différences in income
between men and women can be attributed to being engaged in different
economie activities, which, in turn, is largely determined by rules and
customs with regard to resource control. The above pattern is reflected in
the extent and type of social security resource provision within the
homestead. Because of social practices, women have few ownership
entitlements apart from their own labour power and access to natural
resources. As they are not allowed, as married women, to leave the
homestead, their productive activities aimed at raising an income are
restricted to the homestead. In général, they are entitled to keep the rev-
enues of these activities, but the revenues are often very low. Therefore,
women have few exchange entitlements, whether in terms of their produce
or in terms of money they receive for produce. The rôle of women in the
homestead, then, in providing social security is an extension of her genera!
daily task of taking care of the homestead member's welfare. They do this
by performing all the domestic activities and spending part of their
income on the daily needs of the homestead. In contrast, men's contribu-
tion is often lunited to giving or sending money in cases of great need.
Given their better opportunities for raising an income, this rôle can be
expected. It should be noted, however, that men often deny this support-
ive rôle, still considering it a woman's task to take care of the sick, the
elderly and the children. Notwithstanding their limited income-generating
capacities, then, women are forced to use the little income she has for
social security purposes. Moreover, having less control over resources and
income, women have a weaker bargaining position within the homestead
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than the male homestead members. So it will be more difficult for female
homestead members in need to receive support from male homestead
members than vice versa (see for an elaborate case study on this issue,
Agarwal 1991). It should be clear that thé above practices are regulär
sources of conflict between homestead members and may threaten thé
stability of thé homestead as solidarity group.
6.4. The size of the homestead
Not only thé économie position but also the size and composition of a
social group are important for assessing thé homestead's ability to func-
tion as solidarity group. These factors give an indication of how many
people and which people will have to provide social security resources to
members in need. With respect to size, it was argued that a minimum size
cannot be fixed, but generally the group should at least exceed that of a
nuclear family. What is the size of the rural homestead? The average size
of thé homestead has been well documented throughout the years by both
social scientists in sample surveys and National Population Censuses.
Table 6.10 présents some figures.
As can be concluded from Table 6.10, the average size of the rural
homestead seems to be around 10 persons, with a slightly lower figure
found by Allen (1973:47) and a somewhat higher figure calculated from
Marwick (1966:30). Thèse différences might hâve to do with thé choice of
communities included in thé survey. Also in our survey différences were
found between communities: the average homestead size in Ezokoteni is
12.3 persons, in Ngwempisi 9.7, and in Elulakeni 9.2.
The figures from thé three population censuses and from Russell,
however, show a remarkable déviation from thé figures found in thé other
surveys. For thé population censuses, this can be explained by thé inclu-
sion of the homesteads situated on semi-urban Swazi Nation Land. The
lower size figures found for thèse homesteads will have reduced the
average size. For the Russell figures, the reason lies in her completely
différent définition of who belongs to thé rural homestead and who does
not. In several publications, Russell (1989, 1993) analyzes the use of
définitions of homestead size and argues that many scholars miscalculate
thé size by assuming thé homestead to be an équivalent of a household.
The size is calculated, then, by counting people either eating from thé
same pot, or sharing thé same roof, or pooling their economie resources.
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Table 6.10. Average homestead size in numbers of persons by survey
Survey
Marwick
Kuper
Allen
De Vletter
Low
Neocosmos
Russell
Own Survey
Census 1966
Census 1976
Census 1986
Year
1940
1947
1973
1978
1982
1983
1989
1990
1966
1976
1986
Sample Size**
n.a.
52
44
1,150
376
204
70
195
Nationwide
Nationwide
Nationwide
Mean Homestead
Size
12.0"'
10.7
7.8
10.0
10.4~>
10.0
26.0
10.3
6.9
5.9
6.9
*) In number of homesteads
**) Calculated from Marwick (1966:30): Marwick registrated 33,850 native buts with a
population of 149,680people, which gives an average of four persons a hut. Marwick
(1966:9) also reports that thé homestead consists of three or four buts.
***) Calculated from Low (1986:82),Table 7.17,
Even the Swazi censuses have taken over this type of définition. To
Russell (1993:762), "what homestead members hâve in common is not
their roof and their cooking pot, but their descent from a mâle head
which entitles them to space and identity within thé kingdom and within
thé chiefdom". This means that homestead members neither hâve to be
résident to be a homestead member, nor have to share resources, roofs,
pots or other things. For Russell, like thé older ethnographers, a home-
stead is primarily a lineage group. Consequently, for her calculations
Russell (1989:11) takes thé résidents per unit plus absent offspring of all
résidents plus their partners and children. In this way, a head's son living
in town with his wife and children should be incorporated into thé rural
homestead's size, because it is this homestead which gives thé son a
legitimate status in Swazi society. It is only for economie reasons (son
l
working in town) that thé homestead has broken up into two residential
units.
The homestead définition we used in our survey did not adopt
Russell's définition, although one might argue that, within the context of
social security, this could be useful. We took the members resident at the
rural homestead site plus thé absentée members who did not have a
'second' site elsewhere in or outside Swaziland. Mostly we are talking,
then, about husbands from résident wives or daughters and sons not
engaged or married and working elsewhere. Why did we do this? In our
study, we did indeed consider two separate sites as two separate home-
steads. We agrée with Russell that, essentially, one of the sites is a sub-
unit of thé other, and essentially they are one homestead. But we also
think that thèse separate units have their own internai économie circuits.
A homestead member living in town with his family or at another place in
thé rural areas cannot share all resources with the remaining rural family:
to some extent each unit has to run its own affairs. One might say that, in
such a case, thé homestead's économie affairs are split up into two
circuits, organised 'households' alike. We think that in such cases two
circuits of social security resources can also be distinguished. These
circuits partly overlap as a resuit of transfers going between thé sub-units
and this is, of course, also what interests us. In this study, we restrict
ourselves to thé rural sub-unit of thé homestead, and analyze thé social
security situation from this point of view: the extent to which this sub-unit
can operate as a solidarity group and thé extent to which it receives from,
or gives resources to, the other sub-unit(s). For the sake of convenience,
we refer to thé rural sub-unit as thé rural homestead or just thé home-
stead.
Equally interesting is the variance behind the averages. Table 6.11 gives
an indication of this variance in our own sample. It can be concluded
from Table 6.11 that thé majority of homesteads hâve a size of between 1
and 15 persons. Almost 75 per cent of the homesteads have a size of
between 6 and 15 persons. The lowest size found in the survey was l, a
lonely woman living on her own, while the largest homestead had 37
members. These size figures are similar to those found in other survey s.
The figures show that large homesteads are a minority on Swazi Nation
Land. The ethnographie homestead model at least suggests that this was
different in the past. When homesteads really consisted of many house-
holds and three or more générations, one would expect homesteads of at
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Table 6.11. Sizes of homesteads in percentage of total sample
Size
1 -5
6-10
11 - 15
16-20
21 -25
26- >
Total
Percentage of
Homesteads
12.3
48.2
26.7
7.2
4.1
1.5
100.0
Cumulative
Percentage
12.3
60.5
87.2
94.4
98.5
100.0
100.0
Source: Survey 1990
least 10 persons or more. This could be a further indication that thé
ethnographers described the norm rather than the rule, even when their
own figures (see thé Marwick and Kuper figures in Table 6.10) already
suggested otherwise.
There is discussion among social scientists in Swaziland as to whether or
not a dynamic process is going on whereby large multi-household (tindlu)
homesteads and homesteads of three (or more) générations are gradually
disappearing and are being replaced by one-household and two-generation
homesteads. The development in society from extended families towards
nuclear families is seen as closely related to thé development from a
traditional subsistence society towards a modem cash economy (Murray
1981, United Nations 1986). A breakdown of the extended family (for
example, the classic homestead model) as a resuit of modernization,
urbanization and industrialization would mean almost automatically a
(replacement and) development towards nuclear families (United Nations
1986:13). Is there any reason to assume such a dynamics on Swazi Nation
Land and, if so, which forces underlie such a process?
Analytically, a development from multi-household homesteads to
one-household homesteads can be distinguished from a process whereby
homesteads of three or more générations are replaced by two-generation
homesteads. Although not unrelated to each other, thèse processes are
analyzed separately. In thé Swazi context, the first process would mean
that many homesteads consist of only one indlu, in thé literature often
referred to as a household. Maiti-indlu homesteads exist in thé case of
polygyny, each wife having her own indlu, and in thé case of married sons
staying on thé father's homestead. In our survey, 14.4 per cent of the
homesteads had more than one indlu. The ethnographie studies suggest
that polygyny was the ideal in Swazi society (Marwick 1966:38, Kuper
1947:37) and that married adult brothers used to stay in the homestead of
their father. But Kuper (1947:16) also observed that multi-household
homesteads were more common among aristocrats than on commoner
homesteads. Apparently, even if multi-household homesteads have ever
been a structural feature of Swazi society (which cannot be verified), this
feature must have existed long before Marwick and Kuper made their
observations. For this reason, then, the breaking up of multi-household
Swazi homesteads into one-household units cannot be entirely attributed
to more recent processes of transformation like industrialisation and
urbanisation. This is not to say that the breaking-up in the past was not
due to changes in the social and economie order. Kuper (quoted in Allen
1973:311) reported that the size of the homestead was decreasing from
the old ideal because of "less need for défense, greater independence of
married couples (particularly Christians), and limitations of land". Allen
(1973:311-12) attributes the process to a décline of polygyny, as a result of
the introduction of Christianity, and to earlier breakup of the homestead,
as a result of brothers or married sons beginning to leave the homestead
earlier than the classic model assumes (Allen 1973:237). The latter
process can be attributed to the migrant labour System (which already
existed at the end of the last century and has been growing ever since)
which gives young men early opporrunities to raise an income and estab-
lish their own homesteads (Low 1986:80). Moreover, since the 1960s,
increasing industrialization, accompanied by urbanization, will have
strengthened the pace of the dividing up process.
In line with Russell's arguments, one could argue that a division of
homesteads only divides the homestead in terms of location and the
different parts still form one homestead. However, as we argued above,
from a social security point of view, the splitting up is important because
it may well lead to separate circuits of resources. Obviously, the smaller
size of the two (semi-) independent circuits affects the potential rôle of
the homestead as solidarity group in a negative way. In sum, therefore, it
is an important observation that social and economie processes which
152 153
have been going on since the end of the last Century have led to a situ-
ation on Swazi Nation Land in which mulü-indlu homesteads are the
exception rather than the rule.
The second process, from homesteads of three or more générations
towards two-generation homesteads, is far more diffîcult to observe on
Swazi Nation Land and it should be questioned whether this process
really takes place or not. Let us start by presenting some figures in Table
6.12. As can be seen from this table, over 40 per cent of the homesteads
Table 6.12. Homestead size and number of générations
Count
Row %
Size
1-5
6-10
11 - 15
16-20
21-25
26- >
All homesteads
Générations on Homestead
1
4
16.7
4
2.1
2
18
75.0
48
51.1
10
19.2
2
14.3
78
40.0
3
38
40.4
36
69.2
9
64.3
3
37.5
2
66.7
88
45.1
4
2
2.1
3
5.8
3
21.4
5
62.5
1
33.3
14
7.2
Other *>
2
8.3
6
6.4
3
5.7
11
5.6
*) With 'Other' are indicated combinations whereby one génération in between is
missing: first and third génération, and first, third and fourth génération
Source: Survey 1990
contain one or two générations, while nearly 60 per cent contain three
générations or even more. As can be expected, the two-generation
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homesteads have relatively small sizes. Would these findings suggest a so-
called 'nuclearization' (see Tieleman and Leliveld 1989) of homesteads?
In the first place, a two-generation homestead does not necessarily mean
that the homestead is a nuclear family, that is, husband and wife and their
children. Other research in Swaziland (Allen 1973, Russell 1989) and el-
sewhere in the région (for example, Murray 1981) has shown that home-
steads might consist of two générations, but that these homesteads are not
occupied by husband, wife and children only. Many other people consti-
tute the homestead, varying from close relatives to people who have no
apparent kin relationship to the others at all. Close relatives may belong
to the same génération as the parents or their children. Moreover, the
présence or absence of such members has a high turnover rate and might
change from month to month and year to year. According to Russell
(1993:771), these fluctuations can, amongst other things, be ascribed to
the pressure to stabilize the homestead labour pool in the face of chang-
ing homestead membership through birth, death and migration. The
survey data show that only 29 homesteads (14.9 per cent) from our sample
can be denoted as a real nuclear family, consisting of husband and wife,
and their (unmarried) children. The mean size of these homesteads is 6.0
persons and did not exceed 10 members. And even in these cases, one can
question whether 'benig nuclear' is a structural feature of these home-
steads.
Murray (1981:102-4) makes the following remarks with respect to
nuclear families found in developing countries, remarks which can be
applied to our sample as well. First, the nuclear family can be understood
as just a stage in the homestead development cycle. The nuclear home-
steads we found were relatively 'young' homesteads, all having children
below 15 years of age. These homesteads arise from older homesteads
splitting up (see previous remarks on homesteads splitting up), but may
themselves soon develop into homesteads of three or more générations
and/or homesteads with a continually changing composition of members.
Secondly, the nuclear homestead might appear isolated from its wider
environment because of its location on a separate site. However, Murray
(1981:104) states that family gatherings take place for all sorts of reasons,
which has also been verified by our own observations in Swaziland. The
conclusion that separate sites of nuclear homesteads indicate, at the same
time, complete social and economie independence, as is the case in
industrialised countries, does not hold. We refer to the above argument of
overlapping economie circuits.
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Notwithstanding these remarks, it can already be concluded, without
even having discussed other aspects of solidarity groups, that, given their
size (and composition), these homesteads are relatively vulnérable solidar-
ity groups. The capacity of these homesteads to operate as solidarity
group is further diminished by the husband often being a migrant
labourer. It has already been argued that labour migration offers young
men the opportunity to establish their own homestead, but at the same
time this leads to vulnérable solidarity groups. Out of 29 nuclear home-
steads in the sample, 17 (58.6 per cent) had a migrant labourer, who
worked in South African mines and returned home for just a few weeks a
year. This means that there is only one adult to take care of all the other
members. Although migrants send money home, their unpaid labour
efforts cannot be used when the wife cannot work because of contin-
gencies. This might seriously threaten the continuation of the young
homestead. Murray (1981) has shown for Lesotho that these homesteads
can hardly cope with social and economie contingencies and will frequent-
ly break down. The wife and her children will often have to return to her
parents' homestead or to her husband's parents' homestead.
6.5. The composition of homesteads
While the size of the homesteads sets an absolute limit to the number of
persons which can carry the bürden for others in times of need, the com-
position of the homestead sets a limit within a given size. As reminder,
the composition of a solidarity group should be heterogeneous, to avoid
the occurrence of collective risks. In général, in non-industrialised
societies, this can be realized by groups consisting of both sexes and
having different age groups or générations (Partsch 1983:100). Moreover,
the way in which income-generating activities are spread - both over a
range of activities and over members of the homestead - is also related to
its composition.
To start with the âge composition of homesteads, Table 6.13gives an
insight into the âge composition of homesteads according to size. Three
age groups were distinguished: 0-15 years, 16-55 years, and those older
than 55. Although somewhat arbitrary, this triple classification is chosen
because it also reflects different générations. In addition, it can be
expected that people below 16 years are largely dependent on their
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Table 6.13. Homestead size and âge composition
Count
Row %
Size
1 -5
6-10
11 - 15
16-20
21 -25
26- >
Total
Age composition homesteads
All age
groups
2
8.3
34
36.6
32
61.5
12
85.7
8
100.0
3
100.0
91
46.9
0- 15
missing
6
25.0
2
2.2
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
8
4.1
16-55
missing
2
8.4
1
1.1
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
3
1.5
56- >
missing
14
58.3
56
60.2
20
38.5
2
14.3
0
0.0
0
0.0
92
47.5
Total
24
100.0
93
100.0
52
100.0
14
100.0
8
100.0
3
100.0
194
100.0
Source: Survey 1990
parents, while people above 55 years will become increasingly dependent
on others for their livelihood. Table 6.13 shows that all homesteads have
two or three age groups. From the 'all âges groups' column we see that,
not surprisingly, the incidence of having all age groups present rises with
the size of the homestead. The smaller homesteads (1-5 and 6-10 mem-
bers) have a higher incidence of having no 'old aged' on their homestead.
These homesteads are relatively young homesteads, which either have just
established themselves separately from their parents' homestead, or
consist of young families continuing the parental homestead after their
parents' decease. Given the homestead development cycle, it is very likely
that these homesteads will grow into 'three-age-group' homesteads. The
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three homesteads without the age group 16-55 are more vulnérable from
a social security point of view. The lack of people who are in their most
productive period of life will give rise to sévère problems of who is to
provide the care. Apparently, however, these homesteads are rather
exceptional. The homesteads without the 0-15 age group can be headed
under 'young' homesteads just starting to procreate offspring. Generally,
therefore, it can be stated that the âge distribution within homesteads is
fairly well spread, which is particularly important for the social security
rôle of the homestead in the case of old age (see Chapter 9).
The âge composition gives a général indication of the présence of produc-
tive and unproductive members in the homestead. It reveals little about
the 'bürden' that falls on each productive family member to take care of
the unproductive family members. By calculating dependency ratios, a
more précise picture can be obtained. The dependency ratio is calculated
as the ratio between inactive and active people. Table 6.14 présents some
calculations.
Ratio l gives the ratio between all inactive homestead members and
all active homestead members. In determining who is active and who is
not, we had to use proxies. Male and female members between 16 and 55
years old are considered active members, children below 16 and adults
older than 55 are considered inactive. We realize that this is a simplifica-
tion of reality, because both children and elderly perform labour tasks in
some way or another in the homestead, and because the 16-55 years age
group may contain disabled persons. Nevertheless, it is also true that the
defined 'active' group is most likely to produce a 'surplus', as mentioned
in Chapter 4. For the 195 homesteads, the average value of Ratio l was
1.4, with a range from O to 7. On average, one active homestead member
has to provide for at least one other homestead member. In the size
group 6 to 10, Ratio l is even 1.6, because in this size group there are a
relatively large number of young homesteads with many young children. In
the size category 26 and more, one generally finds multi-household and
three génération homesteads, which means many young children and
elderly to take care of.
With Ratios 2 and 3, a distinction is made between homesteads with
absentée wage workers (Ratio 3) and homesteads without them (Ratio 2).
Why do we make this distinction? Usually it is assumed that migrants
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Table 6.14. Dependency ratios, percentage of homesteads without active
male résidents, percentage of female-headed homesteads, all figures
according to homestead size
Size
1 -5
6-10
11 - 15
16-20
21 -25
26- >
Dependency Ratios *'
Ratio 1
1.1
1.6
1.3
1.4
1.2
1.9
Ratio 2
1.2
1.8
2.2
1.6
n.a.
n.a.
Ratio 3
1.6
2.7
1.9
2.1
1.4
n.a.
no
female
rési-
dents **'
7.7
9.8
6.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
no
male
active
rési-
dents M)
76.9
43.5
26.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
%
female-
heäded
home-
steads ")
69.2
37.1
20.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
*) Ratio l = inactive homestead members/active homestead members; all homesteads
mcluded (195)
Ratio 2 = inactive homestead members/active homestead members; only home-
steads without absentée wage labourers included (58)
Ratio 3 = inactive homestead members/active resident homestead members; only
homesteads with absentée wage labourers included (142)
**) As percentage of homesteads with absentée wage labourers
Source: Survey 1990
send home remittances and in this way contribute to the welfare of those
left behind. To some extent this is true, but when we consider all activities
of daily care of inactive members, the exclusion of migrant workers would
seem to be indicated. Daily care of non-active members consists mostly of
such activities as the following: providing them with food and preparing
their meals, providing their water and fuel needs, cleaning their house,
doing their washing and repairing their clothes, going shopping for them,
and so on. So, daily care mainly consists of labour activities that can only
be done by resident homesteads members. Sending remittances provides
financial means, but this does not alter the fact that unpaid resident
labour power is reduced. Means have to be converted into the daily care
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as described. This work will fall upon the resident active members, more
precisely thé female active résidents, because domestic activities are their
responsibility. The effect of absent members on thé dependency ratio is
most feit in the smaller homesteads, as can be seen in the above table.
One can also mention a somewhat paradoxical effect for homesteads in
the 'poor' class category. For homesteads in this category, labour migra-
tion is for precisely social security reasons, to secure the subsistence base
of the homestead. At the same time, labour migration bas a large impact
on thé ability of thèse homesteads to fonction as solidarity group.
Another effect of labour migration is that thé absence of male
résident homestead members hnplies that their 'traditional' tasks have to
be taken over by women. In thé size group 1 to 5, and considering home-
steads with absentées, more than 75 per cent hâve no active male resi-
dent. In thé sizegroup 6 to 10, this is almost 50 per cent. This means that
tasks like ploughing thé fields, herding thé cattle, construction and
repairing, harvesting, and representing thé homestead in meetings fall
upon thé women - in addition to their already heavy work load. The time
available for taking care of the non-active members - who, in thé home-
steads discussed, are mostly children - will be less, and this may hâve
négative conséquences for their welfare.
The above observations are closely related to thé discussion of the
so called 'female-headed households'. Table 6.14 indicates that a substan-
tial proportion of homesteads with migrants are female-headed. Although
thé female heads will be only temporary heads, being thé mâle head's
'deputy' in his absence, this still influences thé homesteads from a solidar-
ity point of view. Swazi women are allowed to perform male activities in
cases as described above ("necessity has no law"), but they hâve gréât
disadvantages when trying to obtain thé means to perform these activities.
Appeals to receive more land from the chief, to get a tractor or oxen in
time for ploughing, to receive help in construction activities or with légal
disputes or in hiring labour all risk being less listened to and honoured
when requested by a woman. Thus, while doing mâle activities on top of
their female work, women are also hampered in thèse activities because
of lack of support and coopération.
The last observation to be made regarding Table 6.14 is the prés-
ence of homesteads with female migrant labour and no active female
résidents left. Although thé figures include just a few homesteads, we have
to mention thèse cases, as they will have strong repercussions on thé
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welfare of inactive homesteads' members. The daily care activities hâve to
be donc either by thé mâle résidents or by thé inactive members them-
selves, mostly elderly taking care of the children. With females becoming
increasingly involved in wage labour in Swaziland (see Chapter 5), this
situation can be expected to occur more and more often in rural home-
steads.
The arguments with respect to homesteads with migrant labour
mainly apply to relatively 'young' homesteads with young children who
need intensive daily care and supervision. The relatively 'older' home-
steads hâve more active members left behind who will be better able to
cope with thé extra work load, as it can be spread over several persons.
Moreover, some of the inactive members are elderly people, who, com-
pared to children, will be better able to take care of themselves and will
need less daily care and supervision.
While a diversified composition of a solidarity group with regard to age
and sex means a broader spreadmg of the occurrence of mainly health-
related contingencies, the extent of diversifying (income-generating)
activities is important in order to reduce the conséquences of economie
and natural uncertainties. In Swazi rural society, the gender division of
labour lies at the heart of activity diversification. Traditionally, it is
women's work to do the domestic tasks and to feed the family by doing
agricultural labour. In bygone days, men used to spend their time hunting,
paying tribute labour and engaging in warfare through service in age
régiments. Men would and will also herd cattle, clear the fields before
cultivation, and build huts and cattle kraals (Kuper 1947:139, Marwick
1966:60). De Vletter's survey (De Vletter 1983: Table 1) and also our
survey have shown that nowadays there are hardly any tasks that women
do not do. This does not mean that there is no sexual division of labour.
Some labour is more strictly regarded as men's or women's work. As
Dütting (1986:42) concludes, "the genera! tendency is for women to take
over men's job in the homestead due to the spread of wage economy and
hardly any women's tasks are taken over or involve men."
During the twentieth Century, cash has become more and more
important in Swazi society. The importance of subsistence activities has
decreased, including the rôle of subsistence agriculture. For the survival of
the homesteads cash is important and, therefore, also the extent to which
the homesteads can raise cash through income-generating activities. In
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Section 6.3, we have already discussed this in detail. In this section, we
concentrate on the spread of these activities among homestead members.
The gender division of labour has both changed and survived during
'modern' tunes. The greatest changes are that men have shifted their
activities from the subsistence sector to the commoditized sector (i.e.,men
do wage-labour), forcing women to be engaged also in the subsistence
activities which were previously male tasks. The gender division of labour
has survived in the sense that women are still responsible for homestead-
bound activities, which gives women limited opportunities to be engaged
in income-generating activities. Dütting (1986:57-8) even concludes that
the growing importance of the cash economy and wage labour and the
accompanying decreasing importance of the subsistence activities have
made women's work become inferior and private. They have also made
women's work increasingly reproductive, in contrast with the productive
work of their husbands. Table 6.15, with figures from our sample, shows
indeed the limited importance of women's work in raising cash income.
Table 6.15. Share of female and male's cash income in total homestead
cash income (in percentage of homesteads and by share category)
Percentage groups
0
> 0 - 2 0
21 -40
41 -60
61 -80
81 - 100
Total of homesteads
Female
14.2
36.9
16.3
11.0
5.8
15.8
100.0
Male
12.1
3.7
6.3
11.9
16.3
49.5
100.0
Source: Survey 1990
In more than 50 per cent of the homesteads, women contribute 20 per
cent or less to thé homestead's cash income. In almost 50 per cent of the
homesteads men raise 80 to 100 per cent of the homestead's cash income.
The gender division of labour not only keeps women away from
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income-generating activities, it also détermines thé type of income-gener-
ating activities women are engaged in.5 Women generally being home-
stead bound will seldom be able to carry out wage labour and will have to
carry out income-generating activities which can be combined more easily
with their other domestic responsibilities. Table 6.16 shows thé pattern of
Table 6.16. Frequency and percentage (of total sample) of homesteads
with income-earning men and women in agriculture, wage-labour and
other income-generating activities (o.i.g.a.)
Type of activities
Agriculture
O.I.G.A.
Wage Labour
Homesteads with in-
come-earning men
Frequency
59
56
130
Percen-
tage
30.4
28.9
66.8
Homesteads with
income-earning women
Frequency
71
127
59
Percentage
36.6
65.5
30.4
Source: Survey 1990
income-generating activities of male and female homestead members.
This table shows that the majority of the female homestead members
earning income are engaged in income-generating activities outside
agriculture or wage labour. Male members are predominantly involved in
wage labour activities, while their participation in other income-generating
activities is much more limited. In the case of agricultural activities, thé
picture is less clear. Both men and women hâve income from agricultural
activities. As has already been shown, female agricultural income is mostly
derived from growing and selling vegetables and sometimes maize, while
mâle agricultural income is raised by commercial maize or cotton grow-
ing. In some cases, women also receive income from maize or cotton
growing, but in our survey this was only when their husbands were
5
 Of course it is acknowledged that also other factors détermine women's access to
income generating activities like thé distribution of resources m society, the présence of
transport and markets, and so See also Section 6 3
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absentée. In these cases, the women always declared that they were
receiving the money in the name of their husband and also spent it in nis
name. Frequently, however, they spent the money the way they thought
best.
Income-generating activities are not only spread over individual persons,
but large différences can be found also in the type and number of activ-
ities the various homesteads are involved in. In Section 6.3, on economie
differentiation among homesteads, we have already concluded that rural
relations of production have a large impact on the resource mixes avail-
able to homesteads and thereby on their possible combinations of income-
generating activities. In this respect, the opportunities of the 'poor' and
'lower-middle' catégories were considered relatively limited, compared to
the 'upper-middle' and 'rieh' catégories. Although we think that 'class
position' is the most important factor in determining the number and
range of income-generating activities that can be carried out, we also
think that the availability of a homestead labour force contributes to the
explanation. Table 6.17 gives an insight into this issue. What can be con-
cluded from Table 6.17 is that few homesteads depend on only one source
of produce or income. Out of a sample of 180 homesteads, 17 homesteads
(9.4 per cent) either depend on agriculture, or on wage labour or on other
income-generating activities. Most of these are small-sized homesteads.
The percentage of homesteads with a combination of three sources rises
with thé size of thé homestead. Having more active people available must
be seen as a main explanation for this, and also having more people avail-
able of both sexes - as we saw that income-generating activities are to a
large extent gender-specific.
In Chapter 4, we argued that family units which dérive their income
and produce from différent sources and thereby, because of the gender
division of labour, from both sexes are likely to be better able to cope
with contingencies of one or more of its members than those which
dépend on one income source from one sex. Tables 6.6 and 6.17 hâve
shown that in rural Swaziland thé latter family units are a minority.
However, it is noted that, when cash income is considered, thé collapse of
mâle income-generating activities will have more impact than a sudden
interruption of women's income-generating activities, because men
provide thé largest share of cash income. What is also an obvious con-
clusion in this respect is the relatively higher vulnerability of 'poor'
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Table 6.17. Produce and income sources of homesteads; homesteads clas-
sified by size group; figures presented in percentage of number of home-
steads in each size group (first row) and in percentage of total homestead
sample (180) (second row)
Size
1 -5
6-10
11 - 15
16-20
21 -25
26- >
Total col-
umn %
Sources of Produce and Income 4)
only
agr.
8.7
1.1
6.0
2.8
2.0
0.6
4.5
only
wl.
4.4
0.6
3.6
1.7
2.3
only
oiga.
8.7
1.1
2.4
1.1
2.0
0.6
2.8
agr. +
wl.
21.7
2.7
20.5
9.4
16.0
4.4
12.5
0.6
17.1
agr.
+
oiga
30.4
3.9
20.5
9.4
8.0
2.2
15.4
1.1
12.5
0.6
17.2
agr. +
wl. +
oiga.
26.1
3.3
47.0
21.7
72.0
20.0
84.6
6.1
75.0
3.3
100.0
1.7
56.1
Total
Row
%
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
*) meaning of abbreviations:
agr. = agriculture (both subsistence and commercial)
w.l. = wage labour
o.i.g.a.= other income-generating activities outside agriculture and wage labour
Source: Survey 1990
homesteads compared with 'rieh' homesteads, and of small homesteads
compared with large homesteads. When their composition in its several
aspects is considered, it would seem that, at least theoretically, larger and
'richer' homesteads will be better able to operate as solidarity groups.
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6.6. The durability of the homestead
Durability is the fourth aspect of a solidarity group that needs to be con-
sidered. Both 'durability' and 'normative insurance' (see next section) are
variables that are difficult to quantify. Therefore, for the analysis in this
section and in Section 6.7 we use qualitative data collected in our in-
depth study as well as data published in thé literature on Swaziland.
A solidarity group can survive when thé relationships between its
members is sustained. As we hâve already seen that thé homestead is
primarily a lineage group, two important relationships between members
must be considered in this section: kinship relations and bonds of mar-
riage. With regard to archaic societies, Partsch (1983:100-1) remarks that
groups are most likely to fonction as solidarity groups when thé relation-
ships between its members are based on kinship rather than on neigh-
bourhood, friendship or agreement (contract). Kinship structures hâve a
certain stability over tune, and exist relatively independently of the will of
the kinship members. Kinship créâtes groups and ensures to some extent
long-lasting relationships between group members. The way in which
homestead members are related to one another bas been quite well
uivestigated.6 According to thé ethnographie homestead model, the
homestead contains a core of agnatically related kin with their wives and
other related kin (Kuper 1963:18).7 This would suggest that only agnati-
cally kin-related people live on thé homestead. Elsewhere, however,
Kuper (1947:37) argues that, for économie and/or ritual benefits, addi-
tional kinsmen or even unrelated dépendants attach themselves to thé
immédiate family. Thèse unrelated dépendants are not further specified
by Kuper, but Allen (1973:53) suggests a broad interprétation, which
means that not only agnatic but also non-agnatic kin and even non-kin
sometimes form part of the homestead.
Hughes (1972:80-4), using material from 1960 published in Holleman
(1964), bas found that 32.0 per cent (out of 60 homesteads) had what he
called complex family groupings, that is, groupings in which also non-
(agnatic) kin could be found. On thé other hand, he also found 42.1 per
6
 I restrict myself to kin relations within the homestead; the Swazi kinship structure
and its rôle in providing social security are explained in Chapter 7.
7
 Agnatic (noun agnates) is kinship through the male line only; sometimes termed
patrilateral or patnlmear.
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cent of the homesteads containing agnatic km only. Hughes (1972:80)
concludes that "Kuper's catalogue of thé other types of kin of the Home-
stead Head that one might expect to find in a Homestead Group covers
many of thé situations actually encountered; and certainly agrées with the
statements of more conservative Swazi regarding what they feel thé
composition of thé Homestead Group should (underlining Hughes) be.
But it would be quite wrong to imagine that nowadays it is common to
find Homestead Groups where distant kin outnumber members of the
Homestead Head's own immédiate family." Allen (1973:53), who in turn
bases herself on thé typology used by Hughes and Holleman, cornes to thé
same conclusion in her fïeldwork.
The most recent and probably the most detailed study on kin
relations within the homestead was done by Russell (1989). As regards the
incidence of relationships of resident members to the homestead head in
70 rural homesteads, the dominating pattern was one of a homestead
comprised overwhelmingly of the direct descendants of the head and/or
his partner(s). Only 15 per cent of the résidents were not the direct des-
cendants of the head and partner(s). Only 0.5 per cent were not kinsmen
(Russell 1989:16). The findings of her research find support in our own
survey. We did not, however, figure out these relationships in such detail
as Russell did, so it is better to consider her data as quite représentative
and illustrative for this section. Given the above empirical findings, it
seems fair to say that homesteads mostly contain kin-related people,
which makes it, at least theoretically, well fit to operate as solidarity
group.
Conjugal relationships are also important within the homestead. Marriage
is universally found, in order to regulate procréation in such a way that
children are born into stable social units (Russell 1989:1). Marriage
détermines legitimacy, that is, it détermines not only who is responsible
for looking after and bringing up a child, but also the latter's future rights
to property on the decease of its kin and, more broadly, its affiliations and
social identity - the wider groups (beyond the immédiate family) to which
it belongs, and its consequent responsibilities. In other words, the signifi-
cance of marriage is, amongst other things, its effect on descent and
inheritance (Ngubane 1983:98). Moreover, through marriage the home-
stead group is able to subdivide itself into units, which in themselves
become rally grown homesteads again (Ngubane 1983:97). Although this
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study does not intend to give a füll anthropological and sociological
account of marriage in Swaziland, it is important to highlight some
features of contemporary Swazi marriage and its relationship to social
security issues within the homestead.
What a Swazi marriage is, and what it involves, are points of dis-
cussion. It is highly unclear when a Swazi man or woman changes from an
unmarried to a married status, a moment which is accomplished unam-
biguously in Western Law. Marwick (1966:123-4) says "it is extremely
difficult to discover what the essentials are to a Swazi marriage". He
concludes, however, that the really important element of the marriage is
the transfer of lobola (bride-price), although the insulamnyembeti and
lugege beasts8 are closely associated with them and no marriage could be
legalized if they were not forthcoming (Marwick 1966:123-4). Also Kuper
(1963:23) sounds confused when stating that "Swazi practice several types
of marriage". Ideally a marriage entails three public rituals (Russell
1989:29): the smearing with red ochre (kugezalibovu), weeping in the
cattle byre (kugidza), and the exchange of lobola cattle (kulobola). The
bride's family tends to hisist on lobola as the determining ritual, while the
groom's family tends to be content with kugezalibovu and a vague promise
of lobola to come.
Research among women by Russell (1989) found that also women
themselves are divided on what stage is décisive for marriage. But, as
Russell (1989:31) notes, none of these rituals is binding unless the woman
proves fertile. A marriage without children is a contradiction in terms. On
the other hand, Russell found that children do not automatically lead to
marriage, something which has also been found in other African societies
(Molokomme 1991). Russell (1989:33) shows in her study that, out of 304
children in her sample, almost 50 per cent had unmarried parents, in the
meaning of 'just lovers', while almost 30 per cent had fully married
parents either by fully paid lobola or registered civil or church marriage.
The former group is highly problematic, because it was argued at the
beginning of this section that marriage is the only way children can
acquire rights within the father's homestead. Russell (1989:33) argues that
there is some very slight évidence for the process of slow consolidation of
8
 Both cows are brought by the groom's family to the bnde's family. Insulamnyem-
beti (lit. "to wipe away tears") is the cow given to the bride's mother; lugege is the cow to
be slaughtered on arrivai at the girl'shome.
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marriage over time, that is, in the course of a lifetime casual relationships
('just lovers') change into lobola paid marriages. Russell (1989:2) indi-
cates, however, that extramarital children are in no way a phenomenon of
recent years, but have already existed for decades. Swazi custom has a
number of institutions to deal with these births: in the case of damage
inflicted, compensation is paid or the child is bought by its father. In this
way, then, the child is made to belong to a homestead, creating the stable
social environment mentioned in the beginning.
There are, however, changes going on which might become import-
ant for future relationships within homesteads. The tardiness of men to
pay lobola is, for Russell (1989:9), already the first évidence of a changing
attitude towards children. With lobola, men acquire the füll productive
and reproductive powers of women and her children from him. As long as
lobola is not paid, a woman has fewer obligations towards her husband,
the husband cannot acquire cattle for nis daughters, and children are not
accepted in the father's homestead, but have to stay with the mother's
grandparents. A shift away from the readiness to acknowledge children
can also be seen in the practice of kutsenga umtfwana : in the rate and
speed at which Swazi fathers nowadays 'buy' their children. Fathers always
have rights to their children, provided they 'pay' for them. Even if they do
not pay, the child will be ultimately theirs by rules of patriliny, especially
when it is a boy. Raising children, however, costs a lot of money nowadays
and these costs exceed the merits of a child as a productive asset. It is,
therefore, a strategy for the father's family to shift the bürden of éduca-
tion onto the mother's family. These practices have also been observed by
Kasenene (1993:79), who concludes that "there are many indications that
the bond and value of marriage and family life is often disregarded. It is
becoming a common practice for father and mother to live separately with
children living with only one of the parents or to have the children
brought up by the gogo(grandmother, A.L.),or any other relative."
In sum, customary marriage rules are becoming more unclear in
Swazi society than they were already. This is influencing both the rights
and obligations partners have towards each other and towards the off-
spring of that relationship. Moreover, relationships are becoming highly
unstable for both mothers and children and one is never certain to stay on
the father's homestead (if allowed to stay there at all). At the same tune,
mothers are becoming more independent, because they can insist on
lobola when the husband wants to acquire bis füll productive and repro-
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ductive rights. Kasenene (1993:80) indicates that "a section of Swazi
women are demanding their rightful place in the home and family af f aks."
All these new tendencies in Swazi society might lead in the future to
confusion with regard to the rights and responsibilities homestead mem-
bers have towards each other. In this respect, then, the capacity of the
homestead as solidarity group might be threatened.
As a last prerequisite for the group to remain stable, Partsch (1983:100-1)
states that such a group should at least consist of three générations or
more. In this way, an easy and certain care is provided for both the
elderly and the children. For a discussion on this issue, we refer to the
previous sections on the size and composition of the homestead.
6.7. The homestead and Swazi morality
Although the existence of a normative insurance is undoubtedly important
for social security mechanisms, it is, at the same time, the most difficult
factor to tracé in society. In our in-depth study and that of others (see
Knippenburg and Lopriore 1990), many difficulties were encountered in
tracing norms, values and laws with respect to social security transfers.
Again, these norms and values cannot be studied separately from genera!
norms and values in society, whether or not translated into explicit
customary rules or laws. Generally, it can be said that normative insur-
ance is vested in 'morality'. Let us, therefore, first have a brief look at
what can be called Swazi morality (Kasenene 1993). Kasenene (1993:103)
argues that, in the first place, morality among the Swazi is mainly derived
from religion: "the Swazi believe that morality has a divine origin and the
ancestors are the custodians of Swazi laws and customs in which moral
laws are embedded. As the forefathers of the community, ancestors
established most of the Swazi laws and customs and so breach of these
customs is an offence to them as it is an offence to the community. At the
same time it is believed that ancestors guide a person in making moral
décisions and if a person disobeys them and acts against their will, they
will punish him through sickness or other misfortunes." The misconduct of
one person may even involve an entire community.
In the second place, Swazi morality is directed at preserving Swazi
society. Swazis are a communalistic people and Swazi society is a web of
several strings of interrelationships which constitute one extended family.
An individual is a part of this communal existence, which gives him
security and protection. The individual, therefore, is not just an individual
but lives corporately: one exists for the community and the community
exists for individuals. Kasenene (1993:102) states that "tobe a Swazi is to
belong, and being part of the community is the highest value". The basic
duty of each Swazi is to preserve Swazi culture and tradition. This is
regarded as important for the promotion of peace, order and stability in
society: "what preserves Swazi culture and traditions maintains community
and is accepted as moral. What undermines weakens community and is
condemned as immoral" (Kasenene 1993:104). In Swazi society, kinship,
good neighbourliness and harmony are core values to be emphasized in
order to maintain the community. Any action against this is condemned as
immoral and therefore 'unSwazi'; any action in favour is considered as
moral and hence 'SwaziMn order to 'guide'moral Swazi behaviour, then,
there are several laws, customs, taboos, and observances which constitute
the Swazi moral code. All these rules aim to strengthen the basic values
in Swazi society: respect (for âge and status), sharing, sociability and
hospitality, mutual aid, self-discipline. How does the above described
morality work out in the homestead as solidarity group?
Ngubane (1983:104) states that " it is the umuti (homestead. A.L.;under-
lining Ngubane) which has first claim on a member, for its support of its
members and especially those of his own house (indlu, A.L.), as well as
generally for the maintenance of its physical structure, its land and its
livestock, as his or her circumstances permit and as his or her age, sex
and marital status dictate more specifically. Even if only by sending
money, or bringing goods when hè or she can, hè or she should make his
or her contribution. His obligations otherwise depend on his particular
relationship to the head of the homestead and through him to the Chief
and hence to the Nation and the King". It might be stated, then, that
exchanges among homestead members of social security resources are an
integral part of the more jgeneral social and economie obligations home-
steads members have towards each other. These obligations evolve from
someone's âge, sex, marital status and economie circumstances.
Age is a very important factor for determining rights and obligations.
In accordance with one of the core moral values and in common with
most societies, the Swazi have a great respect for age (Marwick 1966:68).
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Children are ideally taught to obey thek elders. Younger men defer to
older men. Older siblings command the younger siblings. Children have
few obligations in Swazi society, although they are expected to contribute
to labour such as cattle herding (young boys) or some light domestic
activities (girls). This is done within the reahn of one's own household. In
older times, thé âge of puberty was the âge for a young boy to joui his âge
régiment and become thé "King's Man" (Marwick 1966:70). Girls at this
âge join local régiments. When boys and girls get married, they hâve
reached complète manhood and womanhood. In this stage, thé man
assumes guardianship over his wife and thek children. The man might
become head of thé homestead, in which case he has thé responsibility for
ail thé inmates of thé homestead and must keep good order therein
(Marwick 1966:71). A woman changes from thé guardianship of her father
to that of her husband. In this stage, both married women and married
men are mainly responsible for the welfare of both thé older and thé
younger génération. When they themselves become older, they hâve less
and less to do with économie activities. The younger générations then take
thé major part in the economie pursuits of the homestead, and thé older
people hâve an increasingly important position in thé social sphère. They
are consulted in all matters of family and tribal import (Marwick 1966:
71).
However, as we found out in our in-depth study, changes can be
observed. Older people often déplore thé disrespect among thé youth.
Younger people say they respect thek elders, but that thé old respect
customs are no longer appropriate. Education is often blamed for thé
aliénation from old respect customs. This érosion of respect also has ils
conséquences for social and économie obligations towards elders. Chapter
9 will illustrate this in thé case of old âge.
Gender is another important differentiating factor in Swazi society
(Marwick 1966:60). An important issue in this context is the gender
division of labour to which it leads. The gender division of labour has
already been discussed. As women are directed into domestic and subsis-
tence activities, thek opportunities to raise a money income are restricted,
and so is, consequently, thek capacity to buy goods. What we see, then, is
that women's obligations towards thé homestead in général, and towards
needy people more particularly, are fulfilled by performing labour activ-
ities for them. As Russell (1984:19) says, "traditionally a woman made her
economie contribution directly in labour for thé homestead in which she
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lived." This is important to note, because it means that thé fruits of a
woman's labour should entirely accrue to her husband's (fatner's) home-
stead.
However, also with respect to thé gender division of labour, thé
actual practice seems to deviate from Swazi custom. We have already
discussed thé point that mâle labour migration has increasingly 'forced'
women into mâle activities and that it is not uncommon nowadays to see
women herding cattle, or ploughing the field, or maintaining housing
constructions (see also Allen 1973:74). Moreover, it is acknowledged that
women need money in order to fulfil thek rôle in provisioning thé house-
hold hi which they live. Earning an income by doing wage labour them-
selves or engaging in other income-generating activities, such as selling
clothes, baskets, béer, baked items and prepared food, is quite normal and
accepted nowadays. Russell (1984:20) points out that women are less
likely to be confronted with sévère claims on thèse earnings. Because of
thek provisioning rôle, homestead members know that most of thek
earnings will be contributed to thé common good anyway. Only when they
are not married, or when they are married but leave thek children with
another kitchen than thé one in which they eat, are they obliged to
contribute cash to thek parents or thé other kitchen. When the kitchen in
which they and thek children eat is thek own kitchen, women can
legitimately keep the lion's share of thek wages for themselves (Russell
1984:20).
Being unmarried or married also has its conséquences in the field of
économie obligations. The unmarried female stays at the homestead of
her parents and her labour efforts and earnings accrue to her parents.
When she is married, her productive efforts will accrue to the husbands'
(father's) homestead, as stated above. The unmarried son is almost in the
same position as an unmarried daughter. His earnings, too, which will
often be wages, accrue for the greater part to other members of the
homestead. When he is married, a proportion of his earnings accrues to
his own household. Nevertheless, both women and men have strong
obligations within the homestead towards non-household members,
although thèse resuit from âge or kinship relationships rather than from
being married or not.
As the moment of being married is not very clear in Swazi society
(see previous section) and as, moreover, values and attitudes towards mar-
riage change, the extent to which a woman keeps her obligations very
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much dépends on the progress made in thé marriage ritual. For a woman
for which füll lobola bas been paid, all her productive and reproductive
efforts can be claimed by thé husband's homestead. When this is not the
case, a woman will also have a strong link with her own parental home-
stead in terms of transferring goods and services. The previous section bas
already explained these issues.
Although âge, gender and marital status are all important factors in deter-
mining someone's obligations, kinship is even more important. Swazi have
a classificatory kinship system and the kinship terminology used indicates
the Unes of responsibility (Russell 1984:11). Kuper (1963:25) concludes
that kinsmen by a single term share a common social identity and, in
some situations, can serve adequately as substitutes for each other in case
of need. To illustrate this, we refer to an example from Russell (1984:11).
All Swazi have several people they call 'father'. Intimacy with and respon-
sibility for these classificatory fathers are ordered and ranked by well
understood principles of the logic of lineage, affinity and birth order. A
man's first father is the biological father, but, if the biological father
should fail or die, the father's eldest brothers becomes father. 'Father' has
obligations to 'child'and 'child'has obligations to 'father'. The strength of
these obligations will depend, inter alia, on how early in nis life the 'child'
joined the second father's homestead. Where there is no male kuisman to
act as father, a woman in the father's lineage may become 'father'. The
responsibility rests with the father's lineage to act as 'father'.
Within the homestead, the main kin relations are between husband
and wife, parents and children and between siblings. A husband is
described as the owner (umnikati) of his wife; hè cannot, however, do
with her as hè wishes without being called to account not only by his
kinsmen but by her own family (Kuper 1950:92). A wife should strictly
obey her husband and is obliged to take care of him and the children,
also in the event of contingencies. The husband is the legal head of the
household and has the responsibility for all that happens in his household.
From the Swazi point of view, the strengest affective relationship is
not that between husband and wife but between mother and child (Kuper
1950:95). A Swazi woman reaches rullest social stature as 'mother' in the
home of a married son, where she takes charge of his domestic affairs and
lives in the great hut.9 As Russell (1984:15) points out, obligations to
mother are particularly strong for the young worker. Sons have strong
economie obligations towards their mother, independently of whether his
children are taken care of by his mother or whether she runs his domestic
affairs. The relationship between father and son is one of complete
authority of the father over the son. Even when a son is married, the
father remains the legal and economie authority and a son is never
regarded as free from his control. A son must work for his father and, as
long as hè lives in his homestead, hè is expected to hand over to his
father whatever hè may earn. The earnings given to the father are used
for the genera! welfare of the homestead (father being the head), or to
buy cattle for the son for later marriage payments, or used by the father
for himself! The relationships between a wife and her in-laws are füll of
respect and humility (Kuper 1950:93). Her obligations towards them are
burdensome and mostly lie in the field of perforaüng all kinds of labour
services to them. As Kuper (1950:107) states: "the young girl becomes the
'handmaiden' of the mother-in-law".
Relationships between siblings are highly influenced by seniority and
sex (see also Chapter 7 in this study). Older siblings take precedence over
younger, males take precedence over females. The eldest brother is
supposed to assist his other brothers in the same way as a father (Kuper
1950:98). Besides this, brothers have life-long latent obligations towards
each other and their children. If a man should fail or die, then his siblings
will take over many of the responsibilities for his wife and children
(includmg possibly marriage of the widow through levirate). The relation-
ship between sisters is not affected to the same extent by primogeniture.
Affection and mutual help are the norms of sisterly behaviour and,
although long distances may keep them apart, they will try to keep in
contact with each other. It is not uncommon that they will borrow each
others' children as nursemaids and helps (Kuper 1950:98).
In sum, it can be concluded that within the homestead norms and values
exist that have the character of normative insurance. This normative
insurance manifests itself in the strong social and economie obligations
homestead members have towards each other, and in their responsibility
9
 A Swazi nddle runs: "If your mother and wife were drowning, which would y ou
save first?", and the correct answer is: "My mother; I can get another wife, but not another
mother".
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for thé gérerai welfare of the homestead. These obligations evolve from
général moral codes such as having respect for seniors and status, sharing
and mutual aid. In daily practice, someone's âge, sex, marital status and
position in the kinship System will largely détermine with whom one has
to share and to whom one has to show respect. The other side of the coin
is, of course, that these factors also détermine from whom one may
receive help and respect. As in Swazi society transfers of resources within
the homestead are largely determined and 'guided' by moral considér-
ations, one might argue that to some extent a 'moral economy' exists.
Individual aspirations and wealth accumulation are to some extent
checked by emphasizing someone's responsibility towards society and
stressing sharing, showing respect and mutual aid as 'good Swazi beha-
viour'. Selfish behaviour in contrast is considered 'unSwazi'.
176
7. KINSHIP RELATIONS AS SOCIAL SECURITY
MECHANISMS
7.1. Introduction
In this (and the following) chapter, attention is paid to those social
security mechanisms which operate outside the domain of the homestead
group. Again, m most cases these mechanisms do not émerge as differen-
tiated institutions for the sole purpose of providing social security, but
constitute an integral part of broader forms of social and economie
organisation. In Chapter 4, we argued that the social and economie or-
ganisations that have a rôle in providing social security can be traced by
looking at someone's social network. In rural Swaziland, kinship relations
constitute thé major part of the individual's social network. In this chap-
ter, we analyze those kinship relations, which also have a substantial rôle
in social security provision. In Section 7.2, thé général characteristics of
thé Swazi kinship System are outlined. In Section 7.3, thé relationships
among siblings are analyzed. In Sections 7.4 and 7.5, we go into more
détail on paternal and maternai kinship relations. In Section 7.6 brief
attention is paid to thé relationships with affinai kin. In the final section
an évaluation is given of kinship relations as social security mechanisms.
It is noted that, in this chapter, individual social networks are investi-
gated, not the homestead's networks. Data are derived from our sample
survey among 295 respondents. It is clear that not all respondents have all
types of kinship relations distinguished in this chapter. In each section,
therefore, we took a sub-sample containing only thé respondents who
have the kin relations as analyzed in thé particular section.
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7.2. General characteristics of the Swazi kinship System
In common with many other African societies, thé Swazi kinship System
has its fonction in distributing wealth in Swazi society. The kinship system
not only régulâtes social life and relationships of people, but also attaches,
at the same time, a variety of économie obligations and rights to kinship
members. For an elaborate description of thé Swazi kinship system, there
are only a few sources (besides oral information) which can be consulted
(see Kuper 1947, 1950 and 1963, Marwick 1966, Matsebula 1988, Kase-
nene 1993). In most cases, thèse authors restrict themselves to a descrip-
tion of behaviour when thé économie content of kin relations is discussed.
As introduction, it is important to outline some main général characteris-
tics of thé Swazi kinship system. In thé fïrst place, Swazi distinguish
between thé clan (isibongo) and thé lineage (lusendvo).1 The effectiveness
of clan membership dépends on thé national standing of the clan. To men
and women of the more important clans, clanship involves political and
social privilèges (Kuper 1950:88). To isolated members of scattered,
defeated, or immigrant clans, thé clan is simply an exogamous group with
a common name and a few common customs; it has no defined organis-
ation or claim on active loyalties. For commoners, thé lineage is the main
group of descent and référence. When discussing kinship relations in this
chapter relations within lineages are analyzed.
In thé second place, thé Swazi kinship system is characterised by
both patrilineality and patrilocality. The former term indicates that new
born become members of thé lineage of their father, the latter term
indicates that a married couple lives with me husband's family, that is, a
wife always leaves her paternal homestead. The Swazi kinship system is
also exogamous, which means that members of thé same lineage are not
allowed to marry each other - although there are exceptions to thé rule.
In thé third place, as a conséquence of being exogamous, Swazi
kinship distinguishes two kinds of relationships: blood relationship or
consanguinity, and marriage relationship or affinity. Among blood rela-
tives, a sharp distinction is further made between relatives on thé father's
side and relatives on thé mother's side. Although a Swazi retains links
A clan is a umlmeal group of descents of which the members can trace a common
ancestor, without being able to trace ail their interrelationships. Withm a lineage thé
members also can trace their interrelationships. Several lineages constitute a clan.
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with the families of both his parents, thé emphasis on thé paternal
(agnatic) kin (kaboyisè) and thé maternai khi (kabonina) is not the same.
The agnatic line has greater time depth, going back five to eight génér-
ations, while in thé maternai group descent can be traced for only three
or four générations, except in those cases where thé mother belongs to
thé royal lineage.
In thé fourth place, thé kinship system is classificatory, which means
that différent relatives hâve thé same names and thereby thé same rôles;
for example, not only the biological father is called 'father' but also his
brothers are 'father' (see also example in Chapter 6). In this way, relatives
can take over each other's rôle in thé kinship system. When your biologi-
cal father dies, another father will replace him. The manner of naming
relatives gives an insight into thé intimate nature of social organisation
and thé rights and obligations relatives hâve to one another. The classifi-
catory kinship system can be very confusing to an outsider making an
attempt to widerstand relationships between kin members. In Appendix
D, the Swazi names of paternal, maternai and affinai kin are visualised.
Swazi kinship terminology covers a range of five générations in ail - two
ascending, thé contemporary, and two descending. We will go into détail
on the most important among them and will try to indicate thé économie
obligations and rights among different kin members.
For thé social security aspects of the kinship system, thé last characteristic
is of gréât importance, because thé way in which relatives are classified
not only defines thé social obligations towards relatives and thé rights one
has to them, but also the economie obligations and rights which may arise
from thé social ones. In other words, thé social relationships between
people which resuit from thé fact that they are kin members may also
lead to exchange of economie resources between thé same people. Social
norms being thé main directive for thé intensity and direction of
exchange, one can say that reciprocity is the main mode of économie
intégration underlying thé exchange of economie resources within thé
kinship system. The économie relationship is determined by the social
relationship and not vice versa.
Having said this, a further observation is that, although thé exchange
of economie resources between members is part of maintaining thé social
relationship and in this way does not differ from singing a song for some-
one, the transfer of economie resources itself has social security aspects.
The way in which the transfers of resources are 'guided' through social
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norms, from young to old, from child to parent, from parent to child,
between male and female, makes clear that besides showing respect,
'support' is a main effect of the transfer. This support can be both 'protec-
tion' and 'promotion'. For example, the transfer of economie resources
from young kin members to older kin members can be considered as an
old age insurance, while the transfers of resources between brothers can
be looked upon as 'promoting' each other's Standard of living by providing
the other, for example, with money to make necessary investments. It is,
therefore, assumed in this section that an investigation of transfers of
economie resources between kin members gives, at the same time, a
picture of the exchange of social security resources within the kinship
system.
The strong régulation of economie transfers by social norms directed
towards mutual support makes the lineage and clan a strong solidarity
group. Moreover, its size, composition, and durability can generally also
be valued positively in this respect. In the Swazi kinship system, the
genera! rule is that the closer the tie the more précise and definite the
social and economie obligations (Kuper 1950:102). It can be expected,
therefore, that the closer kin relations will contain more obligations for
transfers of economie resources than looser kin relationships. In our
survey, not all kin relations of our respondents were therefore examined.2
Figure D.3 in Appendix D gives an overview of the kin relations surveyed.
The relationships with parents are examined in Chapter 9 in the section
on old âge. The following subsections will describe the normative behav-
iour among lineage members, with special attention to the transfers of
economie resources. This normative behaviour is then confronted with
daily practice by investigating actual transfers of resources between our
respondents and their kin members. We asked our respondents whether
or not there had been any transfer of economie resources in the survey
year. It will be further investigated whether or not there is any relation-
ship between personal characteristics of the respondents and the extent
and direction of economie resource transfers. Sex, age, income, marital
status and relationship to the homestead's head are thought to be import-
ant in this respect.
One other considération underlies this sélection. Generally it would be an
immense task to interview a respondent on all her/his kin relationships. Loss of concentra-
tion of respondents because of 'over questioning' would further decrease the reliability of
the data, then.
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7.3. Kin relations among siblings
7.3.I.Normative behaviour among siblings
The social relationships among siblings were partly analyzed in the last
chapter, so we will be brief on this in this section. The social identity of
siblings is closest for children of the same sex by the same mother as well
as by the same father. This is, for example, expressed in the Swazi prac-
tice the levirate and the sororate. When a man dies, nis younger füll
brother is expected to 'enter' the widows and beget children for the
deceased. When there is no younger füll brother, this task falls upon
another junior kinsman, but not on the senior brothers, of which the
oldest in particular is treated with the respect and avoidance accorded to
a father-in-law. Besides the levirate, a man regards nis füll brothers as
essential members of his family council and will consult them on all
important occasions. They also have these strong ties in the field of
mutual support and help. Ties between half-brothers (sons of the same
father) dépends largely on the status of the wives. Often, conflicts with
respect to succession and inheritance can trouble the ties among half-
brothers. 3
Affection and mutual help are the norm of sisterly behaviour. In
older times, older sisters desired to have a younger (füll) sister as their
co-wife. Even among half-sisters the relationships ought to be friendly and
füll of mutual help. Taking care of each other's children is one of the
most prominent forms of mutual help.
Brothers and sisters from the same father have strong relationships
with each other. They give each other gifts and render each other many
informal services. Moreover, the brothers of the same father are supposed
to all profit from the bride-wealth of their sisters, and so brothers by the
same fathers should help their sisters when in need. A légal obligation
rests on the heir or on the brother who received her marriage-cattle, and
a moral obligation on all the other brothers (Kuper 1950:99). Sisters living
in the home of married brothers have a very privileged position and can
take of their brother's wives clothing, Utensils, and other odds and ends,
which may never be refused. The sister is considered as 'the girl of the
home'. In this respect, then, the position of the woman as a wife and a
sister is very marked. A sister has the free run of the home and does not
3
 In Swaziland the first-born son is not automatically the heir. Which son becomes
the heir dépends largely on the status and rank of the mothers and not on birth order.
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use language of shame and respect as a wife is supposée to do. Because
of the trust that brothers have in their sisters being eager to promote their
well-being, these sisters are amongst thé people to whom thé heir is sent
till he reaches thé strength of maturity.
7.3.2.Exchange among siblings in figures
The above observations were made by ethnographers, who, however, had
a tendency to describe thé norm rather than daily practice and who made
their observations among thé Swazi aristocracy and not among thé com-
moners. The normative behaviour described above suggests that social
relationships between füll brothers and füll sisters are closer than those
with half-brothers and half-sisters. It can be expected, then, that this
pattern would be reflected in thé exchanges of economie resources. In the
survey, respondents were asked whether they could say something con-
cerning one-sided or mutual transfers of resources with their (half)-
brothers and (half)-sisters. Thèse data give an indication of the extent to
which social behaviour is extended to économie behaviour (exchange)
among kin members. Table 7.1 summarizes thé data on this issue with
respect to siblings. In addition, thé actual exchange relations among
siblings and thé main characteristics of thèse exchange relations are
visualized in Figure 7.1. Another interesting question is whether or not
social and économie characteristics of the respondents have a significant
influence on thé incidence and direction of exchange. Table 7.2 présents
thé available data to answer this question.4
In thé following subsections, thé main characteristics of the diverse
exchange relations will be analyzed in more détail. Figure 7.1 indicates
(between parenthèses) with each exchange relationship in which section
thé respective exchange relationship is analyzed.
The statistical tables and figures on the significant relations are given in Appendix
E. In some cases it was also thought necessaiy to pay attention to certain insignificant
relations. The figures and tables of thèse relations are also présentée in Appendix E. For
an explanation of thé statistical measures used is referred to Section E.l of Appendix E. In
the above text the numbers in parentheses (El, E2, and so on) refer to the respective
tables and figures ta Appendix E.
Table 7.1. Exchange relationships among siblings (as percentage of those
who have a füll brother, füll sister, and so on)
Relation with
Füll Brother
Half-Brother
Füll Sister
Half-Sister
Indicators
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Kind of
resources
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Kind of
resources
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Kind of
resources
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Kind of
resources
Male Respondents
54.8 %
21.4%
19.0 %
4.8%
Money + Labour
78.9%
0.0%
5.3%
15.8 %
Groceries
54.8 %
21.4%
16.7 %
7.1 %
Money
83.3%
0.0%
11.1 %
5.6%
Goods
Female Respondents
63.0%
8.4%
10.4%
18.2%
Money + Goods
76.9 %
3.1 %
9.2%
10.8 %
Goods
51.1 %
10.4%
20.3 %
18.1 %
Groceries + Money
75.0 %
1.6%
12.5 %
10.9%
Groceries
Source: Survey 1990
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7.3.3.Exchange of male respondents with füll brothers
To start with exchange among füll brothers, the figures in Table 7.1
suggest that almost 50 per cent of the male respondents exchange
resources with their ruil brothers. There is a remarkably low incidence of
male respondents only receiving from their füll brothers. This might have
to do with some reluctance of respondents to admit that they only receive
from others. In Swazi society, a contributor has much more status than a
recipiënt. As was explained in Chapter 6, generosity is a highly appreci-
ated value in Swazi society.
The incidence of male respondents exchanging with their füll
brothers does not depend on their income (El). Respondents with low
and high incomes exchange to the same extent. The différences are in the
direction of exchange. Respondents with higher incomes mainly give (E2).
This corresponds with the normative behaviour that wealth should be
shared with others. One may argue that those with higher incomes can act
relatively more independently of others than those with low incomes. This
might be a reason for escaping responsibilities. In this case, however,
social norms still seem to dominate economie acting.
Our data also showed a significant relationship between the age of
the brothers and the incidence of exchange with füll brothers. The higher
the age, the less the incidence of means transfers (E3). This is logical,
when one considers that older people may have little to exchange. More-
over, older people are expected to receive means from their children for
support, and therefore become less dependent on their close relatives'
support. For those who exchange, it was found that relatively older res-
pondents tend to receive means instead of giving or mutually exchanging
them (E4). This association can be read from Table E.4, but proved to be
insignificant. Nevertheless, based on our findmgs with the incidence of
exchange, we think a relationship will exist between direction of exchange
and age, and the same arguments can be used as those explaining the
relationship between âge and incidence of exchange.
There was also a significant relationship between social position
(expressed as the social relationship to the head of the homestead) and
exchange with ruil brothers (E5). Those who were not the head of the
homestead exchange, while those who were head were less mvolved in
exchange with their ruil brothers. The latter situation can be explained by
heads being fully responsible for the homestead's welfare. Most of their
economie resources will, therefore, be invested in the homestead. More-
over, when heads exchange they mostly give, correspondmg with their
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status in society, while non-heads tend to reçoive or mutually exchange
(E6).
What sort of means do füll brothers exchange? Money is a dominant
item, but this is closely followed by exchanging labour. Because of the
patrilocal kinship system, thé chance of living in thé same community as
one's brother is quite high. This makes it possible to help each other with
activities such as housing construction, brick making and ploughing. This
brings us to thé influence of distance on thé incidence of exchange
relations among brothers, and among kin members in général. It cannot
be denied that distance will generally have an impact on thé extent to
which khi members exchange. But considering individual cases, distance
was seldom mentioned as a constraint for exchange. Most respondents
had kin members living nearby and yet no exchange was mentioned. On
thé other hand, some respondents claimed to hâve strong exchange
relationships with khi members living far away, for example, in town.
Moreover, Swaziland is a small country and distances are relatively short.
It is rather lack of money to pay thé bus ticket and responsibilities at
home that prevent people from visiting each other. Other research in
Swaziland (Russell 1985 and 1993, Barendregt and Brouwer 1986) showed
that distance is a minor factor in determining exchange relations among
kin members.
7.3.4.Exchange of mâle respondents with half-brothers
While thé data reveal that there are significant exchange relations among
füll brothers, thé exchange relations with half-brothers are less pro-
nounced. In thé first place, thé incidence of having half-brothers was low,
and in thé second place, only 4 respondents said they exchanged économie
resources with their half-brothers. These few observations cannot be used
to draw any further conclusions on thèse exchange relations. The only
conclusion one can draw is that exchange among half-brothers is appar-
ently almost non-existent. The already problematic relationship between
half-brothers might cause such situations. Moreover, half-brothers are,
after ail, 'second in rank' compared with füll brothers, and therefore
socially more distant. This seems to express itself clearly in thé économie
relationships between half-brothers.
7.3.5.Exchange of mâle respondents with füll sisters
The pattern found with exchange among füll brothers can also be found in
thé exchange relations between füll brothers and füll sisters. Ahnost 50
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per cent of the male respondents hâve exchange relations with their füll
sisters, and giving thereby dominâtes. This is in accordance with norma-
tive behaviour, in which support and help of brothers to sisters is préva-
lent. One can deduce from Table 7.2 that there is a significant relation-
ship between thé incidence of exchange and the respondent's relationship
to the head (E7). Por those male respondents who are head, the same can
be said as with exchange with füll brothers. Benig head means Ml respon-
sibility for the homestead's welfare. There will be less scope for support-
ing sisters, unless they live in the homestead. No significant relationship
was found between income and incidence of exchange. Explanations are
less easy to find. The fact that there is no significant relationship between
income and exchange with füll sisters seems to prove that social norms
still dominate exchange between füll brothers and füll sisters. In spite of
low or high income, one is supposed to support sisters.
A relationship was found between the respondent's âge and inci-
dence of exchange: the younger the male respondents are, the higher the
incidence of exchange (E8). Although the significance level (0.06) exceeds
our critical significance level (0.05), and therefore the relationship is
insignificant, the small différence between the critical level and the value
found suggests that the relationship does exist. This relationship might be
attributed, then, to an older male having larger responsibilities towards his
own homestead, and sisters (who are at the same time also at an older
age and often married) are not given support because they are supposed
to be maintained by the in-law family. In point of fact, with regard to
maintenance, a married woman in Swaziland does not belong anymore to
her paternal kin, and the responsibility for her well-being rests with the
in-laws.
For those male respondents who exchange with füll sisters, income,
âge, marital status and social position did not prove to be significant in
determining the direction of exchange. This is another confirmation of the
strong social relationships existing between füll brothers and Ml sisters,
which, amongst other things, expresses itself in mutual support and gifts,
irrespective of income or status. The direction of exchange is predomi-
nantly led by social norms and values, and feelings of affection. Money is
thereby the mam. resource exchanged. Males are supposed to give their
labour efforts to their own lineage and not to their sister's in-laws. For
most males, money is relatively easily at hand and can be easily trans-
ferred over longer distances. Moreover, it may be assumed that sisters
mostly need money, reflecting the often existing tension between women's
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limitée income-generating capacities and their responsibilities for thé daily
maintenance of thé homestead members (see also Chapter 6). However,
thé latter statement cannot be further sustained by our empirical findings.
7.3.6.Exchange of maie respondents with half-sisters
Exchange relations of thé mâle respondents with half-sisters are similar to
those with half-brothers: less pronounced and less fréquent. Only 3 mâle
respondents indicated that they exchanged means with half-sisters. This
number is not sufficient to draw any further conclusions on incidence and
direction of exchange. The absence of exchange is again a sign in itself:
half-sisters are socially and economically more distant than füll sisters.
7.3.7.Exchange of female respondents with füll brothers
Looking now at thé female respondents, their exchange patterns should be
thé image of thé patterns found with mâle respondents, as far as exchange
with (half-)brothers is concerned. The figures in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2
largely confirm this statement. As with mâles, almost 50 per cent of the
female respondents reported that they exchanged resources with mil
brothers. As with mâle respondents and their exchange with füll sisters, no
significant relationship could be found between income, marital status,
and thé incidence of exchange. Relationships were found between âge,
relationship to thé head, and thé incidence of exchange (E9 and E10).
The older thé respondents were, thé less thé incidence of exchange with
füll brothers. Explanations should be considered thé same as those
applying to exchange between füll brothers and füll sisters. With relation-
ship to thé head as déterminant, it was found that those women who were
thé head had a lower incidence of exchange than women who were not
the head. In général thé women who are thé head are de facto heads,
because their husbands are migrants or hâve died. In both cases, thé
female head takes over the responsibility of daily homestead affaire. As
with thé mâle respondents, then, there might be fewer opportunités to
hâve contacts with thé brothers and, therefore, to engage in exchange.
However, notwithstanding thé above finduigs, we may state that
mainly social norms détermine économie behaviour between füll sisters
and füll brothers. This statement is further confirmed by thé observation
that no significant relationships were found between thé direction of
exchange and income, âge, marital status and/or social position. Sisters
mainly receiving from füll brothers dominate, and this is in accordance
with social rules. The pattern of exchange can be further explamed by thé
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'raie' that a woman, when married and living in another homestead,
should dévote her labour force and resources to her husband's honiestead
and not to her own people. In the few cases that sisters give to brothers
they mainly give goods, like food and clothes. The main reason for this
may well be that women hâve less access to income-generating activities
and, therefore, hâve less cash available. The same patrilocal kinship
System often forces women to move from their own Community, so labour
exchange with their brothers is seldom possible.
7.3.8.Exchange of female respondents with half-brothers
The picture of exchange between thé female respondents and their füll
brothers is also found m thé case of exchange with their half-brothers.
The incidence is, as can be expected, lower than with füll brothers.
Patterns of direction are, however, thé same and are explained by thé
same factors as for exchange with füll brothers. A différence is that sisters
tend to receive goods from half-brothers, while in exchange relations with
füll brothers money dominâtes. This latter finding might be explamed by
thé fact that money is more appreciated as a gift than other items. Money
gives more freedom to thé récipient, and giving money gives more status
to thé contributor.
7.3.9.Exchange of female respondents with füll sisters
Exchange between ruil sisters is less frequently found than that between
Ml brothers. The main reason will be thé physical distance between füll
sisters after their marriage; it is very likely that they will have to move
from the parental Community to another community. Intensive contacts
are, therefore, more difficult to maintain. Another constraint is that many
married women are not allowed by their husbands to leave thé homestead
for a few days. Visiting their sisters thereby becomes impossible. If
distance and thé husband's résistance can be overcome and exchange
takes place, ruil sisters give each other money and groceries.
Income proved to be an important factor in determining the inci-
dence and direction of exchange: thé higher the income, the higher the
incidence (Eil); and also, the higher the income of the respondents, the
more 'giving' dominâtes (E12). In Chapter 6, it has already been shown
that women have relatively low incomes compared to men and that most
of this already low income will be spent on the homestead's welfare. Only
those women earning a substantially higher income can afford to give to
sisters or to be involved in mutual exchange. Women with low incomes,
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on the contrary, tend to receive. Age also influences thé direction and
incidence of exchange between fall sisters (E13 and E14). Older women
are more likely to receive from their sisters than younger women. The
incidence of exchange déclines with âge. The same explanations as with
exchange among füll brothers can be put forward: support is received
from one's own children, and women hâve bigger responsibilities towards
their own homestead. The relationship to thé head also proved to be
significant (E15). The greater thé relational distance towards thé head,
thé more thé exchange with fiill sisters take place. This finding can
probably be explained in terms of being less within control of the home-
stead head. The relationship to thé homestead head was not significant
with respect to thé direction of exchange (E16). Marital status was also
insignificant in determining incidence or direction of exchange.
7.3.10.Exchange of female respondents with half-sisters
The incidence of exchange with half-sisters is lower than that with füll
sisters, and is restricted to the exchange of groceries. Income is unim-
portant in determining incidence and direction of exchange. Indeed, we
should think of the groceries as being relatively cheap products, such as
food one has produced oneself, soap, sait, mealie meal, and so on. In
most cases, a high income is not needed to buy these things. Incidence
and direction of exchange had almost no relationship with age. Nor are
marital status and relationship to the head of any importance. Generally,
the exchange with half-sisters reflects the social distance that exists among
'half-siblings'.
7.4. Patentai kin relations
7.4.1.Normative behaviour with paternal kin
When looking at the kin relations with both kin from the father's and the
mother's side, the typical feature of the classificatory kinship system can
be shown. A limited number of terms applied to lineal relatives are also
applied to collaterals. As can also be seen in Figure D.l (Appendix D),
the term ubabe ('father'), for example, is not only applied to the father
himself, but also to father's brothers and to father's brothers' sons (gréât
uncles' sons); moreover, with the extension to the maternai side it is used
to all husbands of women who are called umage. The other way around,
all wives of the men called 'father' are umage. However, among the huge
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number of relatives that are called ubabe or umage, différences exist in
the ways they should be treated. The mam différences are described in
the literature (Kuper 1950. Marwick 1966). We start with the paternal kin.
The father's brothers are respected and feared in the same way as the
father is, particularly the brothers who are older than hè (ubabe lomkhu-
lu), since status is linked with primogeniture. The father's younger
brothers (ubabe lomncane) should be consulted in family matters and
become guardians when the father dies. The wives of the father's brothers
are called umage (mother). A father's sister is also called habe (ubabe
lomsikati = female father). As she usually lives at another homestead,
there is not much opportunity for close contacts. However, she is member
of the family council. She is not regarded as a mother, but as a female
father. She has the same authority over her brother's children as her
brother. She must receive respect and obédience from them. Father's ruil
sisters take part in the choice of her brother's son's wife. The fact that the
father's sister bestowed benefits on the father through her marriage cattle
entitles her, by Swazi standards, to make various demands on him, on bis
wives and on the children of the union she made possible. The father's
sister's husband is also called habe, although he is not treated in the same
way as a father or father's brothers. He is, under the custom of giving an
inhlanti (subsidiary wife), entitled to marry his wife's brother's daughter,
and his wife's sister.
The paternal grandfather is ubabemkhulu , and to distinguish hun
from the maternai grandfather hè is called ubabemkhulu lotala babe, His
wife is called ugogo. Since marriage is patrilocal, children often grow up in
the home of the paternal grandparents. They are said to teach the
children to respect their parents. Grandfather has the law of the past in
his voice and should given his sanction and opinion on any important
event, such as the marriage of a grandchild. The power of the grandfather
over his sons and grandsons is partly explained by his being 'the nearest to
the ancestors' and essential officiator in all domestic rituals. Grandmother
is the teacher of the young, and she is very important and honoured.
The relationships with cousins on the paternal side differ between
cousins from father's brothers and those from father's sisters. The children
of father's brothers are called umna and udzadze, which are the same
terms used for one's own brothers and sisters. The children of father's
sisters are, however, called umzala, which indicates more distance. As
these children have a surname different from one's own, they constitute a
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Table 7.3. Exchange relations with paternal kin
Relation with
Father's
Brother's
Sons
Father's
Brother's
Daughters
Father's Sis-
ter's Children
Father's Bro-
thers
Father's
Sisters
Indicators
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Resources
No exchanging
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Resources
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Resources
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Resources
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Resources
Mâle Respondents
78.9%
0.0%
10.5 %
10.5%
Groceries
77.8%
5.6%
16.7 %
0.0%
Groceries
90.0 %
5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
Money
80.0%
20.0 %
0.0%
0.0%
Goods + Money
72.2%
27.8%
0.0%
0.0%
Groceries/Money
Female Respondents
89.1 %
1.1%
2.2%
7.6%
Money
90.7%
2.3%
2.3%
4.7%
Money + Goods
84.0 %
3.2%
7.4%
5.3%
Money + Goods
78.0%
22.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Goods + Money
82.4 %
17.6%
0.0%
0.0%
Groceries
Table 7.3. (continued)
Relation
Brother's
Children
Sister' s
Children
Indicators
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Resources
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Resources
Mâle respondents
69.8 %
16.3 %
4.7%
9.3%
Food + Clothes
71.1 %
18.4 %
7.9%
2.6%
Money
Female respondents
88.2%
6.8%
1.2%
3.7%
Clothes
82.2 %
10.2 %
3.2%
4.5%
Goods + Care of
Children
Source: Survey 1990
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different category. The exchange relations between father's brothers' sons
are similar to those with half-brothers. Although socially these are also
'brothers', the exchange of resources between them is much less pro-
nounced than with füll brothers.
In Tables 7.3 and 7.4 and in Figure 7.2.,the main characteristics of the
exchange relations with paternal kin are presented and visualized. Figure
7.2 indicates for each exchange relation in what section further explana-
tion can be found.
7.4.2.Exchange of male respondents with cousins
Only 4 of thé mâle respondents having cousins from thé father's side
exchanged resources. These few observations justify only one conclusion:
social distance seems to translate itself directly into économie distance.
Although thé father's brothers' sons are 'brothers', they are not treated in
the same way. Because of the few observations, no further commente can
be made on direction or incidence of exchange, nor are they necessary,
given thé relative unimportance of thé exchange relation. The same holds
true for thé father's brothers' daughters (who are also your 'sisters') and
father's sisters' children.
7.4.3.Exchange of mâle respondents with father's brothers and sisters
Few observations were also found when looking at the exchange relations
between mâle respondents and their father's brothers and father's sisters.
However, thé main reason hère is that only a few respondents still had
father's brothers and father's sisters. 20 per cent of the male respondents
having father's brothers said they supported their father's brothers econ-
omically. Goods and money were thé ways in which tins was donc. Those
who did it were younger men (obviously), married and head of their hom-
estead. Although thé incidence of the above support is low, one is
reminded that father's brothers should be supported in thé first place by
their own children. One might argue, then, that thé incidence of exchange
of nephews with their father's brothers rather dépends on thé father's bro-
thers' personal circumstances than on thé socio-économie characteristics
of thé nephew. Nephews seem to be thé 'lender in second resort', when
one's own sons fail to do so. Unfortunately, we cannot verify this state-
ment from our data.
The same arguments can be used for exchange relations with father's
sisters. Of thé mâle respondents who said they had father's sisters, 22.2
per cent supported them. Nevertheless, this low incidence should be
evaluated differently from thé exchange with father's brothers. At first
sight, thé low incidence might be a bit surprising, considering thé import-
ant place of the father's sister in a nephew's life. But, on the other hand,
the father's sister is married into another family and lineage and has a
différent name now. Moreover, a relatively large geographical distance
will, in many cases, exist between father's sisters and their nephews.
Considering ail thèse arguments, there are sufficient reasons for thé
nephew not to support his aunt. When hè nevertheless does, this empha-
sizes thé father's sister's rôle in his life.
7.4.4.Exchange of mâle respondents with brothers' and sisters' children
The exchange relations with brothers' and sisters' children were also
examined. 30.2 per cent of the male respondents said they exchanged
means with their brothers' children. The main relationship was giving, but
receiving and mutual exchange also exist. The older the respondent, the
more the relationship turns into receiving only, which would correspond to
findings on the relationship between brother's children and their father's
brother (our respondent) (E17). No other significant relations could be
found between characteristics of the respondent and direction of
exchange. The same conclusion can be drawn for différences between
those who exchange and those who do not: neither age, nor income, nor
marital status, nor being head or not were significant factors. As with
exchange among füll brothers, social rules and norms seem to coordinate
exchange. Neglecting the rules can not be ascribed to income, age, or so
on. Distance, however, might explain différences; and the fact that
brothers' children do not need extra support may be another reason.
Contacts with sisters' children are of the same magnitude as those
with brothers' children. 28.9 per cent of the male respondents exchange
means, and giving is the most prominent exchange relation. This corre-
sponds to the exchange relation with sisters. Money is the most important
thing given, and it is interesting to observe that, in contrast with exchange
with brothers' children, older men, also, give means to their sisters'
children instead of receiving from them. This emphasizes to some extent
the rôle of the mother's brothers (umalume), described below in the
section on maternai kin relations.
A significant relationship was found between benig head or not and
the incidence of exchange with sisters' children (E18). Those who were
not head all exchange (give) resources with their sisters' children. Having
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fewer responsibilities for the homestead's welfare, they are apparentiy
able to perform better their rôle as umalume, which might be popularly
described as 'legacy uncle'. Other factors proved not to be significant in
determining either thé uicidence or thé direction of exchange with sisters'
children.
7.4.5.Exchange of female respondents with paternal cousins
When analyzing thé patterns of exchange of the female respondents with
their paternal kin, a général conclusion has to be that such exchange does
not occur frequently. The reason for this is very obvious, as argued before,
because women leave thé paternal family, and join another family and thé
paternal lineage of her husband. It is her husband's paternal family which
has exclusive rights on her resources and support. Nor, therefore, with
regard to exchange with father's brothers' sons, is it surprising to find that
thé exchange that takes place is predominantly 'receiving'. No other
significant relations were found to explain thé direction of exchange. With
regard to différences between those who exchange and those who do not,
two significant factors were found. First, marital status had influence:
widows had a significantly higher incidence of exchange than married
women (E19). Secondly, those who were not the wife of the head had a
higher incidence of exchange (E20). Both findings may be explained by
the respondent being more 'loose' from thé head's direct supervision. In
thé case of widowhood, thé head is literally absent, and thé section on
widowhood in Chapter 9 will show that widows are often badly treated by
their husband's kin. They hâve to dépend on children and their own kin in
thé event of being unable to provide themselves with a living. If they are
thé daughter, thé parent, or the sister of thé head (ail cases with higher
incidence of exchange), women generally enjoy more freedom with regard
to extra-homestead exchange than if they are thé head's wife. This might
explain why relationships with other 'brothers' can be maintained. How-
ever, thé findings as described in this paragraph do not apply to thé
exchange relations with father's brothers' daughters (E21 and E22), who
are also your 'sisters'. Although thé social distance is the same as for
father's brothers' sons, thé findings may in this particular case largely be
explained by physical distance; both the respondent and her father's
brothers' daughters are married into another lineage, which will also lead
to larger geographical distance.
As indicated above, thé father's sisters' children are not 'brothers' or
'sisters' and thé (social) distance from them is greater. Nevertheless, the
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incidence of exchange is higher than with father's brothers' sons or
daughters, although it is still relatively low, compared with exchange with
füll brothers or füll sisters. Mutual exchange prevails. A significant
relationship has been found between âge and direction: when becoming
older, thé dominating direction is that of receiving (E23), for obvious
reasons. Other significant relationships were found between marital status
and relationship to thé head, and thé incidence of exchange: also in thèse
cases, widows and women who were not the head's wife had a higher
incidence of exchange (E24 and E25). The same explanations can be used
as described in thé previous paragraph to explain thèse findings.
7.4.6.Exchange of female respondents with father's brothers and sisters
Turning our attention to exchange with thé older génération, exchange
between female respondents and their father's brothers is almost the same
as for mâle respondents. Also in this case, 'giving' dominâtes, which cor-
responds with prevailing norms. There were no significant relationships
between âge, income, marital status and relation to thé head, on thé one
hand, and incidence or direction of exchange, on thé other. The exchange
with father's sisters is less than among mâle respondents. For women, thé
father's sister bears also less importance in their life than for men.
Furthermore, thé father's sister is married into another family, and so is
thé female respondent. Both social and geographical distance become
larger, then. Also in this case, no significant relations were found between
socio-économie characteristics of the respondent and direction or inci-
dence of exchange.
7.4.7.Exchange of female respondents with father's brothers and sisters
The exchange with brothers' and sisters' children is less fréquent than
found for mâle respondents. The relationship is predominantly one of
supporting thé children with clothes or taking care of them temporarily
(in thé case of sister's children). In former paragraphs, we have already
indicated thé close bonds among sisters; this seems to extend also to their
respective children. It is mainly in thé case of young children that support
is given, which explains the significant relation between âge and incidence
of exchange (E26), while the significant relationship between âge and
direction tells us that, when respondents become older, they are supported
by the sisters' children instead of respondents having to support them
(E26a). Moreover, the significant relation found between income and
support of sister's children suggests that support is only given if women
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can afford it (E27 and E27a).
7.5. Maternai kin relations
7.5.1. Normative behaviour with maternai kin relations
The maternai side is the image of the paternal side. In général, however,
the maternai kin play a less important rôle in someone's life than the
paternal kin. Therefore, we will be more brief on the maternai relations.
As with paternal kin, cousins from the mother's side are also classified
differently. The children of mother's sisters are your 'brother' (umna) or
your 'sister' (udzadze). The children of mother's brother are called
umzala, like the father's sisters' children. Although the latter are also your
brothers and sisters, they are socially more distant. The mother's brother
is called umalume , and so is his wife. According to Kuper (1950:102), the
umalume is a great favourite, and the relationship between him and his
sister's children can be described as an easy and protective relationship.
Whenever children have problems with their own father, they go to their
maternai uncle. Mother and children are entitled to receive help from
him. He may even help to collect bride-wealth for his sister's sons,
although hè is not obliged to and bas to ask permission from their father.
Mother's sisters are called umage ('mother'), and have the same position
as father's brothers. Because of the sororate, they are able to replace your
mother or also become wives of your father. Their husbands are called
ubabe.
What do the survey data show us with respect to exchange within
maternai relations? Tables 7.5 and 7.6 and Figure 7.3 give an indication.
As in the previous sections, the different relationships will be analyzed
separately.
7.5.2.Exchange of male respondents with maternai cousins
To start with the male respondents, the figures for mother's sisters'
children and mother's brothers' children indicate that exchange with
maternai 'brothers' and 'sisters' is not intensive. Moreover, and not shown
in the table, we met only four (mother's sisters' sons) or three respondents
who reported an exchange relation. These few observations cannot be
used to make any further statements on the exchange relation with
mother's relatives' children, except that it shows the social distance
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Table 7.5. Exchange relations with maternai kin
Relation with
Mother's
Sister's Sons
Mother's
Sister's
Daughters
Mother's
Brother' s
Children
Mother's
Brothers
Mother's
Sisters
Indicators
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Resources
No exchanging
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Resources
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Resources
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Resources
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Resources
Mâle Respondents
76.5%
5.9%
11.8%
5.9%
Groceries
81.3%
0.0%
18.7 %
0.0%
Money + Goods
85.0%
5.0%
10.0%
0.0%
Groceries
70.0 %
30.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Money
71.4%
28.6 %
0.0%
0.0%
Groceries/Money
Female Respondents
95.3%
2.4%
1.2%
1.2%
Goods + Money
92.8 %
0.0%
7.2%
0.0%
Money + Goods
84.5 %
3.1 %
3.1 %
9.3%
Money + Goods
80.8%
19.2%
0.0%
0.0%
Groceries
75.0%
25.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Groceries
Source: Survey 1990
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existing between them.
7.5.3. Exchange of male respondents with mother's brothers and sisters
For the exchange with mother's brothers and mother's sisters, we had
more observations. A considérable proportion of those who had mother's
brothers and mother's sisters exchange resources, although it is one-way
traffic (giving only). It shows the importance of mother's brothers (umalu-
me) and mother's sisters (may replace your mother) in the life of Swazi
men. It was not surprising to find that mainly younger men exchange with
the elderly from the maternai side (mother's brothers and sisters still
alive) (E28 and E28a). Furthermore, as already observed with other
exchange relations, the relationship to the head played a rôle: those who
were not the head exchanged, while just a small proportion of the heads
had an exchange relation (E29 and E29a). Contacts with mother's kin are
more likely to occur in the case of a man staying at nis parental home-
stead, where in many cases his mother also lives. Also, the bigger respon-
sibilities towards other homestead members associated with being the
head of a homestead may be an explanation for the relationship found. It
must be noted that the conclusions drawn from Tables E.28(a) and
E.29(a) are based on looking at frequencies and not at significance. The
relationship between age and support, as well as the relationship between
being head or not and support, proved to be insignificant. Nevertheless,
we think that the above relationships can be assumed to exist.
7.5.4. The exchange of female respondents with maternai cousins
Turning to the female side of Tables 7.5 and 7.6, we can observe a very
low incidence of contacts between female respondents and their mother's
sisters' children. This low incidence may be explained not only by the
geographical, but also the social distance between them. Mother's sisters'
children are very likely to live in quite a different community, with even a
different lineage from your mother's, which is already more distant than
the father's lineage. Moreover, the move of married women from their
own parental homestead to the husband's homestead in many cases pre-
vents intensive contacts with the more distant relatives of the parental
homestead. The fmdings are, therefore, not surprising and confïrm that,
although mother's sisters' children are referred to as 'brothers' and
'sisters', the content of this brotherhood or sisterhood is quite different
from the relations with your ruil brothers or sisters. The same holds true
for relations with the mother's brothers' children. These children are not
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your 'brothers' or 'sisters', but real cousins. Nevertheless, some female
respondents reported that they had exchange relations with these cousins,
in which 'receiving' dominâtes, especially among older and widowed
women (E30 and E31). No easy explanation could be found by us for why
the exchange relations with these cousins have this incidence and pattern.
One of the reasons might be, but this is very tentative, that it is casier for
mother's brothers and their children to visit their sister or aunt than it is
for mother's sisters and their children, since the latter are more likely to
be bound to their husband's homestead and his lineage. The chance of
maintaining contacts between cousins would be higher, then, in the former
case.
7.5.5. The exchange of female respondents with mother's brothers and
sisters
The exchange relations with mother's sisters and mother's brothers have
the same pattern as with male respondents. As with the male respondents,
a significant relationship was found between âge and exchange: the
younger the respondents, the higher the incidence of exchange (E32a).
Age, however, does not explain the direction of exchange (E32). More-
over, although not statistically significant, an association was found
between the relationship to the head and the incidence of exchange
(E33). A higher incidence could be observed for those women who were
the head's wife than for women who were the head's daughter-in-law. In
Swazi society, the daughter-in-law has to show her füll respect to her
parents-in-law, and her mother-in-law has large control over her daughter-
in-law's labour force and resources. Particularly younger daughters-in-law,
just married and having no or few children, have very limited scope for
acting independently outside the homestead. Contacts with their own
relatives, both with paternal and maternai kin, are therefore difficult to
realize. This explains the différences found.
7.6. Affinai kin relations
7.6.1.Normative behaviour towards in-laws
The third form of kin relations are those with the family-in-law. We asked
only for the closest in-law relations: parents-in-law, brothers-in-law, and
sisters-in-law. Because of patrilocality, the wife's relationships with her
husband's family are more frequent and intimate than a man's relation-
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ships with bis wife (or wives') family. Let us, therefore, start from the
perspective of the femaie respondents. The attitude of the wife towards
her parents-in-law (bakwegatï) is füll of respect. She should avoid her
father-in-law (babetalà) as much as possible and may only treat him with
humbleness and respect. As already mentioned, her mother-in-law (nina-
tala) regards her as a 'handmaid' and delegates many of the home-based
activities to her daughter-in-law rather than to her own daughters when
present on the homestead. As the marriage matures, however, the respect
observances may gradually atrophy.
The wife's relationship with her brothers-in-law (umkhuluwhake )
differs according to their age compared with her husband's. Brothers older
than her husband might come to be as a father-in-law, because one of
them might become the future head of the homestead and family.
Younger brothers might become her husbands and they may call her
jokingly 'my wife', while she may answer jokingly 'my husband'. In fact,
the levirate relationship is füll of problems and is seldom gladly accepted
by a brother, particularly when hè has his own wife. Her sisters-in-law are
also called umkhuluwhake , and that is the same name the brothers and
sisters-in-law use for the wife of their brother. It connotes mutual obliga-
tions and familiarities and a potential link through marriage.
The relationship of male respondents with their parents-in-law is
somewhat different from that in a woman's case. As for his wife and her
father-in-law, the husband has the same avoiding relationship with his
mother-in-law (umatekala ). With his father-in-law (ubabetala) the husband
has a good relationship and he will treat him with respect and courtesy.
They will sometimes cooperate in male occupations and a good son-in-law
is recognized as an asset in economie ventures. With his wife's brothers
and sisters (together called baluma) the husband has familial relation-
ships. Towards his wife's older brothers' wives, however, he will show an
avoiding behaviour, as they could become his potential mother-in-law.
For practical reasons, we analyze the survey data with respect to exchange
with parents-in-law in Section 9.2, which deals with support in the case of
old age. In the remainder of this section, we limit ourselves to a dis-
cussion of the exchange relations with brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law,
for which Tables 7.7 and 7.8 present the data.
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Table 7.7. Exchange relations with brothers and sisters-in-law
Relation
Brothers-
in-law
Sisters-
in-law
Indicators
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Resources
No exchange
Giving
Mutual
Receiving
Resources
Male respondents
85.4%
2.1%
6.3%
6.3%
Money +
Groceries
75.6%
6.7%
11.1 %
6.7%
Groceries
Femaie respondents
61.5%
5.9%
14.9%
18.0 %
Money + Groceries
65.1 %
10.3 %
14.5 %
10.2 %
Groceries + Taking
care of children
Source: Survey 1990
7.6.2.The exchange relations of femaie respondents with in-laws
Looking at the exchange relations between femaie respondents and
brothers-in-law, several significant relationships could be found. First, the
higher the income, the more femaie respondents are involved in exchange
relations (E34); also, the higher the income, the more the incidence of
'giving'to brothers-in-law (E35). With age, the pattern is just the opposite:
the older the person, the less the incidence of exchange (E36); also, when
exchange takes place, the main direction is 'receiving' (E37). It was
surprising to find that widows have a low incidence of exchange with
brothers-in-law: one would expect the opposite. Those widows, however,
who exchange 'receive', which is in accordance with Swazi law and
custom. It has already been observed that widows are often not well taken
care of by their male in-laws. The aversion of brothers-in-law to support-
ing or even marrying their brother's wife is shown here. In Chapter 9,
wecome back to this discussion. The relationship to the homestead head
proved to be less significant in the incidence and direction of exchange.
Some same patterns can be found in the exchange relations between
femaie respondents and their sisters-in-law. They very often already have
a close social relationship, and this seems to translate itself also into
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economie exchange. Income is a significant determinant in the incidence
of exchange (E38): the higher the income, the more the direction is
'giving' (E39). Age proved to be significant for the incidence: the older
the person, the less the incidence (E40); but âge was not significant in
determining thé direction of exchange, although some association could be
found. Marital status was very significant for thé direction of exchange:
most widows tend to receive from their sisters-in-law (E42). It seems that
thé sisters-in-law play thé rôle thé brothers-in-law should play, or it might
be that sisters-in-law act on behalf of their husbands. The relationship to
thé head also proved to be important. Those women who were not the
head's wife had a higher incidence of exchange, especially those women
who are thé daughter-in-law on thé homestead (E43). Daughters-in-law
normally do not receive much compassion from their mother-in-law, but
thé bonds with thé sisters-in-law are strong, for they are in thé same posi-
tion versus thé mother-in-law. The solidarity bonds can become, therefore,
also very strong, expressing themselves in mutual support, and so on.
7.6.3.Exchange relations of mâle respondents with in-laws
For thé mâle respondents, a low incidence of exchange with thé brothers-
in-law was found. This is obvious, as brothers-in-law belong to another
lineage. A mâle Swazi bas, in thé first place, lus responsibilities towards
his own lineage. His wife's lineage cornes second. This is somewhat
différent with his brothers' wives. They belong to his lineage now and thé
male respondent is responsible through thé levirate raies. Those who were
not the head had a higher incidence of exchange with their sisters-in-law
(E44). This can be explained by the fact that the head, even when he is
thé brother-in-law, should be treated as a father-in-law, and 'informai'
relations with him are impossible for sisters-in-law. Many heads, therefore,
avoid strong (exchange) relations with their sisters-in-law. Those who are
not the head, are often younger brothers of thé family. It bas already been
explained that their relationship with their sisters-in-law is loose and
informai. There is more scope, then, for also maintaining exchange
relations.
Furthermore, income proved to be significant in thé direction: thé
higher their income, thé more mâle respondents tend to give to their
sisters-in-law (E45). It also means that those with lower incomes tend to
'receive' from their sisters-in-law, who in this case may be acting on behalf
of the brother they are married to.
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1,1, An évaluation of kinship relations as social security
mechanism
Anthropological theory generally maintains that kinship Systems are
perfect solidarity groups. But is this statement supportée by thé above
data on rural Swaziland? There are indications that the system of kinship
relations still exists and opérâtes, also with respect to ils social security
runction, but this conclusion should be treated with care. In this section,
some qualifications are made, based on thé presented fîndings.
In thé first place, and in faveur of the statement above, thé ob-
servation must be made that thé strength of kinship relations may be
stronger than suggested above, because of limitations resulting from thé
way in which thé data were collected. The data were collected by survey,
measuring one moment in time; they also depend on the good or bad
memory of thé respondents at that particular moment. Moreover, we did
not ask respondents about exchange relations with, for instance, each
brother or sister they had, but with brothers and with sisters as a sub-
group.
In thé second place, and at odds with the above statement, the
figures presented in thé previous sections clearly also show that kinship
relations frequently do not include exchange relations. So, has this always
been the case? Because of a lack of longitudinal data, this question can
hardly be answered, but some useful remarks can still be made. The older
ethnographie sources state that, in their time (1930s), thé homestead and
thé clan were still the main institutions in each Swazi's life. Kinship still
largely determined social and economie life. The Swazi society still had
characteristics of what Raatgever (1988:143) calls the 'lineage economy':
the kinship system is the dominant social organisation, and it is the
kinship system which détermines thé objectives of and sets limits to thé
economie acts of kinship members. The kinship relations détermine thé
nature of the economie relationships (Raatgever 1988:143). Production,
consumption, exchange and distribution operated within thé limits set by
thé kinship system. Raatgever (1988:146) states that thé lineage economy
is very strong: it not only provides its members - by thé way in which it is
organised - with a broad package of provisions, but is also strengthened
further by thé ideological structure underlying thé lineage economy which
binds individuals to thé lineage economy and gives them a sensé of
inescapability. The kinship system is, at the same time, the ideological
structure that régulâtes thé obligations between ancestors, parents and
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descendants. Land and fertility are the work of the ancestors, and man
exists because of bis or her parents. The economie output, therefore, is
thé resuit of thé work of many générations and should be considered as a
social good that needs to be available for redistribution. Nevertheless,
Raatgever (1988:146) concludes that thé lineage economy is as vulnérable
as any other social or économie form of organisation. This brings us to
our kinship in Swaziland again. How strong is it or has it been?
What we can conclude from thé presented data and from field obser-
vations during the in-depth study is that the size of the lineage economy
has at least shrunk. With this statement we mean that, although kinship
relations are still there and are also recognized as such by thé partici-
pants, only a few out of the many kinship relations actually also lead to
exchange and redistribution. Only with close relatives, such as füll
brothers, füll sisters, parents, paternal uncles and aunts, do the kinship
relations resuit in economie relationships and do they still détermine
several économie obligations. When respondents were asked about their
ties with other related people, including clan members, they acknowledged
that these people belong to their kin, but they feit no économie obliga-
tions towards them. Not only the 'scale' of the lineage economy, but also
the intensity has apparently shrunk. Even with close relatives, as we have
seen, exchange relations are sometimes not very widespread. This, too, is
an indication of thé décline of the lineage economy.
Bossert (1985:197), in nis study on Tanzania, gives two explanations
for this décline. The first explanation is that people have become
materially more independent of family and kin members, as a result of
the introduction of the market economy, the spread of wage labour, the
introduction during colonial tunes of a state apparatus and new laws, and
the provision of health care and food by the state in tunes of need. The
second explanation put forward by Bossert is the introduction of Christi-
anity, which affected the ideological structure underlying the lineage
economy. The ancestor culture and traditional magical sanctions against
violating social norms and rules were questioned, and people became
intellectually more independent of those who proclaimed and represented
the ideological ideas, namely the elderly. Although it cannot be stated
with füll certainty, it is very likely that these developments have also
undermined the Swazi lineage economy from the beginning of last cen-
tury, with conséquences also for the extent to which the kinship system
also still opérâtes as social security mechanism. It would be premature to
conclude that thé kinship system as social security mechanism has been
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destroyed, but the scale and intensity of its opération as such has certainly
declined.
The décline of the lineage economy, and therefore the décline of the
kinship System as social security mechanism, does not mean that there is
no résistance to such a tendency. As Zacher (1988:30) states, old units will
try to incorporate new possibilities. Good examples of this in Swaziland
are: the participation of the rural family in the wage of the member who
earns in the mines or in towns; the participation of the rural family in the
new possibilities for satisfying needs which open up in town; the participa-
tion of the rural family in the social benefits the town-dwelling member
receives; and also the opportunity of the same member who has worked
and earned in the town - without breaking the link with the rural family -
to return to the rural family when the town no longer offers hun a
possibility of subsistence. Russell (1985) has described extensively, for
instance, how migrants and their monetary earnings are kept within thé
kinship System by 'new' rules with respect to redistribution and exchange,
However, as Zacher (1988:30) also concludes, "the possibilities of solving
the problems by forming new rules in the spirit of the old standards
remain limited". Other parties in society, such as the state, also play a rôle
in developing countries nowadays. In pursuing modernisation objectives
and trying to change social values, the state may introducé a législation
that opposes older social rules and standards. This can also be observed
in the social security field. State-organised social security provisions arise
for wage-labourers, and législation forces them to participate by making
contributions. A proportion of their monetary earnings, therefore, are
directed to the state and withdrawn from the lineage economy and its
'social security circuit'.
In sum, the direction in which the kinship system as social security
mechanism in rural Swaziland will go is uncertain. There are signs of a
décline in the capacity and scale of its opération as such, but interpreting
this as its 'destruction' would be incorrect and certainly premature.
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8. SWAZI SOCIAL SECURITYMECHANISMS:
NEIGHBOURHOOD, ASSOCIATIONS AND CHEEFDOMS
8.1. Introduction
In this chapter attention is paid to those rural social security mechanisms
that are not based on social relationships resulting from homestead
membership or kinship. Social relations with neighbours, (members of)
associations and the chief also have a fonction in providing social security
resources to people and entitling them to these resources. In most cases,
exchange relations with neighbours and within associations are based on
reciprocity, while the exchange relations with the chief have a
redistributive character. Exchange relations in terms of social security with
neighbours differs from exchange within associations in terms of
enforceability. Exchange relations within associations are often more
'formalized' than those between neighbours. The exchange relations with
the chief are not only highly formalized but also hierarchical. The differ-
ent sets of relationships will therefore be analyzed separately, according to
the scheme provided in Chapter 4.
In Section 8.2.,the social security 'content' of neighbour relations are
examined. In Section 8.3., associations are analyzed and, in Section 8.4,
attention is paid to the rôle of the chiefdom in providing social security.
8.2. Neighbour relations
Generally, neighbours can be another source of material and immaterial
support in the event of adversities and contingencies. Forms of economie
coopération may also exist between neighbours. The extent to which
mutual support and coopération takes place in a spécifie society will
largely depend on the prevailing values and understanding of what 'good'
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neighbourliness is. This may vary from 'not being a nuisance to your
neighbours' to intensive contacts by ways of visiting, support and coopér-
ation. Différences can also be found within societies and can often be
observed between rural and urban areas, big cities and small villages, and
even between city quarters.
Apart from kin, in rural Swaziland the neighbours will, in many
cases, be the first to address in the event of need. The following applies
also in Swaziland: 'a good neighbour is better than a far friend'. Studies
on relations between neighbours in rural Swaziland are scarce. One of the
major reasons could be that in many cases the neighbours are kin, which
submits the mutual 'neighbours' to the rules of kinship behaviour as
described in the previous section. Kuper (1947:1948) already argues that
"a man who seeks a new home thinks of his relatives and friends. Most
men consider a kinship tie adds to local security". This attitude is found in
other parts of Africa as well. Bossert (1985:41), for example, has observed
the same behaviour in Tanzania, and he also gives as explanation that it is
very likely that coopération and help can much more readily be expected
from relatives than from neighbours.
The whole idea of 'neighbourliness' is difficult to grasp in rural
Swaziland. As outlined in Chapter 6, no villages exist in Swaziland and
people do not live as near to each other as is the case in villages. The
Swazi distinguish, however, a form of local Community within the chief-
dom. Kasenene (1993) mentions the bomakhelwane , which includes all
people who live on the same ridge or in the same valley, or are within
'shouting distance' of one another. Hughes (1972:121) has observed that
"every Homestead Head can name a number of others whom hè calls
'neighbours' (makelwane). These are usually those whose Homestead are
nearest to his own, but he may include one that is 'next door but one', if it
is close. Similarly one that is 'next door' in a particular direction may be
excluded if it is some distance away". Hughes (1972:123) refers to these
groupings as "Neighbour Clusters". According to Hughes (1972:126), these
clusters have a limited importance as units of local organization, as the
Swazi do not have a vernacular title for these groupings. But if the
clusters are regarded as a mechanism for social control, they have an
important part to play. It is these neighbour clusters we discuss in this
section. Aggregations at a higher level (community and chiefdom) are
discussed in the next two sections.
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Neighbours have various obligations towards one another. One of the
major obligations is 'watching' the neighbour's homestead. If there are
cattle in the neighbour's fields, or signs of fire on the neighbour's home-
stead, or if the neighbours have been summoned to a tribute labour
garnering, one should warn the neighbours and watch their homestead in
their absence. Neighbours are therefore always included among those
invited to 'smoke beer' (Hughes 1972:121). This is a portion of any beer
brewed in the homestead which should be set aside for free distribution.
The term kunata intutu (lit. 'to drink the smoke') is a référence to the
firewatching duty. In addition, the beer is normally given in exchange for
any favour done by the neighbour. Neighbours are not supposed to
exchange money or other items for services rendered to each other.
The above duties are very spécifie and definite. Besides these duties,
there is also a more diffuse obligation to behave in a 'good neighbourly'
way m général. To the Swazi this is of particular importance, because they
believe that émotions such as hâte and envy between people may lead to
an outbreak of witchcraft. 'Good neighbourliness', therefore, does not only
involve refraining from witchcraft, but one should also strive to remove
the risk of witchcraft by easing tensions which might arise. A way in which
tensions can be avoided can be seen when a new homestead site is to be
built. The chiefdom's authorities will, in most cases, consult the nearby
homesteads on whether or not they agrée to their new neighbour. If they
do not agrée, the building of the new homestead will be prohibited or
directed to another place in the chiefdom.
Concerning the practice of 'good neighbourliness', we can be brief:
all respondents subscribed to the vision of good neighbourliness. In
practice, this means that they 'watch' each other's homesteads, they
sometimes exchange labour, or they exchange small goods (mainly food).
The latter is also confirmed by Sithole (1991) in his study on the ways in
which homesteads cope with food shortages. Apart from relatives, neigh-
bours are the first to attend to when temporary shortages arise. In addi-
tion, neighbourliness may be a basis, as explained in Chapter 4, for the
existence of associations. In this case, however, there are often more
persons involved than only the neighbours. We refer, therefore, to the
next section on associations.
The last remark in this section is on the limits to the obligations between
neighbours. The fire and cattle watching is a strict obligation, as also is
the watching in the case of absence. To give beer in return is obligatory.
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But neighbours are not obligea, for example, to go to each other's work
parties, unless one is invited or wishes to go. Hughes (1972:122) summar-
izes thé relationship between neighbours as follows: "in short, one should
never be thé one's neighbour's enemy, but one is not bound to make him
one's closest friend. Similarly, although members of a Cluster are often
khi, there is no formulated Swazi theory that they should be any particular
type of khi". We conclude that, in terms of providing social security to
homestead members, thé capacity of neighbourlhiess is limited. The kin,
relations and thé lineage are much more important than thé neighbours.
Neighbours play a rôle in those issues where khi cannot, such as 'watch-
ing',for instance. Neighbours play a further rôle in helping to solve small
Problems such as short-term food shortage (borrowing 'sait and meal')
and may be involved in work parties, although thé latter is not obligatory.
To us, thé major fonction of 'good neighbourliness' in Swaziland seems to
be that a person is able to live in a social environment where he or she
has nothing to fear from his nearest surroundings. Actions between
neighbours are directed at preserving this situation. Rendering small
services to each other is part of this préservation.
8.3. Associations
The second type of social security mechanism that will be analyzed in this
chapter is thé association. In Chapter 4, a scheme was presented by which
associations can be analyzed. We will use this scheme in this section.
8.3.1.Défensive associations
Défensive associations were described as being only capable of responding
defensively: for example, operating as a safety net or, as we defîned it, as
social mechanisms directed at protection rather than promotion. In thé
above two sections, two important défensive mechanisms hâve already
been analyzed: thé System of resource exchange between khi members
and thé support and help which may resuit from neighbourlhiess. When
the term 'association' is interpreted in a wide sensé, then, one may speak
of 'kinship' and 'neighbour' associations. In this section, we pay attention
to another more défensive association which has particular importance in
Swazi society and which is not based on kinship or neighbour relations but
on relations resulting from being a member of thé same community: thé
funeral organization. Two major différences with thé kinship and neigh-
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bour associations are that membership goes beyond the the bounds of
kinship and neighbourlhiess and, secondly, thé organization is mostly
directed at covering the material and immaterial drawbacks of only one
contingency: when someone dies.
During the fieldwork it was found that the term 'funeral organization' was
not very clear to thé respondents. In thé first instance, each respondent
mentioned his or her membership of a funeral organization. Research by
Kappers (1988) had already shown that funeral organizations are common
in Swaziland, but do not include ail Swazi. The confusion was, as in most
cases, created by thé fieldworker. More in-depth information revealed that
two forms of funeral organizations can be distinguished: thé organization
that includes those people that are only involved on the day of the funeral
and one or two days before or after, and thé organization that is set up
with thé main objective of providing assistance when a member or
member's relative has passed away. The former is not so much an organ-
ization, but rather a social behaviour resulting from général norms and
values on how to act when a fanerai takes place in thé community. The
latter form is clearly a group of people who hâve deliberately organized
themselves and hâve worked out an administration and rules. Let us begin
with thé first form of funeral 'organization'.
In Swazi custom and law, it is prescribed that each member of a commun-
ity attends thé fanerai of a deceased community member. 'Community'
can be defîned as a group of 'neighbour clusters' (Hughes 1972:123). The
community can coïncide with thé chiefdom, but large chiefdoms are
mostly divided into several communales, each with their own indvuna
(chief's messenger). Hughes (1972) refers to thèse communities as 'wards',
but this is not a term known to thé Swazi themselves. We use the term
community. Our survey was donc in communities, namely Elulakeni,
Ngwempisi, and Ezokoteni. Respondents could easily indicate where thé
borders of the communities were.
In our survey we asked if and where the respondent had attended a
fanerai in récent years. Ail respondents had, and in most cases thèse
fanerais were within thé boundaries of thé community, that is, they were
fanerais of khi, neighbours or other community members. The next
question was what type of help the respondent provided. Table 8.1 gives
an overview. Help with domestic and fanerai activities, and visits to
console thé relatives of thé deceased are the most frequent forms of help.
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Table 8.1. Forms of help provided by respondents at fiinerals
Type of help
Activities
Visiting
Money donation
Food donation
Food + Activities
Money + Activities
Goats
Total
Frequency
93
89
40
33
22
16
2
295
Per-
centage
31.5
30.2
13.6
11.2
7.5
5.4
0.7
100.0
Source: Survey 1990
Money donations to cover expenses and food for the funeral day are also
usual gifts. Are there any significant relationships between the characteris-
tics of the respondents and the type of help they provide? Age and
income were significant factors. The older the respondent, the less hè or
she was involved in help with activities. Support was given either by
visiting and consoling or by food and money donations, or a combination
of these. Respondents with a relatively higher income tended to give more
food and money donations than those with relatively lower incomes. The
help with activities was the same under the different income catégories.
This finding is in accordance with Swazi custom and law, which also says
that one is not obliged to give any particular form of support. Usually
contribution is expected to be 'according to capacity', and a higher
contribution is expected from those who are better off in the family or
Community than from those who have little or nothing. In most cases, the
better off will fulfil expectations, as this contributes to their social status
ui the local Community. There were no significant différences to be found
between sexes. With regard to activities, the traditional division of labour
also extends to ftmerals. Women are more concerned with the domestic
activities, while men take care of the spécifie funeral activities such as
digging the grave, making a coffin (if necessary), and slaughtering cattle.
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Another issue to consider is whether or not people make a différ-
ence between their own relatives and other people. An obvious answer
was to be expected, but in many cases people denied making any différ-
ences. Those who did (39 per cent) said that they would provide more
help to relatives for three reasons: first, it is the custom, people are
supposed to do so; secondly, relatives are closer; and thirdly, it can be
expected that relatives will help you in return, which is more difficult to
expect from non-relatives. Checking these answers with a crosstabulation
between the relationship of the respondent to the deceased and the form
of help provided, it came out that this was a very significant relationship,
more significant than income or âge. Non-relatives were mostly just
visited, or some help with activities was provided. Relatives were also
given money and food, and in two cases even a goat was presented.
Again, as we saw with neighbours in the previous section, the kinship
relations prevail over other relations. Kinship relations are the best kind
of relations to rely on, because mutual obligations and rights are well-
defined, better than in relationships with neighbours or Community
members. Only a more strict organization of people who are not relatives
can equal the effectiveness of kinship relations.
A last question we asked was whether or not the respondent
attended all the funerals in the community which hè heard of. Only 10.8
per cent of the respondents said that they did not attend each funeral in
the community. The reasons were all very legitimate according to Swazi
custom: some of the respondents said they were too old to be able to
attend a funeral, others had chronic illnesses which prevented them from
going, and some of the respondents answered that they were an inyanga
('medicine man or woman'), who is forbidden to attend any funeral. '
The second form of funeral organization has also been described by
Kappers (1988). The funeral organization in its second form originales
from South Africa and was introduced by relatives and friends living in
South Africa. Since then, the number of funeral organizations has risen.
New funeral organizations are founded when a certain group considers
itself too large and breaks up into smaller units. Another way of establish-
ing a new group is the 'démonstration effect': people who attend funerals
see the organization at work and may get interested in following such a
The inyanga only conducts a cleansmg ntual for everybody who attended the
ftmeral This is done when all funeral rites have been passed through.
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positive example. Most funeral organizations hâve monthly meetings, to
discuss matters related to burial affairs and to voice discussion about thé
group and its fînancial statement (Kappers 1988:169). Some groups also
give lectures about killing pests and household tips. The groups are
generally characterized by a well-structured organization. Kappers (1988:-
170) found that ail groups hâve an executive committee consisting of a
chairperson, a secretary, a treasurer and committee members. Some of
thèse groups hâve together formed thé Family Burial Association, which,
in turn, supervises thé groups organized under it. The finances are also
generally well-organized. Most groups have a joining fée and a monthly
contribution. The 'pay-out' practices vary considerably among groups: for
example, when someone dies, everybody who is covered pays one Lilan-
geni to cover (part of) thé burial costs, or thé member's relatives receive
what thé deceased bas contributed, or a fixed amount is given to the
bereaved family (see also Kappers 1988:171).
In our survey, 31 respondents (10.5 per cent) mentioned that they
were a member of a funeral organization as described above. There was a
strong geographical bias: 29 respondents were found in thé Ngwempisi
région, while thé other 2 were in Elulakeni and Ezokoteni. Although thé
number of positive respondents does not necessarily imply an equal
number of funeral organizations, Kappers (1988) also found more
organizations in thé southern and western part of Swaziland than else-
where. She ascribed this finding to thé closeness to thé South African
border, which led to earlier contact with thé phenomenon of funeral
organizations. An additional explanation might be that Ngwempisi is near
an urbanized area (Mankayane and surroundings), where funeral
organizations are perhaps more common because of the absence of
'funeral organizations' in their first form.2 The réputation of funeral or-
ganizations might have spread from thé urban areas to thé near surround-
ings.
What type of help does the funeral organization provide? The
respondents ail gave thé same answers: they can expect fînancial support
for organizing thé funeral and for thé purchase of items such as grass
mats, pillows and thé coffin. The members of the organization provide
It is not very likely that a whole Community will go to town when a former
Community member dies, unless, of course, thé deceased is buried in his rural community.
Moreover, funeral organizations of thé second type are frequently formed by people
sharing the same work place. Schools, factories, shops, and so on are idéal bases for a
funeral organisation.
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labour for cleaning thé homestead, cooking and serving thé meals during
thé funeral, and they console thé bereaved. In essence, thé form of help is
not different from the first type of funeral organization. A major différ-
ence is, of course, that members can truly rely on being helped because
they are 'insured' by thé funeral organization. Whether or not the first
type of 'organization' will be effective dépends very much on community
members respecting thé social norms or not. What we did not ask, but
what Kappers (1988) found, was that funeral organizations may hâve
other objectives in addition: for example, to meet expenses and provide
moral support at weddings and at birth occasions, to reserve money for
unmarried mothers, to pay school fées, and so on. Kappers (1988:167)
states that, in this way, funeral organizations provide thé necessary 'relati-
ves' who can give assistance when a member's relative bas died.
Of thé 31 participating respondents, only 2 were mâle (3.3 per cent
of ail mâle respondents) and 29 were female members (12.4 per cent of
ail female respondents). Kappers (1988) also observed that it is mostly
women who are members of a funeral organization. Kappers (1988:169)
gives thé explanation that not only thé initial member but also his or her
relatives (children, husband, parents) are covered by thé scheme. One
member per family suffices, therefore. But, in fact, the high incidence of
female members remains unexplained. Another characteristics of the
members is that they are relatively old (an average âge of about 44). Also,
most members are married or have been married. Kappers (1988:169)
found that this is due to the requirements of membership. A woman must
be married and must be honest and respected in society, and she must be
responsible. The chance of demonstrably fulfilling thèse requirements is
much greater for older women than for young women. An additional
reason we see are thé fînancial requirements. Contributions to thé
organization are considérable (100 or more Emalangeni a year, exclusive
of thé joining fée and extra contributions in case of death). It will be
mostly older women who can pay thèse contributions, as they are often
involved in earning an income of their own in non-agricultural production
and marketing. Younger women are more bound to thé homestead and
hâve less chance of earning a money income. The average income of the
female members in our survey was approximately 3,500 Emalangeni (with
a range from 360 to 8,400), mostly derived from non-agricultural produc-
tion and marketing.
What can be concluded, then, is that only a very spécifie section of
thé Swazi rural women are members of a funeral organization. The
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members are women who are already relatively 'well-to-do'; for poorer
women there will be no opportunity to enter a funeral organization. It
becomes apparent from this example that the relatively better off are
better able to organise their social security themselves than those who
have less. This situation may be called paradoxical, since social security
schemes are normally established precisely to protect the relatively poor
in society. An explanation can be given by referring to the private-public
dichotomy. Funeral organizations are private initiatives, organized by
individuals and not by a government or parastatal organizations. One of
the major disadvantages of private initiatives (also think of insurance
companies) is that those who need the coverage the most are not 'insu-
red', because they are unable to fulfil the requirements. Governmental
schemes seldom have this disadvantage, because they are organized in
such a way that everyone can join the scheme (assuming that the govern-
ment policy is directed at providing a socially accepted level of welfare to
the highest possible number of people).
A last remark with respect to the funeral organizations in both forms
is that thé second form distinguished is clearly more 'active' than the fïrst
form. In this sensé, thé second form of funeral organization could also be
classified under 'active' associations instead of being denoted as 'defen-
sive'. As already argued in Chapter 4, the line between 'defensive' and
'active' is not as sharp as the classification would lead us to believe. In
most cases, all associations have both 'défensive' and 'active' éléments.
But which element prevails? That is the relevant question.
8.3.2. Active diffuse associations
Active diffuse associations, like visiting groups or dance associations, were
not found in Swaziland in our fieldwork. The older ethnographie sources
(Kuper 1963, Marwick 1966) do not mention them, either. Apparently
they do not seem to have or play a large rôle in Swazi society. We will,
therefore, concentrate on the active focused associations, which can also
be expected to play a rôle in the provision of social security resources (as
outlined in Chapter 4).
8.3.3. Active focused associations: religieus and ritual
The Church
One of the important focused associations in religious and ritual Swazi
life is the Church. When using the term 'Church' we include all types of
dénomination. lts importance is reflected in the church membership of the
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respondents. Table 8.2 présents the results. As can be seen in the table,
Table 8.2. Church membership by dénomination
Denomination
Zionist
Evangelistic
Swedish Bantu
Apostolic
Methodist
Roman Catholic
Anglican
Other *>
No member
Total
Frequency
118
40
21
13
10
7
4
23
59
295
Percen-
tage
40.0
13.6
7.1
4.4
3.4
2.4
1.4
7.8
20.0
100.0
*) 'Other' includes all dénominations mentioned 3 times or less, such as the Seventh Day
Adventists, the Jehovah Witnesses, the Baptists, and several indigenous Churches.
Source: Survey 1990
80 per cent of the respondents are a church member. A fïrst issue to be
analyzed is whether there is any relationship between socio-economic
characteristics of the respondents and being a member or not. Significant
relations were found between membership and sex, marital status and age
(Fl, F2 and F3).3 Income was only slightly significant, although it
becomes important when looking at the dénomination people belong to
(as will be discussed below). The relationship between sex and church was
that relatively more women become members than men. The explanations
for this are diverse.
First, in most communities men are often absent during the week
The cross-tables for this chapter can be found m Appendix F. Like in Chapter 7,
the figures Fl, F2, etc., refer to the tables in Appendix F.
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and even the weekends, leaving them no opportunity to visit the church
group or to maintain contacts with church members. Secondly, as with
funeral organizations, the solidarity among church members extends also
to their close relatives, that is, their husband and children. Given their
présence in the community, women are more likely to represent the
'family' in the church group. Thirdly, women will often lack the contacts
with their own paternal and maternai kin (see Chapter 7), thereby missing
an important source of social security resources. Although the contacts
with the in-laws might be good, women may, simply for social security
reasons, look for other solidarity groups in case the in-laws cannot be
relied upon. An indication of this appears when we see the relationship
between church membership and marital status: relatively more widows
are church members than married women. The former are expected to
receive help from their in-laws, but often this obligation is neglected by
the in-laws. With one's own family being far away, other solidarity rela-
tions have to be found in the nearby surroundings. Churches offer an
excellent opportunity.
We also found a surprising relationship between age and church: the
younger the respondent, the more frequent the membership. One would
expect the reverse. Apart from the argument that younger people are
physically better able to go to church meetings and to maintain personal
contacts, the finding seem difficult to explain. Is the Church becoming a
substitute for the more 'traditional' social relations resulting from kinship?
Is this an indication that in recent times less help and support can be
expected from kin than in earlier days, and that kinship groupings operate
less as solidarity groups than in the past? Although data presented in
Section 7.2 indicate that kinship relations do not always lead to exchange
relations between kin members, we have already indicated that the lack of
data from the past makes it difficult to estimate whether the exchange bas
become more or less intensive. This issue needs, therefore, further
research and discussion.
Our interest was, of course, also directed at the social security aspects of
church membership. Several questions were asked in relation to this
aspect. The first question we asked was whether or not any contribution
had to be paid to be a member. In most cases (41.9 per cent), only a
small contribution per month had to be paid (l to 5 Lilangeni), or no
contribution at all (30.9 per cent). In some cases, the contribution
depended on what a person could afford and, in the extreme case (of a
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particular section of the Zionist Church), 10 per cent of the monthly
income had to be paid .
The question on contributions was asked to see whether there was
any relationship between contributions and the possibility of borrowing
money or receiving donations from the church. There was no such rela-
tionship. Nevertheless, 44 per cent of the respondents belonging to a
church said that it was possible to borrow money from other church
members. 7.6 per cent actually did so in the survey year. In most cases,
the borrowed money was used as follows: for school fées, médical treat-
ment costs, funeral expenses and buying food in case of food shortage. All
these types of expenditure have a high 'contingency content'. Respondents
were unable themselves to cope with expenses resulting from contin-
gencies such as food shortage, sickness or death, and the church was
invoked as 'social security mechanism'. A major observation is, neverthe-
less, that the borrowed money in most cases had to be paid back, thus still
leaving the respondent with the problem of raising sufficient income in
future. Compared with a bank or other 'formal' institutions, however, the
terms of the church members are flexible: respondents said that the
church members they borrowed from did not expect the money back in
the short ran, were not allowed to ask interest, and sometimes the debt
was even remitted.
Some churches actually gave money donations to members in
trouble. This practice can be compared with what is known in Europe and
other parts of the Western World as 'Caritas'. 29.6 per cent of the respon-
dents related to a church said their church gave donations in case of need.
5.9 per cent actually received a donation in the survey year. The money
was used for the same purposes as was found with borrowed money. The
respondents were asked whether they received any other form of help
from their church members, apart from money donations: 15.7 per cent of
the respondents were helped. The most frequent help received was
'prayer' (5.9 per cent); a form of help which was highly appreciated and
considered very important by the respondents in question. When a church
member has mental or physical problems, the other church members
gather at his or her place and they pray together. The respondents said
that without this moral support overcoming their problems would have
been much more difficult. The other forms of help were more earthly
things. Food and clothes (2.9 per cent each) were mentioned, but also
help with agricultural and domestic activities was sometimes received (2.5
per cent each).
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One last remark in this section deals with the large membership of our
respondents of the Zionist church. Kasenene (1993) ascribes the popular-
ity of the Zionist movement (and other indigenous churches) to their
emphasis on the values of the Swazi Traditional Religion and Swazi
culture. Kasenene (1993:136) further states that this emphasis is part of
'nativism': " any conscious, organized attempt on the part of a society's
members to revive or perpetuate selected aspects of its culture". Nativism
can be compared with what is often referred to as 'tribalism'. The purpose
of nativism (and tribalism) is often to counteract social disintegration.
One of the values that indigenous churches have adopted is communalism
and solidarity. In Swazi society, values of kinsnip, good neighbourliness,
sharing and mutual support have always been emphasized. In the face of
social disintegration, indigenous churches have managed to retain and
maintain these values to some reasonable degree. Members of these
churches within a particular area live as brothers and sisters, and people
find hère a high sensé of belongmg, mutual concern and care, especially
ui times of crisis (Kasenene 1993:137). This community spirit opposes the
individualism introduced by Western values and missionary Christianity. In
short, the rise of the Zionist movement may be another indication that
the opération of other social relationships as social security mechanisms is
declining.
Older ritual associations
There are also other Swazi ritual associations, which have an older history
than the organized churches that came with the European présence in the
région. Some of these associations have been described by Kuper (1947,
1963) and Marwick (1966). However, we did not find any indications that
these types of associations were also involved in social security provisions.
8.3.4.Active focused associations: econonùc
In focused economie associations, economie resources are acquired
and/or organized for economie purposes. The economie resources may be
agricultural inputs, money, labour, cattle, and so on. These economie
associations are often also an important mechanism for the provision of
social security resources to their members. One should think in this
respect not only of 'protection' of the members when a contingency
occurs, but also of 'promotion' - in the sense that the economie position of
the members is strengthened, so as to be better able to cope with contin-
gencies or uncertainties. We will analyze the following economie associ-
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ations: rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), labour associ-
ations, and associations that resuit from development projects and self-
help groups.
Rotating savings and credit organizations
A ROSCA is a type of organization m which members contribute money
in small sums daily, weekly or monthly, and collect a lump sum. The first
collector receives an interest-free loan from all the others. The last in line
saves money as (s)he extends credit to fellow members. In this way, not
only the credit position but also the savings position rotâtes. This is why
the term 'rotating' is used (Bouman 1978, 1979). The main objective of
the ROSCA is that members bind and force themselves to save; it also
gives the members opportunities for more substantial purchases requiring
a large lump sum (Kappers 1988:172). As Kappers (1988) observed, the
objectives are often not restricted to saving money but also have social
aspects, for example, helping each other when there is a death, a child's
birthday or a wedding.
With respect to the origin of ROSCAs in Swaziland, Kappers (1988:
172) refers to a comparable phenomenon of thé ROSCA, thé so-called
'Stockfel', operating in thé urban areas in South Africa. The members of
thé Stockfel meet at regulär tune intervals at one of the members' houses.
Each member pays a fixed amount to the host, and the host provides
liquor, food and entertainment. Stockfels have an important social and
recreational fonction, but their most vital fonction is a form of compulsory
saving. The hosts are supposed to make money by selling food and liquor
at inflated priées. The 'profit' has to be deposited in a special account
which (s)he cannot touch without the Stockfel's consent. At the end of the
year, or at some other specified time, money is allotted to each member.
Kappers found that many ROSCA members in Swaziland mentioned that
they wanted the group to be like a Stockfel.
Kappers found ROSCAs in both rural and urban areas. In our survey, 6.4
per cent (19 people) of the respondents were member of a ROSCA. The
members were all female. We asked the members about the size, the
contribution, the destinations of the lump sum, and the other forms of
help ROSCA members can expect from each other. The size of the
ROSCAs differs considerably. In 8 cases, the group consisted of 5 mem-
bers or less; in another 8 cases, the size was between 6 and 10 members.
In 3 cases, the ROSCA contained more than 10 members. The contribu-
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tion was calculated by us per month, although in some of the ROSCAs
money is deposited every four weeks or bimonthly. In 36.8 per cent of the
cases, the amount was E. 11 to E.25; in 31.6 per cent of the cases, the
amount was E.26 to E.50; and in 15.8 per cent of the cases, even contribu-
tions of more than E.50 were paid. The size of the contribution already
indicates that a considérable lump sum can be acquired by being a
ROSCA member.
When the members were asked about the spending of the lump sum,
it was somehow surprising to find that no one invested the money in her
own income-generating activities. On the contrary, money was mostly
spent on items that contribute in some way or another to the genera!
welfare of the homestead. 36.8 per cent of the respondents said they spent
the lump sum on clothes for their children and expensive consumer goods
(stoves, furniture, radios, kitchen Utensils, and so on). 31.6 per cent
collected their lump sum to pay the children's school fées, and 21.1 per
cent of thé respondents invested their money in thé construction of the
homestead. 4 Thèse are ail forms of spending which, with some goodwill,
can be interpreted as promoting the standard of living of the homestead -
or at least of some of the homestead's members. The money from ROS-
CAs is generally not used to cover expenses that resuit from contin-
gencies, but rather spent on resources/items that cannot be acquired
without saving and/or crédit. Other forms of coopération were also found
among members of ROSCAs. 52.6 per cent mentioned the help that was
usually given with spécial occasions, such as funerals (which indeed create
contingent situations), weddings, births and birthdays. 42.1 per cent of the
respondents actually received such help in the survey year. These forms of
help have a higher 'contingency' content than the savings and credit
facilities of the ROSCA. Economie coopération is extended in these cases
to social coopération.
As we have already observed with funeral organizations (the second type),
the considérable contributions that have to be paid by the members
indicate that only a particular group of women can be a ROSCA member.
We found the same characteristics as with the funeral organizations: most
members are married, between 30 and 45 years of age, and have an
Kappers (1988:174) found that many ROSCAs had starled after 1984. The
members of these ROSCAs mentioned to her that the main reason for starting the
ROSCA was the cycloon that hit Swaziland in 1984. Many houses were damaged at that
time, and money was needed to rebuild them.
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income of their own above E.2000 a year; and, in most cases, the higher
their income, the higher their contribution. Members of other age and
income groups had relatively less women who were members of a ROS-
CA. One of the major reasons is, again, that Swazi rural women in the
mentioned age group have the best economie opportunities in Swazi
society to earn a considérable income. Having relatively 'grown-up'
children, who need less daily care and to whom some of the domestic and
agricultural tasks can be delegated, women have the opportunity to be
engaged in other, non-agricultural productive activities of which the
output can be sold in town or at market places. Also, women in the
mentioned age group have a relatively better social position in the
homestead than young, newly-married women. The latter have less
freedom to do what they want (in an economie respect), as they are more
bound not only to their newborn children, but also to their mother-in-law
and the homestead head, who will frequently prohibit them from develop-
ing economie activities that involve leaving the homestead site. In sum,
like the funeral organizations, the ROSCAs are for those people who can
afford it. In général, this will be the relatively better off (economically and
socially) in the rural society. The ROSCA, in turn, enables them to
strengthen their economie position and offers another source of help and
support in the event of contingencies. As only a small proportion of the
rural population is a ROSCA member, the rôle of the ROSCA in provid-
ing social security to the rural population is limited.
An organization very similar to the ROSCA, or one might say a special
type of it, is the Christmas savings and money-lending organizations (see
Kappers 1988). These organizations are seldom found in the rural areas,
but operate in urban sites surrounding government departments, hospitals
and industrial areas. The objective is the same as with ROSCAs: to force
members to save money at the end of each month, mostly from their
salaries. As a result, members will have sufficient money by the end of the
year to cover the expenses of Christmas shopping and school fées for the
new year.5 A major différence with the ROSCA is that the savings are
not paid out as a lump sum each month to one of the members, but lie
idle throughout the year. Therefore, the money is lent to members or
The relevance of Christmas shopping in Swazi society can be seen when the figures
are observed. In 1990 the Times of Swaziland published an article in which calculations
were made showing that 10 to 15 percent of an urban family's total monetary income was
spend with Christmas alone.
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non-members at a certain interest rate. The interest received is also
divided among the members at the end of the year. In this way, the
Christmas savings organizations offer an easy opportunity to obtain credit
outside the bank circuit. Since 1984, the government has demanded that
these organizations register themselves and that tax should be paid over
their 'profits'. Another différence with the ROSCA is that males usually
also participate in the Christmas savings groups. This can be easily
explained by the fact that these groups mainly exist at workplaces where
both men and women have jobs. Furthermore, most groups only acquire
members who are somehow related to other members and have a regulär
income. As already mentioned, the Christmas groups do not exist in the
rural areas. The link with the rural areas may be that rural homesteads
have members who work in town and are members of such a group. So,
some of the revenues may flow to the rural homestead through remit-
tances, as described in Chapter 6. We cannot present material on this on
the basis of our survey, as it was very diffïcult to discover the ultimate
source of the remittances received by homestead members. It would
require an extensive research on the different components of remittances
(salary, credit, savings, gifts), which can only be achieved by also inter-
viewing the relatives in town.
Labour associations
A second important type of économie association in rural Swaziland is the
labour association or, as Kuper (1947:144) calls it, the 'work party'. Work
parties are known throughout the world and have been described and
analyzed for diverse rural communities. For Swaziland, Kuper (1947: 144-
148)) is thé only author who describes the work party in some détail.
Marwick (1966:179-180) pays brief attention to communal labour.
In rural Swaziland, it is almost impossible for thé homestead to
satisfy its labour requirements at all tunes. Organizing a work party
(lilima) is, therefore, sometimes necessary in order to solve labour short-
âge problems. Formerly, most work parties were required for hoeing, but,
since thé introduction of the plough and the overall enlargement of the
area cultivated, most work parties are for weeding. Sometimes, work
parties are organized for harvesting, too. The économie urgency for
coopération is also evident in building or moving homesteads. Huge
quantities of grass, rope, and reeds are required, and thé routine activities
of the homestead cannot be neglected. The additional work can only be
donc with outside assistance. The communal labour is performed by kin
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members, neighbours and/or community members. A commoner is not
allowed to request help from non-relatives living in other communities
without iirforming his chief. The chief controls thé work of lus subjects
and he may negotiate with thé neighbouring chief for extra workers or
material help.
A work party is approached from différent angles by thé organiser
and by thé workers (Kuper 1947:145). For thé organiser, it is primarily an
economie venture and, secondly, an occasion for thé enhancement of
prestige. The organiser is interested in having the work completed on
tune; to him or her (in most cases women organise lilima'), a work party is
an économie enterprise that requires careful handling. There must be
sufficient food stores to reward the workers, and, when lilima is a necess-
ity, men go to considérable trouble to obtain grain on crédit. The
organiser cannot 'demand' lilima, he must ask or 'beg' for it. In other
words, thé organiser is not entitled to someone eise's labour power. The
reward for thé communal work is mostly a feast, eaten at the home of the
host. The feast may also include dancing, singing, display and other social
aspects. Including ail thèse aspects in thé feast will benefit the organiser's
prestige. The worker in a communal party does not give his labour
services from purely philanthropie motives. He (or she) is aware that, if
he does not assist others, he, in turn, will not receive assistance. Once a
participant agrées to joui thé work party, he is obliged to perform his task
as well as possible. This will also benefit his prestige in thé community
and prevent criticism which might threaten support for his own endeav-
our. There is no individual reward for thé worker, such a thing being con-
sidered 'European' (Kuper 1947:145). The feast is not regarded as a wage
by thé workers, because the host offers hospitality, not employment. The
work is voluntary, not compulsory.
As it is described above, the work party also has a strong social
security content. Labour shortage is a serious contingency as it may lead
to another serious contingency, namely food shortage. By organizing work
parties, without much payment involved, thé labour shortages can be
solved for homesteads in thé community. Instead of 'rotating crédit and
savings', one might speak in this case of 'rotating labour organizations'.
Kuper (1947:144) further states that "rulers and chiefs encourage subjects
to assist each other; no man's gardens should be ruined because he is
unable to afford lilima".Kuper observed that some chiefs were anxious to
see that 'thé poor' did not suffer, because they could not afford to reward
workers. People were encouraged also to help 'the poor', although thé
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reward would be low.
Kuper's descriptions are derived from observations in the 1930s. What is
the rôle of lilima nowadays in rural Swaziland? As almost every home-
stead is sometimes confronted with labour shortages, we asked our
respondents what their homesteads do when extra labour is required.
Based on the answer, we then asked further questions on labour pooling
activities. Questions were also asked regarding the respondents' own
participation in lilima activities. The answers given yield an insight into
the contemporary practice of lilima and other ways of solving the labour
shortage problem.
Starting with the 'conventional' way of solving labour shortages, 24.4
per cent of the homesteads said that they had organized a lilima in the
year before the survey in order to get the necessary labour. The 24.4 per
cent can be split up into 21.7 per cent of homesteads which organized a
lilima for agricultural activities (mainly weeding and harvesting maize, and
sometimes weeding and harvesting cotton) and 2.7 per cent which
organized a lilima for housing construction. The rewards given to the
workers were in all cases the same: a combination of beer, porridge and
meat. Did the homesteads which organized work parties share some
characteristics with respect to the income group or class category (see
Chapter 6) they belong to? No such relationship could be found. In all
income groups and in all class catégories, approximately the same percen-
tage of homesteads organized a work party (25 per cent). There were no
significant différences between homesteads in the lower, middle and
higher income groups, or between those in the 'poor', 'middle' and 'rieh'
catégories. The only variable that showed some signifïcance was the level
of agricultural income. The higher this income, the more homesteads
organized work parties. This can easily be explained by the fact that high
agricultural incomes generally indicate market-oriented production, which
is carried out on a larger scale and therefore will require more labour at
peak times than the homestead itself can provide.6
Given the above observations and considering also that not all
homesteads in the survey had experienced a labour shortage in the year
before the survey, it can be stated that the lilima practice is still carried
out by homesteads to some extent. The lack of relationship between lilima
It is noted that the grade of mechanization found in both subsistence and commer-
cial agriculture was very low and in many cases absent, implying that an extension of
production always involves an extension of labour input.
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and the economie position of the homesteads indicates that the underlying
principle of lilima, reciprocal exchange of labour between community
members irrespective of their economie position, still opérâtes. It is clear
that the poorer strata (in terms of income) of rural homesteads particular-
ly benefit from this still existing principle, because their options for
solving labour shortages are limited.
Another option homesteads have for solving their labour shortage prob-
lem is to hire labour by simply paying a wage, that is, the 'European way'.
The fïrst important remark we have to make here is that this solution is
not based anymore on 'reciprocity' as the mam mode of economie intégra-
tion, but on 'exchange'. Labour is simply bought on thé local labour
market. There is also no social security element in this arrangement,
because a person who cannot afford to pay thé wages will not be helped
with his problem. Hiring labour for money is a form of 'self-help', and not
a social security arrangement. Nevertheless, we think it is important to
hâve a closer look at this phenomenon, as it might indicate a shift away
from, or at least a supplément to, thé lilima practice.
Of thé 195 homesteads, 32.5 per cent had hired labour in thé year
before thé survey. In 22.1 per cent of thé cases, this was donc for agricul-
tural purposes (weeding maize and cotton fields, harvesting maize, looking
after cattle). 5.2 per cent hired labour for thé construction of houses. The
remaining percentage covers all combinations of the former purposes. We
asked the homesteads' représentatives how the homesteads financed the
expenses. In 23.3 per cent of the cases, money was paid from the earnings
from male non-agricultural activities, mostly wage labour. In 3.6 per cent
of the cases, money had been saved from agricultural income the year
before. In one case, money was borrowed. The payment of the expenses
by the male members of the homestead can be explained as follows: first,
males have far better access to income-generating activities which raise a
relatively high income; secondly, according to Swazi custom, men are
supposed to finance agricultural Utensils and inputs. In Chapter 6, it has
already been argued that women's earnings are mostly invested in the
reproduction of the homestead; male earnings are mostly used for invest-
ment in productive activities.
In contrast with lilima, the extent to which homesteads hire labour
will very much depend on their level of income, and a strong relationship
could be expected between level of income and hiring labour. This was
indeed the case: a significant relationship was found between income and
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hiring labour (F4). This relationship was more significant than that
between thé disposable homestead income and hiring labour (F5). This
may be due to our way of calculating thé disposable income, which
includes thé remittances from absent homestead members to résident
homestead members, but does not include the money or wealth a migrant
brings with him, which is almost impossible to estimate without Consulting
the migrant himself. The payment of agricultural expenses falls under thé
category 'paid by thé migrant himself'. The variable 'total homestead
income', therefore, better explains thé relationship between income level
and hiring labour. A significant relationship was also found between
agricultural income and labour hiring, but thé causal relationship is not
clear (F6). It is very likely that thé relationship is reversed: by being able
to hire labour, agricultural income can be increased. The way in which thé
labour costs are fïnanced further supports this assumption.
Is thé practise of hiring labour a shift away from lilima or is it a
supplément? This question is difficult to answer: lilima and hiring labour
are both solutions for temporary labour shortages, but are quite différent
'institutions' in rural Swazi society. There is no doubt that lilima also bas
a high social value: it is meant not only to solve économie problems, but
also to strengthen thé social cohésion in thé community. Hiring labour on
thé labour market does not have this social dimension. Secondly, from a
purely economie point of view, the hiring of labour bas its advantages. In
a society in which income-generation is becoming increasingly important
for survival, production must be organized in such a way that the highest
income is realized. This means that inputs, including labour, must be
sufficient and present at times when they are needed. By 'buying' labour,
the producer can décide himself when, at what priée, and for how long hè
will employ an extra labour force. With lilima, a producer dépends on the
goodwill of relatives, neighbours and community members, and they will
décide when they have time to join the work party. Moreover, a lilima can
only be organized for a few days, a longer duration is almost impossible
because the participants have their own business to take care of. Thirdly,
by paying wages to individual persons, an employer-employee relationship
develops, which can be to the advantage of the employer, who is able,
then, to control and manage the individual efforts of his employee(s).
With lilima, the controlling and managing rôle is almost impossible,
because the work is performed voluntarily. In addition, a person has no
moral obligation to work for others when they organise a lilima, because
hè has 'paid' them after his own lilima, and that strikes the balance.
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Whether or not hiring labour will replace work parties remains
doubtful, however. Lilima is, in most cases, thé only solution for those
who cannot afford to hire labour. For those who can afford hired labour,
thé social element of lilima may be considered important, because it still
boosts someone's social prestige when ne or she organises a work party.
Nevertheless, there may be a development in which lilima evolves grad-
ually into a 'poor man's affair', which would emphasize its social security
function in society, and in which hiring labour, with its économie advan-
tages, is preferred by those who can afford it.
Further information on thé practice of lilima and working for money can
be obtained by analyzing thé answers of our respondents on questions
concerning their actual mvolvement in work parties or paid labour, and
their willingness to be involved. 22.4 per cent of the respondents said they
joined a work party in the year bef ore the survey. 8.8 per cent of the
organisers were community members, 6.4per cent neighbours, and 3.7per
cent relatives. Of those people who did not join a work party in the year
before the survey, 55.6 per cent said they would if they were asked. Thus,
44.4 per cent (= 33.6 per cent of the total sample) of these people who
did not join a work party stated that they would never go even if asked
for. Several reasons were given for not going: 13.2 per cent said they did
not drink, 12.5 per cent considered themselves too old, 5.8 per cent said
they would not have time, 4. l per cent had a chronic disease, and 1.0 per
cent said that people should take care of themselves and solve their own
problems. The 'not drinking' answer is interesting, and it is difficult to
estimate whether this covers another meaning ('people should take care
of themselves') or that 'not going' is the result of a consequent attitude to
life. 'Not drinking' is a rule very often imposed by religieus movements on
their followers, although it is not known that these movements forbid their
followers to attend certain meetings. We found only a weak relationship
between the 'not drinking' argument and religious attitudes of the respon-
dents. This does not mean that respondents could not have 'not drinking'
as a principle of life. However, this might then create problems for them.
We saw that a work party is also a social meeting, in which feasting takes
a prominent place. Not joining the drinking because of religious or other
reasons might be interpreted as 'not being social', with all the conse-
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quences for someone's social prestige in the community.7 Furthermore,
there were no significant relationships found between sex, age and income
characteristics of the respondent, and their willingness to go for lilima.
This, again, stresses the rôle of normative social rules in the decision-
making process, together with arguments related to physical capacity and
social attitude.
20.8 per cent of the respondents said they had worked for money:
8.5 per cent worked for community members, 7.5 per cent for relatives,
and 2.4 per cent for non-related neighbours. Mainly younger people (less
than 45 years of age) worked for money, but there was no significant
relationship between certain income groups and working for money. The
willingness to work for money among those who did not do so in the
survey year equalized the willingness for lilima: 55.5 per cent would work
for money when asked for. Main reasons not to do so were: being too old
(18.5 per cent), not having tune (13.7 per cent), illness (5.2 per cent),
having to take care of their own homestead (1.4 per cent), not used to
performing labour for money (1.4 per cent) and not benig allowed to do
so by the husband (1.0 per cent). In the answers on willingness, a signifi-
cant positive relationship was further found between the respondents'
income and the willingness to perform paid labour for others. One would
expect lower income groups to show a larger willingness, but this was not
the case. The main reason may be that the lower income groups contain
most of the old aged, the sick, and other people who are physically unable
to perform hard labour.
In sum, it is clear from the above observations that lilima still has a place
ui the rural society, and that working for money has attained such a place.
Although there are indications that the practice of work parties an willing-
ness to join them is declining, it would be too rash to conclude that wage
labour has replaced the work parties. This observation can be further
illustrated by summarizing Table 8.3, which présents aggregate figures on
the willingness of those who actually joined a work party or worked for
money or both, and the willingness of respondents who did not do so, to
perfbrm lilima or paid labour or both. The figures in the table show that
7
 A similar strong positive relationship between drinking and 'bemg social' can be
found m Western societies, which, similarly, créâtes problems for road safety policies
directed at changing the attitude. A good example that the 'not drinking' argument may
lead to new social classes in society is presented by De Wolf in his article on the Giriama
in Kenya (De Wolf 1982).
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Table 8.3. Practice of lilima and paid labour, and willingness to do so
No lilima and no paid labour
Only lilima
Both lilima and paid labour
Only paid labour
Those who
worked for
others (50.8 %)
15.4%
26.6%
58.0%
Willingness of
those who did
not work for
others *>
24.4%
7.5%
50.2%
18.0%
*) The figures in this column also include those respondents who either joined a work
party or performed paid labour. They were asked about their willingness to do paid labour
or lilima respectively.
Source: Survey 1990
few respondents actually joined or were willing to join only work parties,
and many of them combined work parties with working for money.
Nevertheless, lilima is still carried out to a considérable extent (42 per
cent) and the majority of people are still willing to join work parties.
Development projects and self-help groups
Some individuals or homesteads dérive also part of their social security
from the economie relationships which evolve from being engaged in rural
development projects and self-help groups. The bias of these projects and
groups is towards 'promotional' social security. The aim is to create better
social and economie conditions, enabling the rural population to reach a
higher and more stable standard of living than before. In this respect one
can think of agricultural projects, health care centres, éducation centres,
and the promotion of self-help groups. It must be said that these projects
are often funded and provided by the government or foreign donors, and
in this sense do not belong to the non-state-initiated social security
mechanisms. But often these projects are the basis on which new social
relationships are built up between people, and these relationships, in turn,
are used for the exchange of social security resources outside the 'formal'
circuit. We also found some examples in our survey areas.
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A firsî example, found throughout Swaziland, is the community garden in
thé community of Elulakeni. In this community garden, a collective of
women cultivate small (usually) hand-irrigated gardens which are estab-
lished near water supplies outside the homestead's official allocation of
arable land. Women cultivate for their own consumption and to create
small surpluses, which can be quickly disposed of. The Ministry of Agri-
culture has encouraged such cropping on several Ministry-sponsored
small-scale irrigation schemes. Leases were initially granted only to
married men, but since the returns to be obtained are too low to attract
men from wage employment, and since women are traditionally thé
gardeners, effective ownership has shifted to women (in thé Lulakeni
garden one mâle member could be found). Each woman has a plot of
land for herself. The chief distributes the land, but not according to
customary tenure rules. The plot-holder holds the land as long as he/she
continues to use it (Armstrong and Russell 1985:31-7). Each woman has
to pay a membership fée and has to contribute some amount of money
each month for collective purposes. Moreover, each woman has to
participate in activities which hâve to be donc collectively, such as plough-
ing and weeding. Farm inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers and whatever else
is necessary for thé community garden, are supplied by government
officiais who seil them to thé women, and every participant buys her own.
Like thé ROSCA, thé community garden has multiple uses: it is a source
of income, but also a source of information. Close relationships may
develop among thé women and in Elulakeni this has led to mutual help
among participants in certain circumstances.
In our survey, 15 women were found to be members of the Elulakeni
community garden. Unlike thé ROSCA, thé women do not belong to a
particular social category. Their âge ranges from 22 to 58 years old (37.8
years old on average) and their income ranges between E. 210 and E.
5.160 (E. 1.660being the average). The group includes married women,
but also widows and unmarried women. For 12 women, the garden is also
an opportunity to earn some cash. The absolute amounts earned are
modest, ranging from E.135 to E.360. However, on average the income
from the garden forms almost 25 per cent of thé women's total own
income. For three women, thé income from the garden was even 50 per
cent or more of their own income. One woman derived all her income
from the garden. The share of this source of income in the disposable
homestead income is low, however: on average the income of the garden
constitutes six per cent, with a range from l to 15 per cent. In one case
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only, income from the sale of vegetables was 25 per cent. Nevertheless, it
can be concluded that the community garden provides women with an
income of their own, which makes them less dependent on other home-
stead members in this respect. All the women, when asked, explained that
the community garden was important for them and offered a good
opportunity nearby for raising additional income. Also, the produce can
be sold on the local market, and so no expensive trips to urbanised
centres are necessary.
When asked about the 'extra-garden' activities among them, they
mentioned that collective action was taken in the case of sickness and
fanerais. In the case of sickness, the other women take care of the garden
of the sick. In the event of a member losing a close family member,
money is contributed, as well as food items such as vegetables, and
sometimes also labour if necessary. The latter can, of course, also be seen
as derived from the genera! norms regarding death of family members,
but the women emphasized that the support often exceeds what is 'nor-
mally' expected.
A second example in the category of the economie associations we are
talking about here is also found in the community of Elulakeni, where a
rural éducation centre was established in the 1980s. The purpose of the
centre is to provide local people (women and men) with the basic skills
and knowledge necessary to perform income-generating activities that
could supplement their income. Courses are given on making clothes
(mostly school uniforms), making baked items, and carpentry, and these
activities are also performed at the centre later on. In addition to these
courses and income-generating activities, a literacy course is given, and
the centre also runs a crèche, which not only takes care of the children of
women who attend the courses, but also provides a service for other
women in thé community. The rural éducation centre was established by a
Canadian development agency in collaboration with thé Swazi govern-
ment. Premises were built with all kinds of facilities, including electricity
and running water. The project is a clear example of so many projects in
developing countries: development is thought to come about 'automatical-
ly' if only the 'right' conditions are created. However, after only ten years,
the centre is in a state of neglect. After the initial Investments, the Swazi
government had to take over the management. A local woman has been
appointed to manage the centre, but she meets with many difficulties that
are largely due to the way in which the project was given shape. The
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generator for the supply of electricity and pumping water broke down
years ago, and cannot be repaired unless local people invest in it. Similar-
ly, other facilities that have broken down have not been replaced, because
of lack of money. Nevertheless, the courses are still given, and the crèche
still opérâtes. The centre has returned to using wood stoves, to foot-driven
sewing machines, and to those activities that do not cost money, because
there is no money available. Moreover, given the very low standard of
living in the Lulakeni area, contributions frorn the participants are
difficult to get, which means that the centre is fully dependent on occa-
sional grants from the government or other development agencies.
The current participation of women in the éducation centre is low.
However, in our survey we met many women who were participants in the
past and still benefit from the skills learnt at the centre. These women
decided to continue the activities such as cloth making and baking for
themselves, because of the irregularity in the centre's activities due to the
above mentioned problems. With regard to both activities, the earnings
are considérable. Six women in our survey were found to be engaged in
making baked items and selling the products at the local school. The
average annual income derived from this activity is E.910, with a range
from E.300 to E.2,000. The amount of money earned is, in most cases, a
fonction of the time available for baking and going to marketing places.
The average share in their own total income ranges from 29 to 92 per
cent, with an average of 64 per cent. The share in the disposable home-
stead income is also considérable: 36 per cent on average, with a range
from 5 to 75 per cent. In most cases, thé women engaged in this activity
are thé relatively better off. Making baked items requires some basic
investments in a stove and Utensils, and also the inputs need to be bought
(meal, sugar, sait). Thèse investments cannot be made without having
already a relatively good fmancial position. Most women obtained thé
money for investments from their husband (mostly a mine worker).
The same story can be told for those who make clothes. Ten women
made clothes with skills they had developed at the éducation centre. The
average income from this activity was E.570, ranging from E. 150 to
E. 1,200. The average share in their total income was around 45 per cent,
ranging from 8 to 100 per cent. In five cases, selling clothes constituted 50
per cent or more of thé women's income. The average share in thé
disposable homestead income was 14 per cent, ranging from 2 to 49 per
cent.
In sum, by teaching women skills and teaching them how to use
248
thèse skills, thé centre had contributed to a form of 'promotional' social
security: thé earnings contribute to a higher women's and homestead's
income. We hâve already stated in Chapter 6 that thé women's incomes
are usually spent on thé général homestead's welfare. In this way, then,
thé standard of living of homesteads involved is raised. With regard to
'protectional' social security, thé women explained that there were no
social relationships between thé women who did courses other than those
resulting from kinship, neighbourliness or being a cornmunity member.
There is no extra dimension as in thé case with women working in thé
community garden.
A third example cornes from the community of Ngwempisi, near Manka-
yane, also one of thé survey areas. Hère a group of women was found to
be involved in making baskets. The main objective of this group is to
provide women with an additional income by making and selling baskets
on thé local or tourist markets. The baskets are made from grass, which
can be collected 'for free' in thé area, and further inputs are almost zéro,
except for labour tune of course. This type of organisation can be found
all over Swaziland, and is often referred to as 'Zenzele association'. The
name for thèse associations is derived from thé first association that
started in Manzini, and that was called 'Zenzele', which means 'do it
yourself. This group started in 1981 and its main objective is to help each
other through self-éducation programmes related to income-generating
activities such as sewing and handicrafts (Kappers 1988:181). Since then,
Zenzele associations have been started throughout the country for ail
types of activities: candie making, making sisal products, making storage
tanks, poultry projects, sewing, and so on (Ladin 1988).
In our survey, we found 18 women who were members of the basket-
making group. Grass is usually collected together, and also transport and
marketing is donc collectively. Sometimes, a dealer cornes along to buy
thé products. The production of thé baskets is usually carried out at
home. Earnings from this activity are considérable: E.550 on average, with
a range from E.80 to E. 1,200. Also in this case, the time spent on thé
basket making is décisive for thé amount of money earned. The average
share in thé women's income varies from 5 to 100 per cent, with an
average of 47 per cent. The average share in thé homestead's disposable
mcome is 30 per cent, with again a range from 5 to 100 per cent. The
business was considered by thé women involved as profitable, and by
acting collectively more could be achieved. Nevertheless, some of them
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complained of marketing problems, because the local tourist market (for
which the baskets are mostly made) is overstocked with baskets. Only by
making high quality baskets and applying original designs and colours can
the compétition be coped with. A change of product was, however, not
being considered by the group, although they feared a décline of earnings
in future. Ladin (1988), who investigated problems of the Zenzele associ-
ations, mentioned as two main bottlenecks the organization and the
planning. With regard to the planning problem, Ladin (1988:15) states
that "for the same reason womens' groups are faltering all over the
country - they had no clear understanding of how to plan ahead and take
various priorities into proper account". The Ngwempisi group seems to
have the same problems.
The 'promotional' social security effects of the Zenzele groups are,
however, considérable. Many more women become involved 'm income-
generating activities and some of them are able to raise a considérable
income. By acting collectively, women support and encourage each other
and also strong bonds of mutual solidarity may arise. However, we did not
find these bonds of solidarity among the basket-making women in Ngwe-
mpisi. Collective action remained restricted to the basket making and
selling business; other collective actions in the field of 'protective' social
security were scarce and resulted from friendship between two or three
women rather than from being a member of the same group.
Above, we have described three examples from our field study on econ-
omie associations like development projects and self-help groups that can
also act as social security mechanisms. In most cases, these associations
are implicitly serving promotional social security purposes by creating
conditions and offering opportunities through which the individual's or
homestead's standard of living can be raised. Indirectly they may serve
protectional social security purposes in cases where association members
extend economie relationship to social relationships, and décide to act
collectively also in situations for which the economie association was not
originally established. Mutual support in the event of sickness, death of
family members, or other contingencies are examples of this collective
action. The conditions under which such extension takes place are difficult
to grasp. Looking at the conditions for groups to be solidarity groups, the
mentioned economie associations are excellent in terms of size, compos-
ition, and the possibility for raising means. However, their durability is
highly unpredictable and norms and values are only rules of behaviour
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resulting from being a member of the association. Whether or not mem-
bers also décide to extend their economie relationships to the exchange of
resources for social security resources will largely depend on the follow-
ing: whether or not all members think they can benefit from such an
extension in future; and the adoption of additional norms which oblige
members to participate in the association for such purposes. In these
cases, the norms and values are not given beforehand, as with kinship
relations for example.
8.4. The chiefdom
In this section, we turn our attention to the oldest existing centre of
redistribution: the chief. The chief is the official head of a chiefdom,
which normally indicates both a territory of Swazi Nation Land and a
group of people. Swaziland has about 170 chiefdoms. In Chapter 3, a
redistributive centre was described as a central locality or person where
resources are collected from the population, and then redistributed
according to certain rules and principles among the population or invested
in collective goods or both. In Swaziland, the chief has many characteris-
tics of such a centre. This can best be illustrated by describing the rights
and duties of a chief.
The rights, powers and duties of a chief have been described by
Hughes (1972:108-112) and Kuper (1947:69-71, 1963:34-36). It has already
been explained in Chapter 5 that, with newly created forms of govern-
ment, the chief's rôle in Swazi society has been diminished and his
authority in his own chiefdom has decreased. Nevertheless, the 'modern'
Swazi chiefs still play an important rôle. The most important powers left
to the chief are: the right to décide who shall be permitted to join the
chiefdom under his control; the right (now somewhat limited) to décide
who shall be permitted to remain a member of the chiefdom; and the
right to control land allocations to members of the chiefdom (although
also hère some limitations have been imposed by higher authorities). The
chiefs rôle 'm land distribution is very important 'm our social security
discussion, and will be further elaborated on. Before doing so, we sum-
marize the other rights and duties of the chief.
The chief has the right to demand tribute labour from his subjects. In
each chiefdom there is usually a field known as 'the field of the Great
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House' (insimi yendlunkulu). This is not the ehiefs own field, but it
belongs to the chieftaincy. It should be ploughed, planted, weeded and
reaped by the whole chiefdom. Special tribute labour gatherings (imime-
mo, sing, umemo ) are called to perform these tasks. The reason for this
tribute labour is that the reapings from it supply the cbief with means to
entertain official visitors. A failure to offer a visiter beer or food would
not only affect the Chief s prestige but also the chiefdom's. Therefore, all
subjects are expected to make some contribution, and the usual way to do
so is by doing tribute labour. This tribute labour differs from the work
party described above. In the case of lilima, the chief is subject to the
same rules as nis subjects. In practice, the distinction between lilima and
umemo is not strictly maintained by ehiefs, and some of them also sum-
mon labour for building purposes, the maintenance of 'public works', or
other labour-absorbing activities. It is difficult for subjects to refuse these
calls, although the chief is not supposed to summon them for such activ-
ities.
We asked our respondents whether or not they did work for the
chief or would go there when summoned: 64.6 per cent did or would go,
while 35.4 per cent did not or would not go. The reasons given for not
going were all very legitimate: benig too old, illness, in mourning, handi-
capped, close family of the chief, or someone else on the homestead had
already gone.8 It can be concluded, then, that the practice of tribute
labour is still widespread and each Swazi homestead responds when
labour is summoned, unless reasons as mentioned above prevent the
homestead from doing so. Respondents said that not sending anyone
without good reason would lead to monetary fines or to not being helped
by the chief when more land was needed or disputes had to be settled.
Some ehiefs also claim the right to impose money levies on their
subjects for various purposes. One of our respondents told us that hè con-
sidered this as an adaptation of the chief to modern times. As many
young male members are absent in the chiefdom because of wage labour
elsewhere, they can 'buy off' their obligation to do tribute labour by
paying a 'fine'. In practice, many homesteads seem to pay this 'fine',
although most homesteads were very reluctant to admit it. Hughes
(1972:109) describes cases in which ehiefs raise levies for paying their
fines, repairing their cars, or pay big their hospital expenses. In other
Generally each homestead sends one member to the ehiefs homestead, in many
cases a younger man or woman. We also found a high percentage of daughters-in-law sent
by their mothers-in-law going to the ehiefs homestead.
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cases, however, levies were raised for the 'public welfare', for example for
building a school in the area. The practices seem to differ considerably
among ehiefs, who have considérable freedom to do what they want in
this respect.
Besides land control and asking for tribute, ehiefs also have the right
to make local rulings, as long as these laws are not in conflict with the
Law of Swaziland and do not oppose policies of national authorities. In
practice, ehiefs seldom exercise this right, as it will often lead to problems
with other authorities nowadays. In the past, ehiefs were also allowed to
try all civil cases brought by their subjects, and court fées and fines were a
substantial part of their incomes. Nowadays, the establishment of Swazi
National Courts has deprived them of this sort of revenue. In cases in
which customary Swazi law and customs are involved, ehiefs may play a
rôle, but also hère their rôle is limited.
Besides powers and rights, chiefs also have duties and definite obligations
towards their subjects. The relationship between chief and commoner is
described by the word 'kupatha', which can mean 'to carry', but also
'superintending', 'handling', 'carrying'. The chief has a général duty to
treat his subjects well and to look after them. In daily practice, this means
that hè has the duty of ensuring that all of them have sufficient land for
their needs, thé duty of arranging temporary résidence for visiting kin of
his subjects, the duty of providing entertainment to visitors, and thé duty
of making time available to discuss the purpose of his subjects' visits and
their requirements. Many chiefs have adopted the practice of holding a
général meeting of thé 'Gréât Council' (libandla) on a fïxed day every
week, when cases are heard and issues concerning thé chiefdom as a
whole are discussed. Commoners can attend thèse meetings when they
themselves are involved in a case or when issues directly affect their well-
being. The chief is also a main représentative of his subjects in external
relations with higher authorities, and thé agent and link for higher
authorities with thé people in thé chiefdom as well. The chief must attend
thé national ceremonies, which include thé /«cwa/c-ceremony (First Fruit
Ceremony), thé annual gathering of thé Gréât Council of the Nation, and
thé labour gatherings that may be summoned by thé King. Failure to do
so may lead to fines imposed on him and his subjects. Furthermore, thé
chief maintains law and order in his chiefdom and has thé duty to collect
taxes. In sum, thé chief has a difficult position in Swazi society, because
he is supposed to protect thé well-being of his people, as well as to
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represent the higher authorities and their policies, or at least to act as an
agent for them. Both rôles may contradict and lead to power struggles
between chiefs and authorities on the one hand, and between the chief
and his subjects on the other hand.
Of the above duties and rights, the most important for our social security
discussion is the chiefs right to décide on admitting newcomers in his
chiefdom and to distribute land among his subjects. Access to land is the
most important entitlement for rural homesteads, This importance has led
to extensive studies on the land tenure system in Swaziland. Hughes
(1972) probably provides the most detailed study on Swazi Nation Land.
Among others, more recent studies are those by Armstrong (1985),
Russell (1985), and Bruce and Marquardt (1988). There are several
reasons why the access to the chiefdom and thereby to land can be con-
sidered as an important social security resource. First, access to a chief-
dom, and thus to land, ensures the access to resources directly needed for
the homestead's survival. We have to explain this by going into detail on
how access can be acquired, and what rights evolve from this.
Russell (1985:8) notes that "land rights are derived from membership
of the political Community, not as the result of private transactions
between individuals." Therefore, being allowed to live in a chiefdom is a
necessary condition for having access to land. Membership of the com-
munity gives one the right of avail, which "entitles anyone who partici-
pâtes in it to make use of Swazi Nation Land to satisfy the needs of
himself and the family" (Hughes 1972:128). In order to avail himself and
his dépendants of this right, a married Swazi man will approach a particu-
lar chief in whose jurisdiction hè wishes to live. By the formal ceremony
of subjection to a chiefs authority (kukhonta ), which involves gifts to the
chief, land can be acquired. The process of obtaining membership and
acquiring land can take years, but in the meantime the newcomer will be
'lent' land while waiting for the ultimate décision. In most cases, it is
impossible for a chief to refuse access to a newcomer, because of Swazi
customs regarding courtesy: "how can one refuse the youngest son of your
sister?" Once the newcomer has established himself and new fïelds are
being ploughed, preferential rights to that pièce of land will have been
established even if the land is subsequently abandoned. Land rights are in
principle not inherited, but because the land is made available to the
group and not to the individual, in practice the descendants continue to
have a right to the land their mother ploughed (Hughes 1972:97).
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Besides the right to accommodation and tillage which the right of
avail entails, members of the Community also have rights to pasture and
water, and to hunt and to delve. These latter rights are not exercised
through the homestead group, but are based on the assumption that
Community membership gives one an inaliénable right to a fair share of
the natural resources available to the community as a whole. However, as
Russell (1985:10) observes, a cattle byre can only be built at the home-
stead site, and herdboys often have 'territories' which they défend. Increa-
singly, pasture is fenced of, and grazing may be restricted and rotational.
It is clear from above that acquiring the right of avail is necessary
for a rural homestead to have access to important resources necessary for
survival, such as land and the food that can be cultivated, water, firewood,
pasture land for its cattle, wild fruits and vegetables, and so on. Acquiring
the right of avail is a necessary condition for rural homesteads on Swazi
Nation Land to survive. In principle, each married Swazi man is entitled
to acquire this right. In this sense, then, the right of avail and the resulting
access to land and other resources can be seen as a form of social security
directed at the 'promotion' of the Standard of living: it forms the base for
production and for reproduction of the rural homestead.
A second reason for access to the community and land to be looked upon
as a social security mechanism comes to the fore when the 'protection'
side of social security mechanisms is considered. Having access to Swazi
Nation Land is also considered to be a resort in the event of non-agricul-
tural entrepreneurial or wage-labour activities of the homestead being
disturbed by contingencies (Sibisi 1980). In Chapter 6, we saw that most
homesteads dérive their money income largely from non-agricultural
activities. Nevertheless, almost all homesteads are also engaged in subsis-
tence maize production. This is done not only to provide the family with
basic food, but also to ensure that the land will not be alienated for not
benig cultivated. The chief has the right to alienate land from homesteads
when they do not cultivate their land or continue to neglect it in some
other way. In the event of other income-generating activities stopping, the
homestead members always have the possibility of returning to agricul-
tural activities in order to ensure subsistence. A disruption of the former
activities will not immediately disrupt the homestead's food supply. In this
sense, then, the continuing cultivation of maize for subsistence is part of a
strategy of income diversification, in order to be less vulnérable to
external shocks. Thus, although land is of limited importance for the
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homestead's productive and income-generating activities, it is still held
and cultivated for social security reasons, in the event of other productive
and income-generating activities collapsing.
Above, we showed the importance of having access to land for the rural
homestead. However, the fact that every married male Swazi has a right
to Swazi Nation Land does not mean that every one has land. Some
qualifications have to be made in relation to the right itself, the area of
land available, the land tenure System being communal, and the quality of
the land. All four catégories of qualifications have conséquences for the
social security aspects of having access to Swazi Nation Land.
A first qualification has to be made with regard to the right to land.
It has already become clear above that the right is sélective: it is only
applicable to men, or through men, and to married men at that. This
implies that women have to depend on men in this regard. Armstrong and
Russell (1985:35) found that "there are however exceptions to this genera!
rule. An unmarried, divorced or widowed woman with children may apply
to a chief for land. She must bring with her a male to 'speak for her' but
often this is only a formality (...) In many chiefdoms it is recognised that
women with children must be given the means to support these children".
This observation is important in our social security context, because it
indicates that, in the event of certain contingencies (divorce, death of
husband), women have access to land themselves, which makes it possible
for them and their children to survive. This does not lüde the fact that, in
principle, women cannot own land in their own name and cannot gain
access to land use except through a male relative. As Russell (1985:22)
concludes, "the system of land rights (...)works for the conformist but for
déviants it is irksome and inescapable. "
Apart from women, unmarried men do not have direct access to
land, either. They will either be dependent on their fathers for this access
or will migrate to towns to seek employment. The situation of young man
is seen as temporary (Russell 1985), although Neocosmos (1987a:29)
states that "there is a lack of hard évidence regarding the extent to which
young married men do, in fact, return to the land." Crush (1980), for
instance, notes that many 'squatters' on private land preferred the control
of the white farmers to those of chiefs. Clearly, then, the achievement of
subsistence levels may, in some circumstances, be easier to secure as a
labour-tenant or as a labourer than as a land-possessing peasant (Neocos-
mos 1987a:29).
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Another qualification in relation to the right to land has already
been mentioned: land is allocated by chiefs, but can also be taken away
by chiefs. According to more radical views (see Levin 1985, Neocosmos
1987), this gives the chiefs an enormous amount of power over the
peasantry. According to Neocosmos (1987b: 108-110), this power has been
used by chiefs to 'plunder' the peasantry by levies, tribute labour, and so
on. The power of the chiefs has increased this Century, because access to
land became central to the organization of Swazi rural society - instead of
access to cattle, which no longer holds the centrality it once had in the
socio-economic organization of society. Main reasons are that cattle can
also be obtained nowadays by market transactions and that the 'compéti-
tion' for land has become stronger, due to the increase of cultivation of
cash crops, for which more land is required than for 'just' cultivating for
food subsistence.
A last qualification is that, as with any right, the right is never "God
given" (Neocosmos 1987a:29). The right should be fought for, and dis-
crimination against coloured Swazi citizens is a case in point. Moreover, it
is clear that the right does not apply to non-Swazi, which surely not only
includes the wealthy whites and wealthy Africans, but also the unknown
number of Mozambican refugees for whom no other option is open than
selling their labour power at cheap rates.
A second set of qualifications is related to the area of land available.
There is a discussion in Swaziland as to whether there is a land shortage
or not. Is there enough land for all Swazi to ensure subsistence? An argu-
ment used in pointing out a land shortage is the aliénation that took place
in 1907 (see Chapter 5). Kuper (1947:3) had already stated that "as a
result of (...) the délimitation of Native Areas, Swazis are unable to
support themselves by their traditional peasant farming." Crush (1980),
however, showed that the land set aside for exclusive Swazi occupation
was enough to reproduce the short-term means of subsistence. He states
that Grey, who implemented the partition, estimated that the reserves set
aside could accommodate an increase of 52 per cent in population. Crush
(1980:81) also shows that "contemporary accounts detail no mass exodus
of Swazi from alienated land either before or after 1914 (year that
partition became effective, A.L.)."Of course, in a légal sensé, the Swazi
were deprived of large parts of their land, but at lower levels of society
this did not significantly influence the availability of land for subsistence
purposes. In Hughes' terms, there was a vast shrinkage in the right of
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avail, but, as individuals, people could still avail themselves of this right as
before. The Swazi State was delivered a blow rather than the people.
Although thé partition had a relatively small impact on thé availabil-
ity of land, other developments did hâve an impact. Population growth is
one of them: in view of a growth rate of 3.4 per cent a year, Russell
(1985:13) concludes that "allocations of fertile land between homesteads
are likely to become more contentious, and increasingly so as population
pressure increases". Although the effect of population growth on land
availability bas not been exactly investigated in Swaziland, observations in
some densely populated areas easily reveal thé difficulties that will rise. In
our survey, homesteads in thé Ezokoteni area, in particular, complained
about land shortage and were forced to look for income-generating
activities in other directions. Another important factor has been the
introduction and rise of thé market and cash economy. With thé arrivai of
non-cultivators in Swaziland (entrepreneurs, speculators, prospectors), a
demand for marketed grain developed. Cash cropping became a major
income-generating activity for many homesteads. Cash cropping was
further encouraged by post-independence state policy, directed at
increased crop production and marketable surpluses to achieve 'self-
reliance'. With thé increase in cash crops, land holding came to be
regarded in a new light. In the past, land was only seen as a source of
food supply for thé family, not as an entrepreneurial resource. The rise of
cash cropping increased thé demand for land. Until then, as Russell
(1985:13) concludes, "the 'traditional' System has worked because the land
has not been used to produce cash, for which there is an elastic demand.
The implicit principle 'from each according to his ability, to each accord-
ing to his need' has worked because thé needs of homestead members for
thé products of its fields are finite and inelastic". The need and drive for
cash by homesteads led, therefore, to thé inelastic 'land market' becoming
an elastic one. In thé previous paragraph, we saw that this development
not only leads to greater power and control for thé chiefs, but also to a
compétition starting among homesteads to get thé best parts of land and
as much land as possible. In this compétition, some homesteads will win
and others will lose, and the losers may be deprived of their main basis of
subsistence.
A third set of qualifications deals with an important characteristic of the
land tenure system, that is, that it is communal. It is sometimes put
forward that, technically, everybody not living on freehold land is landless,
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since all other areas are communal and belong to the King. People on
Swazi Nation Land do not own land, which créâtes insecurity of tenure,
no immoveable asset to pledge as collatéral for loans, and a lack of free-
dom to develop the land as they choose. The insecurity of tenure has
already been discussed above. It makes people 'vulnérable' to the power
of the chief and the administration he represents. Resettlement is always
a threat for homesteads. And if homesteads are not banished by the chief,
they may be forced to move by other initiatives. Although not exactly a
banishment, a central principle of the Rural Development Areas Pro-
gramme was (and still is) resettlement. Under that Programme, entire
communities were expected to vacate fertile lands and relocate their
houses on less fertile land, its exact location to be negotiated between
experts and community représentatives. In short, the right to land is
counterpoised by the insecurity of tenure when having it. There is always
the risk that one will be banished or forced to move because of the
development plans of higher authorities.
With regard to the use of land as collatéral, Russell (1985:20) argues
that "since land cannot be pledged, its occupants are spared the tempta-
tion of indebtedness and the entailed threat of expropriation. In this way
the weak are protected from landlessness". She also refers to a study of
Guma and Simelane (1983), which found that few people reckoned lack
of credit to be a constraint in their economie endeavours, as indebtedness
was feared and disliked. But there is also another side of Russell's argu-
ment, as it overlooks the rôle of land tenure in agricultural development
processes. The aversion of credit and indebtedness can, in most cases, be
ascribed to lack of information rather than to a 'natural' aversion. Other-
wise, one cannot explain why most stores in towns in Swaziland offer
credit to their customers and most customers appreciate these offers. For
those farmers who have no further assets to pledge as collatéral, it is very
difficult to undertake the initial investments when they want to extend and
intensify their agricultural activities. Por major investments, credit is
necessary. Although the lack of use of credit among Swazi farmers can be
ascribed to more than one factor, the lack of collatéral is surely one of
them, effectively preventing further investments in agriculture. In this way,
communal land tenure slows down agricultural development and, in turn,
the economie development of the nation. The farmers who have cattle can
use these cattle as collatéral, but they are caught in another 'trap'. In
Chapter 6, it has already been explained that surplus cash income is of ten
invested m cattle as a form of saving. As cattle nowadays can be acquired
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through market charnels, large 'stocks' can be built up. Thèse 'stocks',
however, increase thé pressure on available communal land and the
quality will also be negatively affected because of overgrazing. This
development, in turn, will also have negative conséquences for agricultural
productivity and rural development.
The former qualification is also related to thé observation that
communal land tenure may lead to a lack of freedom to develop the land
as one wishes. Especially the change-over to cash cropping is affected by
it. Hughes (1972:221) summarizes thé point: "there is no actual prohib-
ition on an individual growing cash crops on lus arable allocation. Never-
theless there are many who argue that their large-scale production on
thèse allocations would be a violation of Swazi custom. Thinking is far
from clear on this particular issue, and varies greatly from one area to
another and between individuals. " The main danger to families who
violate local norms is that they make themselves vulnérable to accusations
of witchcraft. Shice success and failure in most endeavours are believed to
be manipulable through people making use of supernatural forces,
resentment against thé successful is likely to be expressed in witchcraft
accusations. It is clear that, in this case, social norms and rules rather than
économie arguments are determining économie decision-making.
The fourth qualification deals with thé quality of the land. As can be seen
in Appendix B, Swaziland bas four ecological zones. The land quality
between thèse zones differs sharply, from thé dry and less fertile Lowveld
to a very fertile Middleveld. Because of différences in land quality,
population pressure in thé Middleveld is higher than in thé other ecologi-
cal zones.9 However, because of the better land quality, Middleveld
families need less land than in thé other ecological zones. Nevertheless, in
some régions, especially those surrounding urban areas, gréât pressure on
land exists, with conséquences for both land availability and land quality.
Besides quality différences due to différent agro-ecological condi-
tions, another important factor in determining land quality is the degree
of environmental dégradation. And in this respect we should not only
think of degrading land for agricultural purposes, but also dégradation of
pasture land because of overgrazing, firewood scarcity because of defor-
estation, and water shortages because of désertification. Ail thèse pro-
y
 Another reason for the relatively high population density of the Middleveld is that
it is also the most urbanised area of Swaziland, which attracts people who are gomg to hve
m thé pen-urban areas.
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cesses of dégradation can be observed throughout Swaziland and hâve, in
many cases, devastating effects on thé homestead economy. Not only are
thé basic supplies of fuel, water and food for daily subsistence threatened,
but also income-generating activities are distorted. Those homesteads that
are dépendent on cash cropping are confronted with declining production.
And as female income-generating activities in most cases need inputs
from the environment (grasses, fruits and vegetables, firewood, water, and
so on), women's activities are also threatened. In Chapter 6, we indicated
thé important rôle of women's income-generating activities for thé daily
welfare of thé homestead members. This welfare would be seriously
endangered if women's income were to décline or stop. Agarwal's study
(1991) is a good example of what can happen to rural family groups when
environmental dégradation takes place.
In this section, we paid attention to thé chief as redistributive centre. In
the context of our social security discussion, thé distribution of land by the
chiefs is their most important social security rôle. This is the reason that
we went into détail on access to land and land tenure and thé problems
that go with it. The right of access, the quantity of land available, thé
communal tenure System and the land quality together détermine thé
extent to which land can operate as a social security resource for rural
homesteads. It has also been shown that récent social and économie
developments, such as population growth and cash cropping, increase thé
pressure on land, thereby at thé same tune strengthening thé chiefs'
powers. The way in which powers are exercised by chiefs differs sharply
among them, but there is évidence that some of them use their increased
power to 'squeeze' their subjects through higher levies, tribute labour,
fuies, and so on.
The most recent development with regard to land is taking place at
the level of policy makers. To promote 'modem' économie development
and to stop environmental dégradation, plans have been developed to
abolish thé communal land tenure System on Swazi Nation Land (see
Bruce and Marquardt 1988). Of course, thèse plans are causing many
political struggles between thé traditionalists and chiefs, on the one hand,
and thé central policy makers, on thé other hand. What the effects of a
change from communal to individual land tenure on thé social security
position of rural homesteads would be is very uncertain. On the one hand,
if it indeed leads to more rapid économie development because of rising
agricultural productivity, this may benefit the rural population in thé long
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run, although much will depend on the 'trickling down' effects. On the
other hand, it cannot be denied that the communal land tenure system to
some extent protects the weak in the rural society, as the right of avail
applies to each homestead in a given Community. It provides the poorer
homesteads, in particular, with means of subsistence which they could not
afford to buy in the market. Water, wood, minerais, pasture land, and
agricultural land is provided 'for free' in the eyes of the rural population.
So, there is a tension hère between economie development goals and
social security considérations. The social security considérations should
not be underestimated ia the discussion, because a change in the land
tenure system does not only affect the access and rights to land, but all
other rights that are cormected with it as well. Not only would a land
tenure system be changea, but also the 'way of life' of many rural home-
steads would be profoundly affected, with all the conséquences for the
social security position of a large part of the economically weaker strata
of Swazi society.
262
9. SOCIAL SECURITY MECHANISMSAND THE INDIVID-
UAL SWAZI
9.1. Introduction
In the previous chapters, we analyzed the main social security mechanisms
operating among the rural population on Swazi Nation Land. In this
chapter, we go into more detail on the question to what extent these
mechanisms play a rôle in the individual life of our respondents. In this
way, a more concrete picture can be presented of the rôle and importance
of the various social security mechanisms in daily social and economie life.
This will be done in two ways. Firstly, in Section 9.2 the various social
security mechanisms as discussed in previous chapters are put into
perspective by pointing out their rôle in the Swazis' individual life-cycle.
Secondly, three contingent situations have been selected: old âge (Section
9.3), sickness (Section 9.4), and death of family members and widowhood
(Section 9.5). In the latter sections is analyzed what should happen in case
of these contingent situations, and this is confronted with the actual
practice according to our survey fmdings. In this way, both the limitations
and the flexibility of the several social security mechanisms can be shown,
as the existence of social security mechanisms does not necessarily mean
that they are always effective for each individual in society.
Since not all respondents in our survey were in old âge, sick, or
widowed, we took the relevant cases from the total sample of 295 respon-
dents. 119 people were found to be in old age, 207 people had been sick
in the year before the survey, in 47 cases a family member had died, and
there were 63 widows. Also in this chapter, some relationships put for-
ward have been statistically tested. The results of this exercise can be
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found in Appendix G. As in the previous chapters, the numbers in paren-
theses (Gl, G2, etc.) in the text below refer to the tables in Appendix G.
9.2. The individual and rural social security mechanisms
In Chapters 6, 7 and 8 we described and analyzed the most important
social security mechanisms operating in rural Swaziland. It has been
explained that the homestead and the kinship system have been the most
important social security mechanisms for the rural Swazi people. Both
mechanisms provide protection - at least to a reasonable extent - in
almost all sorts of contingencies, and they are directed at providing the
individual with a basic standard of living. All is done, of course, according
to capacity, which must be considered relatively limited, given economie
constraints. The homestead and kinship system as social security mechan-
isms are supplemented by social security mechanisms that operate in
particular areas. The land tenure system and the practice of lilima are
directed at overcoming economie constraints which might be caused by
shortage of land or labour. Funeral organisations, operating at community
level, are present to overcome initial setbacks caused by death of family
members, and neighbours are present in the event of temporary food
shortage and when homestead buildings get damaged or destroyed. All in
all, the above mechanisms have provided the rural Swazi people with
social security for almost centuries and can be considered as belonging to
the older forms of social security mechanisms. Except probably for the
funeral organisation, none of these mechanisms are differentiated out of
broader social and economie institutions as particular, single-purpose
social security mechanisms. Except for the land tenure system, all mechan-
isms have reciprocity as the underlying mode of exchange - the mode of
exchange for centuries dominant in Swazi rural society as a whole: a rural
society which can be described as a 'lineage economy', combined with
some éléments of what is sometimes referred to as thé 'tribute mode of
production' (Bonner 1980), in which redistribution is the main mode of
exchange.
But times have changed and, since the end of the last Century,
Swazi society has been transformed by thé introduction of the market
economy and thé values and norms that go with it. Gradually market
exchange has become thé dominant mode of exchange in Swazi society.
New institutions have arisen in order to cope with new realities created by
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thé market economy and thé changing social relations. We have described
thé main institutions operating in thé rural areas: ROSCAs and other
savings groups, 'new style' funeral organisations, churches, development
projects and self-help groups. They are ail of récent date and form a basis
for new social security mechanisms. Exchanges of resources for social
security purposes are, in most cases, thé resuit of new social or économie
relationships between people which are created by thèse new institutions.
Ail thé social security mechanisms discussed cannot solve thé
problem of poverty, but act as best they can to give and ensure thé
participants a certain standard of living which is considered acceptable in
thé given society. In stating this, we do not want to argue that thèse
mechanisms are, at the same time, directed at social and économie
equality among participants. As we have seen, social security mechanisms
may work out differently for men and women, and for younger and older
people. Rights and obligations vary between groups of people, and not all
people have the same opportunities. Moreover, thé rôle of the various
social security mechanisms in someone's life will not be the same for ail
stages of his or her life-cycle. It is important to pay some further attention
to this.
With the help of Figures 9.1 to 9.4, it can be illustrated that someone's
'social security network' constantly changes during the important phases of
bis or her life. Figure 9.1 visualizes this network during someone's child-
hood. It is clear that this network is small and contains only a few social
relationships that may operate as social security mechanisms. Both Swazi
boys and girls will have their mam support relations with their parents
and, when présent, their grandparents. The child is almost fully dépendent
on them, not only for contingent situations, but also for his daily survival.
Some 'receiving' contacts may exist with thé paternal and maternai kin,
especially father's brothers and sisters and mother's brothers and sisters.
This will depend on the parent's own economie position and that of the
'uncles' and 'aunts'. Also the latter's social position (âge, relationship to
head of their own homestead, marital status), as well as the physical
distance, will détermine the existence of supporting contacts. It is also
clear that the relationship during childhood is one of 'receiving'. As
already argued in Chapter 4, children are in a déficit-phase and have
nothing they can contribute except for their labour power in light produc-
tive or domestic activities.
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The picture starts to change when Swazi boys and girls grow up and reach
the adolescent age. This can be seen in Figure 9.2. When a child grows
older, he or she will be gradually engaged in the homestead's economie
activities. As was outlined in Chapter 4, during the courtship period, a
Figure 9.1. The individual social security network during childhood
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child will start to accumulate runds which can be used for further invest-
ment in a future enterprise. For a young unmarried Swazi female, thèse
accumulating opportunities are limited. Normally she will stay on thé
homestead and join thé parent's enterprise. She will contribute her labour
power in exchange for sharing in thé homestead's production and income.
In so far as thé young woman is already engaged in her own income-
generating activities, part of her income will go to her parents or to her
parents' relatives. Exchange may also take place with her cousins, both on
her father's and mother's side. The young woman's membership of the
homestead of a particular chiefdom gives her access to communal
resources. As she will have fewer chances to be engaged in off-homestead
wage-labour, she will not be able to participate in social security mechan-
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isms in the 'formal' sector. For a young man, the picture is somewhat
different. We have already seen in Chapter 6 that a young man often
leaves the homestead to work in the South African mines or Swazi
industry. In this case, he will have to contribute to 'formal' social security
arrangements (and in case of contingencies may receive benefits). More-
over, if Swazi customary rules are respected, hè has to share his income
with his parents, who, in the long run, may give him the necessary
resources to start his own homestead. During his absence, it will be
diffïcult to support other kin members also, but he may be obliged to do
so. In principle, he will keep access to the communal resources, because
his rights as homestead member will not be denied through his absence.
In contrast with a migrant worker, a young man who stays on the home-
stead will be in the same position as a young woman. The main différence
with the latter is that a young man staying on the homestead will have the
prospect of inheriting (part of) his parent's resources, while the resident
young woman will not.
When young men and women are married, the situation again will change.
Figure 9.3 présents thé new situation. It has already been explained that a
Swazi man and woman reach füll adulthood when they are married. They
acquire füll rights in Swazi society, but will also have mil obligations
towards others. This can clearly be seen in Figure 9.3. Having their own
homestead with its own land, both wife and husband are fully integrated
into thé rural society. Since both are productive members of society, they
are responsible for the welfare of the unproductive: their own children,
their own parents and parents-in-law, paternal and maternai kin from
older générations, and brothers' and sisters' children. Both man and
woman also fully participate in social and economie relationships in which
'mutual' social security relations prevail: relationships evolving from
membership of all types of associations, relationships with the chief, with
their own relatives and in-laws from the same génération, and with
neighbours. When a man or a woman are employed in wage-labour, hè or
she will also have to participate in 'formal' social security arrangements.
Being in their productive phase, this normally means that they have to
contribute. In short, in the phase of life in which füll adulthood is reached
and the man or women is productive and générâtes an income, his or her
social security network will be very extended. It should be noted that, in
Swaziland, a man's network is usually different from a woman's. A man
joins different associations, has a different position in the kinship system -
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and therefore different rights and obligations - and is engaged in different
economie activities. Their social security networks will only partly overlap.
When coopération and mutual solidarity dominate in a homestead, and
internai power conflicts and distribution problems between the sexes
canbe overcome, the existence of two social security circuits will be a
great asset. A collapse of (part of) one's own network, because of, for
example, relatives dying, social relationships dissolving, associations
disintegrating, does not immediately lead to a collapse of the social
security position of the homestead group as whole, because another social
security network may still be available. It might even be suggested that
the existence of two or more social security networks of homestead
members is, in itself, a social security arrangement: when one social
security network collapses, there is still another one available for coping
with contingent situations.
Naturally people grow older and their physical abilities will décime. This
will negatively affect their productive activities. They will reach old age,
and also this phase of life will cause an alternation in their social security
network, as can be seen in Figure 9.4. As can be seen, thé relationships
with thé older générations are absent, as well as thé relationships with
one's own brothers (in-law) and sisters (in-law). In most cases, relatives
belonging to older générations will have died as well as one's own parents
and parents-in-law. Siblings hâve also reached old age and will have
nothing to exchange like EGO him- or herself. Being in old age and being
improductive means that relationships with productive people are essen-
tial. Thèse people include mainly one's own children and children-in-law,
and brothers' and sisters' children. Moreover, some social security
resources may be expected from companies or the state, religieus and
social associations (except for the economie ones of which the old aged
are not generally members), and thé chiefdom. The membership of the
chiefdom will always give a person access to thé chiefdom's communal
resources, irrespective of his age and productive capabilities. In short, in
old age thé social security network becomes smaller again, because thé
amount and diversity of social and économie relationships as a whole
déclines. Thereby, thé still existing exchange relations turn from 'giving'
and 'mutual' into 'receiving'.
The above figures hâve clearly shown that social security networks
constantly change during a person's lifetime: the mix of social security
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mechanisms in which a person participâtes changes, as is the direction of
the social security resources that are exchanged within the mechanisms.
This dynamics of the individual's social security network can be brought
into relation with the dynamics of society as a whole. At the individual's
level, economie décisions, which include décisions with respect to social
security, are not only based on someone's present endowments and
opportunities, but also include expectations about the future. For example,
the parent décides to spend part of his income on his childrens' welfare,
because hè expects that in the future his children will spend some of their
income on him. But in situations in which social and economie changes
take place rapidly - such as is the case in developing countries - some
expectations might turn out to be false. Children leave the parental
homestead and migrate to town or South Africa. New norms and values
may replace the ones that enforced mutual solidarity and intergeneratio-
nal help. In other words, someone 'm his or her productive phase of life
will have some expectations about his or her social security network when
hè or she is in old age. Based on these expectations hè or she is prepared
to participate in the present social security network in which 'giving' will
dominate 'receiving'. However, rapid changes at the level of society - in
the social, economie and political order - may influence the opération of
social security mechanisms, as we have seen in the last three chapters.
Social security mechanisms might change or disappear, new ones may
arise. Individuals will be confronted with these alternations as soon as
they reach a particular stage in their life. This confrontation might not be
in accordance with their earlier expectations. As far as their social security
position is concerned, this may mean that they are left with 'empty hands':
older social security mechanisms have disappeared or been eroded, more
recent mechanisms have not been incorporated into someone's network
because these did not exist at that time. It is clear that these people
belong to the most vulnérable groups in developing societies nowadays.
They might become the 'victims' of rapid social and economie develop-
ment and change in developing countries.
Another way of putting the rôle of social security mechanisms into
perspective is by analyzing the rôle of various social security mechanisms
in case of spécifie contingent situations. This is done in the following
sections for three contingent situations: old age, sickness, and death of a
family member.
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9.3. Social security provision in the case of old age
9.3.1.Law and old age
Swazi (customary) law is very clear on what should happen in the event of
people reaching old âge. The first question to tackle, however, is when
someone is considered to be 'm old âge. The social and economie
organisation of the Swazi rural society is, amongst other things, based on
the principle that each should contribute according to capacity, whatever
his or her age. In this society there is no such thing as a 'pensionable age',
which must be considered as a typical construct of Western industrialized
societies. In the latter societies, the 'pensionable age', mostly m the range
of 60 to 65 years, marks, at the same time, the différence between the old
aged and those who are not, or between becoming economically depend-
ent on others or not. Such constructs do not exist in Swazi rural society.
Nevertheless, views exist on when someone is in old age or not.
This is largely determined by someone's social position in the rural
society. A mixture of factors play a rôle: décisive for the distinction may
be whether or not the head of the homestead has transferred his powers
and control over the homestead to one of his sons, which can be con-
sidered as a form of 'retiring'. Age in itself may also play a rôle, but in a
different way than in industrialized societies: thé older someone is, the
more he or she is considered to approach the dividing line between thé
living and the dead, between the living and thé ancestors. Very old people
are sometimes even looked upon as already belonging to the world of the
ancestors. Because of their close contacts with thé ancestors, relatively old
people are therefore supposed to hâve strong mystical powers and wis-
dom, which give them a major social rôle in Swazi society. It is not
thought proper that thèse people should still pay attention to, and spend
efforts on, thé daily struggle for food and survival. A third factor, of
course, is thé décline of people's physical powers which accompanies
ageing. Although older people may still contribute their labour power and
perform light tasks, their contribution to the homestead's welfare is often
less than what they need, that is, they hâve reached a déficit-phase m
their individual life (see Chapter 4 on thé family unit). The above factors
détermine, separately or in combination, whether or not someone is
considered to be in old age. Still, what is clear to Swazis does not have to
be clear for outsiders. In our fieldwork, therefore, we depended fully on
our assistants' estimations concerning whether or not respondents were in
old age, instead of working with age limits or trying to estimate ourselves
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the extent of the respondents' contacts with the ancestors. This way of
working proved to be successful.
The responsibility for taking care of the elderly lies with their children. It
is the eldest son who has the largest responsibility of all sons for taking
care of the old parents. He is supposed to support the parents by provid-
ing them with clothes and food, or by fully taking care of them if they live
at his homestead. In their daily life, the old parents will be helped by
their daughter-in-law. If the eldest son cannot support his parents, the
next son in row becomes responsible, and so on. When a couple has no
sons, the man's brothers must take care of them, according to age (see
also Knippenburg and Lopriore 1990:19). If a couple's own sons are not
alive anymore, grandsons take over; otherwise, the brother's sons must
take care of their uncle (who in their eyes is also their 'father', see
Chapter 7). Although Swazi custom is clear on who should support, and
therefore to whose support the one in need is 'entitled' in case of old age,
the main question is: what happens in practice? The next section goes into
more detail.
9.3.2. How the elderly survive
In view of the absence of pensions or state-regulated allowances, the
question how the elderly survive In the rural areas is not too difficult to
answer, because the possibilities are limited: either one takes care of
oneself by working and earning an income, or one has to depend on
others, or a combination of these possibilities. How do the old-aged
people in our survey survive? Table 9.1 présents the results. In this table
we see that only 26 per cent of the old-aged people depend fully on their
children for their survival. The other 74 per cent still work or have other
sources of support besides their children. We did some crosstabulation
calculations to see whether there were any relationships between 'modes
of survival' and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. The
respondent's sex does not influence the way of survival (Gl). As can be
expected, the respondent's age does. The older the respondent is, the
more hè or she becomes dependent on children or other forms of external
support (G2). It is obvious that décline of physical capabilities explains
this fmding. The crosstabulation between the respondent's income and the
way of survival (G3) is also obvious, and shows that, by still working,
apparently a higher income is raised than when one becomes dependent
on children or other persons. An interesting finding is that marital status
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Table 9.1. Ways in which respondents in old âge survive
Ways of survival
Working + support from children
Support from children
Working
Working + support from children + pension
Support from others than children
Support from children + pension
Total
Frequency
49
31
27
5
5
2
119
Percen-
tage
41.2
26.0
22.7
4.2
4.2
1.7
100.0
Source: Survey 1990
seems to be a significant factor (G4). Widow(er)s depend more on
children and other persons than married elderly. Two explanations can be
put forward for this fmding. The fïrst reason is that widow(er)s are
relatively older than married elderly, in which case marital status gives the
same results as the age of the respondents when crosstabulated with ways
of survival. The second reason is that widow(er)s are usually in a relative-
ly awkward socio-economic position, compared with married women and
men (see also Section 9.4), which gives them less opportunities to be
engagea in income-generating activities. The dependence on others for
survival will be larger then. There is an insignificant relationship between
the respondent's relationship to the head and the ways of survival (G5).
Nevertheless, some association could be found. Generally, those who are
still the head or the head's wife continue to raise their own income (in
combination with support from children), while those denoted as the
head's parent are more dependent on their children or others. Loss of
control over productive resources explains the latter fmding: the control
over the economie resources of the homestead has been transferred to the
son, and thereby also the responsibility for raising an income for the
homestead members and taking care of their welfare.
After this brief introduction into the ways in which elderly survive
in Swazi rural society, in the next sections we go into more detail for each
of the possibilities for survival.
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9.3.3. Support from the children
As already observed in thé previous section, thé support of children is the
main source of livelihood for elderly. Although there are différences in
thé extent to which people dépend on their children, almost ail respon-
dents in old âge said they received some form of support. A first import-
ant finding in this respect is that ahnost ail respondents in old âge lived
with one or more of their children. This can be seen from Table 9.2,
indicating frequency and per cent of thé respondents in old âge who hâve
children living on their homestead.
Table 9.2. Number and percentage of respondents in old âge and support
from children living on thé homestead
Respondent bas no
children
Respondent has children
but not old enough to help
Respondent has children
but they do not help
Respondent has children
and they do help
Total
Frequency
4
11
6
98
119
Percentage
3.4
9.2
5.0
82.4
100.0
Source: Survey 1990
As thé table shows, 82.4 per cent of the respondents are supported by
children living on thé homestead. The respondents who answered that thé
children did not help (5 per cent) were not totally deprived or neglected,
but either they could still provide themselves with a living and feit there-
fore independent from their children, or they had the feeling that their
children did not take care of them and they had to look for their own
ways to survive on thé homestead. Those respondents without children, or
with children living on thé homestead who are themselves too young to
take care of their parents, keep themselves alive by raising their own
income or by depending on support from outside thé homestead (see
further below).
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Restricting ourselves to thé 82.4 per cent who receive support from
their children living on thé homestead, we found that in 41.8 per cent of
thèse 98 cases support is given only by thé sons, in 17.3 per cent of
thecases support is given only by daughters, and in 40.9 per cent of cases
support is received from both sons and daughters living on thé homestead.
So, in 82.7 per cent of cases sons are involved in supporting their parents,
while daughters are involved in 48.2 per cent of cases. The explanation for
thèse figures is not difficult to find. Daughters are in some sensé only
'temporarily' living on thé homestead, because as soon as they are
married they are supposed to leave thé homestead. (One of) the sons,
however, mostly stays on their parents' homestead, according to Swazi law
and custom, and has to take care of his parents. The figures suggest that
Swazi law and custom is respected by thé younger mâle générations in this
respect.
With regard to thé question of who helps, it is also important to
note that in many cases not all children living on the homestead are
involved. It has already been stated that supporting thé parents is the
main responsibility of thé eldest son. Other children may support them as
well, and in daily life are often also expected to do so, but this is not a
very strict obligation. In our survey we found that in 31.6 per cent of the
cases support was given by only one person, mostly thé eldest son living
on thé homestead. In 30.6 per cent of the cases support was provided by
two children, while in 37.8 per cent of the cases support was provided by
three persons or more. In 51 per cent of thé cases thé number of support-
ing children equalized thé number of children living on thé homestead, in
49 per cent of the cases this was less, that is, not all children on thé
homestead provided support. One may suggest that children who do not
support 'directly' in some way or another provide support 'indirectly', as
they are supposed to contribute to the welfare of the homestead members
in général, thé homestead being thé main solidarity group in Swazi society
(see Chapter 6). This is often thé case, but it does not alter the fact that
ultimately someone has to be responsible. Who gives clothes to the old
aged when they cannot buy them themselves? Who cooks their food when
they cannot do it themselves? Who gives them money when they need it?
Who pays for their medicines? It remains, therefore, important to distin-
guish between those who contribute to the genera! welfare of the home-
stead and those who have the responsibility to provide means and labour
for the livelihood of the old aged. Table 9.3 shows the forms of support
that are given by sons and daughters and the regularity of support.
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Table 9,3, Forms of support given by sons and daughters living on thé
homestead to respondents in old âge, by form and regularity
Support
Sons
Daughters
Money
Clothes
Groceries
Activities
Other
Money
Clothes
Groceries
Activities
Other
Not given
24.7%
66.7%
49.4%
60.5 %
85.2 %
54.4%
64.9%
50.9 %
31.6 %
91.2%
Irregulär
24.7%
12.3%
9.9%
16.0%
2.3%
12.3%
1.8%
5.3%
3.5%
1.8%
Regulär
50.6 %
21.0%
40.7%
23.5%
12.3%
33.3%
33.3%
43.9%
64.9%
7.0%
Source: Survey 1990
We can conclude from Table 9.3 that there are two main différences
between sons and daughters in forms of support: 75.3 per cent of the sons
give money as opposed to 45.6 per cent of the daughters, and 68.4 per
cent of thé daughters help with activities or do activities for their par-
ent(s) as opposed to 39.5 per cent of thé sons. In the case of the other
forms of support, thé différences are less striking. The observed différ-
ences can be largely attributed to thé gender division of labour, as already
described in Chapter 6. If we consider thé type of activities that thé
elderly hâve to be helped with, we observe that mostly domestic activities
are involved: preparing food, washing clothes, collecting firewood, fetching
water, shopping, and so on. Thèse are spécifie female tasks and will,
therefore, be performed by daughters. In so far as sons help with activ-
ities, this will be in thé mâle realm: ploughing a field, housing construc-
tion and repair, général maintenance. With thé mâle homestead member
often involved in mcome-generating activities, with higher revenues than
thé female's, their support may be expected to take thé form of money
donations to thé elderly. Sometimes thèse necessities are directly given to
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them: for example, groceries and clothes. What exactly is given and in
what form will also largely depend on how capable thé elderly themselves
are of performing certain activities. Money is useless to an old aged
person who receives money but cannot walk to the shop and is not able to
prépare his own food, unless he finds someone to do thèse activities for
him.
In sum, we can conclude that, as far as thé children on thé home-
stead are concerned, their support to thé elderly is considérable. Means
are redistributed from thé younger to thé older générations through intra-
homestead transfers. In this respect, thé homestead as social group clearly
shows ils capacity to operate as a solidarity group.
Support by children may not be restricted to thé children living on thé
respondent's homestead. He or she may also receive support from
children living on other rural homesteads or in town. Table 9.4 gives an
indication of thé extent to which support is received from thèse children.
Table 9.4. Number and percentage of respondents in old âge and support
from children living outside the homestead
Respondent bas no
children
Respondent has children
but they do not live outside
the homestead
Respondent has children
living outside thé home-
stead but they do not help
Respondent has children
living outside the home-
stead and they do help
Total
Frequency
4
35
20
60
119
Percentage
3.4
29.4
16.8
50.4
100.0
Source: Survey 1990
There is a major différence with children livmg on thé homestead: from
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Table 9.4 we see that just 50 per cent of the respondents in old age
receive support from children outside the homestead. This lower figure,
compared with supporting children living on the homestead, can be
largely explained by the incidence of having no children who live outside
the homestead, but there is also a considérable proportion of respondents
(16.8 per cent) who do not receive support from their children living
outside the homestead. We will return to this group later on, and will first
concentrate on the group of respondents who do receive support from
children living outside the homestead.
We repeated the two questions posed earlier in this section. Who
gives support? In what form is support given? As regards the gender, the
figures on who helps show a pattern which is opposite to that for the
children living on the homestead: in 15.0 per cent of the cases respon-
dents are supported by sons (as opposed to 41.8 per cent 'on-homestead'),
in 53.3 per cent of the cases by daughters (as opposed to 17.3 per cent),
and in 31.7 per cent of the cases by both daughters and sons (as opposed
to 40.9 per cent). The différence in the incidence of support given by sons
and given by daughters seems to confirm the conclusions drawn in the
Paragraph on support from children living on the homestead: (one of) the
sons stay(s) on the homestead to support his or their parents, and as a
conséquence daughters live outside the elderly's homestead more often
than sons. Daughters ultimately leave the parental homestead and can
only support their parents from their own homestead. It should be noted
that it is rather surprising to find that daughters living outside the home-
stead still have a share in the support of their parents, as a married
daughter is supposed to devote all her efforts and revenue to the mainten-
ance of her husband's homestead and his family.
As in the case of children living on the homestead, not all the
respondent's children living outside the homestead support their parents.
This was the case for 36.6 per cent of the respondents. This means that in
63.4 per cent of the cases all children outside the homestead provide
support. Of those with children who help, 43 per cent of the respondents
were supported by one child, 38.3 per cent by two children, and the rest
by three children or more. The forms of help given are reported in Table
9.5.
Two major conclusions can be drawn from Table 9.5. First, the
différences between sons and daughters are less pronounced, in the sense
that most forms of support are given to the same extent by sons and
daughters. Support through providing clothes is still more dominant with
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Table 9.5. Forms of support given by sons and daughters living outside
the homestead to respondents in old age, by form and regularity
Support
Sons
Daughters
Money
Clothes
Groceries
Activities
Other
Money
Clothes
Groceries
Activities
Other
Not given
39.3%
89.3%
57.1 %
82.1%
92.9%
37.3 %
68.6%
56.9%
100.0 %
88.2%
Irregulär
35.7%
3.6%
14.3%
7.1%
3.6%
39.2 %
19.6 %
25.5%
0.0%
5.9%
Regulär
25.0%
7.1 %
28.6%
10.7%
3.6%
23.5%
11.8 %
17.6%
0.0%
5.9%
Source: Survey 1990
daughters than with sons, but sons sometimes help with activities, which is
impossible for daughters for reasons mentioned earlier in this study. The
extent of support by money is almost the same between sons and daugh-
ters. This can be explained as follows: first, the sons give less monetary
support because they have to take care of their own homestead or have to
provide for their own living in town or South Africa; secondly, daughters
give more monetary support because they have a job in town and thereby
earn a higher income than with other income-generating activities, and/or
because, for daughters living outside the homestead, money is the only
form (besides groceries and clothes) in which support can be easily given,
as help with activities is impossible. The second major conclusion from
the above table is that the regularity of support seems to décline drasti-
cally as soon as the children leave the parental homestead. Children living
outside the homestead by no means give their support regularly, which
means that it is almost impossible for the parents to rely solely on the
external support. Whether or not support is given, and how regularly,
dépends in most cases on the (ir)regularity of the visits by the children.
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Regulär visite cannot be made as easily by children living in town or in
South Africa äs by children living in the near surroundings.
In sum, it can be concluded that there are major différences
between the support given by children living on the parental homestead
and the support given by those living outside the parental homestead. For
the old aged, the support of children living outside the homestead is less
'reliable' than the support received from children living on the homestead.
In the latter case, social control and intra-homestead redistribution will
ensure in most cases that the old aged are taken care of, in the sense that
they will be able to survive. This is not to say that a socially acceptable
minimum Standard of living is also reached by this form of 'old age
provision'. It is clear that poor children have few things to redistribute
apart from their labour, and it is far from obvious that rieh children will
share all their wealth with their parents. From what we have observed
during the survey, most parents supported by their children can only be
classified as 'just survivors'. In many cases, the old âge provision means
the children sharing their poverty with their parents.
As mentioned above, we will return now to the group of people who have
children living outside the homestead but who do not receive support
from them. This is not a major problem if these elderly people are
supported in other ways, for instance by children living on the homestead.
Therefore, to get a clear overall picture, we have to combine the above
findings with regard to the support from children both inside and outside
the homestead for each respondent. Table 9.6 présents the results of this
exercise.
The table below shows that in our survey only 13 respondents in
old age (11.0 per cent) are not helped by their children, either because
they do not have children or because the children do not or cannot
support them. The respondents who had no children said they were
supported by other people, including neighbours and close relatives. The
respondents who had children but were not supported by them all said
their main basis of subsistence was provided by earning their own income.
These answers might suggest that in Swazi society a différence is made
between people who have no children and who are for that reason
entitled to receive support from others, on the one hand, and, on the
other hand, people who have children by whom they are not supported
and who, because they have children, are less entitled to support from
others. In the latter case the 'others' do not have to take responsibility
282
Table 9.6. Respondents in old age and support from children
Respondent has no children
Respondent has children but they are
not able to support
Respondent has children able to
support but they do not support
Respondent is only supported by
children living outside the homestead
Respondent is only supported by chil-
dren living on the homestead
Respondent is supported by children
living on and outside the homestead
Total
Frequency
4
2
7
8
1
46
52
119
Percentage
3.4
1.7
5.9
6.7
38.7
43.6
100.0
Source: Survey 1990
and can refuse requests for support by referring to the responsibility of
the children. It is not certain to us whether this line of reasoning is
applied in practice, but the figures do suggest such behaviour. The genera!
conclusion to be drawn, however, is that the 'vulnérable' group of old
aged in our sample is small, and most elderly can rely on support from
their children when they are in need.
The latter conclusion is reached by interpreting the figures. An
important question, however, is also what the respondents themselves
think about the support by their children. We asked the respondents in
old age with children whether or not their children gave sufficient support,
in their opinion. 32.7 per cent thought their children did not take enough
care, 67.3 per cent was satisfied with their children's support. A significant
positive relationship could be found between the answers to this question
and the several possibilities of support as outlined in Table 9.6: the
incidence of people being satisfied rises, not surprisingly, with the fact that
children help and when both children on and outside the homestead help
(G6). It was more surprising to find that one respondent, who received no
support from his children, was nevertheless satisfied with receiving no
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support (!) (see G6).
A check on thé above fmdings can be made when starting from thé side
of thé children involved. Those respondents not in old âge and with
parents were asked about their support of their parents. 72.7 per cent of
thé respondents not in old âge still had one or two parents. The ways in
which they supported their parents are listed in Table 9.7.
Table 9.7. The types of support given by children to their parents
No support given
Money
Groceries
Activities
Clothes
Combination
Total
Frequency
33
13
5
7
3
66
127
Percentage
26.0
10.2
3.9
5.5
2.4
52.0
100.0
Source: Survey 1990
A quarter did not support their parents at all, and just over half the
respondents provided their parents with a combination of money, goods
and labour. We did some crosstabulations with fmdings on thé place
where thé parentslive, with whom thé parents stay, and thé respondent's
sex and income. A significant relationship was found between the area
where thé parents live (as proxy for distance) and thé support given (G7).
First, thé further away thé parents live, the less is the incidence of support
and, secondly, the nearer the parents live, the more the support consists
of a combination of goods, money and help with activities. So, physical
distance seems to matter in this case. Another type of distance is involved
when we look at with whom the parents live and associate the findings
with the support given to the parents (G8). A significant relationship was
found: when the parents live with brothers or sisters of the respondent or
with other family, the incidence of support déclines and the support
becomes less diversified. This is in accordance with the conclusions we
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have drawn on the support that people in old age receive from children
living outside the homestead: this support is less frequent and less diver-
sified.
Significant relationships were also found when we combined the
incidence and type of support with personal characteristics of the respon-
dent, such as sex and income. The incidence of support among female
respondents is less and is less diversified than with male respondents
(G9). Of course, the distance factor plays a rôle in explaining these
findings. In many cases, the female respondents live further away from
their parents than male respondents and are, therefore, less able to
provide support. Income also proved to be significant (G10). The respon-
dents in the low-income groups tend to give less support than the respon-
dents in higher income groups, both in terms of incidence and type of
support. Respondents in the higher income groups give relatively more
combined support, including money. Other personal characteristics, such
as âge, marital status and relationship to the head proved to be less
important.
In sum, also when we examine the situation from the side of the
contributors, it can be concluded that generally children support their
parents. The support is given in accordance with the social and economie
position of the contributor, the geographical place where the parents live,
and whether or not parents are already taken care of by other family
members or persons. From our survey there are no indications that
elderly people in the rural areas are completely neglected and ignored:
however minimal it may be, the old aged are given a basis for survival.
Many of the old aged, however, also provide themselves with a basis for
survival, whether or not combined with support from children. The next
section goes into more detail on this matter.
9.3.4. The elderly and monetary income
Many respondents in old age were still engaged in productive activities
themselves and were sometimes able to raise a considérable income. In
the absence of a 'pensionable age', people in old age are not restricted in
their income-generating activities. Their physical condition will be the
main restriction on their efforts. Old-aged people are therefore often
engaged in light income-generating activities such as mat making, basket
making, brewing beer and baked items. Those who are in better physical
condition are often still engaged in agriculture. As old aged people keep
the right of avail and all the other related rights to communal resources
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as discussed in Chapter 8, this enables them to dispose of the necessary
inputs for their income-generating activities. Table 9.8 gives an indication
of the amounts generaled by the activities.
Table 9.8. Respondents in old âge by income group (in Emalangeni,
annual base), in frequencies and percentage
Income group
No income
El - E250
E251 - E500
E501 - El ,000
El, 001 - El, 500
El, 501 - E2.000
More than E2.000
Total
Frequency
14
24
12
20
19
11
19
119
Percentage
11.7
20.2
10.1
16.8
16.0
9.2
16.0
100.0
Source: Survey 1990
It can be calculated from this table that almost 75 per cent of the respon-
dents in old âge hâve an income of E. 1,500 or less a year (466.8 US
dollars or less in 1990 at the official exchange rate). This figure is 55 per
cent for respondents not in old âge. 466.8 US dollars a year or less is also
44.4 per cent or less of thé GNP per capita in Swaziland (see Appendix
B). As in most societies, in Swaziland the elderly belong to the poorer
strata of the population in terms of monetary income.
Are there any significant relationships between the respondents'
personal characteristics and the income group to which they belong? As
we have already found with the ways in which elderly survive, âge is an
important factor. A higher âge leads to less income (Gil), which has been
explained earlier by the décline of physical capabilities. Marital status was
also important: those who still had a partner were better off than the
widowed (G12). The incidence of widowhood, of course, increases with
âge, but it has already been pointed out several times that widows have a
difficult social and économie position m society (see also Section 9.5).
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Having less access to productive resources will limit the opportunities to
raise an income of one's own. The relationship to the head also proved to
be significant (G13). Those who are the head or are closely related to the
head (by being his wife or being his parent) have a higher income than
those at a greater (social) distance. This finding can be explained by the
continued access and control over productive resources. A significant
différence was also found between male and female (G14). These différ-
ences can be traced to the général différence in economie position
between men and women in Swazi society, as explained in Chapter 6. Last
but not least, the amount of income also dépends on the way in which
people in old âge survive. Those who are more dependent on their
children, have a lower income (G15), as has already been observed in
Section 9 2.2. Combining all these factors, one might say that relatively
old widowed women who are dependent on their children for survival are
the worst off in terms of monetary income.
The composition of the income of the respondents in old age is presented
in Table 9.9.
Table 9.9. Composition of the income of respondents in old age
expressed as ratio 'income from activity / total income respondent', by
income group
El - E250
E251 - E500
E501 - El ,000
El, 001 - El, 500
El, 501 - E2.000
More than E2.000
Income
from agri-
culture
0.04
0.25
0.13
0.27
0.23
0.14
Income
from
O.I.G.A.*'
0.46
0.30
0.34
0.22
0.24
0.25
Income
from wage
labour
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Income
from remit-
tances
0.50
0.45
0.53
0.51
0.53
0.61
*) Other Income Generating Activities
Source: Survey 1990
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Table 9.9 shows that there are no large différences between thé income
groups in terms of the ways in which income is realized and the propor-
tion each activity has in thé respondent's income. In thé lowest income
group, agriculture has a low share in thé income génération, which could
be due to the relatively high âge of the respondents in this group. Thèse
respondents lack the physical capabilities to perform the heavy agricul-
tural tasks and take refuge in light work such as mat making, making
baskets, and so on, which can be donc on the homestead site and does
not require gréât physical strength. In ail income groups, remittances
constitute approximately 50 per cent of the respondents' income, and in
thé highest income group it is even 61 per cent. This may lead to thé con-
clusion that the amount of remittances largely détermines thé différences
between lower and higher incomes among old-aged people. Absolute
figures on thé remittances confirm this conclusion: respondents in thé
lowest income group receive on average E66 from remittances, and this
amount increases steadily with thé higher income groups, being El ,580 in
thé highest income group. Calculations on the significance of the différ-
ences among average amounts between income groups show that thé
différences in agricultural income and remittances are significant, but
those of other income generating activities (and wages) are not (G16).
This gives further support to thé above conclusion that remittances,
together with agriculture, generale the différences between incomes
among respondents. This, in turn, also means that thé rôle of income
génération by thé elderly themselves as a form of 'self-help' is limited, and
most of them dépend largely on thé remittances from their children or
others for their monetary income. People in old âge work and through
this work they raise an income, but this income is hardly ever sufficient
and in most cases will need to be supplemented by support from others.
Apart from thé amount and composition of thé income, it is interesting to
see what thé share of thé income of thé old aged is in thé disposable
homestead income. Table 9.10 présents thé figures. It shows, as was to be
expected, that thé higher the income of thé old aged, thé higher is also
the share in total homestead income. This association is highly significant
(G17). It should be noted that this implies that a low income of the
respondent does not necessarily mean that he or she also belongs to a
poor homestead in terms of income. For example, thé respondents in thé
lowest income group whose share is a maximum of 25 per cent do not
necessarily belong to a poorer homestead than thé respondents in thé
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Table 9.10. Income of respondents in old âge and its share in disposable
monetary homestead income (in per cent of thé frequencies in each
income group)
El - E250
E251 - E500
E501 - El, 000
El ,001 - El ,500
El, 501 - E2.000
More than E2,000
0.01-
0.25
87.5%
91.7%
42.1 %
26.3%
27.3 %
0.0%
0.26-
0.50
6.3%
0.0%
26.3 %
31.6%
0.0%
26.3%
0.51-
0.75
0.0%
0.0%
15.8 %
10.5 %
27.2 %
21.1 %
0.76-
1.00
6.2%
8.3 %
15.8%
31.6%
45.5%
52.6%
Mean
0.147
0.189
0.416
0.537
0.641
0.742
Source: Survey 1990
fourth income group, whose share is more than 75 per cent in thé home-
stead income. The poorest living conditions are experienced by those
belonging to thé 6.2 and 8.3 per cent in thé fifth column of the fïrst two
income groups. Thèse respondents hâve a low income of their own, but
nevertheless this low income constitutes more than 75 per cent of the
homestead disposable income. The relatively well-to-do amongst thé
respondents are those in the lefthand side columns of the higher income
groups. The latter have not only a relatively high income themselves, but
also belong to a relatively rieh homestead, given their low share in thé
total homestead disposable income. Part of this higher homestead income
will be reflected in thé général welfare conditions on thé homestead
(especially housing), from which also the older homestead members will
profit.
9.3.5. Other sources of subsistence
Although thé support received from thé children and their own income-
generating activities are thé main sources of subsistence for thé elderly,
some of thé old-aged people also have other sources from which they are
able to make a living. In most cases, thèse sources are used in combina-
tion with working and/or support from children. In this section, we will
briefly pay attention to pensions, monetary savings, cattle and goats, and
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help from others than children.
Pensions
As could be expected among our 119 respondents, in old age there were
only five people who received a pension (4.2 per cent). Two people
received a pension from the mine Company in which they worked, one
person received a pension from a Swazi Company, and the other two had
worked with the Swazi government (as teachers) and therefore received a
pension from a government scheme. As is mostly the case with the mine
companies, the pensions the two respondents received were a once-and-
for-all lump-sum payment; the other three received their pensions month-
ly. As regards the former mine workers, it is doubtful whether they still
live on the pension, as they said they had invested the money in better
housing and consumables. Not surprisingly, they also answered that the
pension they had once received was insufficient to live on. The other
three respondents thought their pension was sufficient to live on (given
the fact that they also receive support from children or still have income-
generating activities).
Monetary savings
13 of the 119 respondents in old age said they had savings (10.9 per cent).
The amounts varied from E10 to E5.000. The reasons for saving were
various. Three respondents used savings for buying food and groceries
when they were in need; one respondent said she saved in order to pay
the school fees of her minor children; two respondents said they saved
just in case they would need money for unforeseen expenditures; others
mentioned saving for clothes or other consumption goods. It appeared
from the answers that none of the respondents saw their savings as a
regulär basis on which to live. Like the pensions, the savings were con-
sidered as a welcome supplement to other sources of income and subsis-
tence. The incidence of saving among the respondents did not have any
relationship with their age or sex (G18 and G19). There was a weak
relationship between income and savings (G20): among those with higher
incomes the tendency to save was larger. The latter finding is, however,
not very surprising. In sum, the elderly sometimes save, but not on a large
scale. With regard to thé method of saving, none of them were involved m
a ROSCA or had deposited their money in a bank. All respondents kept
their money at home, which means that savings are not seen as a source
of income.
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Cattle and goats
A more usual way of saving in rural Swaziland is by holding cattle or
goats. Apart from thé fact that cattle can be sold when money is needed,
in thé meantime cattle can be used for various other purposes, including
ploughing, giving milk and, sometimes, such domestic activities as collect-
ing firewood and fetching water. Moreover, nature itself gives the interest
if thé cattle are able to multiply. A small part of our respondents in old
age had cattle and goats of their own, as can be seen in Table 9.11.
Table 9.11. Cattle and goat ownership by respondents in old age, in
frequencies and percentage *}
Number
0
1-5
6- 10
11- 15
16 >
Total
Cattle
Frequency
79
13
12
6
5
115
Per-
centage
68.7
11.3
10.4
5.2
4.4
100.0
Goats
Frequency
86
6
9
3
3
107
Per-
centage
80.4
5.6
8.4
2.8
2.8
100.0
*) missing observations: 4 in case of cattle, 8 m case of goats
Source: Survey 1990
To start with cattle, we asked the respondents what their mam reasons
were for keeping thé cattle. Several reasons were mentioned, mostly in
combination: for milk (22 times), for savings (19 times), for méat (8
tunes), for activities (8 times), and for pay ing lobola (bride-price) (6
times). Thus, more than 50 per cent said that cattle were (also) held as a
form of saving, and would be sold when they were in need. In this way,
saving and holding cattle is a form of 'self-help', in the event of the
respondent not being able to benefit from social security mechanisms.
Holding cattle makes thé économie position of the respondent stronger,
and thereby decreases his or her vulnerability in situations where social
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security mechanisms may not operate.
We also made some crosstabulations between cattle ownership and
the socio-economic characteristics of the respondent. Cattle ownership
varies significantly with gender (G21) (see also Asmellash 1990). In
Swaziland, cattle is owned by men, Women cannot inherit or own cattle
except in rare cases. A woman can get a cow as part of the bride-price
upon the marriage of her daughter, in order 'to wipe away the tears', or a
woman can get a cow as a present. Normally, she is not allowed to
acquire cattle on her own initiative. When she has cattle, they remain, in
principle, under the control of her husband during nis lifetime. When the
husband dies, she may lose her cattle, as they may go to sons or other
inheritors. This can also be seen in the crosstabulation between cattle
ownership and relationship to the head (G22). Those who are the head or
are married to the head have cattle, but the greater the social distance,
the lower the incidence of having cattle. The marital status is another
indication of the différence in cattle ownership between the sexes: the
incidence of having cattle is less among widows than among married
women (G23). Age was not a significant factor in determining cattle
ownership (G24). Income, however, proved to be significant (G25): the
higher the income, the higher the incidence of having cattle and the
higher the number owned. Apparently, people with higher incomes invest
part of their income in cattle. The latter might be done not only as a form
of saving, but also in order to have milk and meat. Moreover, in Swazi
society cattle ownership is closely linked to social status: the larger the
herd, the more status the owner has.
Apart from cattle, people may also have goats. Almost 20 per cent of the
respondents in old age had goats. The use of goats differs, however, from
the use of cattle. In many cases, goats are kept in order to be eaten,
supplementing the diet of the homestead people with meat (30.4 per
cent). In 17.4 per cent of the cases, goats were held as a form of savings.
The majority (43.5 per cent) of the goat holders said they had no spécifie
reason for holding goats, which may indicate that they may serve all sort
of purposes. What is clear is that goats are less a savings object than
cattle and are more frequently used to satisfy short-term food needs.
Crosstabulation of socio-economic characteristics of the respondent
and the holding of goats shows the same results as with cattle. Age does
not matter; sex, marital status, relationship to the head, and income are
significant factors determining goat ownership (G26 through G30). The
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same explanations can be put forward as with cattle. This may lead to the
conclusion that cattle owners are, at the same time, goat owners. Calcula-
tion suggest that this is indeed the case (G31); one should note, however,
that the significance of the positive association is mainly caused by the
prédominance of the non-cattle/non-goats association. 39.4 per cent of the
respondents hold cattle and/or goats; this percentage may be subdivided
into 6.7 per cent with goats only, 13.4 per cent with cattle only, and 19.2
per cent owning both. It has sometimes been suggested that goats are the
'poor man's cattle'. Although this statement is difficult to support with our
findings, there are some indications that may confïrm this suggestion.
Both Tables 9.11 and G.31 show that goats are not held in large numbers,
in contrast with cattle. It seems that, if someone can afford to buy cattle,
he will prefer cattle to goats, taking into considération that goats are for
more général use than cattle. The latter also give social status.
Support from others than children
30.3 per cent of our respondents in old age said they also received occa-
sional support from others than their children. Neighbours and friends
were mentioned mostly, and sometimes church members. Support was
mostly received in thé form of groceries or help with domestic activities
(in both cases 36.1 per cent of the positive answers). Money was seldom
received (only twice). In contrast with support from children, this support
is irregulär and directed at solving short-term problems in the field of
activities or thé provision of daily necessities. The support given by
neighbours and others does not so much resuit from the fact that the
respondent is in old age - although this fact may create thé obligation to
support (as it does for thé children) - but rather from reciprocal obliga-
tions and rights among neighbours, community members or church
members, as described in Chapter 8. The support given by others is
relatively independent of thé support from children, as is confirmed by
calculations (G32) which show that thé relationship between support from
children and support from others is insignificant. In other words, no
support from children does not lead to extra support from others, and vice
versa. Furthermore, support from others has no significant relationship
with gender (G33) or the respondent's income (G34), which strengthens
thé conclusion that thé support is part of général reciprocal obligations
and rights.
Although thé above support is irregulär, its importance should not
be underestimated. As already mentioned, it often helps to solve short-
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term problems and needs that might not be solved quickly when other
homestead members are temporarily absent or working in the fields.
Having people around who can occasionally fetch your water, collect your
firewood, do your shopping or prépare your meal can be very 'handy'
when your are in old age. It is the kind of support which, in industrialized
societies, is often semi-institutionalised and denoted as 'home care' or
'home help'.
9.4. Social security provisions in the event of illness
9.4.1. Who should provide which social security resources?
Also in the event of illness, norms and raies exist on who should help the
sick and how the sick should be helped. The norms and rules in the event
of sickness can be described using our in-depth study and what has been
found by Knippenburg and Lopriore (1990:18-9). A differentiation is
made between the illness of men and of women.
A male homestead member, certainly when hè is also the head, is
supposed, hi the first instance, to take care of himself with respect to the
costs his sickness may involve. This may be done by using nis monetary
savings or by selling some of his livestock. In the latter case, the other
homestead members may have to be consulted (Marwick 1966:46). If
expenses cannot be covered by the sick person, his sons are responsible
for him. If the heir has not yet been appointed, they are all equally
responsible and have to contribute to the expenses. When the hek is
appointed, hè is the person most responsible and should also take over his
father's labour tasks, such as ploughing, repairing, and representing the
homestead group. If a male homestead member has no sons or if his sons
are not old enough, other relatives can be called upon for help. His
brothers are then the first to come and help. Brothers are responsible
according to age. If none of the former are able to help, other more
distant relatives can be called upon, such as grand-sons, cousins, and so
on. The principal raie, however, is that the contingencies raised by
sickness should be solved first within thé homestead group.
This raie also applies when sick women are involved. The person
with thé first responsibility is her husband. He must see to it that she
receives thé médical treatment she needs, and ne should cover the
expenses. Daughters and co-wives are supposed to take over her domestic
and agricultural tasks. When there are no co-wives or daughters, daugh-
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ters-in-law are the persons who should help. The people next in lune who
may be called upon to help with thé sick wife's activities are thé husband's
sisters or thé wife's own sisters. If there is nobody to help, it will eventual-
ly be thé husband who will have to do his wife's tasks. If thé husband
cannot fulfil his obligations, either due to a lack of money or because he
is absent or has passed away, thé wife's sons are responsible for their
mother's welfare. If thé husband has died, also his brothers are respon-
sible and should contribute towards paying thé expenses. Knippenburg
and Lopriore (1990:19) found that in thé latter case, however, thé contri-
bution should ultimately be paid back. If no solution can be found, thé
woman's brothers are, in thé last instance, responsible for their sister and,
in case of need, may take her back to her parental homestead, where she
will be taken care of by her own relatives.
9.4.2. Help with illness in practice
In a society in which poverty prevails and médical provisions are scarce, it
is not surprising to find that, of thé 295 respondents in our survey, 207
(70.2 per cent) said they had been ill in thé survey year. We asked thèse
respondents whether or not they went for treatment. 14.5 per cent of
those who had fallen ill did not, as they thought it was unnecessary and
thé disease only lasted for a few days. The largest proportion of the
respondents went for treatment. In 82 cases people said they went to a
hospital in town for examination and medicines, in 76 cases respondents
visited a clinic in their own or a nearby Community, in 26 cases an inyanga
(traditional healer) was consulted, in 13 cases people went to a private
doctor, and in l case the respondent could go to a Company doctor.
The first contingent situation the illness gives rise to, then, besides
physical or emotional misery, is the payment of the costs involved 'm
transport and obtaining medicines. In 61.4 per cent of the cases, respon-
dents had to travel and pay for transport. We asked them who paid these
costs. The choice of answers was limited: most of those who needed
transport (55.1 per cent) paid the costs themselves, in 24.4 per cent of the
cases the husband or wife paid the costs, and in 14.9 per cent of cases the
children on the homestead paid the expenses. Only in 3.1 per cent of
cases did other family members cover the expenses, and in the case of
three respondents (2.7 per cent) the employer paid. We tried to find out
by means of some crosstabulations whether or not there was any signifi-
cant relationship between who paid the expenses and the socio-economic
profile of the respondent. The arguments in the previous section suggest
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that sex and income are important criteria for whether or not one has to
pay for oneself. Sex proved to be significant, income was not (G35 and
G36). The significance of the gender factor suggests that the transport
costs for women are more frequently paid by other persons than for men.
Income was not significant, but this might have to do with the relatively
low costs of transport, as people mostly travelled by bus.
In général, higher costs were incurred in paying for the medicines
and the treatment. In 16.9 per cent of the cases no costs were involved, in
38.6 per cent the respondent paid hinWherself, in 23.2 per cent the hus-
band or wife paid, in 14.0 per cent the children paid, in 4.8 per cent other
family members paid, in one case a church member paid, and in four
cases the employer paid for the treatment. Sex proved to be very signifi-
cant in determining who pays the costs - more so than with regard to
transport costs. Males mostly paid the costs themselves, while in the case
of women the costs were mostly paid by others (husband or children)
(G37). Because of the higher costs involved, also income now mattered
(G38). More people could be found among those with relatively high
incomes who paid for themselves than among those with relatively low
incomes. It can, therefore, be concluded that the payment of costs
involved in médical treatment follows the pattern as prescribed by Swazi
'raies', as outlined in the previous section.
Besides the monetary costs involved, sickness often leads to a second
contingent situation, especially in case of long-term diseases, in which
(productive) activities normally carried out by the respondent cannot be
carried out. In 25.l per cent of the cases the illness had no conséquences
for the activities, because the respondent was already inactive (because of
old age) or the period of sickness was too short (mostly less than one
week). In 38.2 per cent of the cases, the illness was so sévère that the
respondents could not perform any activity. In 36.7 per cent of the cases,
part of the activities could not be done. We asked the respondents
whether or not their activities were taken over by others when they were
ill. In 21.5 per cent of the cases no one took over the activities, in 78.5
per cent of the cases the activities were done by others. Who were these
other persons? Of the 134 respondents who received help with activities,
118 (88 per cent) said they received help from people living on the
homestead: children (41.8 per cent), children-in-law (21.6 per cent),
husband or wife (12.7 per cent) or other people (11.9 per cent). 36 times
(26.8 per cent) (also) someone outside the homestead was mentioned:
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family members (14.9 per cent), neighbours who were not a family
member (9.7 per cent), or other community members/friends (3.0 per
cent). In sum, in 88 per cent of the cases the contingent situation with
respect to the activities was solved within the homestead group itself.
A crosstabulation between the number of active homestead mem-
bers and those who took over the activities of the sick respondent shows
clearly that the smaller the size of the homestead, the more the support
has to come from outside the homestead (G39). ' This is a further indica-
tion that, if sufficient persons are present, the problems are solved in the
fïrst instance within the homestead. The age of the sick respondent also
proved to be significant (G40): the older the respondent, the more
support with activities was given by other homestead members. This can
be explained by older sick respondents mostly having productive children
living on the homestead, while younger sick respondents are themselves,
in many cases, the only productive homestead members, especially when
they belong to small, newly-established homesteads. The gender of the
respondent was not a significant factor in determining whether support
was given from inside or outside the homestead (G41), notwithstanding
the finding that those who received support from outside the homestead
were all female. The uneven distribution between the number of men and
women may have contributed to the insignificance of the result.
Apart from support in paying the costs of treatment and help with activ-
ities, other forms of support during illness may be given. We also asked
our respondents whether or not they had received any. 20.8 per cent of
the respondents who had been ill had. The forms of other help that was
given varied from money and groceries to someone bringing water or
firewood, and from being prayed for to someone else taking care of the
children. A main finding with these forms of 'additional' support was that
in 82.7 per cent of the cases such support was given by people living
outside the homestead. As regards the various social groups constituting
the 82.7 per cent: neighbours (who were not family) were mentioned in
34.8 per cent of the cases, family outside the homestead gave extra sup-
port in 23.2 per cent of cases, church members were involved in 16.2 per
cent of cases, and in the remaining 8.5 per cent other community mem-
bers/friends were involved.
As a proxy for the number of active homestead members we took the number of
men and women between 16 and 55 years old, minus the respondent if hè or she belonged
to this agegroup.
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We tried to find out those factors that influence the incidence of
extra support or not. The only significant explanatory factor appeared to
be the period of time the respondent was ill: the longer a person was ill,
the higher the incidence of extra support (G42). With long-lasting diseases
this finding can be expected: in the long run a respondent will run short
of money and other necessities, because hè or she is unable to perform
the usual economie activities. These necessities will have to be provided,
then, by other persons. The relevance of the duration of the illness,
combined with the finding that most of the extra support comes from
outside the homestead, may well indicate that the homestead is less able
to operate as solidarity group in case of sickness over the long term. The
homestead can cope with the short-term effects of sickness, but when one
of its members falls ill for a long period, external support seems to be
necessary. This is an important indication that the capacity of the home-
stead to provide people with adequate resources is in any case limited.
Notwithstanding poverty, the homestead group can provide social security
resources to non-active members by 'sharing poverty', but also this can
only be done within narrow limits. This fact is also illustrated by the
finding that there is no significant relationship between the number of
active homestead members and the extra support received (G43). In the
long run, even the largest number of active members seems to be unable
to provide the necessary means.
We also asked our respondents some brief questions about the support
they themselves gave to sick persons. 38.4 per cent of the 295 respondents
helped a sick person in the year before the survey. A remarkable finding,
given the above results, was that only 1.7 per cent said they had helped a
sick person on their own homestead. In all other cases (36.7 per cent), the
sick person was someone living outside the homestead: 19.2 per cent were
neighbours on other homesteads (not being family), 9.9 per cent were kin
members, 7.0 per cent were community members and friends, and 0.6 per
cent were church members. All sick persons helped by the respondents
lived in the same community as the respondents. We can only guess what
the reasons may be for the above finding, as a clear and convincing
explanation cannot be thought of. The explanation for the above finding
must be found, we think, in the way data were collected and questions
were asked. Of those people who supported other sick people, more than
70 per cent had been ill themselves. It must be coincidence, then, that
also someone else on the same homestead had fallen sick (but, unfortu-
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nately, we did not also ask about this). Moreover, we did not start our
questions on help to others by differentiating between on- and off-home-
stead help. In the eyes of the respondent, the support given to other
homestead members may have been so 'obvious'.that hè or she only men-
tioned the support given to people living outside the homestead.
The forms of help given by the respondents were: in 44.6 of the
cases help with activities, in 19.2 per cent money was given, in 10.4 per
cent groceries were given, ia 7.4 per cent of cases the sick person was just
visited, in 5.4 per cent of cases transport was arranged for the sick, in 5.4
per cent of cases médical treatment was given, and in 4.6 per cent of
cases a visit was paid to the sick person to pray together. In 3.0 per cent
of the cases, the respondent provided shelter for the sick person. The help
with activities was solely provided by female respondents in the lower age
groups (under 45 years old) and lower income groups (under E2,000).
This has to do both with the gender division of labour, which forces
women into domestic and agricultural activities, and with the observation
that women in the lower âge catégories and with low incomes have
nothing else to offer than their labour power. In contrast, of those persons
who gave money, 48 per cent were men and 52 per cent were women.
When their share in the total sample is considered (21.7 per cent for
mâles, 79.3 per cent for females), one may conclude that, relatively, men
give money more frequently than women. The other forms of help were
given proportionally equally by men and women and by ail age and
income groups. The above brief observations confirm to some extent that
support is given by respondents to sick persons and that Swazi law and
custom is followed - in thé sensé that those who gave help seemed to
hâve given according to their capacity and possibilities.
9.5. Social security provisions in the case of death of home-
stead members
9.5.1. Norms and rules in thé case of death of homestead members
Like birth and marriage, someone's death is an important occurrence in
Swazi society. During the funeral and in the mourning period, strict rules
and rites are carried out and hâve to be obeyed. For a description, we
refer to Kuper (1963) and Marwick (1966). Concerning the behaviourial
rules with regard to social security in the case of death of one of the
homestead members, we can be brief. It has already been stated in
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Chapter 8 that family, neighbours and Community members are supposed
to attend the funeral and to contribute some means and help with activ-
ities. A différence is made, however, between children and adults. The
funerals of children are often small-scale ceremonies, usually involvhig
only homestead members and some close relatives and friends. The
homestead cannot expect much support from outside the homestead in
these cases. If the deceased is an adult, more support can be expected;
and the higher his or her social status in the rural society, the more guests
and gifts can be expected during the funeral period. In the period after
the funeral, the possible economie problems caused by the death of a
homestead member should be solved within the homestead itself, although
external support may be given by neighbours within the broader commun-
ity or close family. The latter are not, however, obliged to provide such
support.
Closely associated with the death of a homestead member are the
rules concerning the levirate and sororate. The former means that, if a
married male homestead member dies, his younger brother should marry
his wife and adopt his children. The sororate means that, if a married
female homestead member dies, one of her unmarried sisters should take
her place and take care of her children. Whether this happens in practice
will depend on the age of the widow or widower, and on the relationships
maintained with the in-laws. That the levirate and sororate are difficult
issues in Swazi society has already been observed by Kuper (1963) and
Marwick (1966). The rule exists, but practice is often quite different.
9.5.2. Support received at the death of homestead members
During our survey we visited 47 homesteads in which one of the members
had died in the year before the survey. Death of homestead members
causes, apart from emotional distress, in many cases also economie
problems for the other homestead members. If the deceased was still
productive his or her contribution to the homestead production will have
been lost, and the funeral itself involves costs that have to be coped with
by the other homestead members.
In 30 of the 47 cases (63.8 per cent) the deceased was not produc-
tive, because the deceased was either too old to work (4 cases), or the
deceased was a young child (26 cases). In the other 17 cases (36.2 per
cent), the death of the homestead member also meant a loss of income or
produce. Six persons were involved in wage labour and 11 persons earned
an income with agricultural or other income-generating activities. Con-
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cerning the social security aspects of this loss of income we can be brief:
in none of the cases were the other homestead members compensated
from outside the homestead for the loss of income or produce. This
means that the death of productive homestead members in most cases
means a décline in the resource base and in the standard of living of the
homestead as a whole. The conséquences of the loss fall completely on
the remaining productive homestead members. The last observation has,
as its rather paradoxical and cynical counterpart, that the death of an
unproductive homestead member lessens the bürden on the shoulders of
the other homestead members, and on average the standard of living per
homestead member may rise.2
Apart from the possible conséquences the death of a homestead
member may have on the homestead's standard of living, the funeral
ceremony itself may also bring considérable direct costs for the home-
stead. Although the ceremony is usually on a much smaller scale in the
case of a child than in the case of adult people, a funeral leads to expen-
ditures not only on a coffin, but also on groceries, cattle and Utensils to
pro vide the funeral guests with food and drinks. In the case of older
homestead members and depending on his or her status in Swazi society,
the funeral ceremony may take several days or even a week or more. In
contrast to the loss of future income, in the case of the costs of the
funeral and its accompanying activities the surviving homestead members
may count on support from outside. This has already been elaborately
described in Chapter 8. Therefore, in this section, we restrict ourselves to
the questions of to what extent the homesteads involved actually received
support, and from whom.
To start with the payment of the direct funeral costs (coffin plus
expenditure on foods and drinks), we asked who had to pay for this in the
first instance. In 64.1 per cent of the cases the costs were paid by some-
one living on the homestead, in the remaining cases someone outside the
homestead paid the costs: family members (16.9 per cent), church mem-
bers (11.3 per cent), Company where deceased worked (3.8 per cent), or
neighbours (3.8 per cent). During the funeral period itself, however, much
support had been received from funeral guests. Support with money was
mentioned 23 times (48.9 per cent of the death cases), extensive support
was received in the form of groceries and food 16 times (34.0 per cent),
Whether or not this will happen will, of course, also depend on the pattern of
intra-homestead distribution, and whether or not the deceased was supported from outside
the homestead, in which case also the homestead as a whole may have benefitted.
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and the homestead members were physically helped with domestic and
funeral activities 20 times (42.5 per cent). 8 homesteads reported that no
extra support from outside the homestead was received. In all the latter
cases, the deceased was a very young child.
Looking at the persons who gave support from outside the home-
stead, the plurality already described in Chapter 8 is confirmed. In
connection with those homesteads that received extra-homestead support
(39 cases), it was mentioned that this support came, amongst others, from
kin members 22 tunes (56.4 per cent), from neighbours 24 times (61.5 per
cent), from community members 20 times (51.3 per cent), and from
church members 9 times (23 per cent). These findings confirm also the
findings in Chapter 8 that in the funeral period a homestead can expect
support from a variety of people in and outside the community, and that
people generally fulfil their obligations. In all of this, the kind of help
given was strongly related to gender. Men tend to give money and help
with the funeral activities (digging the grave, burying), while women help
with domestic activities and generally give groceries and food. It is also
the rôle of the women to mourn with the surviving wife.
In sum, we found that the social security provisions in the case of
death of homestead members are limited. Only in the funeral period can
the homestead expect substantial support; the long-term conséquences of
the death of a productive homestead member for the homestead's produc-
tion and income, however, have to be coped with within the homestead
itself. Generally, the long-term conséquence will be a décline of the
Standard of living for (some of) the surviving homestead members, which
can only be offset when new productive members (children growing up)
present themselves.
We have already indicated in Chapter 8 that widows generally have a
difficult position in Swazi society. They are confronted with a lot of 'do's
and dont's', and even in daily newspapers their problems are sometimes
acknowledged and discussed at some length (Swazi Times 1989). One of
the major restrictions laid upon a widow is that she should avoid mixing
with the public as much as possible. A very strict raie is that a widow is
not allowed to exposé her back to other people, because exposing her
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back would lead to sinyama (bad luck).3 A widow is forbidden to attend
parties, and she may not sing, dance or enjoy music. She is hardly allowed
to attend meetings; if she does attend, she has to sit quite a distance away
from everybody else. Moreover, a widow is not supposed to serve foods or
seil things to the public. This means that those income-generating activ-
ities that depend on extensive marketing cannot be carried out any more.
All in all, a widow is virtually cut-off from the rest of society. This situ-
ation usually lasts for the two years in which the widow wears her black
mourning gowns. Only when the black gowns are thrown off, for which a
special ceremony is held, is the widow released from the strict raies.
There were 63 widows among our survey's respondents (we en-
countered no widowers during our survey). In most cases (84.1 per cent),
the women lost an income-generating husband. 36.5 per cent of the
husbands were involved in wage labour, the others performed income-
generating activities at the homestead (agriculture or other). This means
that the death of the husband caused a considérable loss of cash income
for the homestead and for the widows. The death of the husband was,
however, no reason for most of the widows to stop their income-generat-
ing activities, although one would expect otherwise given their social
isolation as described above. No significant relationship between those
who stopped and those who did not could be found, as far as social and
economie characteristics are concerned. One may assume, then, that it is a
matter of adhering to Swazi customs. Generally, none of the women in-
volved could miss the income from their activities. So, the only reason for
them to stop these activities is that they are supposed to do so as a
widow. Only 12.3 per cent of the widows did actually stop these activities.
20.6 per cent of the widows even started new income-generating activities
to compensate for the loss of the husband's income. A clear différence
was found between those who started new activities and those who did
not. Those who did not already had a monetary income of around E. l ,000
a year. Those who did start new activities were mainly women who were
not engaged in income-generating activities at all before their husband
died. In the survey, their average income was found to be E.730 a year.
This rule leads to difficult situations in public life. For example, when a widow
enters a bus, she has to walk straight to the back seat, turn around and sit down. If the
back seat is füll, someone should make way for her and find another seat. One can
imagine that it is almost impossible for a widow to enter a bus and walk to the back seat
without exposmg her back to someone. When she cannot reach for the back seat, then, she
has to sit in front of the bus, turn around, and face the other passengers. When there is no
provision made to sit there she will have to sit on the floor or get out.
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Comparing the widows with married women also gives striking
différences, which, in turn, say something about the backward economie
position of the widows. Married women have an average income of
E.2000 a year, widows have to make do with half of this. Of course, âge is
also an influencing factor, as widows are, on average, older than married
woman (59 years of age versus 40 years of âge). A différence between
widows and married women could also be found in the disposable income
of the homestead. For the widows' homesteads, the average disposable
income was approximately E.3,500 annualy; for married women's home-
steads, this amount was approximately E.4,200 annually. The différence
might be explained by having one active member less on the widows'
homestead. In sum, it may be concluded that widows are in a weaker
position economically than married women. This also shows up when we
look at what happened to the homestead properties after the husband had
died. In 46 per cent of the cases the properties were still with the widow,
but in 54 per cent of the cases she was deprived of the homestead's
properties. These properties were taken either by the late husband's elder
wife, or his brothers, or his children, or other in-laws. In one case, the
homestead was burnt down after the head had died, which is a very old
customary practice but seldom practised nowadays.
The levirate was not applied in any of the cases. Either the rela-
tionships with the brothers-in-law were not good when the husband was
still alive, or the women themselves rerased to marry their brothers-in-
law, as has also been observed by Asmellash (1990:22). 59.4 per cent of
the widows also said that they received no support whatsoever from the
late husband's brother(s). The 40.6 per cent that were supported mostly
received money and groceries from their brothers-in-law. Almost identical
results were found in the case of the question on whether widows thought
that their in-laws helped them sufficiently: 56.7 per cent thought the
support was insufficient, 43.3 per cent said it was sufficient. In many cases
(55 per cent) widows received support from outside the homestead in the
period after their husband died. This support consisted mainly of help
with agricultural activities (ploughing and harvesting), groceries and
money gifts. This support was in most cases, however, only given for short
periods of time. In the long run, the widow had to depend again on other
homestead members and her own income-generating activities.
What can be concluded from this section is that the conséquences of a
case of death are difficult for most homesteads and homestead members
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to cope with. Although some social security provisions exist 'm society,
these arrangements are directed at solving short-term problems that arise
during the funeral period and shortly afterwards. In the long run, the
homestead (members) have to depend on themselves, as far as income
and subsistence are concerned.
9.6. Some concluding notes
In this chapter, some examples were given of when and how social
security mechanisms discussed in this study may operate in practice for
the individual. The kind of contingent situations we chose mainly asked
about 'protective' social security. In the examples above, the homestead
still plays a major rôle in the social security provision. Kinship relations
and arrangements at Community level, such as relations with neighbours,
also turn out to be useful. The 'promoting' social security arrangements
(associations, the chiefdom) were less in the picture, but their opération
has been extensively discussed ia Chapter 8. The above 'universal' contin-
gent situations were chosen, because it would then be easy for the reader
to see the différences or similarities with his or her own society.
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10. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND OPTIONS FOR
FURTHER RESEARCH
10.1. Introduction
This last chapter is devoted to an évaluation of the results of the present
study. In Section 10.2, we present a summary of the study and its main
conclusions (Section 10.2.1), and some methodological reflections (Section
10.2.2). In Section 10.3, we report several limitations of the study. The
final section contains suggestions for rurther research.
10.2. Summary and methodological évaluation
10.2.1. Summary and conclusions
As stated in Chapter 2 of this study, the basic aim has been to investigate
the opération and dynamics of social security mechanisms in Swazi rural
society. Attention has thereby been focused on non-market and non-state
social security mechanisms, because the majority of the rural people in
Swaziland, and in developing countries in général, depend on these types
of mechanisms.
To achieve the above goal, this study starled with some theoretical
considérations on the opération and dynamics of social security mechan-
isms in the rural areas of developing countries. In Chapter 2, the main
concept of this study, 'social security', was briefly discussed. It was argued
that the conventional définitions of social security as stated by ILO and as
used in developed countries are inappropriate for analyzing social security
in developing countries. Following the notion put forward by some leading
legal anthropologists, we have stated that 'social security' is a multirefe-
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rential concept, iinplying that it may refer to a set of norms and values, a
policy, an exchange mechanism, as well as a social and economie position.
For this very reason, it is no use attempting to give a clear-cut genera!
définition of the concept of social security. It is the task of the researcher
to make clear what hè or she is talking about when using the term social
security. In Chapter 2, it has been further stated that this study concen-
trâtes on what has been defmed as 'social security mechanisms': exchange
mechanisms in which economie resources are transferred for social
security purposes. As already mentioned, both the opération and dynamics
of these mechanisms have been the subject of this study. In Chapters 3
and 4, an attempt has been made to elaborate theoretically on the subject
in more detail.
In Chapter 3, the place and fonction of social security mechanisms
in society have been explained. Por this purpose, we used a multidisciplin-
ary approach by applying insights from Sen's entitlement approach,
Polanyi's theory on modes of economie intégration in society, and the
'articulation approach' within economie anthropology. It has been shown
that social security mechanisms have a particular function in converting
entitlements to social security resources into capabilities, either by making
social security resources available for the individual, or by supporting the
individual in his or her conversion of his or her obtained social security
resources into capabilities, or both. This function can be protective or
promotive. Social security mechanisms 'protect' if they prevent a décime
in the individual's Standard of living (in terms of capabilities), which may
otherwise result from the occurrence of specified risks or contingencies;
social security mechanisms 'promote' if they enhance an individual's
standard of living (in terms of capabilities) when this standard is below a
socially accepted minimum level. In the latter case, the deviant situation is
often described as 'poverty'.In Chapter 3, it has also been shown that the
extent to which and the way in which social security mechanisms perform
these fonctions both depend on the way in which the economy and society
are organised. In rural économies in developing societies, different social
security mechanisms will dominate from those in industrialised market
économies. Main characteristics of social security mechanisms in develop-
ing rural societies are that they are not differentiated out as social security
mechanisms from social and economie organization in général; they
operate within small-scale networks of social and economie relationships,
and they use resources internai to such networks. In Chapter 4, then, the
mam social security mechanisms in the rural areas of developing countries
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have been theoretically pointed out and analyzed: the rural family unit,
the kinship system, neighbourliness, several types of social and economie
associations, and redistributive centres.
After having presented a brief profile of Swazi society in Chapter 5, ia
Chapter 6 the most important social security mechanism in rural Swazi
society has been analyzed: the rural homestead. By analyzing the different
criteria for a solidarity group, that is, a group in which economie
resources are exchanged between active and non-active members, the
capacity of the contemporary rural homesteads to operate as social
security mechanism has been assessed. The criteria investigated were the
size, composition, durability, normative insurance and economie position
of the homestead. In the case of all the criteria, large différences have
been observed among homesteads.
It has been argued that the si/e of the homestead differs according
to the phase in the homestead development cycle, but as a more struc-
tural tendency also a secular change came to thé fore: one-household
homesteads seem to be replacing multi-household homesteads. Although
thé conséquences of this 'nuclearization' should be looked upon critically,
it makes homesteads less suited for operating as solidarity groups and vul-
nérable to internai or external shocks.
With regard to thé composition of thé homestead, it has been
shown that thé âge distribution within homesteads is reasonably well
spread. More important, as has also been shown, is the dependency ratio
(inactive versus active homestead members). It was argued that thé
relatively 'young' homesteads with absent migrant workers are less suited
to operating as solidarity groups: in most cases there is only one active
(female) member left, and thé homestead is often female-headed, which
means that women also have to take over male responsibilities and tasks
without having-the associated 'rights',leading to difficulties in performing
thé tasks. A relatively récent development is the absence of active female
homestead members, which may hâve large implications for the daily care
of thé inactive members (elderly and children). Another matter related to
thé homestead's composition is thé income diversification within thé
homestead, both over sexes and over type of activities. Only a minority of
homesteads was found with only one income source from one sex. Most
homesteads hâve several income sources, spread over both sexes. It was,
however, noted that, when only cash income is considered, thé collapse of
mâle income-generating activities will have more impact than a sudden
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interruption of women's income-generating activities, because men
provide for thé largest share of cash income.
With regard to the durability of the homestead, it was found that
most intra-homestead relationships are based on kinship and marriage.
Both forms of relationships are normally durable and stable, and this
makes thé homestead more suited to operating as solidarity group than,
for instance, relations between neighbours or friends. Kinship structures
have a stability over time and exist relatively independently of the will of
thé kinship members. It was, however, observed with regard to marriage
that customary marriage rules are becoming more unclear in Swazi society
than they were. Mâles are more reluctant to pay thé bride-price and to
acknowledge thé children they have procreated, while women prevent
men from acquiring füll productive and reproductive rights over them if
thé füll bride-price is not paid and children are not acknowledged.
Although thé latter development may be valued positively from thé
women's point of view, both tendencies affect the rights and obligations
wife and husband hâve towards each other and towards thé offspring of
that relationship. This, in turn, may threaten thé stability and durability of
thé homestead as solidarity group.
It was also found that within thé homestead a normative insurance
exists, which manifests itself in thé strong social and économie obligations
homestead members hâve towards each other, and in their responsibility
for thé général welfare of the homestead. Thèse obligations evolve from
général moral codes such as having respect for seniors and status, sharing
and mutual aid. In daily practice, someone's âge, sex, marital status and
position in thé kinship system will largely détermine with whom one bas
to share and to whom one has to show respect. In this way, individual
aspirations and wealth accumulation are to some extent checked by
emphasizing someone's responsibility towards society and by stressing
sharing, showing respect and mutual aid as 'good Swazi behaviour'.
With regard to thé économie position of the homestead, we made
a distinction between inter- and intra-homestead income distribution. At
thé level of thé homesteads, large différences can be observed among
homesteads with regard to économie activities, and thé produce and
income raised. Both temporary and structural factors influence thé écon-
omie performance of thé homestead. It was found that homesteads in thé
'poor' category are essentially doubly poor: both with regard to their
position in thé rural relations of production, and in thé income generaled.
This makes homesteads in this category relatively less able to operate as
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solidarity groups than, for instance, homesteads in thé 'upper-middle' or
'rieh' catégories. However, it must be acknowledged that the static picture
obscures the fact that homesteads might show large socio-économie
mobility up and down in thé différent catégories. On thé other hand, this
mobility créâtes, at the same time, a certain instability in thé rôle of the
homestead as solidarity group.
The intra-homestead income distribution is largely determined by
rules and customs with regard to resource control, which forces men and
women into différent économie activities with différent revenues. This, in
turn, reflects itself in thé extent to which social security resources are
provided by men and women within thé homestead, as well as in thé type
of such resources. As women earn less income and normally stay on thé
homestead, they contribute their labour efforts towards thé daily care of
thé inactive members as part of their domestic activities. Men, having far
better access to high income-generating activities, provide mostly money
in cases of need.
In sum, it can be concluded from Chapter 6 that thé rural home-
stead, given its social and économie structure, is still able to operate as
solidarity group, notwithstanding thé changes it is undergoing and has
undergone. Labour migration to urban areas and to South Africa, thé
évolution of the market economy, the monetarisation of the rural econ-
omy, thé introduction of Christianity, and accompanying social changes
such as individualisation and differentiation have all influenced thé rôle of
thé homestead as solidarity group, by affecting thé conditions for perform-
ing this rôle. However, it cannot be stated on the basis of our fïndings
that these developments have destroyed the capacity of the rural home-
stead to provide social security resources to those in need. The home-
stead, therefore, continues to be one of thé main social security mechan-
isms in Swazi rural society.
In Chapters 7 and 8, other operating social security mechanisms in thé
Swazi rural areas were analyzed. The kinship system must be considered
as thé second important social security mechanism. In Chapter 7, we con-
cluded from thé presented data and observations that there are strong in-
dications to believe that thé rôle of the kinship system as social security
mechanism has shrunk. Only with close relatives, such as füll brothers, füll
sisters, parents, paternal uncles and aunts, do thé kinship relations also
express themselves in économie relationships, including thé économie
obligations. Not only this 'scale' of the kinship system, but also the
311
intensiîy of exchange bas apparently shrunk. Even with close relatives, as
we saw, exchange relations are frequently not very strong. This fact, too,
would seem to indicate a declining rôle of thé kinship System in providing
social security resources.
Two explanations were brought forward for this décline, based also
on observations made elsewhere in thé Southern African région. The fîrst
explanation was that, with thé introduction of thé market economy, thé
spread of wage labour, thé introduction during colonial tunes of a state
apparatus and new laws, and thé provision of health care and food by the
state in times of need, people became materially more independent of
family and kin members. The second explanation put forward was the
introduction of Christianity, which affected thé ideological structure
underlying thé lineage economy. The ancestor culture and traditional
magical sanctions on violating social norms and rules were questioned,
and people became intellectually more independent of those who pro-
claimed and represented thé ideological ideas, namely thé elderly. Not-
withstanding the above developments, however, and running parallel with
the conclusions regarding thé homestead, it would be premature to con-
clude that thé kinsbip System as social security mechanism has been
destroyed, even though thé scale and intensity of its opération as such has
certainly declined.
In Chapter 8, we analyzed social security mechanisms which supplément
thé homestead and kinship System as social security mechanisms by
operating in particular areas. The land tenure System and thé practice of
Huma are directed at overcoming économie constraints which might be
caused by shortage of land or labour. Funeral organizations, operating at
Community level, are présent to overcome initial setbacks caused by death
of family members. Neighbours are présent in case of temporary food
shortage and when thé homestead buildings need to be renewed. Except
probably for thé fanerai organization, none of thèse mechanisms are
differentiated out of the broader social and économie organization as
particular social security mechanisms. Except for the land tenure System,
ail mechanisms hâve reciprocity as thé underlying mode of exchange.
More récent forms of social security mechanisms hâve also arisen
in Swazi rural society, in order to cope with new realities created by thé
market economy and thé changing social relations. We described some of
thèse institutions: ROSCAs and other savings groups, 'new style' fïïneral
organizations, churches, development projects. They are ail of more récent
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date and form a basis for new social security mechanisms. Exchanges of
resources for social security purposes are, in most cases, thé resuit of the
new social or économie relationships between people resulting from thèse
new institutions. This means, in turn, that exchanges for social security
purpose cannot be induced anymore by referring to kinship relations and
thé obligations that evolve from them. New norms and values hâve to be
created, a new 'normative insurance' has to be established. Religion may
be a basis for such new normative insurance, when it lays emphasis on
equality between people and mutual solidarity.
That new social security mechanisms will arise and operate smoot-
hly is certainly less self-évident than for those mechanisms based on
kinship. First, people themselves hâve to décide whether or not they want
to participate in new groups and institutions like churches, ROSCAs, com-
munity gardens, and so on. Secondly, thé people who participate hâve to
décide together whether or not they will use their group or institution as a
basis for action in thé social securiry field. Thirdly, if thé answer is posi-
tive, they hâve to décide in what cases they will act, how they will act, and
what the rights and obligations of the participants are. In short, a great
deal of personal will and engagement is required from participants to get
the newer social security mechanisms to operate successfully, more so
than with mechanisms based on kinship, in which rights and obligations
and when and how to act are 'given' to the participant as soon as hè or
she is born. What the future rôle of the new non-state and non-market
social security mechanisms will be in Swazi rural society is difficult to say,
given their recent existence and development. Much will also depend on
social security efforts at the 'formal' front, that is, government policy and
action regarding social security issues. We do not only mean the govern-
ment's own social security programmes and mechanisms, but also its
attitude towards the newly formed 'informai' social security mechanisms.
All this has to be crystalli/ed out in Swazi society, and no conclusions can
be drawn yet. The only thing that is sure, is that social security mechan-
isms in rural Swazi society are changing and, where possible, are trying to
adapt to new circumstances and realities. The outcome of this process is
unclear. From the illustrations given in Chapter 9, one can conclude that,
in the case of very common contingent situations (old âge, sickness and
death of family members), the non-market and non-state social security
mechanisms still play an important rôle in the daily life of a Swazi living
in the rural areas.
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10,2.2. Some methodological reflections
In Section 2.6 and Chapters 3 and 4 we suggested a theoretical approach
to be used for the analysis of social security mechanisms in developing
countries. This approach was subsequently applied to an analysis of social
security mechanisms in rural Swaziland. How helpful has the theoretical
approach been in analyzing the Swazi context? To put the question in a
different way: would we recommand the theoretical approach to someone,
who, for example, wants to study social security mechanisms in Zim-
babwe? Given our expériences we would answer this question in the
affirmative.
This positive answer is based on the observation that the outlined
theoretical setting can well be used as a heuristic device. It has not been
our intention to present or formulate 'the theory of social security', and to
test this theory on its significance. We have used the theoretical frame-
work as a guidepost to tracé the relevant issues at stake when analyzing
social security mechanisms. Polanyi's theory draws attention to the
existence of several modes of exchange in society, thereby stating that
market exchange it not the only mode of exchange. By looking at recipro-
cal and redistributive modes of exchange in a given society, many social
security mechanisms can be detected and the principles of circulation of
social security resources within these mechanisms can be explained. Sen's
entitlement approach focuses on legitimate command over resources. Sen
explains that people do not have automatically access to resources circu-
lating in society; they have to be entitled to these resources. This will not
be different for social security resources circulating within social security
mechanisms. We can look for 'social security entitlements' people have
within social security mechanisms, what these entitlements mean and how
they can be effectuated. Such analysis leads to statements on the access
that people have to social security resources. The theory of articulation of
modes of production has drawn our attention to processes of change in
developing societies, in which the focus is on the articulation between
older and more recent forms of social and economie organization. This
focus is helpful when we want to widerstand changes in the opération of
older social security mechanisms and the rise of new social security
mechanisms. In short, the above théories have been useful in analyzing
social security mechanisms in Swaziland because they provided us with
tools to understand the important éléments of social security mechanisms:
the set of rights and obligations people have with regard to these
resources, the actual practice of exchange of resources, and the changes
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that take place in these two éléments.
Of course, making a choice and using the théories as heuristic
devices has also its drawbacks. Not all theoretical éléments can be
incorporated usefully and
not all observed phenomena can be adequately explained. As the three
parts of the theoretical setting all belong to the 'Institutional Paradigm'
(see Chapter 2), the attention will be drawn towards an analysis of
institutions (modes of exchange, entitlements, etc.) and less attention is
paid then to people's actions. A good example hère is the tension between
social security entitlements and what actually can be obtained. It would be
misleading to state that the mère existence of entitlements guarantees the
access of people to social security resources. Entitlements have to be
enforced, and conversions have to be made (see Chapter 3). In following
an institutional approach we run the risk that actual social and economie
practices are overlooked. Frequently an institutional approach leads to
normative descriptions instead of positive descriptions. On several places
in Chapters 6 through 9 it has been indicated that practice may differ
from the norm: social security mechanisms may exist, in practice or in the
mind of people, but their actual opération and the extent to which they
really provide social security resources to persons in need may differ
widely from what they should provide or how these mechanisms should
operate. The researcher needs to be aware of this tension when using an
institutional approach in analyzing social security mechanisms.
10.3. Limitations of the analysis
Although we think that the fmdings of this study can be appraised posi-
tively, we think it is also important to point out explicitly some limitations
of the analysis.
In this study, an attempt has been made to analyze social security
mechanisms by not only taking into account the economie aspects. A
deliberate attempt has been made to adopt a multidisciplinary approach
to the subject. This multidisciplinary approach is considered useful and
necessary with respect to research on social security issues. But this
multidisciplinarity also has its drawbacks. In the first place, a
multidisciplinary approach may quickly evolve into a holistic approach,
with the inévitable problem that important problems and explanatory
variables will be overlooked. As argued in Chapter 2, it is questionable
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whether or not the social security researcher should strive for a holistic or
genera! theory of social security. Fundamental différences in prevailing
théories and the methods of analysis between different disciplines con-
front the social security researcher with 'incompatibility', and this may
well be considered as one of the main reasons for not having 'a theory of
social security'. The practical solution is to introducé a form of 'reasoned
eclecticism', as also has been done in this study. The researcher has to
create a balance between the multidisciplinary character of the subject
and his or her own disciplinary background. Therefore, the attempt to
introducé some form of multidisciplinarity in this study should not be con-
sidered as an attempt to formulate a genera! theory on the opération of
social security mechanisms in developing countries. In the second place,
multidisciplinarity may sometimes lead to generality, in which spécifie
Problems or exceptions are overlooked. Also in this study, generality has
sometimes been preferred to detailed spécification. In such instances, we
hâve deliberately opted to outline général patterns and processes, acknow-
ledging that exceptions and spécifie cases might then be overlooked. In
sum, although multidisciplinarity is thought to be an asset in social
security analysis in général and also in this study, it also sets its limits to
thé analysis.
Apart from the problem of the multidisciplinary character of the
subject, the time dimension also imposes its limitations on this study. As
the reader will have noticed in the chapters in which data were presented,
we had data collected at one point ia time. To collect original data on the
dynamics of social security mechanisms would require a great deal of
time, due to the fact that changes in social security mechanisms only take
place over a very long tune span. Practical reasons like time and budget
constraints often prevent such an analysis, and the researcher has to find
practical solutions to this problem. A much used method in social sciences
is to have recource to comparative staties. The collected data are com-
pared with what has been found in the past. This method has also been
applied in this study. By making comparisons with what has been found in
the past and what people have told us about the past, conclusions have
been drawn on the dynamics of the analyzed social security mechanisms.
As data are sometimes incompatible because different collection methods
or calculations are used, some of these conclusions should be considered
with more caution than others.
A last and in fact obvious limitation is set by the case-study
character itself. We think that the social security mechanisms studied in
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our analysis can be found all over the world, and the factors that influ-
ence their opération and development may even be the same. The
analytical approach that is used to analyze the Swaziland case is therefore
considered to have a wider significance (see also previous section). But
the ways in which explanatory factors lead to the ultimate opération and
development of social security mechanisms will differ per society, maybe
even within societies. The analysis and results from the case study should
by no means be considered as représentative for all developing countries
m the world. As stated in Chapter 2, Swaziland can be représentative for
other countries in the Southern African région, given a certain common
historical, political, cultural and economie background. It might even be
suggested that similar developments can be observed in other Sub-
Saharan African societies, but the results of this study should be treated
with care when looking at these other societies.
10.4. Options for further research
It is clear that it is impossible to pretend that all questions regardüig the
research topic have been answered. It was argued earlier that the bound-
aries and possibilities of research on social security issues are still vague
and unclear. Research on social security issues in developing countries has
just starled seriously and is still in an exploratory stage. This study is a
contribution to this exploration. But there is still a lot to be done. We
want to indicate some directions for further research that we think may be
promising.
The first option for further research flows almost naturally from
the previous section: the dynamics of 'informai' social security mechan-
isms. It is not only to be recommended that more case studies will appear
ui future on the opération and dynamics of these social security mechan-
isms in developing countries, but this should also lead to more elaborate
theoretical considérations on the évolution and dissolution of these social
security mechanisms. Certainly, the multidisciplinarity of the subject will
give rise to many problems with regard to the theoretical understanding of
social security mechanisms, but, on the other hand, research on social
security in developing countries is an excellent field in which development
studies (for instance, development économies, (legal) anthropology,
history, and politics) could cooperate and bundie their efforts, in order to
get to grips with the social security problem.
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A second direction for further research can also be distilled from
our study: thé rôle of social networks in the economie acting of économie
agents. It is clear from this study and many other studies that man's
économie acting is not only determined by economie factors such as
relative priées, demand and supply on (international markets for factors
of production and for products, profits to be possibly realised, and so on.
People also fonction in social networks in which they hâve social rights
and obligations. Also as a resuit of thèse rights and obligations within
such networks, exchange of economie resources takes place. How do thèse
exchanges interact with a person's économie acting outside thé social
network? For example, it has been argued in thé literature on small-scale
enterprises in developing countries that the transfer of resources originat-
ing from thé social obligations people hâve are one of thé main reasons
that many small-scale enterprises cannot take off or fail to succeed,
because thé entrepreneur has to redistribute each small profit he or she
makes within thé 'family economy' (see Rasmussen 1992). Therefore,
when it is taken into account that thé social obligations are an intégral
part of a person's economie strategy to secure his or her own social
security position, traditional 'economie' models with regard to thé écon-
omie behaviour of entrepreneurs will have to be modified. The économie
acting of thé entrepreneur cannot be separated from his or her social
acting. Both 'fields' of action are interrelated and influence each other,
and this interrelationship should not only be looked upon negatively. It
would be an interesting topic for development economists to incorporate
to a larger extent thé social security arguments in their analysis of the
économie behaviour of households and individuals in developing coun-
tries.
The third option for further research regards a topic which we did
not analyze in this study, but which will gradually become more import-
ant: thé linkage between non-state and state-organised social security
mechanisms. By 'linkage', we do not mean a deliberately established
linkage, that is, that non-state and state-organised social security mechan-
isms should legally be linked, but rather thé (un)expected relationships
that may exist or arise between thé two catégories of mechanisms. With
developing countries becoming more and more incorporated into thé
(world) market economy (some of them already are fully integrated),
meaning that also the labour force becomes involved and affected,
accompanying social security arrangements which fit thé market economy
are likely to be called for. What factors will influence the rise and estab-
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lishment of new social security mechanisms? What will be thé influence
on older already existing social security mechanisms? And do existing
social security mechanisms play a rôle in determining thé organization
and success or failure of the new ones? Are state-organised social security
mechanisms a supplément to or a replacement of older social security
mechanisms? How does this influence thé varions social groups involved
(women, children, elderly, unemployed, and so on)? Although a few
studies exist that analyze both state and non-state social security mechan-
isms in developing countries (see, for example, Bessert 1985, Hirtz 1989),
these studies only marginally touch upon the above questions with regard
to thé linkages.
A last brief suggestion we want to make in this study is that more
research of 'informai' social security mechanisms would be useful also in
thé industrialized market économies. It is almost proverbial that thé study
of foreign societies opérâtes as a mirror and can lead to new insights in
one's own society and behaviour. Kaufmann (1989) is one example of such
a study. We think, for instance, that one of thé results of such research
may be that we hâve to modify our opinions on thé degree of individuali-
zation in Western societies and thé conséquences this may hâve for thé
ongoing reconsideration of 'formai' social security mechanisms. Research
of 'informai' social security mechanisms might show that with respect to
social security thé degree of individualization is less than we are accus-
tomed to think it is. This might give opportunities to transfer social
security provisions from thé 'formai' sector back again into thé 'informai'
sector. As Kaufmann (1989) states informai social security networks are
much more flexible and can be better adapted to the different wishes and
situations of thé participants. This adaption cannot be achieved by state-
or company-initiated social security mechanisms. What prevents such a
'decentralization' is not the assumed non-existence of 'informai' social
security networks in our society, but our aversion to participate in them.
In a society in which individualization and personal independency are
highly valued, responsibilities within 'informai' social security networks are
transferred to higher levels, i.e, the state, and 'transformed' into 'formai'
social security provisions. Any attempt from policy makers to transfer
these responsibilities back to lower levels will be unsuccesful as long as
we prefer personal independency to mutual dependency within small-scale
social networks.
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A. LOCATION OF SURVEY AREAS
Map A.l.Location of survey areas
1 = Elulakeni, Lowveld and Non-RDA
2 = Ezokoteni, Middleveld and Minimum-Input RDA
3 = Ngwempisi, Highveld and Maximum-Input RDA
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B. SWAZILAND:FACTS AND FIGURES
B.l. Geography and agro-climatical conditions
Official name of the country
Capital
Surface (sq.kms.)
Ecological régions
(see also Map B.l)
: Kingdom of Swaziland
: Mbabane
: 17,368 (second smallest in Africa)
: Highveld, Middleveld, Lowveld,
Lubombo Hills
Map B.l. Ecological régions of Swaziland
Source: Low 1986:60
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Highveld: average élévation
animal rainfall
average monthly
températures
végétation
crops cultivated
Middleveld: average élévation
annual rainfall
average monthly
températures
végétation
crops cultivated
large estate crops
Lowveld: average élévation
annual rainfall
average monthly
températures
végétation
crops cultivated
large estate crops
1300 m (range from 900 to 1900 m)
1000 - 2000 mm (average 1270)
: 22.6«C to 10.8°C
: short 'sour' grass and woodland
: maize, tobacco, potatoes
: 700 m (range from 900 to 350 m)
: 750 - 1150 mm (average 940)
:26.2°C to 11.7°C
: long grasses
: maize, tobacco, cotton, vegetables
: cotton, citrus, pineapple
:200m
: 600 mm (with drought hazard)
: 29.8«C to 15.4°C
: thorn scrub, tall 'sweet' grass
: maize, cotton, sorghum
: sugar and citrus (both irrigated)
Lubombo: agro-climatic environment similar to Middleveld
B.2. Demography
De facto total population (1986)
De jure total population (1986)
Population density (1986)
Population density urban areas (1986)
Population density rural areas (1986)
Urban population (1986)
Average annual rate of (1976-1986)
population growth
Crude birth rate (1986)
342
681,059
: 708,455
: 39.2 inhab./sq.km.
: 82.7 inhab./sq.km.
: 34.0 inhab./sq.km.
: 22.7 %
: 3.2 %
:50.6
V
Crude death rate (1986)
Fertility rate (1986)
Ethnie composition population
16.7
6.51ifetime births
90 % Swazi
6 % Zulu
4 % Others
B.3. Basic economie indicators
Gross Domestic Product per capita 1990
(at factor costs in dollars)
Gross Domestic Product per capita 1990
(purchasmg power parity in dollars)
Average annual growth rate GDP
Growth rate GDP 1989-1990
GNP per capita (1991)
Retail price index (Sept. 1988-Dec. 1990)
Inflation rate 1990
Currency unit
Exchange rate (Sept. 1990)
Value of imports 1990
Main imports
Value of exports 1990
Main exports
External debt 1990
Debt service ratio 1990
(in percent of total export earnings)
Labour force (percent of population)
% of women in labour force
% of labour force in agriculture
% of labour force in industry
% of labour force in services
$620
$ 2,340
8.6 % (1987-1990)
3.0%
$ 1,050
100 - 126.2
13.5%
Lilangeni (pi. Emalangeni)
L. 2.57 = $ 1.0
$ 591 min.
fuels, minerais, machinery
$ 558 min.
sugar, woodpulp, canned fruit
$ 216.5 min.
10.7
24 % (1989-1991)
40 %
74 %
9 %
17 %
343
Total paid employment 1990
Paid employment private sector 1990
Paid employment public sector 1990
Informai employment 1990
Migrant workers to South Africa 1990
Growth rate paid employment 1990
109,000 (estimate)
66,537
27,398
15,000 (estimate)
16,000 (estimate)
2.8%
Main industries private sector : agriculture/forestry, manufac-
turing
Main industries public sector : social services, transport,
forestry
B.4. Basic social indicators
Ranking Human Development Report
Life expectancy (at birth) (1990)
Infant mortality (promille) (1990)
Percent of population having (1990)
access to safe drinking water
Urban population having access
Rural population having access
Illiteracy rate (1986)
Illiteracy rate females (1986)
Illiteracy rate mâles (1986)
117(low human development)
56.8years
76
30.0%
100.0 %
7.0%
32.9%
34.9%
30.4%
Primary school enrôlaient ratio (net, 1988-1990) 82
Secondary school enrolment ratio (gross, 1988-1990) 50
Tertiary enrolment (gross) 4
Public expenditure on éducation (1988-1990) 7.2
(as % of GNP)
Public expenditure on health (1988-1990) 5.8
(as % of GNP)
Military expenditures (as % of combined éducation 20 0
and health expenditure)
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B.S.Data sources
Data on geography and climate are derived from Low (1986), and thé
Annual Statistical Bulletin of the Central Statistical Office (1990).
Data on demography are derived from thé Swaziland Population Census
1986, published by thé Central Statistical Office (1986). Data on thé
economy are derived from thé Annual Statistical Bulletin published by thé
Central Statistical Office (1990), thé Development Plan as published by
thé Economie Planning Office, and thé Third World Guide 1991/1992.
The social indicators are derived from thé Annual Statistical Bulletin by
thé Central Statistical Office, thé Social Science Research Unit (1992) and
thé Human Development Report 1993.
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C. CLASSIFICATION OF HOMESTEADS
To reconstruct the homestead catégories of Neocosmos the criteria were
used as presented in Table C.l.
Table C.l. Criteria to classify homesteads into catégories as distinguished
by Neocosmos (1987a)
Criteria
Agricultural produc-
tion sufficient for
subsistence
Non-agricultural
petty commodity
production
Hiring labour for
agricultural purposes
Homestead Catégories
Poor
No
No
Lower-
Middle
No
Yes
Upper-
Middle
Yes
"
No
Rieh
Yes
"
Yes
Source: Neocosmos 1987a:46-48
Neocosmos defines four homestead catégories. The main differentiating
criterion is the level of all agricultural production (Neocosmos 1987a:48),
i.e.,whether or not this level is sufficient to ensure subsistence. Neocos-
mos checked this in his survey by simply asking people (1987a:47). We did
not. An alternative was found by comparing food requirements with
agricultural production. For the requirements we took figures from
Testerink (1984), who calculated that one adult consumes on average 250
kgs. maize, and a child 125 kgs. By multiplying thèse figures with the
homestead resident size we found figures how many kgs. of maize are
required a year. Figures on subsistence and commercial agricultural
production were converted into maize équivalents. Subsistence maize
production was already asked for in the survey in kgs. Commercial
agricultural production was given in income. We divided this income by
1.10, which was the price of 1 kilogramme of maize meal in 1990. In this
way we could estimate how many kilograms could be bought with agricul-
347
îural inconie. This was compared v/ith thé requirements, and in this way
sufficiency could be estimated.
The poor category, then, are those homesteads which do not reach
subsistence with agricultural production, are not engaged in non-agricul-
tural petty-commodity production and therefore hâve to seil their labour
power in order to reach subsistence. This is a category of clearcut semi-
proletarians. The différence between thé poor and lower-middle home-
steads is the engagement in non-agricultural petty commodity production
of the latter group. The justification for distinguishing lower-middle
homesteads from poor is that in général middle homesteads as one group
are more reliant on petty commodity production than thé poor (Neocos-
mos 1987a:47). The upper-middle peasants can be considered as petty
commodity producers, just like the lower-middle, but thé former can reach
subsistence by agricultural production alone. The upper-middle and rieh
differ from each other because thé latter employs wage-labour from
outside thé homestead, and therefore can be considered as small capital-
ists (Neocosmos 1987a:48).
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D. THE SWAZI KINSfflP SYSTEM AND KIN RELATIONS
SURVEYED
Figure D.I. Paternal and maternai kin
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Figure D.3. Kir, relations surveyed, and described in Chapter 7
Paternal kin Maternai kin Affinai kin
Older génération
Own father
Father' s brothers
Father' s sisters
Own mother Parents-in-law
Mother's brothers
Mother's sisters
Same génération
Füll brothers
Half brothers
Father's brother's
sons
Füll sisters
Half sisters
Father's brother's
daughters
Father's sister 's
children
Mother's sister's sons Wife's/husband's brothers
Mother's sister's dau- Wife's/husband's sisters
ghters
Mother's brother's
children
Younger génération
Brother's children
Sister' s children
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E. STATISTICAL APPENDIX CHAPTER 7
E.l. Statistical measures applied
The tables and statistics in Section E.3 have been calculated with SPSS/-
PC+, version 2.0. The choice of statistical formulae by which the associ-
ation is expressed is governed by the type of data. A nominal variable can
only state whether a quantity is 'such' or 'otherwise', whereas at the
ordinal level there is a notion of ranking in the scores. Fot statistical
association, this means that at a nominal level we would only be able to
say whether or not there is a statistical association between the indepen-
dent and dependent variable, and how strong that association is. At
ordinal level, we can assess the direction of the association, for example,
whether higher income leads to more cattle ownership.
At the bottom of each of the tables indices of statistical association are
shown. When applicable, four indices of statistical association of the
ordinal level are shown: Kendall's tau-b, Kendall's tau-c, Somers' D and
Gamma. In Kendall's tau, all possible pairs of cases are compared for the
ranks they score on two variables in order to see whether the two sets of
ranks are related. The coefficient can vary between O for independent
variables and either minus or plus l for a perfect corrélation - negative or
positive. The variant tau-c was chosen besides tau-b, because it will
provide values between minus 1 and plus 1 for any size of cross-table.
Gamma is based on a similar principle as Kendall's tau-b and tau-c.
Gamma is a 'symmetrie' measure of association: it does not assume either
variable to be dépendent on thé other. Somers' D is an asymmetrie
coefficient: it distinguishes between the dependent and the independent
variable; it is also based on a similar principle as Kendall's tau.
Kendall's tau can be tested for its signifïcance: that is, how likely is it
that thé resuit obtained is due to a coïncidence in thé sample only, and
not a characteristic of thé population from which thé sample was taken?
This significance is measured in terms of the probability that we have had
a sample leading us to reject thé null hypothesis, whereas in actual fact it
is true (this is known as an error of the first kind). The probability (also
known as a) is shown as a proportion: e.g. a significance level of 0.05
means a five per cent chance of an error of the first kind. The lower the
figure shown, the more significant the value can be said to be, since a low
figure means a small chance of an accidentai resuit. When we refer in the
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text to a 'significant' result, we mean that the probability bas a value of
0.05 or less. Résulte with values above 0.05 are considered to be 'insignifi-
cant'.
In a few cases, indices of statistical association at the nominal level are
used (Carmer's V and Contingency coefficient), either because the
association cannot be of an ordinal nature because of theoretical reasons,
or because some sorae association is expected but it is not evident at
ordinal level. The measures used are based on Chi-square, which
measures the différence between expected frequencies (i.e. in the absence
of association) and observed frequencies. Both Cramer's V and the
Contingency coefficient are Chi-square measures that can be applied, in
contrast with the Chi-square measure proper, to tables larger than '2x2'.
As the reader also will see that some tables are presented with on aver-
age less than 5 observations per cell. In social science at least 5 observa-
tions per cell is often used as a 'rule of thumb' for being able to draw
explicit conclusions from a cross-table. In some cases we had too few
observations to fulfil this 'rule of thumb'. Notwithstanding this deficit we
used the available observations for a cross-table analysis, because this
could still raise important findings for our discussion in this study. The
figures and statistical measures, however, should be treated with care in
thèse cases.
E.2. Guide Unes for reading thé tables
The tables and statistics in thé next section correspond with thé numbers
El, E2, and so on, used in thé text in Chapter 7. In thé tables some
abbrevations and codes have been used that will be briefly explained in
this section.
The relationships characterized (either exclusively or partly) by social
security exchange are analyzed in trems of their association with several
démographie, social and économie variables. As regards thé latter vari-
ables, statistically significant association was found to exist with thé
variables: AGERSP, INTOTRSP, MSRSP, and RHRSP. Thèse variables
are coded as follows:
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AGERSP (âge respondent):
1 = between lowest and 30 years
2 = between 31 and 45 years
3 = between 46 and 60 years
4 = 61 years and older
INTOTRSP (income respondent):
1 = lowest through E.2,500
2 = E.2,501 through E.5,000
3 = E.5,001 through E.7,500
4 = E.7,501 through E. 10,000
5 = E. 10,001 through highest
MSRSP (marital status respondent)
1 = single
2 = widowed
3 = married
RHRSP (relationship of respondent to homestead head)
1 = head
2 = wife of head
3 = child
4 = other own family
5 = in-law family
6 = other relationship
The relationships to be 'explained' ail contain thé characters DEREC...,
which stands for 'direction'. The same variables have been used to
describe both thé incidence and direction of exchange. For example:
DIRECFB (direction of exchange with füll brothers), stands for 'direction
of exchange', whereby:
1 = respondent only gives
2 = there is mutual exchange between respondent and kin member
3 = respondent only reçoives
and after recoding DIRECFB also stands for 'incidence of exchange',
whereby:
0 = no exchange takes place
1 = exchange takes place
353
In the following section thé table headings clearly state which meaning of
DIREC is applicable.
E.3. Tables and statistics
Table E.l.
DIRECFB->
INTOTRSP
Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
male respondents and füll brothers' by 'income
category respondent'
Count
1
2
3
4
5
Column
Total
.00
18
2
1
2
23
54.8
1.00
14
2
1
2
19
45.2
ROW
Total
32
4
1
3
2
42
100.0
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B .03301
Kendall's Tau C .02948
Gamma .07263
Number of Missing Observations = 19
Significance
.4129
.4129
Table E.2.
DIRECFB->
Crosstabulation 'direction of exchange between
mâle respondents and füll brothers ' by ' income
category respondent'
Count
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
1.00
5
1
1
2
9
47.4
2.00
7
1
8
42.1
3.00
2
2
10.5
ROW
Total
14
2
1
2
19
100.0
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B -.39592
Kendall's Tau C -.29917
Gamma -.78261
Number of Missing Observations = 0
354
Significance
.0348
.0348 r
Table E. 3.
DIRECFB->
AGERSP
Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange
male respondents and füll brothers' byi
category respondent'
'agé
Count
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
.00
6
11
6
23
54.8
1.00
3
10
2
4
19
45.2
Row
Total
3
16
13
10
42
100.0
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B -.32985
Kendall's Tau C -.38776
Gamma -.51662
Number of Missing Observations = 19
S igni f i cance
.0114
.0114
Table E.4.
DIRECFB->
AGERSP
Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
male respondents and füll brothers' by 'age
category respondent'
Count
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
1.00
2
5
1
1
9
47.4
2.00
1
4
1
2
8
42.1
3.00
1
1
2
10.5
Row
Total
3
10
2
4
19
100.0
Statistic Value
Cramer's V .23814
Contingency Coefficient .31917
Kendall's Tau B .24349
Kendall's Tau C ,22438
Gamma .39130
Number of Missing Observations = O
Significance
.1255
.1255
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Table S.S. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
male respondents and füll brothers' by 'rela-
tionship respondent to homestead head'
DIRECFB->
RHRSP
Count
1
3
4
6
Column
Total
Statistic
Kendall 's
Kendall 's
Gamma
Number of
Table E. 6.
DIRECFB->
RHRSP
Tau B
Tau C
.00
22
1
1.00
14
3
1
1
23 19
54.8 45.2
ROW
Total
36
3
2
1
42
100.0
Value Significance
.29845 .0254
.21315 .0254
.73438
Missing Observations = 19
Crosstabulation 'direction of exchange between
male respondents and füll brothers' by 'rela-
tionship respondent to homestead head'
Count
1
3
4
6
Column
Total
1.00
8
1
2.00
5
2
1
Row
3.00 Total
1 14
3
1
1 1
9 8 ' 2 ' 19
47.4 42.1 10.5 100.0
Statistic
Kendall ' s
Kendall ' s
Gamma
Tau B
Tau C
Value Significance
.36527 .0478
.27424 -0478
.64706
Number of Missing Observations -
Table E. 7. Crosstabulation 'incidence of
respondents with füll sisters'
respondent '
DIRECFS
» AGERS P
^ Kendall
* Kendall
j Gamma
Number
Table E
— > Count
1
2
3
4
Column
.00
8
9
6
1.00
2
10
4
3
23 19
Row
Total
2
18
13
9
42
Total 54.8 45.2 100.0
Statistic
'S Tau B
Value
-.26912
's Tau C -.31066
-.45215
of Missing Observations = 19
exchange male
by ' age category
Significance
.0327
.0327
. 8 . Crosstabulation ' incidence of exchange between
male respondents and füll sisters' by ' relation -
ship of respondent to homestead head'
' DIRECFS-> Count
;i RHRSP
v
Cramer'
1
3
4
6
Column
.00
22
1
1.00
15
2
2
23 19
ROW
Total
37
2
2
1
42
Total 54.8 45.2 100.0
Statistic
s V
Value Significance
.37789
Contingency Coefficient .35350
Kendall' s Tau B .23759
Kendall
, ^ - Gamma
's Tau C .15646
.64486
.0605
.0605
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î Table E. 9. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between m
1 female respondents and füll brothers' and 'âge j|
C of respondents' 3m
%!
î 1î Dnara^> count .00 i.oo TO?:I i
J| AGERSP
S 1
f 2
S
I 3
II
1 4
Column
J Total
ï Statistic
18
46
30
3
97
63.0
19
24
13
1
37 m
70 II
43 m
4 II
57 154 u
37.0 100.0 •
1Value Significance m
— m
î Kendall's Tau B -.14840 -0254 9
! Kendall's Tau C -.16428 .0254 Jj
I Gamma -.26396 m
t Number of Missing Observations = 8 0 JB
s Table E 10. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between B| female respondents and füll brothers' and 'res- m
I pondents' relationship to head' jl|
11 jUI
'
J
 1
,| DIRECFB-> Count Row m
,,{ .00 1.00 Total lj|
fj 2
f 4
1 5
!
Column
j Total
f Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
14
67
1
13
2
97
63.0
5
32
2
13
5
19 •
99
 H
3 ijl
26 Jj|
7 II
57 154 il
37.0 100.0 mi
Value Significance flj
.19620 .0052 ijl
.19700 -0052 IJ«
.37269 al
11 Table E.ll. Crc
1 rSEK pan
•
•I DIRECFS-> Count
R
• INTOTRSP
• 1
11 2
B 3
II 4
K 5
B Column
K Total
Statistic
sstabulution ' inc:
pondents with ful
dents '
.00 1.00
81
5
6
1
93
51.1
63
14
10
2
dence of exchange of female
L sisters' and 'income res-
Row
Total
144
19
16
2
1
89 182
48.9 100.0
Value Significance
Kendall's Tau B .18802 .0046
Kendall's Tau C .15843 .0046
Gamma .43101
•• Number of Missing Observations = 52
1 Table E. 12. Crosstabulution 'direction of exchange of female
respondents with füll sisters' and 'income res-
B| pondents '
•^E DIRECFS-> Count Row
1.00 2.00 3.00 Total
INTOTRSP
B 1
2
-
4
Column
•
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
10
6
3
19
21.3
25
4
6
2
28 63
4 14
1 10
2
37 33 89
41.6 37.1 100.0
Value Significance
-.23723 .0073
-.19391 .0073
-.41626
Number of Missing Observations = 80 Number of Missing Observations =
358 359
Table E 13. Croastabulation 'incidence of exchange between
Table E..LJ.
 femaie respondents and füll sisters' by 'âge of
respondents'
DIRECFS-> Count R°w ;
.00 1.00 Total :
AGERSP
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
Statistic
14 21
38 37
30 25
11 6
35 N
75
55 1
17 ;
93 89 182
51.1 48.9 100.0
Value significance ;
Kendall's Tau B -•117°|[ 'nlta 'Kendall's Tau C -.13779 .0448
Gamma -.19806 j
Number of Missing Observations = 52
Table E 14 Crosstabulation 'direction of exchange between J
female respondents and füll sisters' by 'âge of ;
respondents ' ;
*
DIRECFS-> COUnt ^oo 2>oo 3_ o Q TK°"X 1
AGERSP
1
2
3
4
^ Column| Total
" Statistic
7 8
8 15
4 12
2
6 21 ;
14 37
9 25 ]
4 6 1
19 37 33 89 1
21.3 41.6 37.1 100.0
Value significance
Kendall's Tau B .15892 .0454
Kendall's Tau C -15869 .0454 ;
Gamma -23766 J
^ Table E.15. Cr<
: fer
1 der
DIRECFS-> Count
RHRSP
1
: 2
L 4
î 5
r- 6
* Column
$ Total
Statistic
jsstabulation ' inc
nale respondents ai
it's relationship t
.00 1.00
20
55
3
13
2
93
51.1
10
56
6
12
5
89
48.9
idence of exchange
id füll sisters' by '-resfilp
Row
Total
30
111
9
25
7
182
100.0
Value Significance '
Kendall's Tau B .12458 .0373
Kendall's Tau C .13392 !o373
Gamma .23042
Number of Missing Observations = 52
Table E.16. Crosstabulation 'direction of exchange between
female respondents and füll sisters' by 'respon-
t dents' relationship to head'
DIRECFS-> Count
 Row
1.00 2.00 3.00 Total
f RHRRP _
1 1
f 2
4
5
, 6
|' Column
A Total
. )>
L^
J Statistic
L; Kendall ' s Tau B
1, Kendall's Tau C
f Gamma
1
13
2
3
19
21.3
6
21
3
6
1
3 10
22 56
3 6
4 12
1 5
37 33 89
41.6 37.1 100.0
Value Significance
-.04475 .3183
-.04053 .3183
-.07415
Number of Missing Observations
360 361
•—••"• -srs&x sas r~s
respondent '
DIRECBRC->
AGERSP
Count
2
3
4
Column
Total
1.00
5
1
1
2.00
2
3.00
1
3
Row
Total
6
1
6
7 2 4 13
53.8 15.4 30.8 100.0
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Somers' D
Value
.53072
.46154
.76471
.44444
Significance
.0238
.0238
Number of Missing Observations =
— *•"• 'SASt.ï'-SSS'^ ï
pondent's relationship to homestead head
RHRSP
Count
1
3
4
6
Column
Total
.00
27
27
71.1
1.00
8
1
1
1
11
28.9
ROW
Total
35
1
1
1
38
100.0
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Number of Missing Observations
Value
.45227
.22438
.75000
23
Significance
.0027
.0027
362
Table E.19. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange» between
female respondents and father's brothers' sons'
by 'marital status respondent'
MSRSP
Count
1
2
3
Column
Total
.00
3
13
66
82
89.1
1.00
6
4
10
10.9
Row
Total
3
19
70
92
100.0
Statistic Value Significance
.0040
.0040
Kendall's Tau B -.27439
Kendall's Tau C -.14839
Gamma -.55690
Somers' D -.20300
Number of Missing Observations = 142
Table E.20. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
female respondents and father's brothers' sons'
by 'respondent's relationship to homestead head'
RHRSP
Count
1
2
4
5
6
Column
Total
.00
17
51
3
10
1
82
89.1
1.00
5
2
1
2
10
10.9
Row
Total
17
56
5
11
3
92
100.0
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Somers ' D
Value
.25511
.17060
.65996
.23088
Significance
.0048
.0048
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Table E.21. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange of female
respondents with father's brothers' daughters'
by 'respondent's marital status'
MSRSP
Count
1
2
3
Column
Total
.00
5
15
58
78
90.7
1.00
4
4
8
9.3
Row
Total
5
19
62
86
100.0
Statistic Value Significance
.1053
.1053
cramer's V .22150
Contingency Coefficient .21626
Kendall's Tau B -.13281
Kendall's Tau C -.07139
Gamma -.39759
Number of Missing Observations = 148
Table E.22. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange of female
respondents with father's brothers' daughters'
by 'respondent's relationship to homestead head'
RHRSP
Count
1
2
4
5
6
Column
Total
.00
18
43
12
5
78
90.7
1.00
5
2
1
8
9.3
Row
Total
18
48
2
12
6
86
100.0
Statistic
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Value
.51752
.45962
.13881
.08978
.41089
Significance
.0857
.0857
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Table E.23. Crosstabulation 'direction of exchange between
female respondents and father's sisters' child-
ren' and 'âge respondent'
AGERSP
Count
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
1.00
2
1
3
20.0
2.00
1
4
1
1
7
46.7
3.00
4
1
5
33.3
Row
Total
1
6
6
2
15
100.0
Statistic Value Significance
.0364
.0364
Kendall's Tau B .42768
Kendall's Tau C .41333
Gamma .58491
Somers' D .44444
Number of Missing Observations = 0
Table S.24. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
female respondents and father's sisters' child-
ren' and 'marital status respondent'
MSRSP
Count
1
2
3
Column
Total
.00
3
12
64
79
84.0
1.00
1
8
6
15
16.0
Row
Total
4
2C
70
94
100.0
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B -.32822
Kendall's Tau C -.21458
Gamma - .67521
Somers' D -.27932
Number of Missing Observations = 140
Significance
.0006
.0006
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Table E.25. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
female respondents and father's sisters' child-
ren' and 'respondent'a relationship to thé home-
stead head'
RHRSP
Count
1
2
4
5
6
Column
Total
.00
15
51
1
9
3
79
84.0
1.00
1
7
3
2
2
15
16.0
ROW
Total
16
58
4
11
5
94
100.0
Statistic Value Significance
.0101
.0101
Kendall's Tau B .22653
Kendall's Tau C .17746
Gamma .49873
Somers' D .15860
Number of Missing Observations = 140
Table E.26. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
female respondents and sisters' children' and
'âge respondent'
AGERSP
Count
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
.00
21
52
40
16
129
82.2
1.00
9
13
2
4
28
17.8
Row
Total
30
65
42
20
157
100.0
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B -.15377
Kendall's Tau C -.13972
Gamma -.33077
Somers' D -.09800
Number of Missing Observations = 77
366
Significance
.0188
.0188
Table E.26a Crosstabulation 'direction of exchange lj
female respondents and sisters' chilân
'âge respondent'
AGERSP
Count
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
1.00
8
8
16
57.1
2.00
1
3
1
5
17.9
3.00
2
1
4
7
25.0
Row
Total
9
13
2
4
28
100.0
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B .62931
Kendall's Tau C .58163
Gamma .88372
Somers' D .74419
Number of Missing Observations = 0
Significance
.0001
.0001'
Table E.27. Crosstabulation 'direction of exchange between
female respondents and sisters' children' "and
'income respondent'
INTOTRSP
Count
1
2
3
4
5
Column
Total
00
102
14
12
1
129
82 2
1.00
17
6
3
2
28
17 8
Row
Total
119
20
15
2
1
157
100 0
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B 15974
Kendall's Tau C .10938
Gamma 38339
Somers' D .13268
Number of Missing Observations = 77
Significance
.0196
.0196
367
Table E.27a Crosstabulation 'direction of exchange between
female respondents and sisters' children' and
'income respondent '
INTOTRSP
Count
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
1.00
8
3
3
2
16
57.1
2.00
2
3
5
17.9
3.00
7
7
25.0
ROW
Total
17
6
3
2
28
100.0
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B -.37335
Kendall's Tau C -.32143
Gamma -.63636
Somer' D -.38710
Number of Missing Observations = 0
Significance
.0160
.0160
Table E.28.
DIRMOBR->
AGERSP
Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
mâle respondents and mother's brothers' by 'âge
respondent'
Count
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
.00
2
8
3
1
14
70.0
1.00
1
3
2
6
30.0
Row
Total
3
11
5
1
20
100.0
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B .00000
Kendall's Tau C .00000
Gamma .00000
Number of Missing Observations = 41
Significance
.5000
.5000
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Table E.28a Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
mâle respondents and mother's sisters' by 'âge
respondent'
DIRMOSI->
AGERSP
Count
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
.00
1
9
3
2
15
71.4
1.00
2
3
1
6
28.6
Row
Total
3
12
4
2
21
100.0
Statistic Value
Cramer's V .38006
Contingency Coefficient .35527
Kendall's Tau B -.29139
Kendall's Tau C -.29025
Gamma -.55172
Number of Missing Observations = 40
Significance
.0825-
.0825
Table E.29. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
mâle respondents and mother's brothers' by 'res-
pondent 's relationship to homestead head'
DIRMOBR->
RHRSP
Count
1
3
4
Column
Total
.00
12
1
1
14
70.0
1.00
5
1
6
30.0
Row
Total
17
1
2
20
100.0
Statistic Value
Cramer's V .20153
Contingency Coefficient .19756
Kendall's Tau B .04496
Kendall's Tau C .03000
Gamma .13043
Number of Missing Observations = 41
Significance
.4211
.4211
369
i
à.
Tabla E.29a Crosstabulation 'incidence of sxchange between
! mâle respondents and mother's sisters' by 'res-
ƒ pondent 's relationship to homestead head'
î DIRMOSI— > Count
| RHRSP
t 1i
f 4
.00
14
1
1' Column 15
•y- Total 71.4
*• Statistic
f Cramer' s VContingency CoefficientKendall ' s Tau B
î Kendall's Tau C
J Gamma
1"*
ROW
1.00
4
1
1
Total
18
1
2
6 21
28.6 100.0
Value
.39675
.36878
.32398
.20862
.69697
<
^
î
*
Significance ;
*
1
.0706 ,?
.0706 J
Number of Missing Observations = 40 çj
^ä Table E.30. Crosstabulation 'direction of exchange between j| female respondents and mother's brothers' child- >
t ren' by 'age
f
J, DIRECMBC— > Count
f
-^  AOER^T
11-
$ 2
1
1 3
It
| 4
1.00
1
1
1
f Column 3
f Total 20.0
$
f. Statistic
Cramer 's V
. Contingency Coefficient
« Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
respondent '
2.00
2
1
à .UO
1
2
4
2
3 9
20.0 60.0
Value
.37019
.46381
.32810
.30667
.51111
^Row ^
Total ;
2 1
\
6
2 ^
15 ^100.0 <j
Significance 8
ï
^
.0833 ^
.0833 N =
Table E.31. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
! female respondents and mother's brothers' child-
ren' by 'marital status respondent'
DIRECMBC— > Count
MSRSP
: 1
-; 2
3
* Column
"- Total
Statistic
' Kendall's Tau B
j Kendall's Tau C
ï Gamma
?, Somers ' D
.X
.00
4
13
65
1.00
8
7
82 15
84.5 15.5
Row
Total
4
21
72
97
100.0
Value Significance
-.24240 .0079
-.15687 .0079
- .54993
-.20403
'•i Number of Missing Observations = 137
$v
[ Table E.32. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
1 female respondents
£. 'âge respondent'
i\
•«;• DIRMOBR— > Count
>^
'^ 1
L
;, 2
S 3
1i ' Column|^: Total
fl Statistic
r Cramer ' s V
.00
17
34
8
1.00
6
6
2
59 14
80.8 19.2
and mother's brothers' by
Row
Total
23
40
10
73
100.0
Value Significance
.12623
E Contingency Coefficient .12523
1- Kendall's Tau B -.08484 .2263
I * Kendall ' s Tau C
§• J Pearson' s R|.^  Gamma
?^
-.07206 .2263
-.08087 .2482
-.19048
J.j* Number of Missing Observations = 161
370 371
Table E.32a Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
female respondents and mother's sisters' by 'âge
respondent'
DIRMOSI-> Count
AGERSP
Kendall'
Kendall'
Gamma
Somers '
1
2
3
00
14
30
13
1.00
7
11
1
ROW
Total
21
41
14
Column 57 19 76
Total 75.0 25.0 100.0
Statistic Value Significance
S Tau B -.17977 .0512
S Tau C -.17036 .0512
-.38318
D -.19189
Number of Missing Observations = 158
Table E.33. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
female respondents and mother's brothers' by
'respondent 's relationship to homestead head'
DIRMOBR-> Count
RHRSP
Cramer' s
1
2
4
5
6
.00
4
37
1
15
2
1.00
4
7
2
1
ROW
Total
8
44
1
17
3
Column 59 14 73
Total 80.8 19.2 100.0
Statistic Value Significance
V .29689
Contingency Coefficient .28461
Kendall'
Kendall'
Gamma
S Tau B -.16180 .0738
S Tau C -.13586 .0738
-.34875
Number of Missing Observations 161
372
Table E.34 Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange
female respondents and brothers-in-law' by 'în-
come respondent'
INTOTRSP
Count
1
2
3
4
5
Column
Total
.00
82
8
7
2
99
61.5
1.00
42
12
6
2
62
38.5
Row
Total
124
20
13
2
2
161
100.0
Statistic Value Significance
.0188
.0188
Kendall's Tau B .15910
Kendall's Tau C .13580
Gamma .34429
Somers' D .17467
Number of Missing Observations = 73
Table E.35. Crosstabulation 'direction of exchange between
female respondents and brothers-in-law' by ' in-
come respondent'
INTOTRSP
Count
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
1.00
4
1
3
1
9
14.5
2.00
17
5
1
1
24
38.7
3.00
21
6
2
29
46.8
Row
Total
42
12
6
2
62
100.0
Statistie Value
Kendall's Tau B -.17544
Kendall's Tau C -.14438
Gamma -.30278
Somers' D -.15551
Number of Missing Observations = 0
Significance
.0576
.0576
373
Table E.36. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
female respondents and brothers-in-law' by 'âge
respondent'
AGERSP
Count
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
.00
12
45
33
9
99
61.5
1.00
21
26
11
4
62
38.5
ROW
Total
33
71
44
13
161
100.0
Statistic Value Significance
.0008
.0008
Kendall's Tau B -.23333
Kendall's Tau C -.26527
Gamma -.39819
Somers' D -.16550
Number of Missing Observations = 73
Table E.37. Crosstabulation 'direction of exchange between
female respondents and brothers-in-law' by 'âge
respondent'
AGERSP
Count
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
1.00
7
2
9
14.5
2.00
6
13
5
24
38.7
3.00
8
11
6
4
29
46.8
Row
Total
21
26
11
4
62
100.0
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Somers' D
Value
.28560
.27471
.43672
.26537
Significance
.0062
.0062
Number of Missing Observations =
374
Table E.38. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange"
female respondents and sistersr-in-law',
corne respondent'
INTOTRSP
Count
1
2
3
4
5
Column
Total
.00
91
9
7
1
108
65.1
1.00
40
8
8
2
58
34.9
Row
Total
131
17
15
2
1
166
100.0
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B .17765
Kendall's Tau C .14342
Gamma .39583
Somers' D .19845
Number of Missing Observations = 68
Significance
.0094
.0094
Table E.39. Crosstabulation 'direction of exchange between
female respondents and sisters-in-law' by 'in-
come respondent'
INTOTRSP
Count
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
1.00
8
2
6
1
17
29.3
2.00
20
3
1
24
41.4
3.00
12
3
2
17
29.3
Row
Total
40
8
8
2
58
100.0
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B -.20536
Kendall's Tau C -.17390
Gamma -.33913
Somers' D -.24625
Number of Missing Observations = 0
Significance
.0432
.0432
375
Table E.40. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
female respondents and sisters-in-law' by 'âge
respondent'
AGERSP
Count
1
2
3
4
Column
Total
.00
15
50
34
9
108
65.1
1.00
18
23
11
6
58
34.9
Row
Total
33
73
45
15
166
100.0
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B -.14406
Kendall's Tau C -.16084
Gamma -.25091
Somers' D -.14486
Number of Missing Observations = 68
Significance
.0231
.0231
Table E.41.
DIRECSIL->
AGERSP
Crosstabulation 'direction of exchange between
female respondents and sisters-in-law' by 'âge
respondent'
Statistic
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Number of Missing Observations =
2.00
5
LO
6
3
3.00
5
7
2
3
24 17
4 29.3
Value
A
11
Row %1
Total < "
18 |
23 |
- " i
6 $1
58 |
100.0 /
Significance è
'•?f
.22791 ».
.30678 $:
.15170 .0952 "<
.15428 .0952 1
.22095 J
ffi?
ï, -
§;
376
Table E.42. Crosstabulation 'direction of exchange
female respondents and sisters-in-law' by
tal status respondent'
MSRSP
Count
1
2
3
Column
Total
1.00
17
17
29.3
2.00
1
7
16
24
41.4
3.00
7
10
17
29.3
ROW
Total
1
14
43
58
100.0
Statistic Value Significance
.0041
.0041
Kendall's Tau B -.32812
Kendall's Tau C -.24970
Gamma -.61674
Somers' D -.44613
Number of Missing Observations = 0
Table E.43. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
female respondents and sisters-in-law' by 'res-
pondent 's relationship to thé head'
RHRSP
Count
1
2
4
5
6
Column
Total
.00
18
73
5
8
4
108
65.1
1.00
8
27
4
17
2
58
34.9
Row
Total
26
100
9
25
6
166
100.0
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B .19622
Kendall's Tau C .20250
Gamma .35006
Somers' D .19010
Number of Missing Observations = 68
Significance
.0036
.0036
377
Table E.44. Crosstabulation 'incidence of exchange between
male respondents and sisters-in-law' by 'respon-
dent 's relationship to homestead head'
RHRSP
Count
1
3
4
5
Column
Total
.00
32
2
34
75.6
1.00
7
2
1
1
11
24.4
Row
Total
39
4
1
1
45
100.0
F. STATISTICAL APPENDIX CHAPTER8
F.l. Guidelines for Section F.2.
For this appendix the same statistical measures have been used as|j|r
Appendix E. For explanation of thèse measures we refer to E.l. The taOle
numbers correspond with thé figures given in parenthèses in Chapter 8?
The meaning of thé variables and their abbrevations are explained
below each table.
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B .39142
Kendall's Tau C .23309
Gamma .80822
Somers' D .48560
Number of Missing Observations = 16
Significance
.0042
.0042
F.2. Tables and statistics
Table F.l. Crosstabulation 'membership church' by 'sex res-
pondent '
Table E.45. Crosstabulatxon
mâle respondents
respondent'
DIRECSIL-> Count
1.00
INTOTRSP
1 1
4 2
Column 3
Total 27.3 45
Statistic
S
\*à
'direction of exchange between j|
and sisters- in- law' by ' income ^\i
^
Row •
2.00 3.00 Total
5 3 9 i
!
5 ' 3 ' 11 |
.5 27.3 100.0 ^
Value Significance
Kendall's Tau B -.60388 .0218
Kendall's Tau C -.52893 .0218 1
Gamma -1.00000 ;-
Somers' D -.88889 ^
'«!
Number of Missing Observations = 0 J
1 MEMCHUR— > Count
1 0
,1 0 25
« 1 34
•.> _,.
ROW
1 Total
36 61
200 234
?t Column 59 236 295
al Total 20.0 80.0 100.0
^
>f Codes memchur: 0 = no membership
2. 1 = membership
?"* Codes sexrsp: 0 = mâle
U 1 = female
^ Chi-Square D.F. Significance Min E.F. Cells
\' with E.F.< 5
^
» 19.54189 1 .0000 12.200 None
\^
T Statistic Value Significance
^ Kendall ' s Tau B
fe. Kendall's Tau C
lt-. Gamma
•Vj~ Somer ' s D
.26784 .0000
.17356 .0000
.60668
.26454
Number of Missing Observations
378 379
t Table F. 2. COS
tal
MEMCHUR-> Count
i ' X
2
^ 3
stabulation ' memb«
status respondent
0 1
40
1
16
1 Column 5 7Total 20.0Codes MSRSP: l = married2 = single3 = widowedStatistic
184
1
48
srship of church' by 'mari-/ s
Row
Total !
224 >
2 ;
64 5
233 290 f
80.0 100.0 ?
Value Significance j
Kendall's Tau B -.09466 .0504 1
_ Kendall's Tau C -.06568 .0504 :| Gamma -.24676 1
i Number o f Missing Observations = 0 >
ij Table F. 3. Crosstabulation 'membership church by 'age res- *-
i pondent ' 1
| MEMCHÜR— > Count Row
j 0 1 Total <-'
si AGEGROUP
| 1.00
I*
1
 2.00
3.00
4.00
Column
Total
Codes AGEGROUP: 1 =
2 =
Statistic
1
18
26
14
42
89
68
37
43 j
107 Î
94 »
^51 ;3
59 ' 236 ' 295 ^
20.0 8o.o loo.o 3
16-30 years ^
31-45 years 3=
46-60 years
more than 61 years
Value Significance ^
Kendall's Tau B
j Kendall's Tau C
; Gamma
;
 Somers' D
Number of Missing Observatior
-.18'
-.17£
-.39C
-.12E
380
37 .0002 S
35 .0002 ,-a
43 1
28 'ï
0 ^
i
> -.
1 N Table F. 4. Cro
'to
LSHMHL—> Count
k 2
i 3
F 4
.^ v 5
;^  6
p 7
sstabulation ' hon
tal income homeste
0 1
26
30
12
25
11
12
12
6
5
4
15
15
8
10
lestead hiring labour', hy;
ad'
Row
Total
32
35
16
40
26
20
22
<P Column 128 63 191
: Total 67.0 33.0 100.0
'\ Codes LSHMHL: 0 = homestead does not hire labour
1 = homestead hires labour
Codes INHMT 1 = 0 thru 2500
T 2 = 2501 thru 5000
L 3 = 5001 thru 7500
^ „ 4 = 7501 thru 10000
;
-\ 5 = 10001 thru 15000
'^ 6 = 15001 thru 20000
-^\ 7 = 20001 thru highest
& Statistic Value Significance
4' Kendall's Tau B .23038 .0001|t Kendall's Tau C .28157 .0001
P Gamma .36928
h Somers' D .16667
t Number of Missing Observations = 7
JL* Table F. 5. Crosstabulation 'homestead hiring labour' by
'/* 'total disposable income homestead'
T.- LSHMHI/-> Count Row
0 1 Total
'-•^  INIIMDI3 -
K*! 1
2
-^ ' "^
1
5
'' 1 6
:
:
5'^  7
64
36
15
4
3
3
3
25
16
11
7
1
1
2
89
52
26
11
4
4
5
^ ! Column 128 63 191
,^ , Total 67.0 33.0 100.0
|" \ 381
Codes LSHMHL: 0
1
Codes INHMDIS:!
2
3
4
5
6
7
Statistic
homestead does not hire labour
homestead hires labour
0 thru 2500
2501 thru 5000
5001 thru 7500
7501 thru 10000
10001 thru 15000
15001 thru 20000
20001 thru highest
Value
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Somers' D
Number of Missing Observations
.11524
.12686
.20359
.09555
Significance
.0426
.0426
Table F.6.
LSHMHL— >
INHMAGT
Crosstabulation 'homestead hiring labour' by
'agricultural income homestead'
Count
1
2
3
4
5
6
Column
Total
0
106
15
3
1
1
2
128
67.0
1
44
14
1
2
2
63
33.0
ROW
Total
150
29
4
3
1
4
191
100.0
Codes LSHMHL
Codes INHMAGT
0 = homestead does not hire labour
1 = homestead hires labour
1 = 0 thru 1000
2 = 1001 thru 2000
3 = 2001 thru 3000
4 = 3001 thru 4000
5 = 4001 thru 5000
6 = 5001 thru highest=6
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Somers' D
Value
.14160
.11283
.32348
.15752
Significance
.0227
.0227
Number of Missing Observations
382
t
i
G. STATISTICAL APPENDIX CHAPTER9
G.I. Background information
The tables and statistics in Section G.2 were calculated with SPSS/PC+,
Version 2.0. The numbers of thé tables, Gl, G2, ....correspond with thé
numbers referred to in Chapter 9. Wherever necessary, thé abbrevatioris
and codes used in thé tables are explained below thé table.
The same statistical measures have been applied as in thé Appendices
E and F. For explanation we refer to Section E.l. In two tablet (Gltiûfa
G17) in Section G.2 thé Kruskal-Wallis test bas been applied. The
Kruskal-Wallis test tests whether k independent samples defîned hy a
grouping variable are from thé same population, by ranking cases" aiîd
comparing thé mean ranks from each group. The results of the Kruskal-
Wallis test can be checked on their Significance. In our analysis thé results
are considered significant at a level of Significance of 0.05 or below.
G.2. Tables and statistics
Table G.I.
OLDSURV->
SEXRSP
Crosstabulation 'ways of survival in old âge' by
'sex respondent'
Count
0
1
Column
Total
1.00
10
17
27
22.7
2.00
10
46
56
47.1
3.00
5
26
31
26.1
4.00
4
1
5
4.2
Row
Total
29
90
119
100.0
Codes OLDSURV: 1 = working
2 = working / pension + children
3 = children
4 = others
Codes SEXRSP: 0 = mâle
1 = female
Statistic Value
Cramer's V .33276
Contingency Coefficient .31574
Kendall's Tau B .04705
Kendall's Tau C .04632
Gamma .08884
Number of Missing Observations = 0
383
Significance
.2928
.2928
Tj Si*
Table G. 2. Crosstabulation 'ways of survival in old âge' î,
by 'agegroup respondent'
OLDSURV-> Count
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
1.00
16
5
4
2
2.00
22
16
8
10
3.00
5
5
3
18
4.00
1
1
3
Row !
Total ;
44 s
26 ,;
\
16
33
Column 27 56 31 5 119
Total 22.7 47.1 26.1 4.2 100.0
Codes OLDSURV: see Table F.l J
Statistic Value Significance |
Kendall's Tau B .37017 .0000 ^
Kendall's Tau C .33971 .0000 ^
Gamma .51899 1
S'
[ Table G. 4. Crosstabulation 'ways of survival in old age'
'marital status respondent'
OLDSURV-> Count
1.00
"•> 3.00
Column
Total
Codes OLDSURV- see r
1.00 2.00 :
21 33 :
6 23 :
27 56 :
22 7 47.1 26
Pahl« a 1 .
Row
Î.OO 4 00 Total
L2 1 67
19 4 52
51 5 119
1 4.2 100 0
t-' Codes MSRSP: 1 = married
R 3 = widowed
", Statistic
j; Kendall's Tau B
* Kendall's Tau C
ä - Gamma
Value
.29276
.33303
.49810
Significance
.0003
.0003
!„ Number of Missing Observations = 0
Number of Missing Observations =
Table G.3.
OLDSURV->
INCGROUP
Crosstabulation 'ways of survival in old âge' by
Table G.5. Crosstabulation 'ways of survival in old âge' by
'respondent's relationship to head'
Count
7.00
Column
Total
2
27
22.7
13
3
5
1
56
47.1
5
2
1
31
26.1
5
5
4.2
Row j
Total -;
,\;
_„ !
70
 j
V
30 §
„ 1
t
5
1 ;
3 :
2
 1
119 J
100.0 Ai
4 OLDSURV— > Count
?^i.
F£ 100
:,\'
!£*f
" 2 00
•^  300
%" 400
•*,
£" 500
^ 6 00
f Total
~V
P- Codes HEADREL: 1 =
!;| 2 =
1.00
13
12
1
1
27
22.7
head
wife
2.00
29
23
3
1
56
47.1
3.00
15
6
10
31
26 1
4.00
2
1
2
5
4 2
Row
Total
59
41
14
1
1
3
119
100.0
Codes OLDSURV: see Table G.I.
Codes INCGROUP: 1 = no income
2 = El - E250
3 = E251 - E500
4 = E501 - El,000
5 = El,001 - El,500
6 = El,501 - E2,000
7 = more than E2,000
Statistic Value
3 = parent (in-law)
4 = brother (in-law)/sister (in-law)
5 = child (in-law)
6 = other relationship
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B -.30565
Kendall's Tau C -.25234
Gamma -.48063
Number of missing observations: 0
Significance
.0001
.0001
Cramer's V .45732
Contingency Coefficient 62091
Kendall's Tau B 11429
Kendall's Tau C 09736
Gamma 17216
Number of Missing Observations = 0
Significance
.0810
0810
384 385
*•
X.
>y
Table G.6.
SUPPORT
Crosstabulation 'satisfaction of respondents in
old âge with support from children' by 'support
by children'
Count
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
Column
Total
1
6
2
16
13
37
32.7
2
1
6
30
39
76
67.3
ROW
Total
7
8
46
52
113
100.0
Codes OACHICAR:
Codes SUPPORT:
Statistic
1 = dissatisfied
2 = satisfied
2 = children do not support
3 = children outside homestead support
4 = children on homestead support
5 = children on and outside homestead support
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Number of Missing Observations =
Value
.18589
.19328
.34145
Significance
.0194
.0194
Table G.7.
HELPPAR->
PARLIV
Crosstabulation 'incidence and type of support
given by children' by 'place where parents live'
Count
1
2
3
4
5
6
Column
Total
.00
4
3
17
1
8
33
26.0
1.00
2
5
4
15
2
28
22.0
2.00
15
26
4
17
2
2
66
52.0
ROW
Total
17
35
11
49
3
12
127
100.0
Codes HELPPAR: 0 = no support
1 = only one type of support
2 = support contains several types
Codes PARLIV: 1 = at the repsondent's homestead
2 = in thé same community as respondent
3 = in thé same chiefdom, but in différent com-
munity
4 = in other chiefdom than respondent
5 = in town
6 = outside Swaziland
386
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Value
-.41187
-.41645
-.59092
Significaïiee
.0000
.0000 ™
Number of Missing Observations =
Table G.8.
HELPPAR—>
PARSTAY
Crosstabulation 'incidence and type of support
given by children' by 'persons with whom parents
stay'
Count
1
2
3
4
5
7
Column
Total
.00
13
4
2
19
21.3
1.00
2
17
2
21
23.6
2.00
15
22
9
1
1
1
49
55.1
Row
Total
17
52
15
3
1
1
89
100.0
Codes HELPPAR:
Codes PARSTAY:
see Table G.7
1 = with respondent
2 = with brothers/sisters respondent
3 = on their own
4 = parents' brothers or sisters
5 = other family
6 = other than family
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B -.18364
Kendall's Tau C -.16362
Gamma -.31214
Number of Missing Observations = 38
Significance
.0275
.0275
Table G.9.
HELPPAR->
SEXRSP
Crosstabulation 'incidence and type of support
given to parents' by 'sex respondent'
Count
0
1
Column
Total
.00
3
30
33
26.0
1.00
2
26
28
22.0
2.00
17
49
66
52.0
ROW
Total
22
105
127
100.0
Codes HELPPAR: see Table G.7
Codes SEXRSP: 0 = mâle
1 = female
387
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Number of Missing Observations =
Table G. 10. Crosstabulation
given to parents'
HELPPAR-> Count
.00
1.00 17
2.00 8
3.00 3
4.00 1
5.00
6.00 4
7.00
Column 33
Total 26.0 22
Codes HELPPAR: see Table G. 7
Codes INCGROUP: 1 = El - El, 000
2 = El, 001 - E2,0
3 - E2,001 - E3,C
4 = E3,001 - E4,0
5 = E4,001 - E5,0
6 E5 001 - E7 5
7 = more than E7,
Statistic
value Significance
-.20376 .0080
-.17087 .0080
-.51610
0
' incidence and type of support |
by 'income group respondent'
Row
1.00 2.00 Total
11 18 46
8 16 32
4 12 19
5 6
1 3 4
3 5 12 j
1 7 8 \i
28 66 127
.0 52.0 100.0
00 >
00 ;
oo ;
00
00
500 -
Value Significance
Kendall's Tau B .20478 .0036
Kendall's Tau C .21074 .0036 j
Gamma .29966 5
Table G. 11. Crosstabulation 'respondents in old age by «j
income group' by 'respondents in old age by x-
agegroup' Î
AGEGROUP— > Count
XNCOLD
; .00
1.00
2.00
3.00
' 4.00
5.00
6.00
Column
Total
Statistic
1.00
2
7
6
7
11
4
7
44
37.0
2.00
1
7
1
3
7
3
4
3.00
3
4
1
4
2
2
f* ROW <•
4. 00' f Total '"
8 1 - 1 4
6
 ï ,24
4 3 12
6 - 'S 20
1 ' 19
2 ~ 43,,
6 19
26 16 33 11,9
21.8 13.4 27.7 100.0
Value Significance
Kendall's Tau B -.15705 .0172
Kendall's Tau C -.16364 .0172
Gamma -.19872 ,9
Number of Missing Observations = 0
Table G. 12. Crosstabulation 'marital status respondents in
old age' by 'respondents in old age by income
: group'
NEWMS— > Count Row
. 1.00 2.00 Total
| .00
i i.oo
! 2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
Column
[ Total
4
7
8
15
15
7
11
67
56.3
10
17
4
5
4
4
8
52
43.7
14
24
12
20
19
11
19
119
100.0
Codes AGEGROUP:
Codes INCOLD:
1 = less than 56 years
2 = 56 - 60 years
3 = 61 - 65 years
4 = more than 65 years
0 = no income
1 - El - E250
2 = E251 - E500
3 = E501 - El,000
4 = El,001 - El,500
5 = El,501 - E2,000
6 = more than E2,000
388
Codes NEWMS: l = married
2 = widowed
Codes INCOLD: see Table G.11
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Value
-.23357
-.30167
- 35108
Significance
.0019
.0019
Number of Missing Observations =
389
Table G.13.
HEADREL->
INCOLD
Crosstabulation 'respondent's relationship to
thé homestead's head' by 'respondents in old âge
by income group'
Count
.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
Column
Total
1.00
6
12
2
8
9
9
13
59
49.6
2.00
2
5
9
11
9
1
4
41
34.5
3.00
3
7
1
1
1
1
14
11.8
4.00
3
1
1
5
4.2
Row
Total
14
24
12
20
19
11
19
119
100.0
Codes HEADREL:
Codes INCOLD:
Statistic
1 = head
2 = wife
3 = parent
4 = else
see Table G.il
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Number of Missing Observations =
Value
-.22525
-.21769
-.30421
Significance
.0016
.0016
Table 6.14.
SEXRSP->
INCOLD
Crosstabulation 'sex respondent' by 'respondents
in old âge by income group'
Count
.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
Column
Total
0
5
2
1
4
4
5
8
29
24.4
1
9
22
11
16
15
6
11
90
75.6
Row
Total
14
24
12
20
19
11
19
119
100.0
Codes SEXRSP: 0 = mâle
1 = female
Codes INCOLD: see Table G.il
390
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B -.15767
Kendall's Tau C -.17626
Gamma -.27513
Number of Missing Observations = 0
significa»«« r\1
.0253 *
.0253
Table G.15.
OLDSURV->
INCOLD
Crosstabulation 'ways in which respondents sur-
vive' by 'respondents in old âge by income
group'
Count
.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
Column
Total
1.00
2
2
2
2
7
5
7
27
22.7
2.00
1
12
7
14
9
4
9
56
47.1
3.00
8
8
3
4
3
2
3
31
26.1
4.00
3
2
5
4.2
ROW
Total
14
24
12
20
19
11
19
119
100.0
Codes OLDSURV: 1 = mainly by working
2 = working and support from children
3 = support from children
4 = support from others than children
Codes INCOLD: see Table G.11
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B -.34794
Kendall's Tau C -.34630
Gamma -.45712
Number of Missing Observations = 0
Significance
.0000
.0000
Table G.16. Kruskal-Wallis tests on différences between
income groups with respect to average incomes
from agriculture, wage labour, remittances, and
other income generating activities
Test on agricultural income:
INAGTRSP
by INCOLD
Mean Rank
37.63
54.17
46.10
63.82
65.73
60.76
Cases
24
12
20
19
11
19
105
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
Total
391
!Corrected for Ties
CASES Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Significance j
105 12.7131 .0262 18.4032 .0025
Test on Other Income Generating Activities:
INSETRSP
by INCOLD
|- Mean Rank Cases |
' 4
î; 43.65 24 INCOLD = 1
45.75 12 INCOLD = 2
: 58.92 20 INCOLD = 3
l
' 59.63 19 INCOLD = 4 „,
à 56.32 11 INCOLD = 5
Ç 54.61 19 INCOLD = 6
1 105 Total
V
-^  Corrected for Ties
CASES Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Significance •
105 4.7855 .4426 5.3288 .3771 ;
^ Test on wage labour: ^
INWLTRSP S
x by INCOLD *
£ Mean Rank Cases
^ 53.13 24 INCOLD = 1 3
•: 51.00 12 INCOLD = 2 4
V 51.00 20 INCOLD = 3 j
1 53.74 19 INCOLD = 4 >
î* 51.00 11 INCOLD = 5 1
13 56.63 19 INCOLD = 6
LN> 105 Total
" Corrected for Ties
CASES Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Significance
: 105 .4671 .9933 4.2469 .5144
Test on remit tances: j
REMRSPR H
by INCOLD
Mean Rank Cases |
<JS 31.88 24 INCOLD = 1 ;:
,'; 41.33 12 INCOLD = 2 :•
51.70 2 0 INCOLD = 3
58.32 19 INCOLD = 4
67.77 11 INCOLD = 5
74 . 55 19 INCOLD = 6
105 Total
^ Corrected for Ties
CASES Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Significance
105 26.0278 .0001 27.3370 .0000
Table 6.17. Kruskal-Wallis test on différai
income groupa with respect to me
income respondents in old age vers
posable homestead income
INRATIO2
x' by INCOLD
Mean Rank Cases
23.71 24 INCOLD = 1
33.08 12 INCOLD = 2
54.26 19 INCOLD = 3
64.79 19 INCOLD = 4
69.55 11 INCOLD = 5
77.21 19 INCOLD = 6
f 104 Total
J Corrected
* CASES Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Si<
L- 104 46.3136 .0000 46.5972
1^
 Table 6.18. Crosstabulation 'age of responden
%; dence of saving among respondents i
^ AGBGROUP-> Count
y' 1.00 2.00 3.00 '
| 0 38 23 15
1 1 6 3 1
%n raWoj?V*pp$
ns total **!**• N:
* y •"""
V*
for Ties~
jnificance
.0000
:s' by 'inci-
n old age'
Row
1.00 Total
30 106
3 13
f' Column ' 44 26 16 33 119
Total 37.0 21.8 13.4 27.7 100.0
Codes AGEGROUP: see Table G. 11
Codes OASAV: 0 = respondent does not save
1 = respondent saves
S-\ Statistic Value Significance
.x Cramer 's V .08280
i Contingency Coefficient .08252
Kendall's Tau 3 -.06411
^
:
 Kendall's Tau C -.04802
\ Gamma -.17418
5. Number of Missing Observations = 0
>^
.2246
.2246
392 393
CASES
105
Chi-Square
12.7131
Significance
.0262
Corrected for Ties
Chi-Square Significance
18.4032 .0025
Test on Other Incarne Generating Activities:
INSETRSP
by INCOLD
Mean Rank Cases
43.65
45.75
58.92
59.63
56.32
54.61
24
12
20
19
11
19
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
1
2
3
4
5
6
CASES
105
105 Total
Chi-Square Significance
4.7855 .4426
Test on wage labour:
INWLTRSP
by INCOLD
Mean Rank Cases
CASES
105
Chi-Square
.4671
105 Total
Significance
.9933
Test on remittances:
REMRSPR
by INCOLD
Mean Rank Cases
105 Total
CASES
105
Chi-Square
26.0278
Significance
.0001
392
Corrected for Ties
Chi-Square Significance
5.3288 .3771
53.13
51.00
51.00
53.74
51.00
56.63
24
12
20
19
11
19
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
1
2
3
4
5
6
Corrected for Ties
Chi-Square Significance
4.2469 .5144
31.88
41.33
51.70
58.32
67.77
74.55
24
12
20
19
11
19
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
1
2
3
4
5
6
Corrected for Ties
Chi-Square Significance
27.3370 .0000
Table G. 17. Kruskal-Wallis test on différences
income groups with respect to mean
income respondents in old age versus
posable homestead income
Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA
INRATIO2
by INCOLD
Mean Rank Cases
23.71
33.08
54.26
64.79
69.55
77.21
24
12
19
19
11
19
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
INCOLD =
1
2
3
4
5
6
104 Total
CASES
104
Chi-Square Significance
46.3136 .0000
Corrected for Ties
Chi-Square Significance
46.5972 .0000
Table G.18.
OASAV
Crosstabulation 'âge of respondents' by 'inci-
dence of saving among respondents in old âge'
Count
0
1
Column
Total
1.00
38
6
44
37.0
2.00
23
3
26
21.8
3.00
15
1
16
13.4
4.00
30
3
33
27.7
Row
Total
106
13
119
100.0
Codes AGEGROUP:
Codes OASAV:
see Table G.11
0 = respondent does not save
1 = respondent saves
Statistic Value
Cramer's V .08280
Contingency Coefficient .08252
Kendall's Tau B -.06411
Kendall's Tau C -.04802
Gamma -.17418
Number of Missing Observations = O
Significance
.2246
.2246
fei
393
Table G. IS. Cros
Of £
|
sEXRSP-> Count
OASAV
1
ästabulation ' sex
saving among respor
0 1
25
4
81
9
respondents' by 'incidence
 s
idents in old age'
Row ;
Total
106 ^
13 ï
? Column 29 90 119 J
! Total 24.4 75.6 100.0
1
!
Codes SEXRSP: 0 = male
1 = female
Codes OASAV: 0 = respondent does not save
1 = respondents saves
Chi-Souare D.F. Significance Min E.F. Cells
with E.F.< 5
.05162 1
.32429 1
Statistic
.8203 3.168 1 Of 4
(25.0%)
.5690 (Bef ore Yates Correction)
Value Significance
Phi .05220 , S
Contingency Coefficient .05213 j
Kendall's Tau B -.05220 .2853 ^
Kendall's Tau C -.02796 .2853 y
Number o f Missing Observations = 0 ^
i
*
Table G. 20. Crosstabulation 'incidence of saving among rea- ,|
pondants in old age' by ' income group responde- |
^ nts' ;i
s]
5 OASAV— > Count Row ^
js 0 1 Total 1
INCOLD| .00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
Column
Total
Codes INCOLD: see T
12
22
12
19
18
10
13
2
2
1
1
1
6
14 -^
24 .51
12 S
20 |
19 jj
11 -^
19 ;<
106 ' 13 ' 119 "i
89.1 10.9 100.0 'S
able G. 11 ^
Statistic Value - *Sigttlei<Jsäie& • 1
Kendall's Tau B .12762 " „'OsifW^  ^
Kendall's Tau C .10366 ,OS6^ \ljP ^
Gamma .30970 - „ ^ f^
Number of Missing Observations = 0 t ~ ;* ,~| "y
S ' •- x
 N \
Table G. 21. Crosstabulation 'cattle ownership' by 'sçx xkÈ*
pondent' - "~ ^
CATTLEOA
Count ROW
SEXRSP .00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 Total
0
1
Column
Total
• i Codes C}
-| Codes SI
'| Kendall
;|' Kendall
>, Gamma
Number c
S' Table F
-- Count
=' HEADREL
r, i.oo
E* 2 . 00
VN 3.00
P 4.00
Column
i;. Total
10 1 6 5 4 26
69 12 6 1 1 89 •-'
79 13 12 6 5 115
68.7 11.3 10.4 5.2 4.3 100.0 ^
'j-
iTTLEOA: 0 = 0
1 = 1-5
2 = 6-10
3 = 11-15
4 = 16 >
]XRSP: 0 = male
1 = female
Statistic Value Significance
S Tau B -.40391 .0000
s Tau C -.33784 .0000
-.71283
)f Missing Observations = 4
22. Crosstabulation 'cattle ownership' by ' respon-
dent 's relationship to homestead head'
CATTLEOA
ROW
.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 Total
31 5 8 6 5 55
33 4 4 41
11 3 14
4 1 5
79 13 12 6 5 115
68.7 11.3 10.4 5.2 4.3 100.0
Codes OASAV: 0 = respondent does not save
l = respondents saves
(continue next page)
394 395
Codes CATTLEOA: see Table G.21
Codes HEADREL: l » head
2 = wife
3 = parent
else
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B -.25876
Kendall's Tau C -.18129
Gamma -.47172
Number of Missing Observations = 4
Significance
.0010
.0010
Table G.23. Crosstabulation 'cattle ownership' by 'marital
status respondent'
CATTLEOA
Count
NEWMS
1.00
3 .00
.00
41
38
1.00
5
8
2.00
9
3
3.00
5
1
4 .00
4
1
Column
Total
79
68.7
13
11.3
12
10.4
6
5.2
5
4.3
Row
Total
64
51
115
100.0
Codes CATTLEOA: see Table G. 21
Codes NEWMS : l = married
3 = widowed
Statistic Value
Cramer's V .24480
Contingency Coefficient .23778
Kendall's Tau B -.14249
Kendall's Tau C -.14155
Gamma -.28712
Number of Missing Observations = 4
Significance
.0542
.0542
Table G.24. Crosstabulation 'cattle ownership' by 'age group
respondent
CATTLEOA
Count
AGERSP
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
.00
32
13
8
26
1.00
3
5
2
3
2.00
6
2
2
2
3.00
1
2
2
1
4.00
3
2
Column
Total
79
68.7
13
11.3
12
10.4
6
5.2
5
4.3
ROW
Total
42
25
16
32
115
100.0
Codes CATTLEOA: see Table G.2l
Codes AGERSP: see table G.11
^
*
s
Ji
•v
v
A,
1
^
V
"c
' ^
\
1
1^
Statistic
Cramer' s V
Value
.23239
Contingency Coefficient .37340
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall ' s Tau C
Gamma
Number of Missing
-.00302
-.00242
-.00481
Observations = 4
; Table G. 25. Crosstabulation 'cattle
group respondent'
SÎ
%
: Count
\ INCOLD
.00
1.00
2.00
3 . 00
4.00
5.00
; 6.00
i Column
1 Total
.00
10
20
11
12
11
8
7
79
68.7
CATTLEOA
1.00 2.00 3
2 1
3
3 3
1 4
4 4
13 12
11.3 10.4 5.
-Si aài^yP-9+ *^^ &*r^  ^ f
""*"*""'* *rmf\ 'i '
• "vL •• "
,48S'JS*V
.485à'1 ; >' *
"•'"'"•'",
• ;,? ,
ownership' by '-inootnè
" » ' .' >
' Ç < '
*M'
Ro^ î
.00 4.00 Total.
13
1 24
1 12 »*• f
1 1 20
3 19
1 2 11
1 16
6 5 115
2 4.3 100.0
'| Codes CATTLEOA: see Table G. 21
t Codes INCOLD: see
ï Statistic
;v Kendall's Tau B
l- Kendall's Tau C
?? Gamma
^
5-\. Number of Missing
Table G. 11
Value
.21689
.17637
.32841
Observations = 4
Significance
.0026
.0026
^ Table G. 26. Crosstabulation 'goats ownership' by 'age res-
t* pondent'
\
f GOATSOA-> Count
|r- AGEGROUP
r\
',-
N
r^ -K'
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
.00 1.00
32 3
19 1
9 2
26
Column 86 6
Ê Total 80.4 5.6
ROW
2.00 3.00 Total
5 1 41
3 23
3 14
1 2 29
9 6 107
8.4 5.6 100.0
396 397
Codes GOATSOA: 0 = 0
1 = 1-5
2 = 6-10
3 = 11-15
4 = 16 >
Codes AGEGROUP: see Table G.24
Statistic
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Number of Missing Observations
Value Significance
.22506
.36320
.05128 .2771
.03377 .2771
. 10147
12 Nj
s * ' *-,
Table G. 29. Crosstabulation 'goats ownership' b$j« '-respe
dent 's relationship to thé homestead Kaad.' * .
GOATSOA-> Count
' IIEADREL
jî 1.00
2.00
-; 3.00
^
4.00
Column
.00
38
32
12
4
86
1.00
4
2
6
2.00
5
3
1
9
3.00,
e ~i
„
6
ROW •
Totale
s3
37
• 13'
4
107
Total 80.4 5.6 8.4 5.6 100.6;
Table G.27.
GOATSOA->
SEXRSP
Crosstabulation 'goats ownership' by ' sex res-
pondent '
Count
0
1
Column
Total
.00
13
73
86
80.4
1.00
4
2
6
5.6
2.00
3
6
9
8.4
3.00
6
6
5.6
Row
Total
26
81
107
100.0
Codes GOATSOA: see Table G.26
Codes SEXRSP: 0 = mâle, 1 = female
Statistic Value Significance
Kendall's Tau B
T^ rt.«y^ -iT 1 t fi T^ï» f
Gamma
-.43178 .0000 'i
- 30e7D .0000 \
-.77365 î
12
Table G. 28 . Crosstabulation ' goats ownership ' by ' marital ^
sta
1.00
2.00
Column
Total
.00
45
41
86
80.4
1.00
6
6
5.6
Row
2.00 3.00 Total
4 6 61
5 46
9 6 ' 107 ;
8.4 5.6 100.0 ;
Codes GOATSOA: see Table G. 2 6
Codes NEWMS : 1 =
2 «
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
married
widowed
Vali"* Siemificance
•^ '
-.18425 .0251 i
-.15058 .0251
-.45802
v UUATÖUA— > count
^ INCOLD -
.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
1 5.00
V 6.00
.00
13
19
10
14
11
8
11
1.00
2
4
2.00
1
1
3
1
3
3.00
1
2
3
Row
Total
13 -^
20 „-
11
17
18
11
17
Column 86 6 9 6 107
4 Total 80.4 5.6 8.4 5.6 100.0
^ Codes GOATSOA: see Table G. 26
| Codes INCOLD: see Table G. 11
^sj- Statistic Value Significance
; Kendall's Tau C .21452 .0001
J Gamma . 54594
•\
Number of Missing Observations = 12
398
Codes GOATSOA: see Table G. 2 6
Codes HEADREL: 1 = head
2 = wife
3 = parent
4 = else
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Number of Missing Observations =
Value
-.21746
-.13323
-.50709
12
Significance
.0074
.0074
 :
Table G.30. Crosstabulation 'goats ownership' by 'respon-
dent 's income'
Number of Missing Observations = 12
399
Table G.31. Crosstabulation 'catlle ownership' by 'goats
ownership' of respondents in old âge
CATTLEOA
Count
GOATSOA
.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
Column
.00
63
2
4
1
70
1.00
11
1
12
2.00
6
2
3
1
12
3,00
2
1
1
2
6
4.00
1
1
1
1
4
Row
Total
83
6
9
6
104
Total 67.3 11.5 11.5 5.8 3.8 100.0
Codes GOATSOA 0 = 0
and CATTLEOA: 1 = 1-5
2 = 6-10
3 = 11-15
4 = 16 >
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B .39892
Kendall's Tau C .22559
Gamma .67528
Number of Missing Observations = 15
Significance
.0000
.0000
Table 6.32. Crosstabulation 'support respondent in old âge
receives from others' by 'support from children'
SUPPORT
Count
.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
Column
Total
0
2
1
5
6
31
38
83
69.7
1
2
1
2
2
15
14
36
30.3
Row
Total
4
2
7
8
46
52
119
100.0
Codes OAHELPOP:
Codes SUPPORT:
0 = no help from others
1 = help from others
2 = children do not support
3 = children outside homestead support
4 = children on homestead support
5 = children on and outside homestead support
400
Statistic
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Kendall ' s Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Missing observations : 0
Value
.11657
.11579
-.06363
-.06666
-.12016
.2306 «*i
Table G.33.
SEXRSP
Crosstabulation ' support respondent in olâ
receives from others' by 'sex respondent'
Count
0
1
Column
Total
0
21
62
83
69.7
1
8
28
36
30.3
ROW
Total
29
90
119
100.0
Codes OAHELPOP: see Table G.32
Codes SEXRSP: 0 = mâle
1 = female
Chi-Sguare D.F. Significance
.01612
.12915
.8990
.7193
Min E.F. Cells
with E.F.< 5
8.773 None
{ Before Yates Correction )
Statistic
Phi
Contingency Coefficient
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Value
.03294
.03293
.03294
.02599
.08487
Significance
.3602
.3602
Table G.34. Crosstabulation 'support respondent in old âge
receives from others' by 'income respondent'
INCOLD
Count
.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
Column
Total
0
11
17
10
11
13
7
14
83
69.7
1
3
7
2
9
6
4
5
36
30.3
Row
Total
14
24
12
20
19
11
19
119
100.0
401
Codes OAHELPOP: see Table G.32
Codes INCOLD: 0 = no income
1 = El - E250
2 = E251 - E500
3 = E501 - El,000
4 = El,001 - El,500
5 = El,501 - E2,000
6 = more than E2,000
Statistic
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Number of Missing Observations =
Value
.18314
.18014
.04322
.05169
.07202
Significance
.2960
.2960
Table G.35.
SEXRSP->
SIPAYTR
Crosstabulation ' sex respondent' by
transport costs in case of sickness'
' who pays
Count
1
2
Column
Total
0
15
5
20
15.7
1
55
52
107
84.3
Row
Total
70
57
127
100.0
Codes SEXRSP: 0 = mâle
1 = female
402
Table G.36.
SIPAYTR->
INCSICK
Crosstabulation 'income respondent' ä$y 'WÎIQ.
transport costs in case of sickness'
Count
.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
Column
Total
1
3
31
20
4
3
1
6
2
70
55.1
2
7
24
9
7
4
2
4
57
44.9
Row
Total
10
55
29
11
7
3
10
2
127
100.0
Codes SIPAYTR: 1 = respondent pays him-/herself
2 = other persons pay
Codes INCSICK: 0 = 0
1 = 1 thru 1000
2 = 1001 thru 2000
3 = 2001 thru 3000
4 = 3001 thru 4000
5 = 4001 thru 5000
6 = 5001 thru 10000
7 = 10001 thru highest
Statistic Value Significance"
Chi- Square
2.89920
3.79315
2 = other persons
D.F. Significance
1 .0886
1 .0515
Statistic
Phi
Contingency Coefficient
Kendall's
Kendall's
Pearson' s
Gamma
Number of
Tau B
Tau C
R
Missing Observations =
pay
Min E.
8.976
( Before
Value
.17282
.17030
.17282
.12524
.17282
.47867
0
F. cells l
with E . F . < 5 i
None
Yates Correction ) <
Significance
.0262 1
.0262 ^
.0260 *
; Cramer 's V .26801 ,
Contingency Coefficient .25888
Kendall ' s
Kendall's
Gamma
Number of
S Table G. 37
ï^
': SEXRSP->
\ SIPAYME
>*
ï>
»
Tau B -.05402 .2514
Tau C -.06522 .2514
-.08828
Missing Observations = o
Crosstabulation 'sex respondent' by 'who pays
médical treatment in case of sickness'
- f.
Count
0
1
2
0
7
21
8
1
28
59
84
Row
Total s j -
35
80
92
403
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Value
.16318
.13825
.36577
Significance
.0070
.0070
Number of Missing Observations
Table G.38.
SIPAYME->
INCSICK
crosstabulation ' income respondent' by 'who pays
médical treatment in case of sickness'
Count
.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
Column
Total
1
4
30
21
8
4
3
8
2
80
46.5
2
9
43
19
10
4
3
4
92
53.5
Row
Total
13
73
40
18
8
6
12
2
172
100.0
Codes SIPAYME and INCSICK: see Table G.36
Statistic Value Significance
Kendall's Tau B -.14432
Kendall's Tau C -.17523
Gamma -.23572
Number of Missing Observations = O
.0185
.0185
Table G.39.
SIACT2->
ACTIVE
Crosstabulation 'origin of support with activ-
ities of sick respondents' by 'number of active
homestead members'
Count
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Column
Total
1.00
62
29
3
2
96
72.2
2.00
6
3
9
6.8
3.00
24
4
28
21.1
Row
Total
92
36
3
2
133
100.0
404
Codes SIACT2: 1 = support from within homestead*
2 = support from within and outside the
3 = support from outside the homestead
Codes ACTIVE : 1 = 1 - S
2 - 6 - 1 03 = 11 - is
4 = 16 - 20
5 = 21 thru highest
Statistic Value
Kendall's Tau B -.17241
Kendall's Tau C -.11346
Gamma -.42208
Number of Missing Observations = l
Significaare
.0193
.0195 *
Table G.40.
SIACT2->
AGESICK
Crosstabulation 'origin of support with actJLv-
ities of sick respondents' by 'age of siok res-
pondent '
Count
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Column
Total
1.00
12
34
39
12
97
72.4
2.00
5
3
1
9
6.7
3.00
9
11
8
28
20.9
Row
Total
21
50
50
13
134
100.0
Codes SIACT2: see Table G.39
Codes AGESICK: l = lowest thru 30
2 = 31 thru 45
3 = 46 thru 60
4 = 61 thru highest=4
Statistic
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Value
-.21009
-.17092
-.38329
Significance
.0038
.0038
Number of Missing Observations
Table G.41.
SIACT2->
SEXRSP
Crosstabulation 'origin of support with activ-
ities of sick respondents' by 'sex of sick resp-
ondent '
Count
0
1
Column
Total
1.00
11
86
97
72.4
2.00
2
7
9
6.7
3.00
28
28
20.9
ROW
Total
13
121
134
100.0
Codes SIACT2- see Table G.39
Codes SEXRSP: o = male
l = female
405
Statistic Value- Significance
.0980
.0980
.0630
Cramer's V .19154
Contingency Coefficient .18812
Kendall's Tau B .10944
Kendall's Tau C .05992
Pearson's R .13287
Gamma .43883
Number of Missing Observations = 0
Table G.42. Crosstabulation 'incidence of extra support
received by sick' by 'length of sickness period'
SITIME
Count
0
1
2
3
Column
Total
0
15
57
47
45
164
79.2
1
2
11
8
22
43
20.8
ROW
Total
17
68
55
67
207
100.0
Codes SIOTHHLP:
Codes SITIME:
Statistic
0 = respondent did not receive extra support
1 = respondent received extra support
0 = one week or less
1 = 1 till 4 weeks
2 = more than one month
3 = more than one year
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Number of Missing Observations =
Value
.16061
.15562
.33003
Significance
.0063
.0063
Table G.43. Crosstabulation 'incidence of extra support
received by sick' by 'number of active homestead
metnbers '
ACTIVE
Count
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
Column
Total
0
96
58
7
2
163
79.1
1
24
15
4
43
20.9
Row
Total
120
73
11
2
206
100.0
406
Codes SIOTHHLP:
Codes ACTIVE:
Statistic
0 = respondent did not receive extra;
1 = respondent received extra support
1 = 1 - 5 persons
2 = 6 - 10 persons
3 = il - is persons
4 = 16 - 20 persons
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Kendall's Tau B
Kendall's Tau C
Gamma
Number of Missing Observations
Value
.10301
.10246
.03429
.02875
.08012
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H, QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN SAMPLE SURVEY
i
4->
l
i
g
01
<u
s «>
•0 ^1 *
3 B
c»;
a'
i
E
O
g
3S
> A
Q) C3
1 -
5
 SS £
m
a
rit
al
s
ta
tu
s
|
+J
8
• c
L.
O
<0 M
'S
'S
V
0
-0
1
g
+J
m 3
0)
sj O)
tD
ro v
s
C
fj T-
«- C3
C
A
>x,
JE
-
è
tM
ï:
ro
Ä
è
**
*»»
£
IA
*x
£
O
*»sx:
N.
^
CO
£
o-
•«X
£
o
ï
^
z
ï
N
è
JO
»X.
E
^*
ï
in
O '
S!
11
*
w p — *
«I'S(o w
o
YE
S/
NO
I
a g
-5 >
ü i s
o o i !
5
N
i
s
•g
B
R! S
iI!
-j 0)
S o.38
o û
•§e
I
c
<u
1
H-
O
re
m
itt
.
ye
s/
no
§ **
u
H- 'S
O
3".
t_ 4-*
S. S
0 8
•§•§
••- M
4-> t-
^ s
U E
t. — .
J O
•s
tl
(0 4-
o
UJ
£
o
LLI
IA
O
S
SS
s
o
s
«
PART 3. 3.1. Transfers between respondent and (non)-relatives.
If respondent has no children, GO TO QUESTION 3.
1. We would like to know if thé ohildren or children-in-lâw who
live on this homestead (SEE SHEET 1) give you money, goods, O3£
other things.
NO. Does support
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
Kind of support Frequency Amount
2. Further we would like to know if children and children-in-
law, who do not live on this homestead give you money, goods,
help with activities or do other things for you
no. M/F Place Occupât on Help
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
Form Frequency Amount
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3. Can you also tell me if you support or help the following
relatives with goods, money, food, clothes, activities, etc. or
if they help you.
Older brothers from same
tnother and father
Younger brothers from same
mother and father
Brothers from other
father /mother
Brother children
Older sisters from
same mother and father
Younger sisters from
same mother and father
Sisters from
other father/mother
Sisters children
Fathers brothers sons
Fathers brothers daughters
Fathers sisters children
Mothers sisters sons
Mothers sisters daughters
Mothers brothers children
Husbands/wives' brothers
Husbands/wives' sisters
Husb/wives ' brothers children
Husb/wi vas' sisters children
Do you hâve
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
YES/NO
Actual help
give
Actual help
received
4. Do you hâve parents yourself?
.... YES, father and mother (go to 5)
.... YES, only mother (go to 5)
.... YES, only father (go to 5)
.... NO (go to 9)
5. Where does he/she or where do they live?
same homestead as respondent
same community as respondent
other community, but same chiefdom as respondent
other chiefdom in Swaziland
6. With whom do they live?
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7. Please, can you tell me if you help them with orie or, aiore ,-of
the f ollowing things: (for codes activities use activities' Itsfe)
.... Nothing is given to (one) of thé parents (go to 8},'
.... Activities:
.... Food ,,, - , •
.... Money * s • •
.... Clothes
.... Groceries
.... Transport
.... Blankets
.... Firewood
.... Building materials -• , •
.... Agricultural items (plough, fertilizer, seeds, été) ,
.... Other items, please specify • • -- • ^
GO TO SECTION 3.2.
f-
8. Why don't you help your parents as Swazi custom says that
children should take care of their parents? ;
3.2. OLD AGE
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ONLY NEED TO BE ANSWERED BY ii§ESf i
WHO ARE NOT OLD AGED. FOR PERSONS WHO ARE OLD AGED,
QUESTION 22 .
1. Do you think your children will take care of you
old?
....YES (go to 2) ....NO (go to 2)
.... Respondent has no children (go to 3)
2. Why do you think so?
DO NOT«KNg>W ,
(go to 2)
3. Please, can you tell us if you support one or more, off the
following persons and with what you help them?
Persons
Father- in- law
Mother- in- law
Fathers brother(s)
Fathers sister (s)
Mothers brother(s)
Mothers sister (s)
Own grandparents
Husbands /wives '
fathers brothers
Husbands /wive s '
fathers sisters
Husbands /wives '
mothers brothers
Husbands /wives '
Alive Support Form Freq h*
zu
«AjIKSUatru.
*
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mothers sisters
Grandparents - in- law
4. Are there maybe other persons who are supported by you like
friends, neighboors or other people?
.... YES (go to 5) NO (go to 7)
5. How are these persons related to you?
6. How do you support him/her or them?
7. Are there already activities that you did recently but are
not doing now anymore?
.... YES (go to 8)
8. What kind of activities?
NO (go to 10}
Agricultural activities:
Domestic activities:
Wage labour activities:
Other income generating activities:
9. What is the reason that you do not do these activities
nowadays?
Setting older
Children took over
Not profitable anymore
Other work got préférence
Sickness
Got married
Lack of inputs
No transport
Did not like thework
No demand for it
Other reasons:
10. Can you expect to receive a pension when you are old?
.... YES (go to 11) .... NO (go to 14)
11. From whom will you receive a pension?
.... National Provident Fund
.... Pension from mines
.... Pension from government schemes
.... Social welfare department
.... Pension from Company
.... Others, please specify:
12. Will you receive this pension monthly or just once?
MONTHLY ONCE
13. Do you think it will be enough to stay alive when you are
old?
....YES ....NO DO NOT KNOW
14. Do you have savings yourself?
....YES (go to 15) ....NO (go to 16)
15. Why do you save this money?
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IS. Does your husband or wife have savings? - -"*
....YES ....NO
17. Are you or your husband/wife saving for your old£age a*t the
moment or not?
. . . .YES NO
18. Do you yourself have cattle?
....YES (go to 19) ....NO (go to question 21a)
19. How many cattle do you have? ....
20. Why do you keep this cattle?
21. What will you do with your cattle when you are old?
2la. Did you have cattle in the past?
....YES (go to 21b) ....NO (go to section 3.3.)
21b. What did you do with this cattle?
GO TO SECTION 3.3.
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS NEED TO BE ANSWERED BY RESPONDENTS WHO
ARE IN OLD AGE
22. In genera! how do you stay alive now you are in old age?
.... By working
.... Selling my cattle
.... Living from pension
.... Children help me
.... Use my savings
.... Other persons besides children help me
.... Other answers:
23. Is this the homestead you used to live after you were
married?
.... YES, this is own homestead
.... NO, this is homestead of a son
.... NO, this is homestead of a daughter
.... NO, this is homestead of a son-in-law
.... NO, this is homestead of other relative
.... NO, we come from another place
24. Are there activities that you did when you were younger, but
not doing now anymore?
.... YES (go to 25) ....NO (go to 26)
25. What kind of activities did you do?
.... Agricultural activities:
.... Domestic activities:
.... Wage labour activities:
Other income generating activities:
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26. Why don't you do this activities anymore?
Getting older
Children took over
Not profitable anymore
Other work got préférence
Sickness
Got married
Lack of inputs
No transport
Did not like thework
No demand for it
Other reasons :
FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ONLY WHEM RESPONDENT HAS CHILDREN. OTHERWISE
GO TO QUESTION 29.
27. Do you think your children take enough care of you now you
are old?
. . . .YES (go to 29) NO (go to 28)
28. Why do you think so?
29. Do the neighboors, friends or other community members some-
times help you?
....YES (go to 30)
30. How do they help you?
NO (go to 31)
.... Give/send me money
.... Give me food
.... Give me a place on their homestead
.... Give me clothes
.... Bring me groceries
.... Do certain activities for me
.... Other help :
31. Do you receive a pension?
.... YES (go to 32) .... NO (go to 35)
32. From whom do you receive a pension?
.... National Provident Fund
.... Pension from mines
.... Pension from government schemes
.... Pension from Company
.... Social welfare department
.... Others, please specify:
33. How much is this pension and how many times do you receive
it?
Amount: Freguency:
34. Do you think it is enough to stay alive?
....YES ....NO
35. Do you have savings?
....YES (go to 36) ....NO (go to 38)
36. How much do you have as savings? Emalangeni
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37. Where do you use them for?
.... To buy food
.... To buy clothes
.... To pay médical treatments
.... To pay transport
.... To buy groceries
.... To cover other expenses:
.... Does not use them at the moment
38. Do you yourself have cattle?
.... YES (go to 39)
39. Why do you keep this cattle?
NO (go to 40)
Milk
Méat
Use them for ploughing
Use them for transport
Seil them when I need money
To pay lobola for children
Other reasons, please specify:
GO ON WITH QUESTION 42
40. Did you hâve cattle yourself in the past?
YES (go to 41) .... NO (go to 42)
41. What did you do with your cattle?
.... Gave them to my sons
.... Sold tem
.... Slaughter them in order to have food
.... Used them to pay lobola for children
.... Other:
42. Do you hâve goats yourself?
.... YES (go to 43)
43. How many goats do you hâve yourself?
44. Why do you keep this goats?
.... To hâve milk
.... Slaughter them to hâve food
.... Sometimes seil them
.... Présent for visitors
.... Other reasons:
NO (go to 45)
45. Do you meet any problems now you are old?
.... YES (go to 46) NO (go to 47)
46. What kind of problems?
47. Do you think children take care more or less of their par-
ents, than you did in the past or is it still the same?
.... MORE (go to 48)
.... LESS (go to 48)
.... SAME (go to 3.3)
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48. Why do you think so?
3.3. SICKNESS
1. Have you been ill during the last 12 months?
YES (go to 2) NO (go to 19)
2. For how long were you ill?
.... Less than one week
.... Between l and 4 weeks
.... More than one month, specify number:
4. Did you go anywhere for treatment?
.... YES (go to 5) NO (go to 11)
5. Where did you go?
.... Inyanga
.... Clinic
.... Hospital
6. Where was this?
Company doctor
Private doctor
Other:
.... Own Community
.... Other Community, specify:
.... Town, please specify:
.... Company, please specify:
.... Other place, please specify:
7. How did you arrive at the place of treatment?
Walking (go to 10)
.... By bus (go to 9)
.... By car (go to 8)
8. Who owns the car?
9. Who did pay the transport?
10. Who did pay for the treatment and the medicines?
11. When you were ill, were you still able to do your activities
on the homestead and on the fields?
YES (go to 16) NO (go to 12)
12. which activities couldn't you do during your sickness?
.... Agricultural activities:
.... Domestic activities:
.... Wage-labour activities:
.... Other income generating activities:
13. Were all these activities or some of them taken over by
other people?
YES (go to 14) NO (go to 16)
14. If yes, who did these activities for you?
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15. Did you have to pay these people for doing these activities?
YES .... NO
16. Were you also helped with other things, like food, money,
clothes, etc. during your sickness?
.... YES (go to 17) NO (go to 18)
17. Who did give and what did they give?
18. Where did you stay during your illness?
.... own homestead
.... parents homestead
.... homestead parents-in-law
.... homestead son / daughter
.... homestead brother / sister
.... other homestead
.... hospital
.... somewhere else, please specify:
GO TO QUESTION 27
19. If you were ill where would you go for treatment?
.... Inyanga
Clinic
.... Hospital
.... Company doctor
.... Other, please specify:
20. Can you teil me where this is in Swaziland?
.... Own community
.... Other community, specify:
.... Town, please specify:
.... Company:
21. How do you think you will arrive at the place of treatment?
.... Walking (go to 23)
.... By bus (go to 22)
.... By car (go to 22)
22. Who will pay the transport?
23. Who will pay for the treatment and the medicines?
24. When you would be ill are there any activities in or outside
the homestead or on the fields that cannot be taken over by
other people?
.... YES (go to 25) NO (go to 26)
25. Can you please specify these activities?
26. Who do you think will normally help you when you are sick?
27. In général, do you go to anyone who is sick in this com-
munity or do you only give help to particular people when they
are sick or don't you give help at all?
.... Other answers:
.... No help given to no one (go to 29)
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28. What kind of help would you normally give?
29. Did you help other people in the past twelve months, when
they were ill?
.... YES (go to 29) .... NO (go to 31)
30. Who did you help?
31. Does the person you helped live in this Community or not?
.... YES .... NO
32. What kind of help did you give?
3.4. DEATH OF HOMESTEAD MEMBERS AND/OR RELATIVES
1. Did someone pass away on this homestead during the last 12
month?
.... YES (go to 2) .... NO (go to 11)
2. How was the person related to the respondent?
3. What kind of activities did the deceased do bef ore he/she
died?
4. Has anyone taken over these activities from the deceased:
.... YES, all of them (go to 5)
.... YES, partly (go to 5)
.... NO (go to 6)
5. Can you teil me who has taken over what activities:
6. The activities that are not done anymore, does this mean a
loss of production or income for the homestead?
.... YES (go to 7) NO (go to 8)
7. Is the homestead compensated in one way or another for this
loss of income or production?
.... YES, specify:
.... NO
8. Who paid for the funeral expenses?
9. Did you get help from other people outside this homestead
during the funeral period?
YES (go to 10) .... NO (go to 11)
10. How were these people related to this homestead and how did
they help?
11. Did you give help to homesteads, where a relative or a com-
munity member died in the last 12 months?
.... YES (go to 12) .... NO (go to 16)
12. How was the deceased related to you?
13. What kind of help did you give?
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14. Are you still giving help to this homestead?- ">** ^ 'f\ *""
.... YES (go to 15) N0-(gô fcO,'î4ï; j ^ u\' "
15. In what form? •. ^ ««,
16. Do you attend every funeral in this Community? •• * * - -^ ; f,, ;-
YES (go to 20) NO (go to Î7J." „*V • !' '
17. Why not? "- *•- fr •*
> ^v ',
20. Do you give more help at funerals of relatives'-'tftaiix aé
funerals of Community members or other people or is it thö-/satBS?.
....Relatives more (go to 21) ....Same help (go tO,'22>'
21. Why do you help relatives more than other Community
22. Are you member of a funeral organization?
.... YES (go to 23) .... NO (go to 24)
23. What kind of help can you expect from this funeral
ization?
24. Is respondent a widow or widower?
.... YES (go to 25) .... NO (goto 3.5,) ,
25. What did your husband or wife do bef ore he/she died? s ' " • :'
26. Did you start other activities in addition to what you did,
before your husband/wife died? '"
.... YES (go to 27) NO (go to 28)
27. What kind of activities did you start?
28. Did you stop with certain activities af ter your husband/wife
died?
.... YES (go to 29) ____ NO (go to 30) ~ s„
29. With what activities did you stop? |j
i-
30. Did your husband have brothers who were still alive?
.... YES (go to 31) .... NO (go to 34)
31. Were they helping you since your husband died?
.... YES (go to 32) .... NO (go to 33)
32. With what did they help you?
423
GO TO QUESTION 34
33. Why do you think they do not support you?
34. Were you supported by other people outside this homestead
after your husband died?
YES (go to 35) NO (go to 37)
35. Who did help you?
36. How did they help you?
37. Do you meet any problème by being a widow?
YES (go to 38) NO (go to 39)
38. Can you explain what kind of problems you meet?
39. Do you think people treating you differently than when you
were not a widow?
.... YES (go to 40) .... NO (go to 41)
40. Why do you think so?
41. Do you think your husbands' family take enough care of you?
.... YES (go to 43) .... NO (go to 42)
42. Why do you think so?
43. Are the properties of the homestead still with you?
YES (go to section 3.5.) .... NO (go to 44)
44. What happened with this properties?
3.5. MEMBERSHIP OF COMMtJNITY ORGANISATIONS
1. Are you metnber of a church?
.... YES (go to 2) NO (go to 15)
2. What kind of church is this?
Zionist
Evangelistic
Catholic
Lutheran
Saven adventist
.... Anglican
Franson Christian
.... Other
3. Do you have to pay contribution?
.... YES (go to 4) NO (go to 5)
4. How much per month
5. Can you borrow money from church members?
.... YES .... NO (go to 8)
424
6. Did you borrow money from them last or this year?
.... YES NO (go to 8)
7. Por what purpose did you borrow money?
8. Does the church give donations to its members?
.... YES (go to 9) NO (go to 11)
9. Did you receive a donation last or this year?
YES (go to 10) .... NO (go to 11)
10. Where did you use the money for?
11. Did you receive any other help from them last or this year?
.... YES (go to 12) .... NO (go to 13)
12. What kind of help did you receive?
13. Are you member of a savings organization?
.... YES (go to 14) .... NO (go to 19)
14. How much do you have to contribute each month? E
15. How many members does it have?
16. Where do you use the money for?
17. Do the members help each other also with other things or at
other occassions?
.... YES (go to 18) .... NO (go to 19)
18. With what kind of help or at which occassion?
19. Did you receive any other help from the members last or this
year?
.... YES (go to 20) .... NO (go to 21)
20. If yes, what kind of help did you receive?
21. Are you involved in any other organization and/or committee
in or outside this Community?
YES (go to 22)
22. Please specify:
NO (go to section
23. Can you expect help f rom the other members when you are in
need?
.... YES (go to 24) .... NO (go to section 3.6.)
24. What kind of help can they give?
3.6. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HOUSEHOLDS ON SAME HOMESTEAD
Only to be answered if two or more kitchens on homestead. If no
go to section 3.7.
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1. Does each household have its own fields?
YES .... NO
2. Do the members of the households eat together?
YES • • • • NO
3. Does each household have its own maize storage?
YES NO '9° to 6 '
4. Do you sometimes borrow money from members of the other
household?
YES (go to 5) NO (go to 6)
5. Por what purposes?
6. Do members of one household help members of the other in case
of
.... Sickness
.... Funeral
.... Food shortage
.... Paying expensive items
.... Agricultural activities
.... Other things they do together:
3.7. LABOOR SHORTAGE
1. Did this homestead have enough people to do all the necessary
agricultural and on homestead activities last or this year?
.... YES .... NO
2. Did this homestead hire people for money last or this year?
.... YES (go to 3) .... NO (go to 6)
3. For what kind of activities did this homestead hire them?
4. Where did this homestead get the money from to pay them?
5. How were the workers who came related to you?
6. Did you practice lilima last or this year?
.... YES (go to 7) NO (go to 9)
7. For what sort of activities?
8. What did you give the people who came?
9. Does this homestead have a permanent or temporary worker?
.... YES .... NO
10 id you yourself go out to do lilima for somebody else last
or this year?
.... YES (go to 11) .... NO (go to 12)
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11. How were these people related to you?
GO TO QUESTION 14
12. If people corne to you to ask you for lilima/ would you ge»?
YES (go to 14) NO ( go to 13)
13. Why wouldn't you go?
•iïTj *
14. Did you go out to work for someone else for money last or
this year?
.... YES (go to 15) .... NO (go to 17)
15. How were these people related to you?
16. What kind of activity were you paid for?
GO TO QUESTION 19 « *,*»-& X
^^  ^%
17. If someone would come to ask you to work for money would you
go? ~*
.... YES (go to 19)
18. Why wouldn't you go?
NO (go to 18)
19. Did you go out to work at the chiefs' place last or this
year?
.... YES (go to 21)
20. Why didn't you go?
NO (go to 20)
21. Can you expect help from the chiefs' place when you are in
need?
3.8. FOOD SHORTAGE
1. How much maize did this homestead produce last year and this
year and was the maize production on this homestead sufficient
to feed the family?
last year: .... bags
.... Sufficient .... Not sufficient
this year: .... bags
.... Sufficient .... Not sufficient
(if both sufficient, go to 5, otherwise go to 2) .
2. What were the reasons for the shortages?
3. How did this homestead solve the problem of shortage of
maize7
(If bought go to 4, otherwise go to 5)
4. Where did you take the money from to buy it?
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5. If you had a food shortage what would you do?
.... Buy food (go to 7}
.... Ask food from relatives (go to 7)
.... Ask food from neigbours (go to 7)
Nothing (go to 6)
.... Ask other community members (go to 7)
6. Why won't you do nothing?
7. Did you go out yourself to ask for food this or last year?
YES (go to 8) NO (go to il)
8. To whom did you go?
9 When someone cornes to ask for food on this homestead do you
give to anyone who cornes or only to particular persons?
10. Why do you only give to particular persons?
THE FOLLOWING QUESTION ONLY NEED TE BE ANSWERED BY PERSONS WHO
SOLD MAIZE LAST OR THIS YEAR. OTHERWISE GO TO SECTION 3.9.
11. Hâve you always sold maize in the past?
YES .... NO
12. What does this homestead do when there would be no raaize to
seil?
13 If you hâve harvested your maize do you put aside enough
maize to feed you and thé members of this homestead first or do
you seil all the maize?
.... Own food first, then selling
.... All is sold
.... Other options :
3.9. QUESTIONS OH WEALTH ON HOMESTEAD
1. How many fields does this/each household hâve and how much
time did it take to plough them?
Household 1:
Household 2 :
Household 3 :
Household 4 :
2. How much time did it take to plough all the fields of this
homestead?
3. Does this homestead own a tractor?
.... YES (go to 7) NO (go to 3)
4. Did this homestead hire or borrow a tractor last year?
YES, hire / borrow (go to 5) ....NO (go to 9)
5. From whom did you hire or borrow?
6. How much did you hâve to pay for this?
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7 . Did you hire out your tractor?
.... YES (go to 8) .... NO (go to
8 . How much did you earn with this last year?
9. Does this homestead hâve a plough?
.... YES, oxen / tractor ..
10 . Does this homestead hire oxen?
.... YES (go to 11)
11. How much did you pay last year?
12 . Does this homestead buy f ertilizer?
.... YES (go to 13)
13 . How much did you pay last year?
14 . Does this homestead buy maize seeds?
.... YES (go to 15)
15. How much did you pay last year?
16 . Does this homestead buy pesticides?
.... YES (go to 17)
17. How much did you pay last year?
18. How many cattle does this homestead hâve?
.... of which .... sisad and of which .
19. How many goats does this homestead hâve?
NO
NO (go to 12)
NO Cgo to 14)
NO (go to 16)
NO (go to 18)
sisad away
20. Did you borrow or anyone else borrow money last or this
year?
.... YES (go to 21)
21. From whom did you borrow?
....Bank ....Relatives
NO (go to 22)
.... Company ....Other
22. Does anyone on this homestead go to the RDA centre for one
or more of the following things?
.... Seeds
.... Fertilizer
.... Pesticides
.... Construction material
.... To ask for information
.... Fencing materials
.... Agricultural equipment
Crédit
.... Other things:
23 Did an extension officer visit this homestead last or this
year?
.... YES .... NO
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A few last personal questions to the respondent:
If respondent is male:
* Please, can you teil us if you are the eldest son or not and
if not which number you are?
* Did you pay the füll lobola for your wife?
* In what form did you pay this?
* If you did not pay will you pay or not? (Why not)
If respondent is female:
* Is lobola paid for you?
* If not, will it be paid for you?
Please observe the houses (not kitchens and stores) on this
homestead and write down your observation:
Material combination
* Walls: wood + stone
Roof : grass
* Walls: wood + stone
Roof : corrugated iron
* Walls: bricks
Roof: corrugated iron
* Walls: wood (+ grass)
Roof: grass
* Walls: concrete
Roof : corrugated iron
No. of houses
PLACK FOR ANY FURTHER REMARKS WITH RESPECT TO THIS INTERVIEW:
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NAME INDEX
Agarwal, B 36,83-4,146,149,263
Ahmad, E. 4
Allen, C.J., 149,166-7
Armstrong, A. and M. Russell 258
Asmellash, T. 144,306
Barnes, J.A. 87
Benda-Beckmann, F. von 4,14-5,17,18
Benda-Beckmann, F. and K. von 16-7
Booth, A.R. 106-7
Bessert, A. 98,218,222
Bunu 106
Burgess, R. and N. Stern 100
Chayanov, A.V. 125
Cornia, G.A. 2
Crush, J. 258-9
Dalton, G. 67-8,97-8
Drèze, J. and A.K. Sen 32-4,38,43
Duin, M. van der 117-8
Dütting, G. 161-2
Ellis.F. 38-40
Portes, M. 70,73-4,125
Freiburg-Strauss, J. and D. Jung 40,70-
1,73-5,77,82,83
Gasper, D. 35-6,53
Gmindza, T. 145-6
Godelier, M. 51
Goody, J. 70
Guma, X.P. and V.R. Simelane 261
Halperin, R.H. 45,47
Harrod, R. and E. Domar l
Hirtz, F. 5,10-13,93
Hughes, A.J.B. 104,119,166-7,222,224-
5,254,260,262
Kappers, S.P. 225-9,235-6
Kasenene, P. 169-170,222,234
Kaufmann, F.X. 87,321
Keynes, J.M. l
Knippenburg, R. and M. Lopriore 296-7
Kuper, H. 27,121,124,131,153,166-8,
174-5,222,234,240,259
Kuznets, S. 2
Laeyendekker, L. 50
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING
(Summary in Dutch)
Studies over sociale zekerheid in ontwikkelingslanden beperken zich
meestal tot het beschrijven en analyseren van 'formele' sociale zekerheids-
instellingen, d.w.z. die instituties en instellingen die sociale zekerheid
verschaffen in de formele sector, zoals overheden en bedrijven. De meeste
van deze studies komen tot de weinig verrassende conclusie dat in ontwik-
kelingslanden sociale zekerheidsvoorzieningen beperkt zijn, zowel wat
betreft de hoeveelheid voorzieningen alsmede het aantal mensen dat
daarmee bereikt wordt. Gebrek aan (financiële) middelen en problemen
met administratie en beheer bij de sociale zekerheidsinstellingen liggen
vaak ten grondslag aan deze situatie.
Pratijkstudies hebben uitgewezen dat het merendeel van met name
de plattelandsbevolking in ontwikkelingslanden afhankelijk is van zoge-
noemde 'informele' sociale zekerheidsinstellingen. Voornaamste kenmer-
ken van deze instellingen zijn dat ze functioneren in kleinschalige sociale
and economische netwerken, alleen middelen gebruiken die binnen deze
netwerken circuleren, en niet of nauwelijks te onderscheiden zijn van de
'gewone' sociale en economische organisatie. Grootfamilies, sociale
netwerken en traditionele machtscentra (dorpshoofden, 'chiefs', clanhoof-
den, etc.) vormen de belangrijkste onderdelen van dit 'informele' sociale
zekerheidsstelsel. Deze studie is een analyse van de werking en dynamiek
van deze 'informele' instellingen, die in deze studie verder worden
aangeduid als sociale zekerheidsmechanismen ('social security mecha-
nisms'). Swaziland fungeert daarbij als case-study. De gegevens zijn in
1990 verzameld middels literatuurstudie, een diepte-studie van enige
maanden in een rurale gemeenschap, en een sample survey onder 195
homesteads en 295 respondenten in drie verschillende gemeenschappen.
Hoofdstuk 2 begint met een korte discussie over het concept 'sociale
zekerheid'. Veelal wordt sociale zekerheid gedefinieerd volgens richtlijnen
van de International Labour Office (ILO), d.w.z. dat sociale zekerheid
bestaat uit door de staat wettelijk geregelde voorzieningen die de individu
moeten beschermen tegen de nadelige financiële gevolgen van het lopen
van bepaalde, welomschreven sociale risico's (werkloosheid, langdurige
ziekte, overlijden kostwinners, ouderdom, etc.). Met deze definitie kunnen
we moeilijk uit de voeten wanneer we kijken naar ontwikkelingslanden,
waar men niet alleen met een ander risicopatroon te maken heeft, maar
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ook met een andere sociaal-economische en culturele organisatie. Met
name vanuit de rechtsantropologie komt daarom de suggestie sociale
zekerheid als concept in een meer functionele context te plaatsen en te
gebruiken als term die kan verwijzen naar zowel ideologie, beleid, institu-
ties en relaties, als ook de sociale praktijk. Het uitgangspunt van analyse
is niet het bestuderen van a priori bepaalde instituties in geval van
bepaalde sociale risico's, maar het bestuderen van hoe sociale risico's
worden gedekt in bepaalde samenlevingen. Welke die risico's zijn zal per
samenving verschillen, zodat een grote variëteit aan instituties, beleid en
sociale praktijk kan worden gevonden, zelfs binnen één samenleving.
Deze bredere invulling van het concept sociale zekerheid wordt ook in
deze studie gehanteerd. Drie vragen staan centraal in deze studie:
1. welke sociale zekerheidsmechanismen bestaan er in ruraal Swazi-
land en hoe werken deze mechanismen?
2. wat is de dynamiek van deze mechanismen; hoe beïnvloeden
sociale en economische veranderingen in de rurale samenleving de
werking van de sociale zekerheidsmechanismen?
3. welke theoretisch aanknopingspunten zijn er binnen de sociale en
economische wetenschappen om op zinvolle wijze informele sociale
zekerheidsmechanismen in ontwikkelingslanden te bestuderen en
hoe kunnen die behulpzaam zijn om bovenstaande twee vragen te
gestructureerd te beantwoorden?
Het is vanzelfsprekend dat vraag 3 eerst dient te worden beantwoord
alvorens concrete gegevens uit Swaziland geanalyseerd en geïnterpreteerd
kunnen worden. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt daarom eerst ingegaan op de
functie en plaats van sociale zekerheidsmechanismen in de samenleving.
Hiertoe maken we gebruik van een multi-disciplinaire benadering waarbij
inzichten worden gebruikt uit Sen's 'entitlement approach', Polanyi's
theorie over ruilmechanismen in samenlevingen, en de 'articulatietheorie'
uit de marxistische economische antropologie. Er wordt aangegeven dat
sociale zekerheidsmechanismen een drietal functies hebben: het laten
circuleren van middelen die gebruikt dienen te worden voor sociale
zekerheidsdoeleinden; het regelen van bijdragen aan en aanspraken op
die middelen en het naleven van die regelingen; en het eventueel helpen
van individuen bij het omzetten van middelen in de vervulling van levens-
behoeften. Het doel is de bescherming ('protection') dan wel versteviging
('promotion') van de individuele levensstandaard. Sociale zekerheidsme-
chanismen zijn op velerlei manieren geïntegreerd in de rest van de
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samenleving en in hoofdstuk 3 wordt ook een globaal overzicht gegeven,
hoe factoren en ontwikkelingen binnen de samenleving invloed kunnen
hebben op de werking en dynamiek van sociale zekerheidsmechanismen.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt dan meer specifiek ingegaan op een theoreti-
sche beschouwing van afzonderlijke sociale zekerheidsmechanismen die
een belangrijke rol spelen in ontwikkelingslanden. De nadruk ligt op de
informele sociale zekerheidsmechanismen zoals de (groot)familie, ver-
wantschapsverbanden, buurtschappen, verscheidene sociale en economi-
sche verenigingen, en herverdelingscentra.
Na een korte introductie tot Swaziland in hoofdstuk 5 wordt het analyti-
sche raamwerk uit de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 gebruikt om de werking en
dynamiek van sociale zekerheidsmechanismen in ruraal Swaziland te
analyseren. In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een uitgebreide analyse gegeven van de
capaciteit van de rurale homestead als verschaffer van sociale zekerheid.
Daarbij worden diverse criteria gehanteerd: de omvang en samenstelling
van de homestead, de 'duurzaamheid' van de homestead als sociale groep,
de heersende normen, waarden en wetten m.b.t. herverdeling van midde-
len, en de economische positie. De belangrijkste conclusie van deze
analyse is dat de rurale homestead nog steeds goed in staat is sociale
zekerheid te verschaffen aan de homestead leden. Daarbij zijn wel
verschillen te constateren tussen homesteads: relatief 'jonge' homesteads
zijn mulder goede 'solidariteitsgroepen' dan 'oudere' homesteads; zoge-
noemde 'female-headed' homesteads zijn slechter af dan 'male-headed'
homesteads; armere homesteads functioneren minder goed als sociale
zekerheidsmechanisme dan rijkere homesteads; homesteads met een
ongelijke verdeling van middelen tussen man en vrouw ten gunste van de
man, zijn slechter af dan homesteads met een meer gelijke verdeling; en
homesteads met labiele interne sociale relaties tussen de leden (bijvoor-
beeld t.g.v. onduidelijkheid over verwantschaps- en/of huwelijksrelaties)
zijn minder geschikt dan homesteads met stabiele interne relaties. Ver-
schillende sociaal-economische veranderingsprocessen beïnvloeden daarbij
de rol van de homestead als solidariteitsgroep: arbeidsmigratie van jonge
mannen naar Zuid-Afrika, de ontwikkeling van de markteconomie, de
monetarisering van de lokale economie, de opkomst van het Christendom
en de daaruit voortkomende tendensen van individualisering en differenti-
atie. Ondanks dit alles mag evenwel niet geconcludeerd worden dat de rol
van de homestead als sociale zekerheidsmechanisme is uitgespeeld.
Integendeel, voor de meeste rurale Swazi is de homestead nog steeds de
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belangrijkste bron van sociale zekerheid.
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt gekeken naar de rol van verwantschapsver-
banden binnen de voorziening van sociale zekerheid. Er zijn sterke
aanwijzingen, op basis van data en observaties, dat de rol van het ver-
wantschapssysteem als sociale zekerheidsmechanisme teruggedrongen is.
Alleen met nauwe verwanten (broers, zussen, ouders, ooms en tantes)
worden de verwantschapsrelaties ook uitgedrukt in economische relaties.
Naast de omvang, lijkt ook de intensiteit van de economische relaties
voortvloeiende uit verwantschap minder. Zelfs met de naaste verwanten
zijn de ruilrelaties veelal eerder incidenteel dan regelmatig. Ook dit lijkt
een indicatie voor de afnemende rol van het verwantschapssysteem als
sociaal zekerheidsmechanisme. Twee oorzaken kunnen worden gevonden
voor deze ontwikkeling. De eerste verklaring is dat door de introductie
van de markteconomie en van loonarbeid, en de opkomst tijdens de
koloniale periode van een staat die naast nieuwe wetten ook ging voor-
zien ui gezondheidszorg en voedsel in tijden van nood, mensen minder
afhankelijk werden van familie en verwanten voor hun materiële behoef-
ten. De tweede verklaring is de opkomst van Christendom, die de ideolo-
gie die ten grondslag ligt aan de 'verwantschappelijke economie' verander-
de. De vooroudercultuur met haar traditionele magische sancties op het
overtreden van sociale normen en regels werd ter discussie gesteld, en
mensen werden intellectueel onafhankelijker van diegenen die de ideolo-
gische ideeën vertegenwoordigen, te weten de ouderen. Deze twee
ontwikkelingen hebben ertoe geleid dat de verwantschapsstructuur losser
is geworden en daarmee ook de naleving van de sociale rechten en
plichten die mensen binnen het verwantschapssysteem hebben.
In hoofdstuk 8 worden andere belangrijke sociale zekerheidsme-
chanismen, die functioneren naast de homestead en verwantengroep,
geanalyseerd. Belangrijk kenmerk van deze sociale zekerheidsmechanis-
men is dat ze veel meer gericht zijn op het dekken van een bepaald risico.
Het landverdelingsysteem (op chiefdom niveau) en de praktijk van lilima
(werkverbanden) zijn erop gericht economische beperkingen als het tekort
aan land en arbeid weg te halen. Begrafenisverenigingen, opererend op
gemeenschapsniveau, zijn erop gericht de eerste gevolgen op te vangen
voor diegene van wie een familielid is overleden; buren zijn er in tijden
van tijdelijke voedseltekorten op homestead niveau en voor hulp in geval
van bouwwerkzaamheden. Meer recente vormen van sociale zekerheid
zijn ook te vinden, die als antwoord dienen op de nieuwe realiteit die de
markteconomie en veranderende sociale relaties met zich meebrengen. In
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hoofdstuk 8 worden spaar- en kredietgroepen beschreven, begrafenisver-
enigingen 'nieuwe stijl', de rol van kerken, en ontwikkelingsprojecten.
Deze vormen van sociale en economische organisatie zijn alle van meer
recente datum en vormen vaak de basis voor het ontstaan van nieuwe
sociale zekerheidsmechanismen. De uitwisseling van middelen voor
sociale zekerheidsdoeleinden zijn in deze gevallen vaak een afgeleide van
de nieuwe sociale en economische relaties die mensen aangaan binnen
deze instituties. Deze uitwisseling kan echter niet meer worden gelegiti-
meerd door te verwijzen naar verwantschapsbanden en de verplichtingen
die daaruit voortvloeien. Nieuwe normen en waarden moeten gecreëerd
worden. Religie kan de basis zijn voor die nieuwe normen en waarden,
zeker wanneer zij de nadruk legt op gelijkheid tussen mensen en onder-
linge solidariteit. Een goed voorbeeld hiervan zijn de Zionistische bewe-
gingen die in geheel Zuidelijk Afrika gevonden worden.
Dat er uit deze meer recente instituties en organisaties nieuwe
sociale zekerheidsmechanismen zullen ontstaan die ook soepel zullen
functioneren is evenwel minder voor de hand liggend dan voor sociale
zekerheidsmechanismen die gebaseerd zijn op verwantschap. In de eerste
plaats bepalen mensen zelf of ze willen participeren in nieuwe groepen
zoals kerken, spaargroepen, gemeenschapstuinen, etc. Ten tweede, de
groepsleden moeten gezamenlijk eerst overeenkomen of ze hun groep wel
of niet gebruiken als basis voor acties op sociaal zekerheidsgebied. Ten
derde, als dit antwoord positief is, dan moeten ze beslissen in welke
gevallen ze sociale zekerheid bieden, hoe ze dat zullen doen, en wat de
rechten en plichten van de leden zijn. Samenvattend, er is meer wil en
betrokkenheid nodig om de nieuwe 'informele' sociale zekerheidsmecha-
nismen succesvol te laten werken - meer dan met mechanismen die geba-
seerd zijn op verwantschap, waarbinnen rechten en plichten, en wanneer
en hoe te handelen al vast liggen vanaf het moment dat men geboren is.
Wat de toekomstige rol van zowel de oudere als de meer recente 'infor-
mele' sociale zekerheidsmechanismen zal zijn in de rurale samenleving in
Swaziland is moeilijk te voorspellen. In hoofdstuk 9, en op diverse plaat-
sen in de hoofdstukken 6 tot en met 8, laten we zien dat de diverse
mechanismen een kleinere dan wel grotere rol spelen in iemands leven al
naar gelang leeftijd, sexe, huwelijkse staat, en sociale en economische
positie. Ook het sociaal risico dat moet worden gedekt bepaalt in veel
gevallen welk sociale zekerheidsmechanisme wel en welk niet gebruikt
wordt. Ook dit wordt in hoofdstuk 9 getoond voor drie verschillende
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sociale risico's: ouderdom, ziekte, en het overlijden van een familielid.
Veel zal in de nabije toekomst ook afhangen van de rol van de Swazi
overheid op het gebied van sociale zekerheidsvraagstukken. Hiermee
duiden we niet alleen op de initiatieven die de overheid zelf neemt op dit
gebied (zoals kort beschreven in hoofdstuk 5), maar ook de houding van
de overheid tegenover nieuwe initiatieven vanuit de Swazi bevolking zelf.
Hierover kunnen nog geen algemeen geldige uitspraken worden gedaan.
Wat zeker is, is dat de sociale zekerheidsmechanismen in ruraal Swazi-
land aan het veranderen zijn, en, indien mogelijk, zich proberen aan te
passen aan nieuwe omstandigheden en realiteiten. De uitkomst van dit
proces is onduidelijk. Wat deze studie in ieder geval wel heeft aangetoond
is dat 'informele' sociale zekerheidsmechanismen nog steeds een belang-
rijke rol spelen in het dagelijks leven van de Swazi op het platteland. Ze
vormen een belangrijke basis voor het bereiken van een zekere minimum
levensstandaard, ook al ligt deze meestal op het niveau van 'net kunnen
overleven' en veelal niet op het niveau van wat sociaal wenselijk zou zijn.
Zonder de informele sociale zekerheidsmechanismen zouden evenwel
velen 'net niet' kunnen overleven; het wel of niet bestaan en kunnen
functioneren van de informele sociale zekerheidsmechanismen betekent
voor veel mensen in Swaziland, en in andere ontwikkelingslanden, de
grens tussen (over)leven en de (honger)dood.
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